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In many ways the Hellenistic: perký has been the poor - relation. as far as 
military studies have been'concemed. Even quite comprehensive works on 
ancient warfare deal with this period in a relatively cursory manner, scholars 
concentrating on hoplite warfare or Roman military systems to the detriment 
--------of -the* Hellenistic- -period. - To make- matters worse, a historiographical 
tradition exists which places the generals and armies of the period firmly in 
the shadow of Alexander the Great. Hellenistic warfare has therefore been 
seen as unimaginative and stereotypical, dominated by armies which used 
cumbersome and outmoded tactics, and which were led by generals 
outstanding only in their mediocrity. 
This thesis is an attempt to redress the balance. I have sought to form a 
detailed picture of the Hellenistic military machine from the ancient sources 
and to test modem theories about its operation. The format of the thesis 
reflects these objectives. As my research progressed it soon became apparent 
that Hellenistic armies were not the cumbersome devices portrayed in many 
modem works and that they were composed of a series of interlocking 
tactical systems that could be viewed on a series of levels, the highest being 
the army itself. Hellenistic armies functioned as an all-anns combat force. 
Within each formation and category of troop-type,, however, a series of 
organisational levels existed to enhance' operational flexibility and 
effectiveness. I therefore decided that this complex system was best viewed 
combat arm by combat arm - phalanx, peltasts, p! iiloiand cavalry (the 
V 
., as ý,, ' in t, reg diVisions used bý the ancient tacticatwrit6rs)ý7, ý, 
isjCW' hiý-" 4ýardAhat'. 1: 
each was most distinct from the'othe-r5.,, Within eac "chýpterl hive'&cu'.;; ied 
t the origins, equipment, orgafiisationdnd't6ctics'ýo eac tro th, a 
concluding section that links each-into the overallýstiiicture` 6 th6"miI ry 
system. Finaffy, I have drawn the discussion tojether, in a discussion of the 
military system as a whole in a concluding chapter. 
I have - concentrated on the - strategic -and-tactical'- operations- -of the- 
armies of the period because it is in action that military systems prove their 
worth. I have also attempted to show how the military system invented by 
Mlip II, and used until the final defeat of Macedon by Rome at Pydna, was 
an effective socio-econornic, reaction to the military needs of the states of 
the period. It allowed the Hellenistic state to enlist large numbers of men 
into its army without the limitation of relying on a small section of society, 
as did, for example, the Classical Greek city-state. 
Many people have given me the benefit of their knowledge and advice 
on various aspects of this thesis, and it would not be possible to mention 
them all. However, I would like to thank in particular my supervisor John 
Lazenby for his support, many helpful suggestions, criticisms of my 
arguments and for proof reading the final text, Dr. Jon Coulston for many 
hours of informed discussion on ancient military history and for also proof 
reading the text, and to Peter Callaghan for advice regarding the art 
evidence of the period. I am grateful to the library staffs of the Universities 
of Newcastle and Leeds, and of the Hellenic Society for much assistance in 
tracing elusive books and articles. Finally I would like to thank Hartley 
vi 
th6. fi P, aft*erson 'ifid., Nich, olas, ý Slopelf&,, ý,. ifie'iný'We! D ýit,: Onvotiligi. 1 
hiid opy, 
Colchester 1992. 
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Chapter, I- The, Saoý& Phalanx (1) 
A) In 1L1ction 
Throughout the- history of ancient Greece the most, important c6m nint PO 
of an army was its heavy infantry, soldiers who fought'shoulder-to-shoulder 
in a dense formation called a phalanx (2). In this chapter we will examine the 
differences between the phalanxes used by the armies of the Classical and 
Hellenistic periods. It will be shown that there were fundamental differences 
between the heavy infantry of the two periods, in style of fighting, equipment 
and sources of recruitment. 
References to the phalanx can be found in Homer as much as in 
Polybios. Indeed so common was this style of fighting to the ancients that 
Polybios found it fit to quote the Iliad as Mustration of the manner in which 
the phalanx of the third century fought, 
"Shield was pressed close against shield. each man standing shoulder to 
shoulder; 
Over their glittering helmets the horse-hair plumes touched as they nodded, 
So tightly packed were the ranks... " (3). 
Homer refers to warfare at least rive hundred years before the time of 
Polybios. Despite this, the later historian feels no reluctance to use this 
archaic passage in a third century context. 
The quote from Homer also has many points of similarity with Classical 
phalanx warfare. Thucydides tells us in detail about the events of the battle 
of Diliuifi, ý fou6t in 424-B. C. " 
... for now the Boe6tians, after Pag6iidai 
als6 huiii6'dlý,. 4ddr6: ised, th6m; ý, 
sang the, p7em and began to', move forwaid-, d6wn', the'hill.,, ý, --Th&,. Atnemans 
advanced against them and the armies met'at'46 run. No COntact'wai made 
between the extreme wings of either army, since both alike were held up by 
water courses in the way. But everywhere else the fighting was stubborn with 
sl-ýielcl pressed against shield, " (4). 
We can see from these three extracts that the ancients believed the 
phalanx held certain common characteristics that set it aside from other 
infantry. Broadly speaking the ancients believed a phalanx was a body of 
infantry drawn up shoulder-to- shoulder, who fought with hand-to-hand 
W eapons and who would decide the outcomeof a set-piece action (5). This 
ancient definition of the infantry phalanx is not, however, enough for our 
'purposes. We need to identify the tactical differences between the phalanx of 
the Classical and the Hellenistic period. As the most obvious difference 
between the two is one of equipment we shall call the former the hoplite 
phalanx, the latter the mdm phalanx. 
Phalanx tactics were the basis of of Greek warfare from the seventh 
century onwards. Despite innovations in other fields, for example the 
development of light infantry and cavalry, the phalanx remained the arm of 
decision in war. In order to win a conventional war a state had to have an 
effective phalanx, all other anus being supplementary to this key fighting 
force. The details of the phalanx evolved as time went on and, as a result, so 
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did I its relationshiO* to'the oth I ei I -Oarts- of the, army. ýVe'sh4ll`see tliat'ClassicAl p 
hoplites were the main strikin'g force of the armies of their-day, 'w eiias the 
Hellenis I tic phalanx provided a basefrom which other types of , soldier could 
operate. One of the reasons for this shift in emphasis was, on the one hand, a 
change in weaponry and, on the other, change in the social group from which 
the infantry were drawn. 
The phalanx of the Classical period was composed of soldiers equipped 
with an eight foot (2.4 M) thrusting spear, large shield and a short sword; 
they wore varying amounts of armour and were in generall drawn from a 
quite wealthy peasant farmer class. The Hellenistic phalanx was, on the other 
hand, equipped with a small shield and a long spear; they wore little body 
armour and were generally drawn from the lower strata of society. As these 
broad differences effect our analysis of the mdm phalanx, we must first 
examine the hoplites of the Classical world. 
B) The Hoplite Phalanx 
a) Tntroductio 
The hoplite dominated the battlefields of the Classical world. Originating 
sometime in the seventh century this troop type came to be the most effective 
heavy infantryman in the Mediterranean area. By the close of the Classical 
period hoplites could be found in the armies of such divergent powers as 
Etruria and the Persian Empire. The hoplite and his style of fighting arose 
from a complex socio-economic system and the tactics he employed on the 
3 
tifii baitlefidd '-ý'altlf6bkh"effictive'ý'f6r'the-' ere-hinit 
(6). 
b) pmeit 
The cquipmentl carried by the individual hoplite-, IargelY delined the 
tactical limits of the Classical phalanx. Despite an argument by some 
commentators that armour was abandoned, the basic equipment and tactics of 
the hoplite phalanx remained constant throughout the period. 
The most important piece of equipment was a large body- shield, the 
hoplon from which the hoplite possibly derived his name, though the usual 
Greek word for the shield was aspis The shield was approximately three feet 
in diameter and weighed almost seven pounds. It was strapped to the 
soldier's forearm by an poipar and it was controlled by a handle at the rim, 
the w&7, ahe. The weight of the shield was considered oppressive and in flight 
the shield was the first item of equipment to be discarded. As a result the 
loss of the shield in battle was regarded as a mirk of cowardice. Hence the 
Spartan mother's instructions to her son to leave the battlefield with his 
shield or on it. On occasion the shield was discarded to allow other military 
tasks to be performed. Obviously the uo& was an unwieldy and sometimes 
unwelcome piece of the hoplite's equipment (7). 
The tactics of the phalanx were largely dictated by the vpix Although 
the aspis was a large shield the peculiar manner in which it was carried 
allowed it to cover only the left half of the soldier's body. This prompted the 
need for the hoplites to stand in a phalanx in order to receive full protection 
4 
and also caused a teiiden6y, f6r-'eith-'iiiiii-, t6"shýffle'to"th6, not, ýi&6idýi. 'ýto',, 
f -shi6 squeeze ever moW proitecfioný, rom', hisýýfieighb6iir's'll Id. two,, ý serious. 
Z, -- 7e, k 
tactical sideeffects resulted from'this'. pe-'cu'liýiiýY,.. 'bt the -,, 'phd afixi-Fltsily, ýihý, ' 
h AeWflia phalanx as a whole would tend to 'drift'- to tSe, 'ripýt,, makinwt e, 
vulnerable to envelopment. This is best illustrated by, Thuýyaides! account of 
Mantinea, 418 B. C. Secondly, individuals would lose the mutual protection 
afforded- by -the- phalanx should it be-* caused to- break-up and disruption of the 
phalanx's formation became a major aim of the generals of the period. 
Furthermore, as the Classical period progressed the strategic pressures of 
warfare forced hoplites to operate in situations where a phalanx could not be 
formed, 
, 
for example in broken terrain, with a resulting reduction of 
protection for the individual hoplite (8). 
To reduce some of these disadvantages auxiliary forces such as peltasts 
and cavalry were introduced. These did not, however, have a substantial 
effect on the set-piece battle - through-out the. period the only method to 
achieve decisive victory in war - in which the hoplite reigned supreme. 
Therefore the disadvantages of the aspis were considered acceptable to the 
soldiers of the period. 
The sspis also provided the primary offensive weapon of the hoplite. 
Frontally the phalanx was nearly invulnerable to the weapons of the time, 
both hand held and missile. The phalanx had to b'e first disordered to kill 
large numbers of enemy hoplites. The main tactic whereby this objective 
could be achieved was to push the enemy line over by brute force, literally 
5 
shield, pressed on shiel& Most armies would: 'att6tipt': this byý, fushing; 'at the 
W& e, - enem-y at full speed, ', ýhftting the en6my'r line,., with,: maximunilimpe" * 
Th " 
Spartans,, however,,, Rieferred to strike tfie-'enemy-afthe 
wai-k "g, ai n*- victory, 
through prolonged,, disciplined pressure. Owing, to their geneially, superior 
training only the Spartans, and we can presume certain other picked forces, 
could gain victory by the latter method (9). 
After the as5pis the most important defensive item of equipment was the 
corslet. The protection this gave the hoplite's body varied in degree 
depending on which part of the Classical period is under examination. Indeed 
a general theory, first proposed by Chrimes but not accepted by all, exists 
that as the Classical period went on body armour got gradually lighter, with 
unarmoured hoplites being the standard type by the period of the Corinthian 
War. 
We can be sure that the earliest hoplites wore a bronze back and breast 
plate, known as the bell cuirass. In addition the earliest types of hoplite had 
protection for the upper parts of the limbs. Some time around the period of 
the Persian War the linen cuirass, or hRýothorvx, came into vogue. This item 
of equipment is profusely illustrated in art, especially pottery. Some 
examples show the addition of metallic scales to vital body areas, such as the 
abdomen; for the most part, however, this armour consisted only of multiple 
layers of linen or leather. Final-ly, if one accepts the Chrimes theory, the later 
hoplite would wear only his chilon, relying' alone on his aspisand the mutual 
protection afforded by the phalanx (10). 
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The early, - sýag' 6s: of, -, hoplite', -. armour.., e'v"'o"'i'ution,; ý'are,,,,,, ý,, there ore; "t(ea' s'y", " to-''ý' 
follow. The- initial siages--of hoýlite de., e 
armed soldier. As the mutual support- affoided"bty th'eýý4alpx, 'ýecaTeAear, - 
metal armour was discarded and eventually , the 
largely non-metallc 
1h7olhorax was adopted. Chrimes' theory would. have this trend continue until 
all body armour was discarded, the shield waH of the phalanx making armour 
ChrimesF alSO argued' tlfat' arf ivolutiori in'tactics took place, 
largely under Spartan influence, that required a lighter, faster hoplite and 
prompted the adoption of a more manoeuvrable phalanx. This tactical motive 
for a gradual reduction in armour is, however, based on a general 
misconception of warfare, that weight of equipment is directly related to 
tactical role. Hoplites were, by later standards, relatively lightly equipped, 
their entire panoply coming to approximately fourteen pounds. Furthermore 
ancient battles did not last for prolonged periods of time; soldiers would 
have, as a result, suffered more from the fatigue effects of the psychological 
stresses of combat than the weight of their armour Q 1). it is difficult. 
therefore, to accept that tactics dictated a lightening of armour later in the 
Classical period. 
Another factor mitigating against Chrimes' theory is the fact that the 
hoplite generally supplied his own equipment. We cannot, as a result, assume 
any type of standardisation in army equipment. One would assume that each 
individual would wear what he could afford. An exception to this is the use 
of state arsenals by certain city-states as the period went on. In particular the 
7 
Spartans are, known to'. haVe used, state" su#p equipmept, 'fbi,: their, "citizen, 
and helot ýopýtes'. The, Chriines -theory, - rnai. "ý 
th; eiefore-. ý-, libe. mom, logical in 
regard to Spartan forces (12). 
Finally in no way is the Chrimes theory, supported conclusively, 'by- art or 
literary evidence. Many of the supporting examples she uses are unsatisfac- 
tory when compared to the quite voluminous evidence for the continued use 
of arinour (13). 
The wider socio-economic implications mitigate against a reduction in 
armour. Logic demands that a reduction in armour would be motivated by a 
desire to place more men in the field, for we have already seen how such a 
lightening of equipment would have had little effect on mobility. The 
problem with the hoplite is that social class defined who would take the field 
in the phalanx. On very few occasions were the poorer elements of Greek 
society deployed as hoplites (14). 
Other protection was provided by a helmet, 0 *f which there were several 
designs. These were made of beaten bronze and were usually topped with 
large horse-hair crests. One type, the pdog is included in the Chrimes theory, 
evidence being cited to show that it was a Spartan peculiarity and made of 
felt, but once again this is controversial (15). Finally the hoplite's protective 
equipment was completed by greaves; made of springy bronze these covered 
the lower leg (16). 
The hoplite's main offensive weapon was a spear some six to nine feet 
long. The spear was used in two ways, an over- and an underarm thrust, the 
8 
f6iiiiir- appaieiitly,,, bdýg pFefiiied, m", the"c a" "J'inki"O Ithe; 'p fix'-'Our", ý7 PTP 
eyld. ence ifidicates-th4t e speýr' ýviouid Or4y'.,,, bec6ifiý", -important,, "bnce-,,, e., 
phal4nx broke-, up (17). 
The hoýlite also carried a sword; but this was 'very much a secoýdary 
weapon. It would appear that'hopliies would pref6r to fight- on with the 
butt-spike of their spear should it become broken rather than resort to 
drawing their sword. It is notable that the most highly trained hoplites, the 
Spartans, carried a sword that was little more than a dagger (18). 
This equipment cost a considerable amount of money and only a 
minority could afford to equip themselves for fighting in the phalanx. As the 
period progressed the hoplites became a distinct social group within the 
city-state, often making claim to special political rights and becoming jealous 
of the privileges that"went with their position; it was within the capacity of 
the city-state to organise a state funded militia and expand their military 
capacity, but few 'examples exist of this happening and most'city- stýtes 
prefered a middle-class manpower base for their armies. 
0 The Tactics of the Hoplite Phalanx 
The tactics of the hoplite phalanx were relatively stereotyped in the early 
and middle part of the Classical period. It was only after and during the 
Peloponnesian War that new troop types, and hence innovations, were 
introduced to the battlefield and even then the basic principle of hoplite 
warfare remained. Essentially victory could only be achieved by pushing the 
9 
ý'bi6ke, iri fli' -r, enernyphalanx:, ufitil it became Aigorder6d an ise, of, - 
'Z, "all "this taýiic'. b- '. 1; 6'Gieek"' name ref6iince we shall -c Yý 
"sh6ving". 
In Classical hattles- 
-ihe 
two phalanxes deployed, on as ffit. a piece of,. land 
as possible, then both, advanced. Once at close quarters each would push 
shield-to-shield and attempt to push the other back and ultimately over. The 
-ti'ýf-"ý-a-ýs"flik'e-ýo-n-'e--hu--ge-"ruiby's-c'-r-u-m-. 'Only onýi-66 enem-y-shi6ld iiill haid 
been broken did the opportunity come to inflict substantial casualties on the 
enemy. As a result most armies would run once their phalanx had broken up. 
Indeed this became so common that it was considered unsporting for losers 
to reform to try their luck again (19). 
Cawkwell offered a modified version of this scenario. He argued that the 
hoplite battle fell into two distinct phases. Firstly, the two phalanxes 
advanced until the two lines were almost in contact. Here they halted to 
engage in individual righting. Only when this had progressed for some way 
would the hoplites finally pack together for the ohVsmos (20). The main 
evidence against Cawkwell's theory comes from Plato's dialogue Taches', 
where Laches asks Socrates if itwould be worthwhile to pay a professional 
trainer to teach his son the finer points of hand-to-hand righting - in the later 
Classical period many ex- Spartan trained soldiers provided this service to 
the Greek social 8EIa Socrates advises against such a course of action; he 
replies that the hoplite only needed individual skill-at-arms during the pursuit 
phases of a battle. Either a fleeing soldier might be forced to turn to face a 
10 
ýýPursuer Or vIce7yersa., inwiiiclfcak tli6-"ýoffiý4ct. -phalai&'ý. 
6ki'n. ', "Af, "n'6! 
poýýt does Plato mention'an mu ia pe such- ii tlik'suggested bi Civ&ýill 
, '(2 1). 
This phase of individual combat before the - phalifixes. 'clashid. prope - r, is 
impractical when you consider that both sides might - be closing at some 
considerable speed. At normal human jogging speed a phalanx, some eight 
deep, might be assumed to cover its own depth in less that five seconds. We 
have evidence to show that the phalanx could, and often did, close at the run. 
For Cawkwell's theory to work the entire phalanx - both sides - would have 
to halt in order for his initial phase be allowed to run its course. This is not 
evident from the sources nor is it logical. We must, therefore, reject the 
phased battle theory and conclude that the objective of hoplite warfare was a 
violent and speedy o&&mos 
It is clear that this basic tactic could be modified by local conditions and 
outside factors. It is evident that often manoeuvre could be employed mi an 
attempt to gain local dominance in weight. Most notably the Spartans with 
their system of organisation could move by sub-unit to disrupt the enemy's 
formation (22). However it would be difficult for most of the semi-trained 
city-state militias to do anything but strike the enemy in the time honoured 
fashion, frontally, and then resort to brute force for victory. 
For the most part the battle did not progress far beyond a successful 
o&ismo. g Once disordered and broken-up a phalanx usually took to flight. 
Very few armies had the discipline or training to reform. Furthermore there 
11 
was a teridefi Greek-, iýfaie-J6, f 
4 
PO ti d, ', hýnc6 the"' viýf6r. med any- sultifig, the' battle- was won, aný -,,, re li 6al 
Secon adva al, ree ntage, afid'exce o6dshid. bý6ametunnecessar 
armies of the period were, ill-equipped f6r, pursuit., The proper . ', arm. for. sých 
a task ý- light or mounted, troops - were - either not readily available or - badly 
handled. Further the nature of hoplite warfare mitigated against pursuit by 
the -phalaa i661f. In chising ý-defeated -enemy a victor-ious-'phalank--risked 
disorder itself and perhaps a reversal of the situation. 
The basic tactical building block of the phalanx was the file. This was 
composed of a single fine of soldiers of variable depth. A number of files 
were placed side by side to form the phalanx as a whole. The most important 
soldiers in the file were those at its front and its back. They maintained the 
alignment of the file, the soldiers in between simply making sure'they were' 
in line with the two ends. The phalanx could be turned about by reversing 
the positions of the two ends of the file by -a process called counter- 
marching; note that each file rather than each individual hoplite made the 
about-turn. Furthermore this system meant that the phalanx could only wheel 
- not turn - to face the flank. This was normally impractical as the phalanx 
could be hundreds of metres in length and the line could only face to the side 
by wheeling sub-units and then manoeuvring each sub-unit in an attempt to 
reform the entire battle-line. We can only expect the Spartans to have had the 
ability to conduct such a complex manoeuvre. The flanks of the phalanx 
were, as a result, very vulnerable to envelopment (23). 
12 
Another, tactical peculiarity was for, the, phalanx to -'drift' to: the fight, 
during battle. This resulted from each, individual hopfite'edgmg'ýb` "', ""the 
shield of his right hand comrade as t6e action progressed ý (see: above' p. 5). 
The two phalanxes would move in a 'crablike' movement as they approached 
each other, the right wings of each formation eventually extending beyond 
the enemy left. This invited a flanking envelopment, which, as we have seen, 
was, very difficult for- the -hoplite formation--to- deal with. - Classical - 
commanders realised the importance of the drift and sought to make 
maximum capital out of it (24). 
The only general to successfully counter the 'shield 'drift' was the 
Theban -Epaminondas. He and his largely Boeotian army defeated the 
recognised. masters of hoplite warfare, the Spartans, twice, at the battles of 
Leuctra. and Mantinea. At the former he used a tactic which has become 
known as the echeloned or oblique attack. He reinforced his left wing, 
deploying it fifty deep and with a front rank qf o6fffe troops, and he then 
refused his right wing. Epaminondas' achievement is all the more astounding 
when one remembers that he was outnumbered. This innovation needs 
investigation as it is seen as the basis of several mdmphoroi formations in 
the Hellenistic period and., many scholars argue that Philip 11 of Macedon 
learnt this ploy whilst a hostage in Thebes at the height of Epaminondas' 
power (25). 
At Leuctra Eparninondas deployed, contrary to the normal Classical 
practice. He placed his best troops on his left, opposite the S, =rY,? Ie phalanx. 
13 
'e N6rrrially, ", `this wo 1ý'ý., haV 0ý-'ý'YeF 
ig""ilýý-best-'6'f "the", 'BOe'o'daný fo'r`ce: "ýý'ý", " t outflankii4 ind evehtýa ul 
y'. nqt' s, op of, the iniývitable shielý "drift- Eýimiii6fidi§', ý'tacti6, 'yK'ý"s" to, "'t' j 
committing. the right Lflýnk. of, '. -a'nny, ýýntil,, 
't6: bitfle'was:. well', p"ýo'g"essýd -his 
and,, hopefully, the'eRe of ý the Spartan, aFm'y''was m''flight, The ý sol I diers on 
the Boeotian right, who were inferior to the Thebans formed on the left, 
n6t suffef-thC'stmss"of -cld§6-*cdmbat'that'prompted the drifting effect. 
Further their static position would lock the deeper Theban phalanx in 
position, preventing it drifting to the right. 
Eparninondas' tactic worked: the fifty deep - Theban phalanx, led by 
three-hundred strong 6ffte Sacred Band, forced its way through the Spartan 
right, inflicting heavy casualties on and putting to flight the Spv&ýi&iforce 
opposing it. With the Spartans in retreat the main part of the Spartan allies 
took to their heels. The battle was won before the refused Boeotian right was 
committed to the action proper (26). 
Despite the obyious adyantages of this tactical ploy it was not copied by 
contemporary generals. It is argued, however, that the echeloned attack 
became part of the tactical doctrine of Philip and Alexander's Macedonians 
and to some extent their successors; furthermore, that the use of the deep 
phalanx by Eparninondas had a profound influence on Philip 11's thinking as 
he introduced the mdm phalanx. 
Another development in the later Classical period was the introduction of 
small units of eAfe troops, hoplites trained to the same high standard as the 
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strategic areas'such as`scoufin': an&tý. in"', broken -'areasg, but ` the*y' had 9 
little'- inflU 
, 
ence in, the set-piece, which'rernaimd, the - decisive . -event of 'war 
through-out the period. 
To summarise, despite advances in technique and training the o&ismos 
of hoplites in a set-piece battle remained the typical feature of war in the 
period. For the most part the tactics of the Greek armies eclipsed by the 
Macedonians of Philip and Alexander were very, similar to those which had 
fought in the Persian War some one hundred and fifty years earlier. 
d) The Socio-Economic Background of Hoplite Warfare 
The hoplites were only a small proportion of the total military population 
of Classical Greece and as a result the annies of the time were relatively 
small. The reasons for this are very important in an explanation of 
Macedon's rise to dominance, partially as a result of the introduction of the 
mdm phalanx. 
Hoplites were a product of the poffs system and they were drawn from 
its middle-classes. These soldiers had to have enough income to equip 
themselves in the expensive hoplite panoply and maintain themselves on 
campaign.. Some armies were subsidised from state funds but this was rare 
and provision was often inadequate. The lower classes of the po& could only 
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fight as hopýites, if a,,, su ff6rt Ima e..,,,, yý,. t e, --, ',,, g6Yernmen o -' bstantial"e 
provide equipment., As a, result A6,, 'ýbntrib6tiow 
was limited to the provision of li i7nfant6.. oi, 'I ro 
disparity of military responsibility resultý&in`tS6 h6plite. class a,,; ýsumiing a 
key political position in all but those states'Whith relied heavily on the sea 
for military power. The political power held by the hoplite classes is best 
illustrated-by-the social turmoil that- struck- most Greek-states when-hoplite, 
tactics were adopted for the first time (27). 
In most jwleis the middle classes jealously guarded their monopoly of 
political power and this attitude in general counter- acted any progress 
towards the raising of state-funded hoplite armies drawn from aU strata of 
society. As a result the manpower available to a poffs was underused; only 
those states which relied on naval power, such as Athens, made proper use of . 
the resources at their disposal. The figures available support this analysis: 
Perikles gives a total hoplite force of 29,000 available to Athens at the 
beginning of the Peloponnesian War, 13,000 at home, 16,000 in garrisons 
across the empire. Athens was at this time the most populous and richest of 
the cities of Greece. Sparta, her rival, suffered severely from a shortage of 
hoplites, a problem that began at the time of the Persian War and got 
progressively worse as the period went on. Even when alliances of city-states 
combined forces the result was hardly inspiring. At Delium, 42413 B. C., the 
Boeotians and their aRies massed only 7,000 hoplites on the battlerield. 
Overall army numbers in the Classical period compare very unfavourably 
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with those in'the HeHenislic, 'even -when, we, 'c6 ell e. rnp o Greece 
proper, rather thana smaH city-state with A Mike" Helle stl chy (28). " 
e) C-ond-u-sim 
The hoplite was in his day the most effective close formation 
infantryman that1had yet fought., on-the battlefields-of the,, Mediterranean 
world. With success, hoplite warfare spread from Greece itself and by the 
end of the period the hoplite could be found fighting in all the major armies 
of the Mediterranean region. Even with the creation and rapid expansion of 
mercenary forces in the later Classical period, the establishment of large 
armies of hoplites was hindered by the manner in which these soldiers were 
recruited. The hoplite performed his military task extremely well whilst war 
remained a matter of low intensity operations, campaigns over small areas of 
ground and cuhninating in a series of set-piece battles. However once the 
geographical limits of war expanded and conflict was measured in years 
I 
rather than months, the hoplite was found wanting. 
The Peloponnesian War was the watershed; it forced the combatant states 
to fight across the length of the Balkan peninsula and to venture into Asia 
Minor and Sicily. The nature of the conflict, a land power versus a sea 
power, called for a protracted war of attrition that could not be decided by a 
single battle. The Greeks attempted to redress the situation by the creation of 
new types of soldier, mercenaries, light troops, state-equipped hoplites. They 
failed, however, to address the basic difficulties that reliance on a 
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middle-class militia placed on succ_e, -ýsful: 'military 6p6rati6hs;,: Wmapyways, 
they could not overcome them beca, -. 'th"'ho' li as r'otedin'the, e e, p te system o 
social fabric of their culture. It ie 'a, ' that qxýired ra ,ce 
that had brought the hoplite into existence in , the first - place, with all the 
attendant socio-economic and political -upheaval associated with such a 
change. As we shall see it took an external force to modify the military 
- systerns of the southern- city-states, a change'that destroyed, the political and -- 
military predominance of the states of Old Greece. 
C) The Smisa Phalanx 
a) IntrDd dion 
The &vim phalanx was the base upon which the Hellenistic anny rested. 
It was deployed in large numbers in all battles of the period. It did not solely 
dominate war; rather it was part of the combined arms doctrine that was the 
basis of Hellenistic warfare. 
The smisvphoroi of the Hellenistic period were very different, from the 
hoplites of the previous era. These differences were not confined to 
equipment and tactics; the sociological background of the mdmphoroiwas 
radically different from the hoplite. The hoplite is rarely encountered in the 
Hellenistic period, so much so we must assume he must have been 
superseded in a relatively short span of time. 
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The mdmphoroi stood shoulder-to-shouldei in a phaknx,,, -which", Was 
deeppr than that used in the Classical ý6ri6d. -. Their pnmary. weapon--was,, the, 't 
sv*, a large spear wielded in both lInds. T46'lrapk-and 'file', of ýhemma 
phalanx was drawn from the lower classes of society; they were Macedonian 
peasants, the settlers on royal land in the east or even freed slaves. Large 
numbers of soldiers could be raised in short periods of time to meet 
emergencies; for example in 217 B. C. the Ptolemies put a phalanx of native 
Egyptians into the field in under a year (29). With this shift in the burden of 
military responsibilty came a massive expansion in the size of armies and a 
change in the power structure of the Eastern Mediterranean. Even in Greece 
itself areas that were backwaters in the Classical period were rapidly thrust 
into the forefront of international politics, a notable example being the 
Achaean League of the northern Peloponnese (30). 
These changes in the pattern of warfare were, the result of a development 
in weapons and tactics, and they meant that f4r poorer soldiers could be 
deployed on the battlefield in large numbers. War also became more 
aggressive; casualties to soldiers and civilian alike rose in this period. The 
economic effects of war became more damaging. Further at the higher level 
of command a more professional attitude to tactical and strategic planning 
prevailed. This expansion in the scope of warfare swamped the city-states 
which had traditionally held sway in Greece and the Aegean; even the 
massive Persian Empire was dismembered as a result of the new style of war. 
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The mds,?, was 'the' , 'iii'f ýi47" 
aý9 
f &i', liäi p anx period. Its Üie wäý gehtrýI'to th& ks -' e- 
The most striking feature of the'sidsiwas its., Iýng& Sources -vary as to 
the exact length of the weapon, and it is clearý that length varied from place 
to place and time to time. Polybios tells us that the mdm was seven cubits 
long in his day, having been shortened from a length of eight cubits. 
Theophrastus recorded that the longest mdm was twelve cubits long, whereas 
Asclepiodotus wrote that the shortest was ten cubits and that none exceeded 
twelve. Polyacnus, writing about Cleonymus of Sparta (circa 300 B. C. ) stated 
that the &vim reached a length of sixteen cubits. Arrian also gives the length 
of the mjim as sixteen cubits, whereas Aelian quoted eight. We therefore 
have a weapon of varying length, from eight to sixteen cubits, or twelve to 
twenty-four feet. To confuse the issue further some scholars have argued that 
the size of the mdm could differ from rank to rahk within the same phalanx 
(31). 
No hard and fast conclusion can be reached on this point, and 
ultimimately we must attribute these differences in stdmilengths to regional 
or chronological variations, also perhaps different svimilengths would have 
been found within a single army. After - all some Hellenistic phalanxes were 
very large formations; one might not expect an ancient state to be able to 
supply regulation lengths of weapon for all its soldiers. Alternatively 
individuals may have shortened their weapons for ease of use in battle or on 
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the - march, perhaps without', the, permission, of hijheu, Iauihqrities-. -', 
Pf --- ' one 
thing, however, we can be certain; that -the'- elibofate 9che'rhes' laid,, by', "some 
scholars that differing lengths of &ViMi were distributed each rank was 
beyond the logistic capabilities of the states of the period. 
The weight of the mdm was not recorded by the ancients. Markle and 
Larnmert attempted to estimate a figure. Markle reconstructed a &visa based 
upon artifacts found at Vergina. He concluded that the Vergina example 
would have weighed fourteen and a half pounds if eighteen feet long, twelve 
if fifteen. He assumed that the wood used for the mdsa was cornel. Markle 
also reconstructed a hoplite spear from a smaller head found in the Vergina 
cist; he found it to be seven times lighter than the mdm. Larnmert estimated 
a figure of six kilograms (32). 
The only hint of the cost of the mdm'comes from the Ampbipolis 
Decree, dated to the reign of Philip V. The fine for the loss of a mdm was 
three obo. 1k The relative worth of this sum is *dependent on whether one 
believes the fines to be for replacement of the weapon or simply as a 
punishment. As the fines for armour loss appear ridiculously low, it would 
appear the latter is the case (33). 
The most important feature of the mdsa was its general unwieldiness and 
the fact that it had to be used in both hands. As a consequence the large "pis 
could not be carried by the mjimphorm, its large rim being incompatible 
with a two-handed weapon. Some authors have argued that our sources are 
incorrect on this basic point and that at least part of the phalanx used its 
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mdsai on6-hahded. A variation on, this Ahiory is, a phali., `, -,,, Aih each", rank 
-g' armed with a different length of spe ki. usin ork-hah 6d 
hopEte spears. This would aiso'ailow. th*6 spear, po ýof . Jhe'. 'pý-I"`-t'-'f6rm. ýnts, a,., anxý, o 
a continuous row rather than being staggered. Despite the ingenuity of this 
theory no source makes a direct reference, to such a practice. Most conclusive 
is Polybios' statement that the &vim was held in both hands, using up six 
-feet of the weapon, two between the user's hands, four behind (34). 
As the mdm prevented use of the aspis Heflenistic phalangites were 
equipped with a small target, similar to the Classical zgkrij, strapped to the 
left f6rearm. Asclepiodotus described the shield, 
"The best shield for use in the phalanx is the Macedonian of bronze, 
eight palms in diameter and not too concave... " (35). It is difficult for us to 
detect- this'shield in art or literature and perhaps it 'is noteworthy that'the 
author implies that the Macedonian shield is the best of several. Our study is 
further hindered by the use of imprecise terminology by our sources. The 
most common Greek word for shield is cc(YxLQ, which is technically the large 
hoplite shield. Despite this, however, 'when authors use this word with regard 
to smisa-anned troops in the Hellenistic Period we must assume that they 
refer to the small target. However the ýword pelle was 'also used, a better 
word for the small shield carried by the &vimphoros. Unfortunately the fielte 
was also used by a common troop type, "the peltast, and on occasion this 
causes confusion as to the actual type of soldier being refered to (36). ' 
Problems with terminology aside, at least two types of shield were in use 
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by 'the, phýiahx"', in-'Ah 
ti6ii in'art. ',,, This't- )f, "shi Id iýý ýfioi4 idifi hiii&ý--' quite common' repTeS6ntal 
j" 
of phalangiies"art. &M'isolation as trobhi6s. j 
former is'a, belt- buckle'from', Pe'rga'mu'm" w'hicliý sfiows'4, 'ýýhaldiLk, advaricing 
on barbarian,,. zperbPS Galatian, infantry. Of the litter'i the'ý balustrade 'reliefs 
from the Temple of Athena at Pergamum show piles of bowl shields, stacked 
inside one another. Other representations, such as the Boscoreale shield or 
those depicted in the tomb of Lyson and Cafficrates are ambiguous, largely 
because they are depicted frontaUy with no indication of the characteristic 
"bowl" effect. The bowl shield is depicted with circular or star patterns on 
its face, often seen as characteristic of the type (37). 
Broadly the bowl shield fitted the diameter suggested by Asclepiodoýus 
about twenty-four inches; but it can hardly be said to be "not too'concave" 
as the mark of the bowl shield., was its deep concave structure. As has been 
said, however, Asclepiodotus may merely be stating a preference for one 
type out of many. The Pergamurn belt-buckle best illustrates hoýv this shield 
might have been used. Two soldiers are shown shoulder to shoulder; they are 
obviously phalangites as they use long, two-handed spears. Unfortunately the 
spear of the foremost soldier appears to pass behind his shield in a most 
awkward fashion; perhaps, however, we can attribute this to error or artistic 
convention. Most notably the shields appear to rest on the soldier's left 
shoulder, perhaps supporting the weight of the shield and providing a firmer 
base upon which to receive the enemy's blows. We cannot tell how these 
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'SNýjds''would be fixed to the foir, earr'n, as" they suiýly,, rnust be`ý in Us- 6iiinple. _., '. z 
ly., ýirfiapjs an insert., of : somej 4iF, " . 
if the mdmi are to be wielded effective 
46'the entire forearin in provided a flat area and allowed, the soldier to. get - his 
concave bowl. The shield ý is good for defence, its shape curving around'., 
en I compassing the left arm and shoulder of the phalangite and it may be that 
this is the reason why Macedonian phalangites brought their shields down off 
their shoulders at Pydna (38). 
The only physical support we have for the Asclepiodotus shield are a 
cover from Pergamum and the Aemilius Paullus monument. The former is a 
bronze covering for the outside of a shield. It fits perfectly the description of 
Asclepiodotus. The second is the possibility that a phalangite is advancing 
with a small target. It is probable, however, that the shield is closer to the 
Classical -Argive type, the ispA The shield recorded- by Asclepiodotus 
would, we conjecture, have been easier and perhaps lighter to carry, but it 
might not have offered as effective protection as the bowl-shield (39). 
Finally Connolly has proposed that the Boeotian shield may have been 
used by mdsa armed troops at least in the early part of the period (40). The 
Boeotian shield is illustrated in art; it is an Argive shield, an aspig with two 
serni-circular cuts at the edges. It is similar to the Persian geirhv and the 
Dipylon shield of the Late Geometric period, but as no actual example has to 
date been found, the Boeotian shield has been dismissed as an artistic 
creation based on a race memory from the Bronze Age type. Connolly 
suggests, however, that this type could have been used with the smisa, the 
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inde h, wF " po --ýts. overcoming J. hýý'6ioble- usirtg,, a. Iwo, ", anded ms, 01 
'that, thii "shi6ld, bee large-rimined Argive'shield. --H6-. Oggests, n,,; 
used by Epaminqn I "das in 6rderto e'quip his men', ýý&, '16ýgeu ýspears. -, ý, beý ... iýi §p e. 
supporuiti and-this'wnte'r',, ' the ingenuity of the theory there is'no'evidence to 
therefore rejects the Boeotian shield as a possible 'phalangite 
"shield. 
' 
Despite the small shield used by the miimphorm, * the phalanx appears to 
have been remarkably well protected frontally. Livy quotes an example, at 
Atrax, of a phalanx holding a gate. The Romans tried to dislodge this 
formation with flights of piX?, which simply bounced off the wall of shields, 
having little effect and killing few men. The pi7um was an armour piercing 
javelin, capable of pinning overlapped shields together, and it is noteworthy 
that it was ineffective against a wall of shields carried by a formed phalanx 
(41). Further if pila were so ineffective, then how complete would be the 
protection against lighter missiles, such as arrows? 
The most contentious item of equipment uýed. by the. phalanx of this 
period is body armour. Two broad schools of thought exist, those for and 
those against an armoured phalanx (42). In addition there is a middle ground 
whereby a partially armoured phalanx was deployed, the front ranks enjoying 
better protection than those in the rear. As for the materials used for armour, 
the bulk of our evidence seems to indicate that metal armour, at least, was 
rare in this period. Our main problem is that literature does not readily 
differentiate between the types of material used in armour and that art 
evidence is open to misinterpretation. 
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se r'VNed'; 1(43). 
`, `, Thýy, repre ntýti of H, w"i tic i. ififantry'. ý hiv6` kii ons, e enis 
are, - h6wever, difficult t6, 'use asý 6vidin&for. the d so die 
ffice the paiýt! p'gs, ý, for, ' SOC107econo-nucý reasbns,, ý'pi6babW d6i6t ?b rs, ý' ir. r, 
status and wealth allowing them to w6armore expensiv Ie equipment. 'As such 
we must be wary of drawing wide Tanging conclusions fromý these sources. 
Armour from art evidence can be divided into two broad categories. Firstly, 
the linen cuirass, sometimes called'the '&7othorzrbY the ancients, an example 
being the Lefkadia warrior (44). This type was used in the Classical period 
and has been discussed above (see p. 7). Secondly, there was the muscled 
cuirass, often depicted on statuary of high ranking officers and this style 
lasted into the Roman Imperial period (45). The muscled cuirass was beaten 
out of two pieces of metal, the surface of the armour often being worked to 
depict a stylised muscled torso, hence its name. It is probable that this type 
was fitted to the individual when manufactured and was an extremely 
expensive item; it would not have been worn by the rank and file of the 
Hellenistic phalanx. 
The lh7othor,? x is a common subject for military art of the period, and as 
such it is possible that this type of annour was in widespread use. It is 
possible that materials other than linen or leather were used in the 
construction of this armour. Pottery representations from the Classical period 
show that metallic scales could be applied to enhance protection of vital body 
regions and it is possible that metal plates could have been inserted beneath 
the outer layer of the armour. It is difficult to tell if this was done in the 
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Hellifiistic -period as most -,. o'f,, 'oxir, 'Art,, evidence"'&6mes from sculptujj6,, ', 'whi61 
would have been paintid"'iýd-6ffcbý-rse'*ý, thiý"colq"'ý" 
leaving'-doubt as to the, ýxtenttoVany-, ý eta ýad ed'ý icý".. the baýic', linen 
foundation garment. 
This problem has been exacerbated' by the, discovery of the 'Philip 
cuirass' at Vergina (46). This artifact was -constructed from iron with 
extensive gold decoration. Its shape closely conforms to the &2olhoral. It has 
replicas of the fold-down shoulder guards and even the square flange at the 
back of the neck - these are present in the 67othoraxas a result of its fabric 
construction, but are not necessary for an iron cuirass. The armourer has 
obviously attempted to copy the 67othomr From our point of view the 
'Philip cuirass' casts the shadow of doubt over the surviving uncoloured 
examples of the EnothoFzr, were the Vergma example to be so depicted, we 
could not tell whether it was in fact constructed of iron or linen. Despite this 
we must remember that the 'Philip cuirass' belonged to a king and that very 
few, if any, comparable examples would havý existed. Lh7othorjkes may 
have been equipment exclusive to officers. We have already mentioned the 
Lefkadia warrior. He is wearing a h; 7othounvx, yet he is an officer - hence the 
distinctive red sash which indicated rank. Finally. much of our art evidence 
for this type derives from monuments such as the Pergamum. reliefs where 
armour is shown as trophies.; Such armour is in isolation and as such we 
cannot say with confidence that it is annour normany worn by the rank -and 
file of the phalanx. These problems compound to make art evidence, at best, 
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_6 eyýqpce, -Jofj e,, ýýyivmg iteii problimatic. Weý'ý, yyl , 
seý'd 
. .... ..... armour by the phAink,. "of "the ý'Hellefiistic., pen6d. '-, T e`evidenc-i'fdlijntdjwo, t 
ftles; main types, tho'se"', ', wiýýh',, 'm'Ae', g'eneraI comifients during, accounts, of, *, ' 
and campaigns, and specific, riferences to'ý'armament. `Jfis diffkult; f6r, ýus to 
use the former. with any certainty, as the ancientswere prone, to 'use Jcertain 
literary devices to describe an army in full battle order. An example is 
reference to an army that'glittered with iron and bronze, no reference being 
made as to which equipment is reflecting the light. One must be aware that a 
Hellenistic phalanx would present the enemy with a line of polished shields, 
helmets, greaves, spearpoints, etc. - opportunity enough to dazzle the enemy 
without the addition of metal body-armour. This evidence is, therefore, at 
best problematic, at worst useless. Direct references to phalanx equipment are 
better for our purposes, but even here there are problems deriving from 
imprecise terminology or local variation. The earliest example of this type of 
evidence come from Polyaenus and it refers to the phalanx of Philip 11 (47). 
The author recorded that Philip would often take his men on route marches. 
They would carry helmet, greaves, fieAh mn&x, and all the rations and gear 
that they needed from day to day. No mention is made of body armour. 
We have contradictory evidence for the use of armour by Alexander's 
army. Polyaenus tells us that the thomy was withdrawn from service and 
replaced by a henzýthorjx - presumably a piece of equipment covering the 
chest - in order to discourage flight (48). Curtius tells us that new armour 
was issued to the phalanx at the end of the Indian campaign, the old sets 
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b6n'g'bumed-- this IeArly,, ýindicates'ý 6 `A`Iq`: K. and_er. ý,, p'ý, 64, c 
made of 'd combustible., matýiiil, (49). "- Furthei,, ýwe have ývanou i! Pýs to 
the "heaviest of the phalanx the "61"' 47ih x am 
various parts of the phalanx mayýhave caffiýdjiaýieý,. Ie "e'n't . 'than 
"offi , er , s; qT 
(50). We must, however, recognise'j4at many., ofjhise'references apply'ý't*'o' ihe 
phalanx in a strategic, rather than a tactical, situation. Nevertheless there is 
considerable evidence to support the-opinion that the phalanx of Alexander 
was annoured. 
A gap appears in the sources between Alexander's time and the late 
thirdlearly second century B. C. The Achaean army was refonned by 
Philopoemen in 207 B. C. and our sources refer to equipping the new &visa 
phalanx of the League with thorakem This evidence for armoured Achaean 
mdmphoroi is supported by two references, one, in action and one at a 
review (51). 111 
The reform of the Spartan phalanx by Cleomenes III, however, mentions 
nothing about body armour (52). Also the sources seem to indicate an 
unarmoured phalanx in service with the later Antigonid army. Livy recorded 
that the Romans had the better of the righting in the Aoos Pass because the 
Macedonians lacked armour (53). The Amphipolis Decree makes mention of 
body armour, the tho. -ax and the hen2ithorjx, fines for loss of such equipment 
being two and one dmchmve respectively, but it is clear from the inscription 
that only a proportion of the phalanx was equipped with these items and that 
the majority appear to have wom the xo-rOvPo,;. This item of equipment is 
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difficult toidentify, but'it, a g -ý', " en ! 'ý f a, " f foý64a'tion'i arm t1 or, type -JD P)p 
other armour. 'Alternatively 
like the Of ký, ý'only", Jhiee, 
; "f6- Th6 ""Phipolis` re-, obolg cheap enough to equip every soldier,., -ýým- IL decret: J ere 
appears to demonstrate that the main 'part,, of PhiliP", Ts, ' phalanx', -'., was 
equipped with armour made of leather, with a small proportion wearing the 
heavier thomlesor hemilhorakes(54). 
The proportion of heavily armoured men in the phalanx is open to 
debate, but some scholars opt for a large number with the entire front rank 
armoured. This argument is based on an identification of the rank -of 
hegemon. Some authors interprete this rank literally, the leader of the 
phalanx, the file opener. Others point to Egyptian evidence that shows the 
liegemota to be an officer of high rank, a unit or garrison commander. The 
former view is appealing; after all it would be economically and tactically 
sensible to armour the front rank, the part of the. phalanx holding the post of 
most danger. However most of the evidence seems to point to the hegemoB 
being a high ranking officer and, as such, a minority within the vast majority 
of the phalanx who would have wom leather armour of an indeterminate type 
(55). 
Appian is the only writer who refers to the annour of the Seleucid 
phalanx. In the final stages of the battle of Magnesia he recorded that the 
Romans were afraid to approach the phalanx because it was so heavily 
equipped, but his statement is too general from which to draw any 
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conclusions (56). 
The tacticians ail'ag'ýeýe', týýt'the, "t')"na'ianx,. ', ýwas,, armoýred, ýbbt, ýWe', tnuýi'beý., 
a ar we that'they wrote general, "wo n Fwar`-, ifid,, thiiý 'ofie `inikht. 'ex ct 466, ' 
'bed as the, fieaviest arm,, lo'-, be'an-nour, - . "'Thenature phalanx, which is descd 
of these sources, however, make'them'usel6ss-f6r our overall'survey (57). 
Most of the evidence - including evidence from silence, always a 
dangerous tool - points to an unarmoured phalanx. Isolated formations were 
equipped with a variety of types of body-armour. For example, the reformed 
Achaean phalanx received the thorar, perhaps metal arm'our; of the phalanx 
of Philip V only the officers wore the thmax or henzithoray, the rank and file 
receiving only leaiher protection. In addition the phalangite would wear a 
helmet, greaves and would carry a side-arm. Many sources, literary and 
artistic, show these items in use. They were, however, secondary to the mdm 
which is the most important single piece of equipment and which, as will be 
seen, affected the tactics used by the phalanx. 
0 The Origins of the Phalanx 
The exact date for the introduction of the &visa is open to interpretation, 
various arguments have been offered: ranging from the reign of Archelaos of 
Macedon (413-399 B. C. ) to early in the reign of Alexander the Great. The 
majority of academic opinion supports a date of introduction sometime in the 
reign of Philip II of Macedon, but there is debate as to the exact year. 
Macedon was a poor, unsophisticated state when the mdsa phalanx was 
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created- The. new, forination, g'4ye'ý, Philio,, 41'ý ýtaie"ý', inilitar'y'ý-kýa, ý'v"'a"'nt"6ý; 
allowed him to defeat the h6plite anuies'of- th6"s6ýifieii. 0ri& 6tY. ýstate's., ý'Ilt- 
f tthi" is therefore --important that'we examine the-,,,, 'earjyý ., years os muitary: 6 '1+' ...... 
innovation., The earliest proposed. date is sometime iný the r'ý' ig" 
Archelaos, 413ý399 B. C., based on a statement of Thucydides, who saysiliat 
Archelaos, 
"... reorganised the cavalry, the arming of 'the infantry, and equipment in 
general. " Geyer argued that this is a description of the introduction of the 
mdm phalanx. There is, however, no other evidence to show that Macedon 
began to deploy an effective infantry force at this time. Rather, an surviving 
references to pre-Philipic infantry show quite the opposite, that Macedon had 
no native infantry that could stand in the line of battle. As a result, unless we 
assume Archelaos' introduction of the s=ýw was a complete failure, we can 
reject Geyer's hypothesis (58). 
The second possible period is the reign of Alexander 11,3697 368 B. C. 
Several fragments, notably that of Anaximenes cite by the grammarian 
Harpocration, refer to a reform of the Macedonian infantry in the reign of a 
king called Alexander and. the introduction of peze4? hvj. ' The phalanx of 
Alexander the Great is on occasion refered to by this title. Two theories have 
sprung from these fragments: firstly, that a special guard unit was created, 
perhaps a precursor of the famous hypuspists, secondly, that the smim was 
introduced, in addition, to at least part of the Macedonian infantry force. 
Lock especially supports the latter, quoting in addition references to the use 
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in, this' earl -, bi4hý-, -Thr'a' ian'", 
'los'e--, 'neighbýu'rs, 'of,, th6,, t of 'the mi'm y'penod, 'c., s-'c 
"'bleiii'that'i'i6f 'rd" Macedoruans. However''again we have, the'pro '&o 4adyance, ý 
in'the use of Macedonian, infantry exisis'. 'Until"ýi"p, "&' ýJeiý, pro t. g 
either a'conclusion that, the introduction of the, mdsa had, little effect on 
tactics or, that this theory is incorrect. This -writer would veer toward the 
latter conclusion (59). 
The majority of modem historians support a date during the reign of 
Philip 11,359-336 B. C., although few are prepared to state exactly when this 
reform took place (60). Three general views predominate. The first, being the 
rather nebulous solution that the 'sa", m was introduced sometime in the reign 
of Philip, is the result of a marked lack of detailed evidence for this period. 
This view does not have the precision needed for our survey. 
A second theory is that the mdm was used for Macedonian infantry very 
late on in Philip's reign - and that the cavalry received the weapon first. 
Thirdly, the s&-, Ew was first used when Philip ascended to the throne, in 359 
B. C., and that a new type of phalanx helped defeat Bardylis (a variation of 
this view is a reform just after the initial crisis faced by Macedon was 
overcome, time being too short for radical innovation before this point). ,, 
The second alternative was proposed by Markle (61). His argument is 
based on the paucity of evidence for the period and he argues that the ýwim 
was seen for the first time at the battle of Chaeronea in the hands of 
cavalrymen. The early reference from Diodorus, discussed in detail below, is 
rejected as insufficently precise by Markle. He concluded that the swim was 
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onlyisýuedyery, late in. P', ip 
Markle" efitis we hi- --ifit-, *ý6U, s arguM akejýed'ý hi imons, About% t e, e ys op quipm( 
'infintry'up to the iiitroducti6nofýthe'. ', %"ýw''. i'w.. He'a: igues that Philiý'S 
agains-it''Ba"rdy'lis wa'sIf6ught with filfantry'typical 'of 'the earlieýr, ace oman 
kingdom. - soldiers early evidence shows to be inferior. After 359 B. C. 'the 
wars against the southern Greek states were fought with an army of 
Mac'edonian-hoplit'es, * funding for their re-equipment being supp] I ied by the 
substantial mineral wealth acquired during Philip's reign. Markle goes on'to 
argue that this hoplite equipment was retained 'in store even after the 
introduction of the mdm and that it was periodically re-issued to Alexander's 
phalanx for special missions. 
Markle, however, presents a distorted picture. It was not a simple matter 
to equip an entire infantry force with the hoplite panoply; indeed - as we 
have seen - the Greek city-states had to develop a complex socio-economic 
system to support their hoplite armies. The pc& simply did not exist in 
Macedon, forcing reliance on central goverment funding. Further the notion 
that Alexander's army could carry complete sets of new and entirely 
different equipment is difficult, if not impossible, to accept. Finally where 
Markle's theory is at its weakest is in the motive for infantry reform in the 
first place. 
This work assumes that the motive behind the introduction of the w"sj 
was to create a solid native infantry phalanx, a'force that had previously been 
absent fronl Macedonian warfare. The introduction of an army of native 
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h6plites would'hive solved this dericiency, but -what of the, short _`P&iod 
before the reform, the battle against Bardylis? " Dipoor6s' q*ccopnt`,, "of, -, 'this 
battle implies that the Macedonians - used a, close-ordek infantry - force, 
suggesting that some change in the tactical capabilities of Philip's infantry 
had occured even at this early stage (62). Markle also misinterprets Philip's 
use of wealth, which was consistent with normal Classical practice, whereby 
wealth-could be exchanged for military muscle by hiring mercenaries. Philip 
did use mercenaries and he also spent vast sums on his diplomatic ventures; 
this would have amply strained his finances. Most important is the manner in 
which Markle argues that Philip created a force of hoplites, at considerable 
effort and expense we can assume, only to re-equip it with an untried weapon 
late in, his reignl It would seen more logical for him to retain this hoplite 
army composed, of the don-dnant infantry type of its time which if one 
accepts Markle, had beaten the Greeks consistently. Markle's theory, 
therefore, appears fatally flawed and it seems that logic forces us towards 
acceptance of the final alternative, the creation of the mdm phalanx at the 
very beginning of Philip's reign. 
This view is based on a statement of Diodorus dated to 359 B. C., 
"[Philip] having improved the organisation of his forces and equipped 
the men suitably with weapons of war, held constant manoeuvres under arms 
and competitive drills. Indeed he devised the compact order and equipment 
of the phalanx, imitating the close order fighting with overlapping shields of 
the warriors of Troy, he was the first to organise the Macedonian phalanx. " 
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(63) 
Diodorus des'cribes a Macedonian" infantry f6ice, radic'ally, -: diffýiýýt, "ffo'm, ' 
that which'prece'ded Philip'. He `io'-'re-eqý`jp- tho, ý i try, Pin 
and training them in a new battle drill"but does not mention the., miA? 
directly. He is certain, however, that this reform was before the battle with 
Bardylis and that it produced the close-order infantry force that was the key 
to Macedonian victory. Philip won the battle by the offensive power of his 
cavalry, an arm in which Macedon was traditionally strong. His infantry were 
not asked to take a difficult role; they simply acted as a base for the mounted 
arm: However it is'difficult to imagine the pre-mdm armed Macedonian 
infantry accomplishing this mission. It is, therefore, entirely logical and 
consistent with known events that we place the introduction of the szdsa in 
359 B. C. and that this'reform was the first action of the new king's reign. 
A second question which has interested scholars is the possibility of 
outside influences on the introduction of the &vim. These range from a 
Thracian origin to the influence of Greek military innovators, such as 
Epaminondas and Iphicrates. This requires examination in order to determine, 
on the one hand, whether Philip 11 truly created the basis for Hellenistic 
warfare or on the other, whether he copied existing ideas. 
The refomis of lphicrates have often been cited as the precursor to &vim 
warfare. lphicrates had certain links with the Thracians and hence their style 
of warfare. He was a mercenary leader of some note and he appears to have 
been a major reformer of the peltast, in whose tactics he was a specialist. 
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7rnijo Bot4,, Nepos and'Di6dorus. reco. rd Ahat'lphicýatei`rnade, k6ang6s"Ad-A e',,,: 
equipment of : the, later ý: Claýsical- 'eltast, -- in -padi'61ýý! I tfi `the"ý`ýj -P ,_ 
eng ening ý, 
pt scholiki'46. " -""'I'hi" tes'-,,, carried by these soldiers. Thi§ has pý6nf 6d some view, p cra 
as a major influence on Philip 11's sanýu'p ahx. Such'ar6_ ýiobkffisWitfi, 
this reform, however, that some have rejected it, efitirelY,,, hand 
some are of the view that the lphicratean peltast was not the product of later 
Classical tactical - thinking; rather he represented equipment- that- was normal ., 
for Thracian warriors of the period (see below pp. 136ff) (64). 
The Thracian connection is 'especially important when applied to 
Macedon. Pre-Philippic infantry would have been similiarly equipped to their 
Thracian neighbours. The Macedonian infantry encountered in Thucydides, 
for example, are clearly peltasts. Indeed the only major difference in 
equipment between sxisvphoFoiand Thracian peltasts is the lon. - spear; in 
particular the Hellenistic phalanx used a shield much like the mlh Some 
authors have argued that the &visa-armed infantryman existed in Thrace 
before PWip II came to the throne of Macedon and that he simply changed 
the tactical function of the troop-type to close- order infantryman. Lock takes 
this argument to * its conclusion and cites evidence from Euripides which 
records that there were three types of Thracian infantry, peltasts, bowmen 
and javelimnen. Lock argued that the peltasts were sub-divided into those 
who fought with a javelin and those with the, mdm. He argued that Philip 
took an existing troop type and trained it to fight in an ordered, close packed 
line (65). 
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It is, however,, difficult to accept the-, -ýyýbthe'ýiýtthit', ýlitei-,, ", Clýýical,, ", 
peltasts were armed With a miim like the 'one,, , the i 
phalanx. The argument fails because ol a nusinterpietatiOn'10f-, the'r'elýti6ýsl-ýp 
between weapons and tactics. A spear, a 86&; - was a common weapon iit the 
ancient world. It was, however, of varying lengths and clearly the lphicratean 
peltast took the existing peltast spear and lengthened it. We, cannot, however, 
easily determine the effect this might- have had'on tactics. Perhaps the longer 
spear was combined with javelins to give the peltasts - who were essentially 
missile troops at this time -a limited hand-to-hand capability. Alternatively 
some authors have argued that Iphicrates' intention was to convert his peltast 
force into hoplites, a troop-type more in demand in the Persian empire (66). 
We can safely assume that he did not rearm his soldiers with the two-handed 
miim. Literature attests to the unwieldiness of the mdm, statements that have 
been supported by modem reconstructions (67). Had lphicrates issued such a 
weapon to his men then they would have ceased to be peltasts; the heavy 
mdm would have radically changed their battlefield role. The peltast fought 
as an individual-, mdsi-armed troops, as our sources often say, were gravely 
disadvantaged when in such a situation. There is no indication from our 
sources that peltasts in the later Classical period changed their style of 
fighting. We must, therefore, conclude that lphicrates might have introduced 
a long spear to his peltasts, but that he did not issue mdsar, if he had then he 
must have denied the peltast his skim-lisher role and created a close-order 
phalanx. As such we must again give full credit to Philip 11 for the 
introduction of the heavy, clumsy infantry swiw and the creation of a native 
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Macedonian phalanx., 
There is, also opmi on that - 
influenced byý the, rnilitary. innovations bf. iEpar'nl'n, hdi§ý6f;, ýThe'týý", ýPhill' It 
spent soine of his early years 
Theban, military success' under Epanun , opdas. In, particular'' it was during 
these years that Philip learnt of the deep Theban phalanx and the echeloned 
attack (68). 
The most extreme form of this theory was proposed by Connolly. He 
argued that the Thebans introduced the mdsa in the time of Epaminondas in 
conjunction with the Dipylon style shield and that this innovation allowed 
them to use deep formations at Mantinea and Leuctra. This theory rests on an 
argument for the existence of a special Theban form of the aspig which was 
examined and rejected above (see pages 24-5) for lack of evidence. From 
what we can teH from the sources for Epaminondas' wars the Thebans fought 
as normal hoplites and their deep formation simply added more weight to the 
OW. 5mos 
A related theory is that the deep Theban phalanx inspired Philip to 
deploy his new sajisa-armed infantry in equally deep formations. It is the 
case that later Hellenistic phalanxes were on occasion drawn up exceptionally 
deep, though none were ever as jeep as the Theban formations at Leuctra 
and Mantinea. The evidence, however, from the period of Philip and 
Alexander, refers to shallow mdw formations, a rile of ten men, a delag or 
the use of an eight deep phalanx at the battle of Issus (69). 
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Thei6, is -ý"61ýo, ýah "'asisium`ptioýfi , 
`, 'that ithe, ', 'afta'cký-ý'i'n"4'ýlobliqýe,,, -o'r eriwasjaýý, 
stindar d formation-, m Ale'x'aiidir's-býftles, "'an,. -ýassumptioii-, that. ourý, evioences- 
1 A. does not necessarily,; sýpýok., Ifi, rijost of Ale'k'ifider, s býttles the'04ali anx 
deployed in-a straijht line. - It Ied . ivith-. the 
iighi, -but, did-not-carry*rou'tith6 
special oblique attack used by, Epamihoridas., In addition we shall see, that the 
smim phalanx was an essentially defensive formation, whereas the oblique 
atti& Tý ah--offensive tactic. . The"Thebah 'attacks -at Le-fictra: ifid -Mahtirka 
were ferocious when compared with the typical phalanx tactics of the 
Hellenistic, period. Finally, as we have seen, Ahe real innovation of 
Epaminondas was to attack with his left wing leading, and on no occasion 
did Alexander use such a tactic. 
As a'result the writer is of the opinion that Philip 11 created a new style 
of fighting in 359 B. C., right at the' beginning of his reign. The impact of the 
introduction of the mdsa and the creation of a large force of close-order 
infantry was immediately felt. Bardyfis was expelled from Macedon and 
Philip's new army overcame the hoplite armies of the Greek city- states in a 
series of wars. Philip, by the simple use of a long two-handed pike, made the 
Macedonian peasant, - formerly a peltast, and a bad one at that - able to 
stand. in the line of battle. He created a close-order infantry, force which 
Macedon had never possessed before. Finally, this advance in equipment and 
tactics happened over a very short period of time. 
d) Sociological Factors-Effecting Kuiw Warfare 
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the- sociW,, biAkiound', oV the- 
1, ý 
already been, discussed, and'- the':,, c. onc usion-, '"feach that, for.,, the i most part,,, 
these -Soldiers were drawn froni'a -'n. arrow;, býhd `6fi tho'si', `ýho'could, afford'the 
expensive panoply.. As a result Classical hoplite ý, armies,. tend6d'to be small 
and, except for. those powers who. relied on sea power, the majority of the 
population contributed little to the defence of the state. The introduction of 
the &visa into warfare allowed the state to tap the poorest elements of its* 
population and, as a result, far larger annies were deployed in Hellenistic 
times than had ever been the case in Classical Greece. 
After the victories of Phifip and Alexander's Macedonians the tendency 
in Hellenistic Greece was for armýies to"reform to the Macedonian model and., 
as a result, achieve the phenomenal increase in military manpower that had 
propelled Macedon to the fore in Greek politics in such a short tiMe. The 
first example of this is, of course, Macedon itself. Philip II introduced the 
mdm in 359 B. C. He immediately repulsed Bardylis' invasion and soon 
successfuffy confronted and defeated the hoplite armies of the Greek 
city-states. This rapid change in Macedon's fortunes, until that point very 
much a pawn in international affairs, was due to clever diplomacy backed by 
the threat of military action. PhiliP created a steady, close-order infantry 
force from the Macedonian peasantry to supplement the already powerful 
native cavalry ann. , 
The phalanx of Philip 11's time was drawn from the poorest elements of 
Macedonian society. - No pobs' of any size existed in Macedonia and there was 
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not the rt-ýddle class of the south to, form'a, So" li " &-- force'. Macedonian, soc , iety, ý,,, p 
_9 
an er was polarized into a wealthy aristocracy,, ýnýd, 'a'po'ýr. ýi)e'a'ýýi, ýI 
hiniself highlighted the humble origins of the, 'phaii'ix, 
"Philip found you a tribe of impoverished vagabonds,, most ý of you 
dressed in skins, feeding a few sheep on the hills and fightingi feebly 
enough, to keep them from your neighbours - Thracians, TribaRians and 
Illyrians. He gave you cloaks to wear instead of skins; he brought you down 
from the hills to the plains; he taught you how to fight on equal terms with 
the enemy on your borders, till you knew that your safety lay not in your 
mountain strongholds, but in your own valour. " Philip in effect utilised what 
would have been the theles of a Greek pa& to form a large infantry force 
capable of standing in the line of battle (70). 
This'rearmament of large numbers of the poorer elements of society is 
echoed elsewhere. Both the Achaean League and Sparta under Cleomenes III 
created potent military forces in a relatively short time by the introduction of 
the &visa. The centre of the Achaean League was along the northern coast'of 
the Peloponnese, an area that was an inconsequential backwater in Classical 
times. Yet by the middle of the Hellenistic period the League was one of the 
foremost powers in Greece. Sparta is a similar example. By the reign of 
Cleomenes III Sparta had experienced an acute manpower crisis and as a 
result been reduced to a shadow of her former self. Cleomenes' introduction 
of mdm tactics led to a quick reversal in Sparta's fortunes. So powerful did 
she become that intervention by Antigonid Macedonia itself was required to 
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ýh, C166rnenes_, ý re olme. 
ýotft, '&se "ý6tiý'oweclýýltheir', '-, Sud6ess, 'to'-'a, -, "ýýddiiiiiicr"ease ', m ,ý availible"ý 
ýa f, militaij irpan-power. The-` Achýead League-, experienced, 'ahi ihitial n 
expansion ufider Aratus, but SUCcesý was ý', to -dlploiiia. cyr6the`r', 
_ than , 'war. 
Indeed -ý Plutarch tells us that. af this time the entire - League 
had ý, only the 
military,. capacity equal to a single city. -At Sellasia the Achaean contingent 
was very small, surprisingly so when one considers what was at stake for the 
League at this battle. In comparison, after the mjisa reform League armies 
are markedly expanded in size. It appears that a three tier military system 
was instigated with the final measure being a full levy of the League. When 
this was done immense numbers of soldiers could be fielded; one need look 
no further than Mantinea, 207 B. C., for proof. When one compares the leap 
in military power made by Philopoemen's Achaeans to the Macedonians of 
Philip 11 the parallel is inescapable (71). 
The story was repeated in Cleomenes III's Siiarta. In Classical times the 
hoplites of Sparta had dominated the battlefields of Greece, but by the 
mid-Hellenistic period the basis of the city's military power, the SpviVarai 
class, had dwindled to almost nothing. Cleomenes, following the lead of his 
predecessor Agis IV, expanded the military manpower of Sparta by drafting 
the entire male population into the army. So radical was his reform that even 
Mots were given their freedom and allowed to serv6ý in the ranks. 
Cleomenes achieved this resurgence of Spartan military power by the 
introduction of the mdm. Sellasia, where the new army was defeated, 
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Aemofistiates,,, th&'ý`ýi6 "of ýtfý6, --phAýý,, 'tliit, ', '-co'uld'? I)i'field6d', ivith* em, S VA 
the swm gave-, the"s, 6'', cessI6.4lai&ri"p-ropo on of. fitarv Agam te ac__ rti its rm 
niifip6ývei base, thm the nu tary', ', sy Fm used, previousli (72). 
These* three powers shared I many socio , -e'c 
, 
ononuýc - iraiis just'before the 
introduction of the mdsa to their arrrýies. -There was a background of 
economic collapse or backwardness. The reform allowed large numbers of 
close-order infantry to be deployed; further the new szdw phalanx proved 
itself capable of at least holding its ground against the enemy. These parallels 
are less obvious when we examine the eastern Hellenistic powers, which 
drew for the most part on Graeco-Macedonian settlers for their sxA? phoroi* 
These settlers are often seen as relatively wealthy, but there are comparable 
examples of mass mobilization to those cited above. 
An example is the deploymenf of native Egyptians in large numbers by 
the Ptolemaic army just before the battle of Raphia in 217 B. C. The 
Ptolemaic dynasty had faced a continuous shoilage of European military 
manpower since, it first came to power in the later fourth century. For 
example Ptolemy I took 8,000 troops from the defeated army of Demetrius 
and settled them on Egyptian land in an effort to solve this problem (73). 
The equipping of the native Egyptian mvchhimiin 217 B. C. was'a reaction 
to a severe military crisis that ensued once the Seleucids began active 
preparation for war against Egypt. The dynasty attempted to hire mercenaries 
to make up its manpower deficit, but was forced to bring Egyptians into the 
army by equipping them with the sxiýwa. The mdsa was a symbol of 
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el Macedoiiian-, ý'do'rmnan6e., l'iti-ý, ýth6""ý'Eýýi'ýý-4hhd'; 'untilý,, ', ",, 217, -; B. C'., 'ý4, th6,,,, H' lehistic: 
I, 
e a&iIhihdkJ, monarchýýfiad, bý w pAtIouVof; _*67 
li 
'i, w in;, e,, so tj, reequipping tfie, ým h&ýo. M"Myyere, Wl'', li"'A tefinýsuccessiul;, 
native, resentment' and, e'ýentua ri revo t., For in the long-term it caused 
our purpose it is enoughAo note.,,,. that", the' ref6rmýallow6d access, to a 
previously untapped reservoir of manpower (74). 
There was n, o-, s, im- ilar evenf- in"- t-'h--e'-'- h'i-s-t'-or*'y-'o'f tifie"'S-ele'u-8d'' a-r r-y'. 'The 
history of the Seleucid army is very badly documented when one considers 
how active this dynasty was in the military field. There is great difficulty 
determining how the phalanx was recruited and the -only general conclusion 
we can reach is that'it was drawn from military settlers. However, when we 
do encounter the Seleucid phalanx it is always in very large numbers (75). 
The large number's encountered may be in themselves significant. From 
what we can tell, European settlement in the Seleucid Empire was not as 
dense as in Ptolemaic Egypt. The majority of Seleucid settlements appear to 
have been concentrated in northern Syria and along the Tigris and Euphrates 
valleys. To aggravate the situation the Empire was almost constantly at war, 
with subsequent attrition of manpower reserves. Despite these problems the 
number of phalangites deployed by the Seleucids was remarkably -large. A 
good example is the parade'at Daphnae, 168 B. C. The Macedonian phalanx 
on this occasion numbered some 20- 30,000 men, actually an increase on the 
numbers -deployed at Magnesia some twenty-one years before, 16-26,000 
(note Magnesia was a major defeat), after which the Seleucids lost all of their 
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recruiting grounds in Asia - Minor. So reffiark'a le', is' e that "some'. - 4 
.......... V 
authors- have been prom'pied: 'tp., ýrýgue. *ýhat'k'muC ýo '-t e-, ý a' e-., -p alanx-ý 
consisted of Orientals dressed: 'as' soldiers". to, improve D6sOit6'j this' 
opinion, it would be more logical to attribute thii-bu . ge r6seivoli, bUsAdiers' 
to the retention of the &2ds,? allowing anybody regardless of income to fight 
in the phalanx (76). 
The Antigonid - dynasty inherited the kingdom of "Pfiilip and Alexander' 
after the turmoil of the Diadochi Wars and the phalanx used by this dynasty 
probably retained the peasant background of its forefather. The Antigonid 
army is first encountered in the war against Cleomenes III of, Sparta, in 223-2 
B. C.. and periodically this force was sent home, probably to perform 
agricultural duties. Later Philip V faced problems maintaining the military 
manpower of his kingdom. He levied the youngest men of the population to 
face outside threats. He also appears to have attempted land settlement of 
Thracians in order to bolster recruiting. Perseus, his successor, may have 
reaped the benefits of this policy as he is recorded as fielding 43,000 men in 
the Third Macedonian War. There are also references to "free Thracians" in 
his army, perhaps settlers, much like the clerachsof Egypt (77). 
Clearly Macedon faced the same manpower, problems it had in the 
mid-fourth century. Although Macedonian armies had conquered the Persian 
Empire, any economic benefit either never found its way back to the peasants 
of the mother country or it was offset by mass migrations in the early 
Hellenistic period to military settlements in the lands of the richer eastern 
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""Antigo monarchies. - The mdm was nieded, -'hids W maintaift' e,, size,, o 
their the'ý', n-'ýwh, 6 , phalanx, and 
fu*rth6'r 
'N-, V11 I" 
? ve 
wielded the weapon-was 
"4 lvlý 
Philip IT. Once again the swm appears. to', be a bf fi, iel&ga'mass, o1 
proletarian soldiery. 
The examples quoted above deat with national trends or policies. - There 
is additional evidence in the form of rapid am-dng of large numbers of men 
with the &vim. In the Diadochi War soldiers called piatookwi appear; they 
are used by factions that worked out of an Asiatic base. They are said to be 
armed in the "Macedonian fashion", a common euphemism for sxiswphoroi 
(78). In the absence of European military manpower and due to the scale of 
the Diadochi conflict, perhaps generals were amling natives as mjimphomi 
just as the Ptolemies equipped, Egyptians in 217 B. C. This type of soldier 
disappears after the Diadochi period. Perhaps the troop-type had been made 
obsolete as a result of stable government and Eurgpean military settlement. 
In the later part of Alexander the Great's reign there is reference to an 
experimental phalanx that combined Persians -with Macedonians. The, first 
three and the last rank of each file of this fonnation were Macedonian 
veterans armed with the &visa. The rest, twelve ranks, were Asiatics armed 
with javelins and bows., Obviously Alexander believed that a phalanx of 
these troops could stand on its own in the line of battle, despite being only 
twenty- five percent mdm arined., The first three ranks were designed to 
keep an enemy at bay and the final phalangite was a file closer to keep the 
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formation together. It may be that this - exppýi' f o'ini'i'ti'b'ý`n ý was ý never,, 
intended to charge other close order foot, but it, ý, wOýld'ckarli-., s r P -O. 
viý- e, 
Aý the base off which the Macedonian' horse could operate , Thi , I, exa 
le 
demonstrates how few men inAhe phalanx needed be armed withihe mjim 
and still be expected to hold the line (79). 
Finally there are two examples of note from outside our period: the use 
of phalanxes of slaves by the Achaean League at the battle of Corinth and by 
the Pontic army of Mithridates. Both demonstrate again that the mjim 
enabled line-infantry to be drawn from the least privileged members of 
society, allowing very large numbers of men to take the field at any one time 
(80). 
The general conclusion that one can draw from this evidence is that large 
numbers of poor soldiers could bý deploy'ed. bythe introduction of the mim. 
This gave rise to a new type of mass warfare in the Heflenistic period. In 
general Classical arn-ýies were small, around 10,000 men, whereas Hellenistic 
armies often reached the 50,000 mark and it is not unusual to find armies of 
almost 100,000 men fighting. This was a fundamental shift in the balance of 
war and created a war effort on a "national" scale in a way that Classical 
warfare never did. The mdm had freed the military structure of the state 
from reliance on a small, relatively privileged sector of society and it allowed 
the manpower potential of the state to be utilised to the full in war. Further, 
as will be seen, this mass of phalangites, with worse equipment and in some 
cases training, was the match for the old hoplite. 
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6) anWtký" Dfilfdthýý& 
se 6164m" ih ln'oFderJoi, 6j' "' "ý' bers, oUclo" er'. 'i6ldkrs",, to,, ctive 1 6y, ý num' 
need properýorgarusation! a fidildrilL; Both, ý, 'we're,,, eiriployed;, in ejjellenistic, ý 
period for, regular troops, inc mg, 6 pbanx. - sec ion, ý we- wi In thii ti 
examme ý how', 'the", phalanx was orgarusedý -drilled , and the effect this had on 
battlefield performance. 
The main sources for phalanx organisation are three writers known 
collectively as "the tacticians". They came from n-dxed backgrounds and 
their works Probably derive from several common sources. Arrian was' a 
Roman governer and military commander of considerable experience who 
wrote in the second century A. D. Asclepiodotus is closer to our period: he 
was a philosopher of the first century B. C. Aelian, the third tactician, 'is a 
shadowy figure about whom we know almost nothing. These writers preserve 
some of the technical aspects of phalanx warfare and they had access to 
military manuals now lost to us. They'must, however, be used with caution 
as they obviously portray "ideal types" (81). 
Before we proceed it is useful to examine some of the basic tenets of the 
tacticians. All believed that the phalanx was the heaviest infantry type, the 
opposite of the p0oi - the light infantry. The phalanx was trained and 
equipped to fight at close quarters with the enemy. There is some confusion 
in the tacticians over the type of spear used'by the phalanx. Asclepiodotus 
wrote of the phalanx in terms of a formation equipped with the Mjim. Aelian 
is less precise: he recounts that the soldiers of the phalanx are do. %phoroi- 
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i. e. short spear or dt' beare Mwevýi; desýitiý'th6, "'Ob'vio'us'ý'imp'ilicýtion,, lt'-ý 
"qru 
rs 
is clear that Aelian, 'as'sunýid p"671iiik7, was umlm 
without ever dir6ctly'saying so, "Aman was, morelfif6rrn ,: per.;,, 
of his extensive, military experience and heýý distiýýuisfied be 
., 
', e,., - 
armed hoplite and the &vimphoroiof the later period (82). 
The tacticians are more in agreement when it comes to their main 
contribution to our study, an in-depth analysis of the organisatiOn and drill of 
formed infantry. The only problem is one of verification. It is probable that 
the complex system presented in the tacticians derived from the Spartan 
organisation of the Classical period as it is based on the file, with progressive 
numbers of files being linked to form higher units. The organisation 
presented by the tacticians is "square". The largest formation was a phalanx 
of 16,384 men, and this number was halved and halved again down the chain 
of command until a lochosof 16 men was reached (83). It is probable that 
the higher formations of this system are theoretical, since the figures are not 
easily divisible into numbers given for, phalanxes in actual battle accounts. 
Despite this, attempts have been made to match these theoretical units to 
historical references, one example being the a unit of some 4,000 
soldiers. It has been argued that two such units formed the Macedonian 
phalanx at Sellasia. It is noteworthy, however, that the number must be 
changed to 5,000 in order to fit Polybios' figures and this writer would argue 
that it is rather self-defeating to juggle figures in this way, and that the 
higher formations of the tacticians be disregarded as only theoretical (84). 
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It, is, easier', - to, 'kudy, " th6 f'sm'alkrýnits 'of'the-ýý441inx 
, viith the syvk? ýý'ý-, The"ý tkiýý ricoi-d that sUch' a unit -256"men stiong', 
V 1* 1,1 
f 
and often e4ýat6dl by-, v hist6fiahs", ývith,, a', ý ormati6n ý,: 'tall6d tb6'ý- s 
formation is identified by, rnanyýauthors'aslhe' basic-. unit, 'of inanoeuvre -6'th6 
Hellenistic , phalanx. Of special interest, are references to "alternate, 4whý' 
in our sources, a parallel - some argue - to the flexible Roman manipUlar 
Aegion. Thi§ line of arguinent will -be- followed'in full-later; suffice it to say 
here that the syR&gm.? often appears in Ptolemaic papyrii and that, as such, it 
was most definitely an actual rather than theoretical formation (85). 
Below this formation the . only important sub-unit was the file - lochos 
which the tacticians record was sixteen soldiers strong. The file was the key 
to the phalanx, both Classical'and Hellenistic, and was a line of soldiers led 
by a man of some experience. All drill movements that involved changes of 
formation were based on the file. The central role played by the Aochoswill 
become apparent below (86). 
The tacticians also'offer us some insight into the complex baffle drills 
performed by the mj7m phalanx. They were in the main concerned with 
methods by which the combat density of the phalanx could be changed. 
Three main spacings were used by the phalanx. A march spacing of four 
cubits per man was used to maneouvre the phalanx into action. To actually 
attack an enemy spacing would be reduced to two cubits per man. Finally 
there was a dense, defensive formation of one cubit per man (87). It is clear 
that these theorectical writings bear some resemblence to actual phalanx drill, 
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but; there is controversy' over the. - precise frontage -, ', '-! 'occ'u jpied,,. ý, bý"'ýJeach, ý'., 
phalangite. Polybi6s-, makes'a 1.1gession 
into ilid,, "fiatur f, " 
'for ce'n" the, later thirdlearly seconi t6ri'es', B. C. - He-'-recoi ;I 'i`, `whenI6 ed, - 
battle the soldiers of the phalanx were, spaced at two cu, b. it, intervals., H6 later 
confuses the issue by- stating that, each, Roman legionary would have to face 
two phalangites if fighting the phalanx head on. There is considerable 
--- modem discussion as to what Polybios exactly meant and the spacing of 
Roman legionaries at this period. Further, some commentators have found it 
difficult to accept a military formation where each man would form up on an 
eighteen inch frontage, the most dense of the three formations. Additional 
evidence comes from Polybios' critique of Callisthenes' account of the battle 
of Issus. There he says that one stade would hold 1,600 phalangites when 
drawn up eight deep and also appears to record an increase in the density of 
the phalanx as it emerged from the pass onto the plain in front of the Persian 
position (88). 
It is logical that some kind of loose formation, like that described in the 
tacticians, was used to move the phalanx from position to position when 
there were no enemy in close proximity. This would allow for rapid 
movement, crucial if one were to deploy large numbers of infantry efficiently 
on the battlefield. Polybios' account of the approach to Issus fits this general 
concept; however it is difficult to interpret his figures as he is attacking 
Callisthenes' ability as a military historian (note the academic discussion at 
note 88). The Macedonian army was moving through a narrow and rugged 
52 
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and fle Aility of. m inifit'would, h" ay,, '*ith'th6ý--. xi ovi, hýve be6n-j e. 6rc 
......... 
phalanx only-fo th&'Jifial, 'ý'ý approach'. ', ' 46 "'the ýTeisian 
, 
Tmingý4prqpe, 
position was imminent. It would "appear to be'reasonable to, thirefpre, ', accept 
the four cubit spacing for phalanx mOv6ment when there was little, danger of 
enemy interference. 
Two terms are used for the denser formations. Firstly, 
(which we will Anglicise as suaispismos), which means 'locked shields'. 
One rnýght be excused for believing this to be the one cubit defensive 
formation except that units on occasion attack whilst in stwjspAvo. % The 
second, -cv9vo'r'15- (Anglicised. Fukaavý) simply means compact, making it 
difficult interpret (90). 
pismosformation is often encountered in defensive situations, The sums, 
Livy, for example, often compares it to a wall. On one occasion he says the 
formation is like a Roman lestudo. It is testinfony to the strength of the 
six-aspismos that Livy should make such a comparison because Roman 
infantry used large body shields to form tevtado, whilst phalangites only had 
their small targets. The testailo formation is described in many of our sources 
as almost invulnerable given the right tactical situation. Finally SIM", . . PISMOS 
formations appear to have been formed by phalanxes who were on the 
defensive, although this is not a hard and fast rule (91). 
Logically the evidence for the san"pumos points to a very close 
formation. If 'one were to take the term literally then the shields of the 
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phalalanx would have to overlap, " or at leastý touch,, giymg_ýapproximately'A6, 
one cubit frontage of the tightest forma e ticians., ti6n 
Furthermore . this formation appears to 'have , 
been jen6rally, ý` only'- assumed 
when a strong defence was required. 
It is difficult to evaluate whether the attack formation of two cubits was 
a reality in Hellenistic warfare. We can speculate as to the possibility of an 
advance whilst in samspimo4 with locked peltm, or in the pab7osis 
formation. Certainly one would presume that the phalanx would have to 
loosen its ranks if it were I to move forward without losing the all important 
cohesion of its formation, especially as one would be carrying the battle to 
the enemy. It is, however, impossible to determine the spacing used for such 
an assault-formation except, perhaps, to say that it was probably looser than 
the sawaspismos 
Changes in the density of the front rank could be achieved by 
counter-marching and doubling. This technique was used in hoplite warfare 
and probably copied by Hellenistic armies. The tacticians say that there were 
three ways in which the phalanx could counter- march, the Laconian, the 
Macedonian and the Persian or Cretan. Respectively they allowed the 
phalanx to adjust its density by advancing towards the enemy, giving ground 
or remaining in position whilst at A times facing the enemy (92). 
The key figure in this drill evolution was the Iocha , gos 
He fonned the 
very front of of the file, lochog and hence the phalanx. To execute a 
counter-march or double the phalanx, either in or out, he simply changed 
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e, was, id7, I id6n`g" position'in'the, p4alanx whilsthii, 'fi]6-ý,! ýs'ýn'ýk"; ' behind him'ý H 
uf ile-,, '. clo' ýýmeWhi! bdiieeh,. s 'ýported in this by an 6ý'q 
neided to do was to kee allgqT6iit, ý-witli-,. ý'i6, ese, ý"twb', s6ldidi41h6'ý 
advantage of this system, w thit" 9 71, roP and -ýs 6f 
phalanx needed to be experieii6&l: `Soldiersý., - co, ur, se there were: proplems. 
The loch.? 'for example, were in an exposed pbsition and presumably the . goi, 
first to die- in battle. -Indeed-the tacticians--recommend, that the experienced 
soldiers be stationed in as many successive ranks back in the phalanx as 
possible in order to replace Ioch.? W, &who became casualties. Even so it is 
important to note that the majority of the phalanx did not have to be veterans 
for the formation to be effective. We have seen how many szdsa units of the 
Hellenistic period were mass formations composed of badly trained 
manpower. The loch, 9goiand oam, , goiwould 
have helped unite these peasant 
soldiers into an effective military formation (93). 
The most important disadvantage that came ftorn the use of lochwgoiand 
ourv , goi was 
the inability of the phalanx to face either to its rear or to its 
flank. The kchjýepiand oz=Woiwere pre cisely what their name implies, file 
openers and closers. The phalanx lost its ability to double or counter-march 
by simply facing to flank or rear. Complex evolutions of drill or wheeling of 
sub-units within the phalanx had to take place if the whole'infantry formation 
were to be realigned and as we shall see this was very difficult in action, to 
such an extent that the flanks and rear of the &visa phalanx were extremely 
vulnerable. 
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as,,: y I ýq` hive, ý seih, ý,, 1. ti, of, ` ý, ý, 'Jh6'pWanxias spW, mto, sub-, `, 'um 
yanous It, is'cle'ar; frbm'theý-tacticians-"a'n'ýd,, "ou'r, balik, 'a6counts thit th66,,,: - 
UY"'oU sýub-unitS -'performed', 'com lex", functior6virid i manoeuvres., -; The', *, -ma ion p 
x these, were wheeling and. marching to 
'create., 
pps. in t46. ý front. of the a an 
or to move from column-of-march to line of hattie. -A: secondary purpose was 
to wheel in place to realign the phalanx or face threats coming from 
directions other, than the-front. Thirdly, the, tacticians give a number of very 
complex manoeuvres, none of which appear in historical accounts. It is 
probable that many of these evolutions were part of standard doctrine and 
utilised at the orders of the sub-unit commanders, for example the 
sy, a1.? Sm,? 1arvAg as tactical circumstances dictated. Some of these manoeuvres 
and evolutions appear time and again in the sources. 
Firstly, deployment from column to line, which was not often attempted 
in the face of the enemy. The easiest method appears to have been employed 
by the Spartan army at Mantinea in 207 B. C. The army marched into the 
field, wheeled and moved parallel across the front of the enemy line. -At the 
appropriate moment the sub-units of the phalanx halted and wheeled to face 
the enemy (94). A second, more complex manoeuvre, was to peel each 
sub-unit successively out of the column and march it up to form a battle line 
adjacent to the lead unit of the army. This is described in detail by Xenophon 
in relation to the Spartan army and is seen in use in battle at Issus, 333 B. C. 
This manoeuvre needed a well trained and co-ordinated army; it was often 
used for deployment from narrow passes and the like (95). We can presume 
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thafthe' sýv of aý, HeHenisti6ý'plialitýx, -, 'ýi6ýld, p'e, "rf"or*"m"ýtlýi, ". 
The leading Sy'n&gm.? would" s owý'd' V HoWs,, wou oveýu 
either side of it as the defile widened -A 66 ftofit1wow 
-; 
'as a resu t, a'contint 
14 
gt maintained. A plialanx-would'hAve, taken up,, a,, cohsider'able, 4n'4 -'ý, -OU road 
when in column, and close control bUthe niovement:: of, units would have 
been essential if disorder were to be averted. It is noteworthy that at Issus 
local commanders performed the drill , without- prompting, from higher 
authority, the implication being that a standard drill was used. 
A variation of this drill may have been used on those occasions where 
gaps were opened in the ranks of the phalanx, an example being Gaugamela, 
where scythed chariots were allowed to pass through the phalanx leaving it 
unharmed (96). It is a mystery as to how this was achieved. Clearly reducing 
the density of the phalanx by counter-marching, would not have created 
enough room between files to allow through a massed chariot attack. If, 
however, we examine the options open to the pbalanx via information from 
the tacticians, we might conjecture a combination of Macedonian counter- 
march, pulling a phalanx sub-unit out of the line whilst retaining facing, and 
a wheeling movement behind a sub-unit to left or right. One could, in theory, 
create a series of avenues perhaps a sývjM? Smv wide. Chariots would naturally 
move into and along theseas they shied away-from projecting svimiof units 
to either side of -the gaps. The procedure could be reversed to reform the 
phalanx. This manoeuvre would have been very complex and the writer 
would argue that only the most experienced Hellenistic army could expect to 
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use, it. ', It is notýýr6ithý',, thýt'at', ýGaugameli, the. 'OlialiiL-ýýýwas, bn'ýei inlu 
tfieý'tac'fic -and "o'rderM to remain"' sileiit'to'-6iiýure'. 'the'ý'ýftýctiv'e', 'iian'snussi'on "Of, ',; ý 
orders. 
I 
'be used to order the phalanx for Finally 'sub-unit organisation "ý6ýld 
battle. In Hellenistic times an increasing use was made'Of 'complex plialanx 
formations. The tacticians themselves show very complex formations that do 
not appear in our histories, such as huge army wedges (97). Clearly a 
Hellenistic phalanx of tens of thousands could only have been deployed with 
a proper command structure such as that outlined in the tacticians. 
The tacticians give us an insight into the technical workings of the 
phalanx that would otherwise be hidden in extant battle accounts. Some of 
I 
the work of the tacticians is theoretical, but much is invaluble for our 
underslanding of the basic mechanics of miým warfare. With the writings of 
the tacticians at hand we now need to examine the mrim phalanx in action 
on the battlefield. 
D The Sadw Phalanx in Action 
In this section we shall examine the tactical changes brought about by 
the introduction of the smisa phakar to the ancient battlefield. In particular 
we shall see the &vi-w phalanx in three tactical situations, against the hoplite 
phalanx, against other mdsa armed formations and finally against the Roman 
legion (98). 
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y, ;, "4, "14 iputation,, of,, 4' lix-iiide6&': ý- hf 6vershadowed'ý by the r Great: ., -,, T e-, ý gemus; o 
Alexander and his spectacuiar, caTpaignsin'th6 east' as'. -. "in'th6'eyýs'bf:, SO*Me',, -, ', " 
- devalued the exploits later Helk icýarmies. geniial, ihebry has, - as a 
x result, been argued that the &vim phalanx OUPhilip and Ale an er, ý, wasý-a 
highly trained and flexible combat arm, but without the genius of these two 
monarchs and with a lack ---of 'tactical , imagination on' the, -part 'of - later, - 
commanders, the miim phalanx degenerated and became unwieldy and 
vulnerable on the battlefield. The argument continues to blame this tactical 
inflexibility for the final victory of the Roman legion over the Hellenistic 
phalanx (99). It will be shown how simplistic this theory is and how the 
&visa phalanx remained a potent force until matched by a superior tactical 
system, that of the manipular legion. 
The first period under examination is the early period, where the enemies 
of the mdm phalanx were hoplites and'the Persian army. Unfortunately the e 
rise of Macedon under Philip II is very badly documented and we can only 
conjecture as to the effectiveness of the new type of phalanx in action. We 
know that Philip routed the army of Bardylis early in his reign and some 
scholars have attributed this to the combination of cavalry and infantry made 
possible by the invention of the mdm phalanx. Others have argued that the 
use of the echelon was pioneered at this encounter, a tactic that later became 
common in Alexander's eastern war (100). 
The first main hoplite-mdsa clash for which' we have evidence is 
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'Chaer'onea, ý'338, ýB. CiTýts', ýýiiie has oeen'eiýýýn6d-ifi'd6tiiiýy, 96h6lars: whQ,.,.,.,,,, -;,, 
base"' their, ý 6ofidusion s 'on"' literary, sources, aiid'ýý&oiii 
battle"z c Ons ae iký 6ný 66- ttl", -'sqppose, on Iled of the". 
es 'out 'of withdraWal by the -Macedonian, ý to lure,, the'- drek'Y 
fonnation; into the resulting gap charged . -the, 
Maced9pia'n, cavalryý led by 
Alexander. Their line, punctured and the ranks of their phalanx disorganised, 
the- Greeký , were 'forced to -quit" the field. We -must, however, reject- these---- 
reconstructions as conjecture only. the literary evidence being too sparse and 
imprecise. It is, however, possibly significant that it was clearly the 
Macedonian cavalry which won the battle, and that the phalanx played a 
secondary role (101). 
A similar hoplite-s&F, ýw confrontation came at Megalopolis in 331 B. C 
(102). Here a numerically inferior Spartan army fought Antipater, Alexan- 
der's regent in Greece, to a standstill, Yictory only going to the Macedonians 
after an entire day of long and hard fighting. CurtiuS tells us of the ebb and 
flow of battle, a series of attacks and counter-attacks. The Macedonians 
appear resilient in defence, but brittle in attack - hence the, "see-saw" nature 
of the action. The Spartans appear to have been able to withdraw at the end 
of the day in relatively good order, despite the fact that their commander was 
very badly wounded and, their weapons slippery from sweat and difficult to 
handle. It is noteworthy that Curtius says that the battlefield was narrow and 
congested. One might conjecture that the Macedonians were, as a result, 
forced to fight without being able to use their cavalry to the full. If this were 
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""ri"hoplit' the case then the phalanx wo'uld'ha: ýe - had; 'to engage, the iSp. es 
aded thdr 6o frontaffy and this appears to have. degrý rnbafefiicieýi . 
'm'a ed ncy 
especially when advancing tO the, 'aftýaci 
The battles against the Persians are'difficult for us to evaluate as part of 
an overall Hellenistic context. Hellenistic am-lies did not face a foe like the 
Persian army of Darius III and perhaps the only contribution these examples 
make to this study is evidence for the mdm phalanx in action against Greek 
mercenary hoplites in Persian service. The mdsa phalanx played little part in 
the battle of the Granicus, in 334 B. C., which was won by cavalry who 
forced a mounted Persian cordon away from the river bank, whilst the 
infantry waded to the eastern bank (103). The battle of Issus, 333 B. C, is 
more informative. Again the phalanx crossed a river obstacle, but this time 
infantry,, some of it mercenary hoplites, ' opposed the crossing. One 
Macedonian taxig that of Ptolemaeus, was badly mauled - losing ten per cent 
of its effectives and being outflanked. On this occasion rough ground placed 
the mdm armed troops at a clear disadvantage (104). Gaugamela, 331 B. C., 
also saw the phalanx partially failing in its mission. Alexander contrived to 
create an army square to prevent the superior Persian cavalry from'encircling 
his army and attacking it from the rear. The Smisa phalanx formed the front 
face of the square. When placed under pressure, one phalanx &U. ýg that of 
Simmias, failed to maintain its alignment and a gap was created in the fine, 
into which rushed Indian and Persian cavalry. Fortunately for the 
Macedonians this cavalry passed right through the army intent on reaching 
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týe', Maced'oýnia'n"c"amp', ý',, 'thýus averting, the" disaste'rjof theýýOhalifiii being., taken,, 
in the rear. w st pinnýd jibntally".,; One'. m4st, " ali6 ý'add; `, 66iýe'ver; -, a, supTeme 
'cipj1fiid, ý"drilV,, 'where,, earlief., in., -a th6` phalank, had.,, example oVdis - -, -X I -. 
f, ýII . 1ý11 I 'Ie 
opened its, ranks to allow enemy chariots, to*, pass,. harml .: 
ýIy b4gh', to 
waiting lightý, infantry inside, the army square -0 05). At the' Hydaspes, 326 
B. C, the presence of elephants in the Indian army prevented the Macedonian 
'tdValry from assuming its normal- battle 'winning role, but the -phalanx 
managed to combat these beasts plus a large number of Indian infantry only 
after a long and costly battle of attrition (106). 
Several preliminary conclusions about the nature of mdm warfare can be 
drawn from the voluminous Alexandrian evidence. It is clear that the &2dsa 
phalanx could be a highly trained, precision instrument in the right 
circumstances. The anti-chariot tactic used at Gaugamela has been noted, and 
to this can added the use of drill evolutions to frighten Thracians early in 
Alexander's reign (107). From our survey of the. tacicians (see above) it can 
be ascertained that the phalanx was trained in complex drill procedures in 
order that these battlefield feats could be accomplished. It is also important 
to note, however, that the phalanx could very easily become disordered, 
placing itself in a very dangerous position. In addition the extra-battlefield 
activities of the phalanx in Alexander's eastern campaign must be noted; they 
mark it out as a premier infantry force. Despite this the battlefield record of 
Alexander's phalanx does not merit the modem opinion that it was a flawless 
machine that was never equalled, let alone surpassed, in the Hellenistic 
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warfare. 
The, many conflicts following Alexander's death, are collectively known 
as the, Diadochi Wars. A series of wide ranging campaigns were directed by 
generals who had served under Alexander - men who were thoroughly 
aquainted with the problems of mds.? warfare - and fought by an-nies whose 
core were Alexandrian veterans. Due to the massive increase in the size of 
the conflict, however, these armies were leavened by many new recruits 
being drafted into the ranks to bolster numbers. We have already noted how 
this was easily facilitated by the ease by which raw troops could be called to 
service in the &vim phalanx 0 08). 
The first battle under examination is Crannon, 322 B. C. This is perhaps 
the best documented hoplite-mdm encounter that has survived. Attention 
must be drawn to the size of the Greek army, some 40,000 strong, very large 
by Classical standards. It is not known what percentage of this force were 
hoplites, but the sources record that the quality and morale of the troops was 
high, as many ex-mercenaries flocked to the ranks of the Greek anny., It 
might be noteworthy that some effort had been made to concentrate such 
numbers of trained men, perhaps to offset the large manpower potential of 
the svisa-armed Macedonians. It is also important for our survey that the 
Macedonians refused battle after a preliminary cavalry skirmish was won by 
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The battle: proper is sin-diar to the ', outline- of Mejaloo6fis, left us by 
Curtius. By the day of Crannon intem'al, 'diýsension had reduced I Greek 
numbers to 25,000, to which the Macedonians had 40,000 infantry alone. 
Again a cavalry action preceded the battle, this time, however, followed by a 
major action. InitiaRy all went weH for the Macedonians as they pushed the 
Greeks back. However the situation stabilised as the Greeks began to fall 
back up a slope. The Greeks were able to dress ranks and the Macedonian 
attack was repulsed. Losses were 150 to the Macedonians, SW to the Greeks. 
The Macedonian army at Crannon contained many veterans of the Persian 
wars. It outnumbered its enemy, but even after initial success it 6iled'to 
carry the battle through to a decisive result. 
Crannon is the last battle where hoplite facedthe mriv phalanx. The rest 
of the Diadochi Wars and military history up until the intervention of Rome 
in Hellenistic affairs, in the later third century, are characterised by 
mdsa-svim confrontations. In the Diadochi period politics influenced the 
battlefield; for example it was common to see large contingents of an army 
deserting. Often this'led to one or both of the flanks of the phalanx being 
exposed, surrender being the normal result. There are, however, still many 
actions where tactics-and determination dictated the outcome of the battle. 
The first example is an encounter between Craterus and Eumenes in Asia 
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in numbers, a phalanx could not advance if its flanks were not secure. This 
was'not'the-me-in the -battle, between -Antigonus, and Alcetas in Pisidia-, 
320119 B. C Q 11). Here the Antigonid horse were also victorious in their 
sector of the field; however Alcetas' infantry managed to fight on despite the 
enemy's cavalry dominance and being outnumbered by the enemy phalanx. 
The best documented battles in this period were Paraitakene, 31716 B. C, 
and Gabiene, 31615 B. C. The sources differ as to what percenatage of the 
infantry in each battle were mdsa armed, so only. numbers for phalangites 
definitely anned with the &vim will be cited. It is clear, despite this, that 
large numbers of soldiers had been drafted into Ihe phalanxes of both sides, 
perhaps again pointing to the ease with which swý; rarmed infantry could be 
raised and deployed. 
At Paraitakene the Antigonid phalanx consisted of 20,000 men, of which 
11,000 were armed with the svis.?. Some of Antigonus' infantry were cafled 
. We cannot be certain as to the origin of these troops, but it is 
possible, that they were Orientals. armed in the Macedonian fashion to boost 
numbers (112). Facing these were 17,000 men under Eumenes, 11,000 being 
"imphomi 0 13) . Eumenes' force included 3,000 hypaspists and 3,000 
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Alexander's guards, and they prýovedto: be a, f6ýce. to. which"'Antigon ,uIs, 6d 
no answer (114). Diodorus' lengthy account of tlýý'b aýttiýý'. de"votes little to'the 
infantry fight but it appears that the erFle centre of Eumenes' army smashed 
clean through their opponents and carried the day. Overall, numbers were in 
Antigonus' favour - although we cannot be certain of the true ratio of 
swimphoroito other infantry. - ParaitAkene is an ex-drnple bf-qidgity prevailing 
over quantity. It is also important to note that the cavalry action on the wings 
went very much in Antigonus' favour. Perhaps, however, the ferocity of 
Eumenes' infantry attack did not give Antigonus' horse time to threaten the 
enemy s rear. 
Posterity has not left us any, figures for the numbers of combatants at 
Gabiene. Details are given for each contingent in Eumenes' army and it is 
therefore possible that his army was approximately the same strength as it 
had been at Paraitakene. No details are given for. Antigonus' army except for 
references to various units during the fighting. All we can, say with 
confidence is that Antigonus' infantry were deployed in the centre. 
The victory of Eumenes' 8ffle phalanx at Paraitakene had had a severe 
effect on the morale of Antigonus' men and this was reflected in the crushing 
victory inflicted on the Antigonid centre, 5,000 being killed. This caused 
Antigonus' army to break up in flight. Victory was stolen from Eumenes by 
the well-known defection of the argymspides after the capture of their camp 
by Antigonus' cavalry (115). Again the value of highly trained veteran 
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The next example is Gaza, 312 B. C., fought'! ýýtýeen I Pernetrius and a 
Ptolemaic force under Ptolemy I and Seleucus: (116). It is clear from 
Diodorus that Demetrius' phalanx was of superior quality to that of the 
enemy and that it may also have had an advantage in numbers. Ptolemy and 
Seleucus, however, overcame this disadvantage by winning an overwhelming 
cavalry victory on one flank. Once stripped of its flanking supports, 
Demetrius' Phalanx surrendered; these soldiers were taken back to Egypt and 
I 
settled there. 
The largest battle of the Diadochi period, Ipsus 301 B. C., has only 
survived in fragments Q 17). Plutarch's account is perhaps the best, but it 
concentrates on the hero of his work, Demetrius, and so covers only the 
cavalry action of the Antigonid right in any detail. Two points are important 
for our analysis. Firstly, the allies expected to lose on their left flank and 
deployed a chain of elephants to seal off this wing and protect their infantry 
centre. Secondly, the centre of the Antigonid army may have fought on after 
its left was uncovered by a successful allied cavalry assault. Demetrius was 
prevented from intervening in the centre by the elephants, whilst the allies 
rode off the field in rash pursuit. Clearly the two wings of a Hellenistic army 
had to , be closely supervised to ensure a proper envelopment of the 
vulnerable flanks of the phalanx. 
Throughout the Diadochi Wars campaigns were fought in Greece, but 
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again morale, and - leadership were, important, factors 0 18)., A more detailed 
account has survived of Pyrrhus' attack on Sparta (119). As Pyrrhus' army 
- apprbached their city7, th& Spartans-c-ohstructed -a- defensive -barrier of -wagons-, 
buried up to their axles, with a ditch in front. Pyrrhus assaulted this barrier 
repeatedly with his infantry, called hoplites in the sources but most definitely 
mdm-anned. However, on this occasion a defended field fortification proved 
impenetrable to a mdm Phalanx. 
We now jump forward to the later third century and our primary source 
now becomes Polybios. A soldier and statesman himself, he provides us with 
first class evidence for military operations in the period up to Pydna, the 
closing date for this studY. 
The first encounter of the period detailed in Polybios is Sellasia, 222 
B. C. (120). Sellasia was-the decisive battle of the Social War, fought on the 
one hand between Macedon and her Greek allies and -on the other the 
Spartans under Cleomenes Ill. The first problem is the size of the MdM 
phalanx deployed by Cleomenes, after he had reformed his army and 
introduced the mdm to many of his infantry. In particular Plutarch tells us 
that he expanded the citizen body of Sparta by taking the most promising of 
the jmdo. 
&oiand equipping them with the new weapon. At Sellasia. pedoikoi 
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Polybios' statement, in two 'ways': -ý'eithei', "alteinatifig 'ý blbcký, ' of 
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being an: exclusive, Jboydy, the'ý flexible 'alternate-sý, mizkm- formation, each 
perhaps one - behind'the- other., If the ý former is correct then ý we -can go one 
step further. Certain baffle accounts may point to SUb-units of mdmphoroi 
beirfg afixed, witif -peltasts'fif -the -Alteinate; ýspevrat* formation, thereby-giving- 
the flexibility a normal phalanx lacked (see below p. 91 on Pyrrhus' Italian 
battles). If this is the case, then the cha&asp6des are mdmphorol. ' 
Alternatively the chdl", pides are, like the Illyrians, peltasts and this 
interpretation is influenced by the general argument regarding the equipment 
of guard units with 'coloured shield' titles, outlined above. Briefly many 
historians believe these guard units were highly trained peltasts and, as we 
shall see, there is evidence'that the peltast of the Hellenistic period had 
evolved from being a purely missile armed infantry type to a semi-heavy 
troop type skilled at shooting and hand-to-hand combat. To summarise, 
therefore, either the chj&jspides are mnkrarmed troops intermingled with 
Illyrian peltasts to produce a flexible phalanx formation, or they are peltast 
troops - once more n-dxed with the Illyrians or they are a separate body - 
still in the "altemate-. vpeh-d' formation stationed to the rear of the 
Illyrians, armed either as mdmphoroior peltasts. 
To solve this dilemma, the scheme of deployment for the entire allied 
right must be taken into account and the following reconstruction is most 
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logical and shows'the -cha&iýpjqýý were, on . -this 
'occasion 1tasts. -,. Fiistl' 
ibn': th'.. ly nd although deployed in the , altemate-s. hý format e, II nans, a 
cI7,2&,? sp, ides were deployed as separate contingents. Polybios states that the 
Illyrians opened the action, so they would be in the van, the ch.? &aspides 
peltasts following immediately behind them. Following them were Acar- 
nanians and Cretans, ikowbkai and bowmen respectively; then came the 
A'&ieafi§, in-resifV6 - (124). -The *plan of operation was one of attrition 
followed by a break-through attack by the Achaeans, who were hoplites. The 
serni-heavy troops would have advanced to pin the Spartans in position, 
either by hand-to-hand righting or missile attack. Their fluid formation - the 
alternate-speimi-, and their tactical doctrine - as semi- heavy troops -, would 
have protected then from the powerful mdm phalanx. Added to which the 
ground being fought over was broken, ideal terrain for semi-heavy or fight 
troops. In addition the jw7oifoffning the. third rank could shoot a barrage of 
n-ýissiles over the heads of the two lines of peltasts, the Spartans being a clear 
target on higher ground than their intervening friends. Finally after enough 
confusion had been caused, the Achaean heavy infantry could advance in an 
attempt to push the Spartans off Euas. The writer would argue that this tactic 
was employed because of the very strong position held by Eucleidas and the 
risks that would have surrounded an unprepared frontal attack. The writer 
thus believes that the chj&isppides were peltasts. 
So much for the numbers of miisaphoroi present at Sellasia. What can 
the battle tell us about the tactics employed by the two &visa phalanxes? 
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At this point'Polybios criticises Eucleidas' handling"of--, t, li6 -'situation. ' He 
says that a limited attack should have been ordered, - thereby disr'uýpý'ting, 'the 
allied battle-plan and their formation, which was so suited to their equipment. 
Then the phalanx should have made a righting withdrawal back to the crest 
of the hill (126). This tactical advice appears sound given the situation that 
existed on Euas. A rapid advance down the hill would have disrupted the 
phalanx's formation, but this would not have mattered whilst opposed by the 
peltasts and p&oi only --a point which supports the conclusion that 
were absent from the alfied front fine on Euas. Once, however, 
this advantage had brought the Spartans to the Achacan hoplites waiting in 
reserve, it would have been time to fall back; hopefully the bad terrain would 
hinder the Achaeans as much as the Spartans, blunting their attack and giving 
Eucleidas the time he needed to reorganise his line. 
Instead Eucleidas chose to hold the crest and it was here that the battle 
for Euas was fought out. Eucleidas' motives are not clear. Perhaps he felt 
safer uphill of the enemy; perhaps he was following defensive orders issued 
by the king. Polybios says that the Spartans were eventually pushed back due 
to the weight of their enemy's formation and their peculiarýarms (127). Does 
this support the conclusion that the front two lines of the allied force on Euas 
were semi-heavy peltasts? Or is this an argument for the challospidew being 
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broken, ý Polybios specifically refers to the. allied b6n-`ý fr6sh'ý'aM 
ordered - as one would expect with semi- heavy troops (128). - The; Spait*, 
on the other hand, chose to fight on the crest and may have had the majority 
of 'their--hien- on ! he reverse slope "thereby negating ýdVdntage-of --g-roui-fid 
whilst incurring the disordering effects of an uneven battlefield. 
Analysis of this event relies on our perception of the allied attack. If it is 
assumed that a frontal charge was made by the allied troops, then it is 
difficult envisage how peltasts forced the Spartans off the hill by 
hand-to-hand combat. Polybios accounts for the allied success by their use of 
a special formation and tactics, so it would be more realistic to reconstruct 
the allied attack as a series of fluid and controlled actions conducted by 
sjxhTi' In this manner the Spartans would have been wom down by missiles 
and then engaged by smaH units moving in and out of combat, sections of 
their phalanx might have been drawn out of position and the tactical 
cohesion, that was critical to the phalanx's survival, may have been broken 
up. Eventually the weary and demoralised Spartans would have fallen back, 
accelerating the collapse of their formation. Eventually the phalanx would 
have broken in flight. As we shall see later, the battle on Euas may have 
presaged the tactics later used against the phalanx by the Roman manipular 
legion. 
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punishment dealtbut by the combined allied force attacking them. Once their 
spirit was broken they fell apart, retreated and eventually fled. We note that 
---Polybibs' initial-advice Was thaUFeombifie&arms force like'that'approaching- 
the Spartans on Euas needed to be pushed away at all costs. Here Polybios 
emphasised the vulnerability of an unsupported phalanx. 
Events on Mount Euas had an immediate effect on Cleomenes' men on 
Olympus. Loss of his left wing forced Cleomenes to launch an attack with 
his phalanx. Our sources are contradictory as to the timing of this attack. 
Polybios has Cleomenes order the attack after he has heard of the defeat of 
his brother; Plutarch has the advance begin before this, i. e. with no outside 
factors affecting Cleomenes' judgement (129),. Polybios, as the primary 
source and due to his reputation, must be preferred. In addition we must note 
that the cavalry attack in the centre, launched by the allies to stop a move by 
Spartan jz&oi, was still developing and Polybios adds this factor, into 
Cleomenes' decision to attack. Clearly it was very possible that the left flank 
of Cleomenes' phalanx could be enveloped by victorious allied soldiers. Here 
we see a basically defensive posture broken by a change in tactical 
circumstances. Cleomenes did not want to attack, he was forced to. 
Cleomenes' men tore down the barricade that covered their front, the 
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two advantages, numbers and ground. Polybios; also adds that the courage of 
the Spartans told in the right. However, eventual-ly their attack ran out of 
inoinCntu-m and th6-battk'-slowly began to'go'agairist -- them. -- Especially 
important was the formation of the Macedonians. Polybios says that 
Antigonus was able to close his phalanx and depth became the deciding 
factor (130). This may be a reference to the formation of szwaspismos As to 
how the mechanics of the change operated we can only conjecture, especially 
as the Macedonians appear to have completed the evolution whilst in combat. 
Perhaps the forward ranks of the phalanx fell back and compacted into those 
behind, a difficult but not impossible manoeuvre. Of especial importance in 
Polybios is the compacting of weapons; obviously it was crucial that as many 
mdsaiengaged the enemy as possible. 
The general conclusion that we can make from Sellasia is that the 
smio-armed formations were extremely reluctant to advance and engage 
each other; further that the attacker was at a disadvantage, even with ground 
and numbers in his favour. It seems that by merely moving forward, a 
phalanx courted disruption of its formation and hence disaster. Secondly, in 
the right circumstances the phalanx could be defeated by lighter troops using 
fluid, combined-arms tactics. The tactical equilibrium of a phalanx could be 
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Our next example is perhapsý,, th&', "clasýsiq. s,, swm-, 'cofifr_o-n_, - 
tation, Raphia, 217 B. C. (131). The Seleucid. ai, id"P'to"Ilem, ai , c. armi, 6"that 
of troop-types that fought at Raphia were large and contained a'multipliCI 
fought together in a complex tactical scheme. The respective md-w phalanxes 
were only part, albeit a large part, of this scheme. Raphia has been viewed by 
some modem commentators as an example of the decline of the quality of 
the wim phalanx since the days of Philip and Alexander: we shall keep this 
theory in mind as we examine the tactical role of the phalanx at Raphia. 
Polybios' account of Raphia concentrates on the two commanders and 
our primary area for study, the infantry combat, is badly recorded. Thus our 
perception of the role of the phalanx in the battle is prone to distortion. The 
two armies were deployed in three sectors, two wings and a centre, the 
phalanxes being in the centre. Generally the right*wings of each army, mostly 
cavalry, attacked and drove their opposite numbers from the field. The 
phalanxes then fought, victory finally going to the Ptolemaic army. It is 
noteworthy that the phalanx of both sides stood whilst their wings were 
stripped away, Polybios appears to think this unusual and worth recording 
(132). It is also important to note that as at Sellasia the two infantry 
phalanxes spent a lot of time inactive before finally being committed. 
There has been debate over the numbers of miimphoroi present at 
Raphia, the Ptolemaic phalanx in general and the equipment of the Seleucid 
77 
"by. sc oars, % ut',,,,. argýmp, ide. v MR, This- debate has received much attention,, ' h"I"' b" 
all that needs to', be said"hire is thii, the, -wn'ter sU'vitiorts th6"'a'rgým'6ntt'i"o'r',, 
"t", 
larger figure on the - grounds that Tady, of the- 11 Ptolernaic",, 
ý, 
r J. 
newly-raised Egyptian mvclztýnoiand a large Ptolemaic ph la 
been needed to overcome the veteran Seleucid infantry. As for the 
. zrgv=sp. ide-5; they form part of the general argument surrounding Hellenistic 
guard units (see zboveý--page 69). Despite this, it is probable, that- the - 
&r&rjsp. ides were armed with the smim, and took their place in the line as an 
eRe phalanx. 
As has been said, the record of the infantry fight at Raphia is brief. 
Polybios says that the Ptolemaic phalanx, under Andromachus and Sosibius, 
lowered svimiand charged. They broke the Seleucid line after a short fight, 
the argymspides putting up stiffest resistance (134). Polybios implies that the 
infantry only came, to blows after the action on the wings had been decided 
and that the Seleucids received the Ptolemaic infantrY attack at the halt. 
The reasons for the victory of the Ptolemaic phalanx are hard to 
determine given the paucity of evidence for their part in the battle. Numbers 
were obviously important and often the reader is given a false impression of 
the size of the two &visa formations, especially with regard to the Ptolemaic 
phalanx, with many modem commentators concentrating on the settler and 
Egyptian contingents. The Seleucids deployed 5,000 Greek mercenaries, 
10,000 jrgj7" 
. Wpidesand 
20,000 Macedonians, all armed with the &2dsa. On 
the other hand the Ptolemies had 3,000 Libyans, 20,000 Egyptian machimov, * 
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the &mm, a total 6f, 56,000 (135). Th'er'ef6ýeý, th6, 'T'iti6-, bf: 'phýlanx", 'was nearly.,,,,.,, 
t three to wo in faý6ue, `of the Ptolemaic,, anny.,, h6Weýii, 'ýiiinimber' 
that a substantial part of the - Selucid'- line, ý was, - formed,, of ý-'the eWle 
,? r, V=vp. ide-g whi-Ist many of the Ptolirnaic 'phalanx were newly - recruited 
natives. This may have offset the Ptolemaic army's predominance in 
numbers. 
We can observe at Raphia the same reluctance to commit the phalanx 
until circumstances left no other option. Polybios' account shows the 
phalanxes still facing one another after the cavalry actions on the flanks, 
despite the fact that both wings had been cleared of supports. The situation 
was, however, different from that facing Cleomenes at Sellasia. At Raphia 
the battle was not going against Ptolemy; if anything one might describe the 
battle as a draw at the point when his phalanx was committed. It is clear that 
Ptolemy saw the clash of the infantry as the decisive action of the battle; 
hence his appearance with his men in the centre. It may be that he feared the 
superior cavalry forces possessed by the Seleucids, for they had more 
cavalry, especially light cavalry suited ý to pursuit. The imminent return of 
Antiochus' pursuers might have motivated the assault in the centre in order 
to win the day before the enemy could intervene with their superior mounted 
arm. It is clear from Polybios' account that he thought the fight in the centre 
to be of supreme importance - hence the vignette when Antiochus realises 
how rash he has been and that he has lost the battle. Again the phalanx battle 
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ivas- forced on one of the conýnariders. 
Why did the Ptolemaic iý, fantry win? Firstly, -the Ptolemaic 'army 
possessed more smiqWhorov, who could have been, deployed in two, ways., 
Either they retained the same depth as the Seleucid infantry and overlapped 
their wings, or they were in a deeper phalanx. Of the two, the latter is more 
likely to be correct. Depth was the safest option for the raw troops being 
used by Ptolemy. Furthermore, it was not the task of the phalanx to envelop 
enemy wings; it was too clumsy. Outflanking moves were the responsibility 
of the lighter support troops deployed, as at Raphia, on the wings of the 
phalanx. Therefore the Ptolemaic phalanx probably had an advantage in 
depth. Secondly, it appears that the light infantry deployed to the right of the 
Ptolemaic centre took advantage of the developing tactical situation, better 
than their Seleucid counterparts on the opposite side of the field. These 
troops may have begun to envelop the Macedonian settler phalanx on the left 
of the Seleucid line as the battle progressed (136). Such a manoeuvre would 
have had a severe morale effect and would have disrupted the formation of 
the phalanx. This being the case, the Ptolemaic foot may have struck an 
unformed phalanx, compensating in full - and more - for any disorder they 
may have incurred in, their advance. Such a hypothesis is bome out by the 
reference to the argyiapides being the last to flee. Not only were they rErte 
troops, but their flank was secure until the settler phalanx fled. Thus, from 
what little information we have, Raphia demonstrates the importance of 
depth and the vulnerability of the flanks of the phalanx. 
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Ueýj ifial, confrontation. that , 
has 'surviýed', ý in' ', Mail from' , our", 
peri6& is the',, battle of, ý"Miýiiiýia. ý,, 207, -ýB. C. -ý(1'37). *, ". 
"-, 'Pýit6ý6tý, -m6n sýýnerly 
under, ", ' YT t re rmed 'ýAthae; in airnyý mei"'ýýný",. ",,, -d6feated,,, the., Spaitafts-, * t" "an 
Machanidas. As, with, many of the , battles, of the period if is, - 
difficult ý. to 
determine the, preciýe numbers'of sanýqphoroi, present., At -MAntinea it is 
probable that the bulk of the heavy infantry deployed by both sides were 
irffi6divithAhe mdm. ' Eviden6e -6n- be f6iýrid f6fthis iri the - general'6rdei to- 
lower mjimz, given to both phalanxes during the battle (138). This being the 
case Mantinea is unique in that both sides deployed reformed phalanxes. 
Again we cannot be certain of the number of men that stood in the ranks 
of each phalanx. In fact we have only one reference to numbers for this 
encounter: Plutarch recorded that there were 4,000 Lacedaemonian dead. We 
can, however, give an approximate figure. Both sides deployed armies of 
about 20,000 men, of whom, respectively. 12,000 were phalanx (139). 
The Achaeans deployed their army first. The phalanx was mustered 
behind a ditch which stretched the length of their centre. As the obstacle 
would have made any advance disorderly and dangerous, to say the least, we 
can only assume Philopoemen intended his phalanx to have a purely 
defensive role. This conclusion is further supported by Plutarch's assertion 
that the Achaean phalanx formed in compact order (140). 
The Spartans marched on to the field and deplo I yed into battle formation 
directly from road column. Machanidas then deployed a chain of light torsion 
artillery pieces along the front of his army. Some commentators have 
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i ted'this verallfblinýý to besiege th6ý- town ,,, of Maritinea inter*- -'as part of ý`afi, o" 
itself. -'Walbank, however, hisrijht! ý, "'*n&ýa i6t N4iýhaiiidiý'iri6výd'6ut'6f, 'hiý, -, 
pad rniikýi H bast at Tegea only after the'Acfiae`hn'ir! py, 'j 
have regarded the chance of, an encoiinter. battle before-h Ie *ý cduld'ýet, d614 to - 
besieging Mantinea as high. Polybios mentions the artiflery twice', -once 
during their transport to Mantinea in wagons, secondly when they were 
actuaHY set-up foi theldtfl-604D. - 
Furthermore as the Spartans moved directly into action from column of 
march, we must assume they transported the artillery fully assembled and 
ready for action. This was very unusual because it was not until the Roman 
invention of the cheh-objff&tj that siege artitlery was routinely moved in 
righting order. Hellenistic weapons were normally either dismantled for 
portage or constructed on site by work gangs directed by skilled engineers. 
Mantinea is not an isolated example of artillery being used in the field - for 
example Alexander used such weapons in his crossing of the Oxus - but it is 
very unusual (142). 
We must assume that the weapons deployed by Machanidas were light 
bolt shooters, the large stone throwers of this period being too heavy to move 
across country in wagons. Such artillery consisted of anti-personnel weapons 
shooting a bolt three sparisin length, very'good at shooting men, but almost 
useless against city walls. As such we must conclude that Machanidas never 
intended to use these weapons against Mantinea itself and that he planned to 
use them in a set-piece battle. 
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The'Spartan army mýi6hed -6nio the field oU Madfinia' I swýeiping` across 
the fro'nt'of the waitinj Achýeaiis'- ltýý then, halted"afid, 'each, sub, -umt ", whiý616d 
ca to, the'right to face the enemy. ', Od'to f6rM theI 
e did not interfere with this manoeuvre, probably- due, to A 'e' fe 
arrangement of their army discussed above. Machanidas' army'perf6nnid 
this drill'with great precision, so-much-so that a detailed plan of action may 
haVe -been Affanged'before-th-ey -* e-v-e-r 'redched the field. That being so, - wd -- 
shaU examine the positioning of the Spartan artillery'and the repercussions 
this might have had on the tactical role intended for the phalanx. Machanidas 
placed his machines in a chain in front of his army ý and as a result his 
phalanx could not advance; doing so would have 'masked the guns', so to 
speak. The placement of the artillery, so painstakenly, brougbt to Mantinea, 
indicates a, static, defensive role for the phalanx. 
Therefore it appears that both commanders envisaged a defensive role for 
their svimphorm, at least 'until a tactical breakthrough was achieved 
elsewhere. Philopoemen perhaps wanted a stalemate. 'ý or at least to force the 
Spartans to attack at a disadvantage. Machanidas, however, out-thought his 
opponent. When the Achaeans'saw the bolt-shooters, they were astonished 
and at a loss what to do - it would have been revolutionary to encounter so 
much artillery on a battle field. These weapons could have shot down the 
men of the Achaean phalanx with little risk of reply. Ancient bolt-shooting 
artillery was greatly feared by soldiers, since no armour could protect a man 
from missiles launched from even the lightest bolt-shooter. Further it is clear 
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from the ceý th* t ýtich,, 'weýpgiiýýgr'eatlyýoutrini6dýtheýýfiiissiles, "6fý,, ýý ýour a 
The tactical. Oans' of the,, two- donunafidefs appear-. 46 in dic'a'te, thk!, both 
r ifiidaý expected an`esseiitla1lý ýtýeic'-ý'difiiisiveýrole'ior, b6thýphalýn'xeg""' ah 
hoped, to stiri the Achdeans into'action, and the battle. be 9 gan, with'a reaction 
to this unforeseen threat. The Achaean phalanx could not expect to advance 
across the ditch protecting its front without fatal disorder, making it easy 
prey to its- Spartan -dounter-part, s6"Philopcietnen tent -forward -the left wing 
of the Achaean army to out-flank and roll-up the Spartan artillery. 
Unfortunately this attack was repelled and put to flight by a swift counter 
attack by the Spartan right, which left the field in hot pursuit. 
Polybios records that the Achaean phalanx was deployed in 'alternate- 
s, wzr, v" (143). On Us occasion reference is clearly made to an organisational 
and tactical division within the phalanx as a whole. Other evidence points to 
the high standard achieved by the "new model" Achaean army in these two 
areas. Plutarch tells us how Philopoemen drilled and exercised the soldiers 
and also refers to -the parade drill and military evolutions of the Achaean 
phalanx at the Nemean games (144). The quality of Philopoemen's phalanx 
might have been achieved in two ways. Firstly intensive training might have 
taken place immediately after the mdsa reform. Alternatively the phalanx 
might have been bolstered by a core of permanant iNle troops, references to 
which appear elsewhere in the history of the League (145). Either way 
. 91 Philopoemen's phalanx at Mantinea was able to deploy in 'alternate-spe"m 
and to use this flexible formation effectively in the battle. 
84 
41- 1 17 
Thý's'ourcis'are; cnti6ýlý,, 6f), th6! SpArL-inýtyiý4t! Mýýhifiid; iý1 for, ' failing: 
V "w rally his rijhý_- from -'pursuit., _it,, `against. -, th6, i 6kp6ýid 
Achaea h'' le np alanx. C 
known' to-ancient wriie'rs'. ý' We., ý'ihouta"ý-"n'ot6ýý'ý, how'e'ver, "thýt", th6, ': Iiýc ar' 
formation of the-A'chaeaýn'in ýii Thil - p&ih6' - t6 wheel, a, Mlosbf fantiýý'allo_, `_ý' d'' oen 
his phalanx to cover his exposed left. The special 'alternate-soch-al 
f oiiýkion alI_o'w_ed-tSe_* sub'-unifs- of _66' ýliýIiiii"i6-ýfiiýo'e-'u-v'r-e'lndepeiidently 
without causing disruption to the line of battle as a whole (146). Plutarch 
takes this manoeuvre one step further: he says that the telosof the phalanx 
actually outflanked the Spartans and fell on their exposed right, but this 
movement is not mentioned by Polybios and is therefore suspect (147). 
Rejection of Plutarch's account of the actions of the left of the Achapan 
line is further'supported by the sequence of events that follow in Polybios. In 
Polybios' account the manoeuvre of the telos was overtaken by events. 
Orders' were issued for the rest of the Achaean phalanx to advance-, 
presumably over the ditch, the detached teloswas joined by remnants of the 
defeated Achaean left and it seems that this combined force was going to 
support the advance of the phalanx - we must assume at this point that this 
telos had moved beyond the'boundary' of the ditch. 'Perhaps Philopoernen 
wanted to ease the crossing of the ditch by threatening the enemy's exposed 
flank. This combined attack on the Spartan phalanx never came about, as the 
Lacedaemonians took matters into their own hands'by launching a vigorous 
attack on the Achaean infantry. They appeario havi become carriedaway by 
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of theirýi left:, 'afid, crosý t' the Idit6h, wit 6ut, or ers', "disoid6ririg-! the success"' 
ofl e. anger, of cfossiýgthis-bý6'1 y os. cein their formation. ý Pol'bi was aware 
the face of enemy resistance, And he 're, cords"thit'the, Lace&em6nians"iýir6 at 
first worried'at this prospect, but onceAhey fia d' started their; move Ahey had 
no alternative, made light of the ditch and continued their assault. The 
Achaeans lowered szdmiand put the enemy to flight. If we were to accept 
Plutarch's record of the flanking attack by the detached telosthen we- might 
insert it at this point in the battle account. As, however, Polybios is silent on 
this point, the writer would prefer to ignore Plutarch and place the emphasis 
for Achaean success on the disorder incurred in the Lacedaemonian phalanx 
by crossing the ditch (148). 
Three major points can be made regarding the role of the phalanx at 
Mantinea. Firstly, again we encounter' the phalanxes of both arraies in 
defensive roles. The Achaeans deployed behind field fortifications and the 
Spartan made use of artillery, both requiring p stationary phalanx to be 
effective. Secondly, the flanks of each phalanx were important. In the case of 
the Achaeans superior training and organisation. allowed their flank to be 
secured after an initial Spartan success which had caused wing supports to 
flee. It is perhaps important that the armies at Mantinea followed the normal 
Greek practice of the period by deploying very few horse. Had Machanidas, 
had available a mounted force like that used by the eastern Hellenistic 
powers he might have been able to take more advantage of his successes on 
his right. Finally, the phalanx was at a grave disadvantage once it became 
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disordered. Once the Lacedaemohians had - been disrupted - by, crossing, the 
ditch they felI easy prey to the waiting, orderedAchaeans. 
We now come to the period of Roman defence against Pyrrhus of 
Epeiros and the Republic's expansion to the east. During this period the 
szdsa phalanx faced a new threat, the manipular legion. Eventually the 
Hellenistic military system succumbed to that of Rome. During our survey 
we shall discover how the mjisa phalanx was largely unable to defeat the 
legion in battle. We shall see that the tactics of the phalanx were fatally 
flawed when faced by the mobile and flexible legion of Republican Rome. In 
order to understand the threat posed by the legion we shall make a general 
survey of its equipment and tactics. 
The Roman legion that faced and defeated the Hellenstic powers was 
composed of three lines of heavy infantry supported by detachments of 
javelin-armed fight infantry. In battle the latter were deployed as a screen in 
front of the legion. At the appropriate time this screen retreated to the shelter 
of the legion's main body as the battle came to hand-to-hand righting. The 
first two lines, the h"6dand pii; 7cipeg were equipped with a large body 
shield, a scalum, and armour - the type varied from man 'to man. Tk 
offensive weapons of these two lines were a number of heavy javelins, pik, 
and a sword. In battle these soldiers would advance on the enemy aild 
discharge a volley of pila into the enemy's ranýs. They would swiftly 
follow-up with the sword to take full advantage of any disorder caused by 
their missiles. The third rank, the hi&4, used similar equipment to the first 
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qpg, thfiisting, 'spqar,! for', the, "ýýi1j. ".. -This, two lines,: _ýýcFpt'that it, ýubiii 't6d` I"" 
9d, or krielt, in iesýer'výe` 'u"'n't'll, it, 'w'a"'s"'fi'e'ý'd"ed, -t6'bo stert ea yanceý ines, -,, 
line sto 
'itývictor y The kýioý at'thisý fýýifit; in , small 'sub'-, `6iuts', 'of: 'ffi-en, or explo 
or maniples, in a chequer-board'forindtion. -This 'allowed,, for ifidivi dual 
movement during sword fighting. Further the maniples could infiltrate enemy 
formations and fall back through one another, if pressed. The "concertina- 
like" -ability* of the legion gave it great endurance in battle as maniples could 
replace each other during combat and maintain the freshness of the men. 
Finally the legions had been tested to their full in the closing years of the 
third century by the Second Punic War; it was veterans from that war which 
formed the nucleus of the armies that fought Philip V and Antiochus III 
(149). 
tII. 
The first confrontation between legion and phalanx, came at Heraclea in 
280 B. C. Our analysis of this battle is complicated by the use of Italian allied 
contingents by Pyrrhus of Epeiros, some of which might have been tactically 
intermixed with his phalanx. The details of this battle are few, especially 
with regard to the role -of the - &vimphorov. In the battle the Romans are 
portrayed as very aggressive: they stormed across a river and carried the 
battle to the enemy with such vigour that the forward elements of Pyrrhus' 
army seem to have been taken by surprise. The Epierot phalanx was held 
back in this initial phase, the brunt of the Roman attack being bome by 
cavalry. The phalanx was only committed when the forward mounted 
elements, were driven in by the Roman attack. This stabilised the situation 
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casualties; vereý, er, aitac, appýoiifiikely, the,, ýsame 'k, 
fbr,., ý6ih"s'ije's, ý". 'Iý-14, '00'men, I an,, unusuai,, occurence, ýin, *'ancient"ý'W-, ýifýi6ýýý41tig 
frorii Heriadea that, we derive, &ý, p '-'f)wj., c-'vlctory ý0). --Agamthe 
phalanx was held in reserve until, tactical, circurfiýtances forced it into action. 
Once committed the battle swayed to and fro for some time, six times we are 
told. A general-note is the-tenacity and -staying power of the lqimmiz, a 
tendency that wiH become a common occurence in our study. 
Pyrrhus' next confrontation with the Roman legions came a year later at 
Asculurn (151). This encounter can be compared with the one at Heraclea 
since the Romans had obviously Icarnt some lessons from the first battle. At 
Asculum. the Romans occupied broken and hilly terrain, with a river running 
across their front. They were clearly attempting to neutralise the Pyrrhic 
cavalry and perhaps the elephants. From our standpoint, however, it is also 
useful to note that the legion could fight on such rough terrain, whereas a 
phalanx would have fallen into grave difficulties. This tactic caused stalemate 
on the first day of the battle, the Romans fearing to leave their position, 
Pyrrhus to enter it. On the second day Pyrrhus contrived to lure the Romans 
down on to level ground, where a hard battle of attrition was fought, victory 
going again to Pyrrhus as a result of an elephant charge. 
Several points emerge from the ancient accounts of Asculurn. Firstly, 
Plutarch tells us that the Romans did not have the room either to avoid battle 
or to shift to meet attacks (152), the implication being that the Romans 
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would, "fiofifially-. -, using. maniýýlai, *'iýste'm',, ý;,, '-",,, have'ý,,, % 
manoeu. vrid'. ou Jifi'ei&iý. 'situatibns- 'ý'ýAf, ýAse'uluiii, '-,: how6verý ested,.,. - 
6ttle" I e4e, re leldlo, rced them to- meet th6 ý'Phalinýý h6ad-: 6fi'., -- ftifthermor' 'told 
Yfthic''heavyi antry, W6re'the that" the Ro'mans wanted to destroy"ttid, 'P'' 
dreaded elephants could be bought up. As a result' the legions threw 
themselves onto the enemy line with little regard for danger. They failed in 
, __ _ __ -id. ih AI . -- I_. - f6y_-p6t' up" a I-ong -hard struggle, an e egions were 
already recoiling when the elephants were brought up (153). The phalanx 
was used in an essentially pinning role for another combat arm, the 
elephants. We must also note that the phalanx made a better right in defence 
on the second day of Heraclea than it did on the first. 
Plutarch tell us that Pyrrhus led forward his force in dense array at 
. 
-p. ismos Polybios adds that Asculum, implying use of pz&nwis or sunas, 
Pyrrhus deployed equal numbers of Italians with his phalanx, intermixing 
them in "altemate-sfieiýjl'. The normal interpretation of this is that Pyrrhus 
tactically intermixed lighter Italians with his heavy phalanx, copying the 
flexibility of the Roman manipular system met the previous year at Heraclea. 
This tactical ý innovation is seen as a radical step forward by many modem 
commentators, despite the fact that Polybios goes on to say that the 
formation was useless against the Romans. Indeed such a formation - if it 
was actually used in combat - would only have served to disrupt the serried 
formation of the phalanx recorded by Plutarch. 
There is also a problem with the equipment of the Italians troops to 
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whom Polybios refers. For the 'flexible-ýhalanx"thepýý, ýohýV6, 'ailiy,,, "crecienceý: 
these Italians would have to be peltast-type'troops,, a coficltision, the- sou , rc . es 
do not necessarily support (154). The only evidence for'the'equipTent, bfý the 
Italian contingents in the battle come from Dionysios of Halicarnassus 
record of Pyrrhus' order of battle. Dionysios records that the large numbers 
of Italian troops in Pyrrhus' army were deployed and fought in separate 
contingents, but no mention is made of any special formation. Turthermore it 
is clear that many of these Italians, were heavy infantry and some perhaps 
mtisj armed. 
, Dionysios tells us that the Tarentine contingent was called Aeucaspides 
and these men may have been re-equipped with the swim between Pyrrhus' 
landing in Italy and Asculum. Many of the other Italians were probably 
boplites; a rrýnority would have been peltast-type troops, notably those 
soldiers from the mountain regions (155). Therefore, even if Pyrrhus did use 
Epeirots and Italians intermixed, he may simply have been mixing Italian 
phalanx units with Epeirot in order to bolster the morale of the former. 
It is difficult to reconcile the accounts of Dionysios, Plutarch and 
.9p Polybios as to the use of "altemate-speimi at Asculum or any of Pyrrhus' 
battles. If this formation ý was used then we need to examine the motives of 
Pyrrhus. Either Pyrrhus was experimenting with a flexible phalanx or he 
intended to bolster the raw Italian soldiers by intermixing them with his 
Epeirot veterans. In either case one should assume that small units would 
have been the basis of , this mixed formation, perhaps sw&Smjtj or the 
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nt unti, ' 6es *, i not,,: support, suclf., ý an`, -, -, - equivale' 
assumption, since he ref6rst6 lai ans. - je c6fiti' 6nts, ofJtali' 
'lace his"refeTence' to tfi6ý! ýa'ý svevw. Finally Polybios does' not p Iternate- 
in any specific moment in Pyrrhus' campaigns; Ascuium'is aýsumed to" h aý', 'V'e 
been the point at which the new formation was introduced because it is- the 
most logical candidiate. Heraclea can be rejected because it was the first 
meeting of legion and phalanx, and Pyrrhus would have not had the time to 
digest and copy the manipular system; Beneventum also, as it was fought in 
wooded terrain and on the march, the phalanx had a hard time in this battle 
and the tactical situation did not lend itself to experimentation. Asculurn 
remains, therefore, the only logical opportunity to test Pyrrhus' new phalanx 
tactic. Despite its logic, however, this argument for the timing of the 
introduction of the new formation is still conjecture. Polybios wrote about 
Pyrrhus' use of the "altemate-sfieiral' as part of a technical digression and 
may have drawn upon information lost to modem scholars; for example we 
know that Pyrrhus wrote a technical treatise on warfare (156). Polybios may 
have been making reference to a theoretical formation, one which was never 
actually used in the field. 
The evidence for Pyrrhus' introduction of a new phalanx tactic is 
therefore scanty and contradictory. Polybios may refer to a formation that 
existed only in a technical manual. None of the accounts of Pyrrhus' battles 
make any mention of a new phalanx formation composed of small, 
interlocking units of phalangites and peltasts. The sources imply that large 
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,ý"t A" 
units of phalanx fought si s al" 6ý,, r, e "is I 
, 
qe-bY7 ide in the tradition panner. -As't 6 
in4n3 exant historical support for PolýbiOS ref6renceýJo.,,, t 
of Pyrrhus' battles, we must reject it as' evidence'' foi, a`rei6lutionir ', phManx, -,,.,, 
tactic designed to overcome the cumbýrsome nature of the Dhalanx -,, and 
imitate the tactical flexibility of the manipular legion. 
Pyrrhus' final battle against Rome came in 275 B. C. at Beneventurn, but 
it tells us almost nothing about phalanx warfare (157). The battle was fought 
through wooded terrain, probably by the specialist light units of Pyrrhus' 
army. One might speculate as to how important a role the legion had in this 
encounter, and if even manipular tactics aHowed heavy infantry to right in 
such unfavourable circumstances. 
The legion next met the phalanx in the Second Macedonian War. In the 
intervening period Rome had fought and beaten Carthage in the Second 
Punic War. The armies that invaded Greece and met Philip V in battle were 
tough veterans of this war. This factor should not be understated in our 
examination of tactics in this period. 
The first encounter of the war was the stonning of the Aoos pass, one of 
the main highways into Macedon from the west. As a mountain pass, Aoos 
was obviously broken terrain, and Livy also states that the defile was 
wooded. He records that this terrain hindered proper use of the phalanx, and 
in particular he specifically states that the phalanx needed an open, flat 
battlefield to make use of its 'very long spears' (pmeloafflývhisds) and 'wall' 
vallum) of shields. It is clear that Livy believed that the strength of the 
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Joe ed.;,, ýs e s, 4jpe phalarrx derived from--its, "'hi'ld'"" 
san-? sp_, =os(l58). 
had, b&n't r-amin I gýdu _-ffie % Livy'also re'co'rds'thai, Philip s,. men 
t6 tfi Rom of 199 B. C., but despite this he also no hý ibý'n&a g 
of discipline in the fighting in the pass. Ftirthermore he statei-, that the 
Romans had better body protection, perhaps indicating an unarmoured 
phalanx on this occasion. To offset these Roman advantages, the 
Macedonians held a strong defensive position, which they reinforced by 
placing artiHery to cover the approaches. It must be noted here that Livy 
makes no mention of any difficulties that the phalanx may have had in 
holding such broken terrain and we might speculate that the phalanx needed 
to be stationary to hold the pass -a role that would easily have fitted. the 
tactical situation. Again the phalanx is deployed in defence, on this occasion 
stationary on terrain that would normally have disrupted its ranks. 
At Aoos the Macedonians gave their philanx considerable support. 
Along the flanks of the pass they deployed pjilm, * who combined with, the 
catapults to create a beaten zone in front of the line of, svisv. Philip held to 
this defensive plan, even failing to exploit a substantial local cavalry victory, 
and the Romans were forced to assault this position for several days. They, 
however, sustained heavy casualties and failed to break the phalanx frontally. 
The attack on the Aoos pass was not a set-piece battle, and it was logical for 
Philip to defend such a position. Despite this, however, Livy's narrative 
makes clear the effectivenes of a properly positioned and supported 
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phalanx. The main encounter of the'ýecond Ma'cedonian' warwaý, fou& 
at Cynoscephalae in 197 B. C. The - battle was'not . planned butesc'ailaýed 
from 
a skirmish between advance bodies of both annies. As a result'Philip V's 
mjim phalanx was not forM'ally deployed; rather it was fed into action as the 
battle developed (159). 
The battlefield of Cynoscephalae was dominated by a large hill, on 
which the Macedonians positioned their line. The hill, which lent the battle 
its name, initially concealed the movements of the two opposing forces, a 
factor which was exacerbated by bad weather. As a result the first encounter 
of the action was between opposing light screens. A skirmish took place 
which ebbed and flowed up and down Cynoscephalae. At first the 
Macedonians managed to hold their own, but eventually the fight swayed in 
favour of the Romans. It was at this point that Philip began to commit his 
phalanx (160). 
The phalanx marched to the field in column and as Philip had little 
I 
intelligence as to the progress of the righting on Cynoscephalae, we must 
assume that his infantry followed normal Hellenistic practice and was 
moving in the most dispersed of the phalanx formations with six feet 
between each man (see the discussion above at note 88). The phalanx would 
have marched with a very narrow frontage and with each sub-unit strung out 
one behind each other. In particular the loch.? goiwould have been in the 
front ranks with each sub-unit being many files deep; the Aochvgoiwould not 
have marched along the flanks of the phalanx. 
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As the phalanx entered the battle area, and thýl situatio& bo6came., cleaf to 
Philip, it was deployed for action. The mec6nics of 
unclear. Polybios says that the leading ranks occupied, the head of the'ý piss,, ' a 
defile wbere the road crests Cynoscephalae, inunediately tumed to the, left 
and were inserted into the line of battle (161). Taking note of the march 
formation of phalanx, this manoeuvre could not simply have meant the 
colUmn moving onto -the hill, turning and snaking along the crest -and then- 
once in position each man turning to face the enemy. Some driH must have 
been used to pull the phalanx from its route-column into battle formation 
whilst placing the loch. 7. goi in the front rank. Two alternatives might 
reconcile Polybios' account with our knowledge of the mechanics of mdsa 
warfare. Either the phalanx marched along the crest, as suggested above, and 
each sub-unit wheeled to the left and into the line. More probable, however, 
is a drill known to Xenophon and used by Alexander at Issus, which fits 
closely with Polybios' statement that units were ipserted into the line directly 
the lead unit had reached, and presumably halted on, the crest. This 
manoeuvre, would slowly convert column to fine as each unit moved to take 
station to the right of its leader (162). The latter is more consistent with our 
knowledge of phalanx drill as it would have allowed the phalanx to deploy 
without presenting a flank to a victorious enemy and form with the Ioch,? . goi 
in the front rank. 
At this point in the action the right wing of the phalanx was deployed 
into a line of battle facing the Romans. We must assume that it retained its 
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miich, density -of sLifediii: maii Og h, "dis6tiýgion"at'ý6i6 88). ý-Th& j eý 
Mac , edonian s eiii, 'ý, 'still ',, r-, ightifigk býlow'ýýthe, *philaiii,, 'ýt-,, - thý, *3 f 66t', -ý" bV, 
Cyfioscephalae'O then Roman -,,. pressure r 
from our accounts that these s'oldiers"did'n-o''t R6ý. thi6ugh'the,, 0'ý'iajarix; ý'rat'lier 
they veered to pass around - the, right flank of'the, ý phalanx (163). We might 
conjecture that this was forced upon thepsiloiby an absence of gaps between 
sub-uruts in the pfialanx, or because of the complex ma'noeuvres being 
perforined by the phalanx at this point in the action - see below. 
The phalanx now readied for combat, and here Polybios' account 
becomes difficult to understand. He says that says that, "... he ordered the 
peltasts and the phalangites to double their depth ( 'ro^L,; 6e-uXTacrxaL,; ý%aL, 
and compact to the right ( Y9T ýakakkf .0 tTat;. -raQqyywz 8waaaw'itew To pq'ooý 
% 
YaL: cuxvouv S. IL TO 8eýw**A" (164). This manoeuvre is very 
difficult to understand, but clearly its intention was to prepare the phalanx 
for combat as Polybios' account immediately follows on with the order to 
lower mdmiand charge the enemy who were by this time almost upon the 
phalanx. Walbank interprets it to mean that the Macedonians doubled the 
depth of their phalanx from a marching depth of eight to a righting depth of 
sixteen and then reduced the frontage of each man from six to three feet by 
counter-marching or compacting (pu, &aa. This conclusion is, however, 
difficult to reconcile with the situation. Given that the phalanx had arrived on 
the scene in column-of-march it would have already been in a deep 
formation prior to this drill evolution, negating any reason to double the 
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kide s--. `6Uth&jiin6us,,, r phalanx as, Walbahk`su e Itefnativ61Y*, "Ih6-ýý c6mm gg sts. 
pl sub-units haajaken it upon V. f6i, battl&'6ý 
soon as their respictive sub-7,. units hid taken iiptheiv position, on, e cres o 
'ii6nIwh6i64, the. Cynoscephalae (described above), reýmovi'ng'ý'tlý6'ýdiiU"ýýýli. 
phalanx's depth was reduced from that of a-, - column-of -march to'ý a combat 
formation from Polybios' account. After all we have already seen how quite 
complex manoeavres were the responsibility of the lower-echelon comman- - 
ders, for example at Issus. However, once again a discrepancy arises: unless 
these sub-units commanders had been incompetent the phalanx would have 
already been in fighting formation making Polybios' reference an iffele- 
vance. The problem arises from Polybios' simultaneous reference to doubling 
the depth and compacting the front of the phalanx: both appear exclusive 
terms i. e. one reverses the other. Therefore unless we are to assume that 
Polybios means that the Macedonians doubled the depth of their phalanx by 
countermarching, only to immediately undo the. action by compacting, we 
have to look elsewhere for a solution, and that lies in marrying what we 
know about Hellenistic drill nomenclature with the -tactical situation on 
Cynoscephalae. 
Asclepiodotus gives an alternative interpretation for doubling (165). He 
records that the drill could be used to extend the front of a phalanx with the 
intention of outflanking the enemy. This being the case Polybios' account 
makes sense and the action of Cynoscephalae can be reconstructed as 
follows. The phalanx had moved into position on the crest of the hill (see 
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d above). Howý ., with, ' -th6zflighV', 
`6fAhi 
beca"me critical; "note'! tfiat"P" HE` ýc us ene'm"Y`,, ýý 9 Y, IPS -Y 
toflo 
troops were' foý. thi main , 
Mac6doiiian': Iiý'e"'-. ý, The, ý'ýhýlAýki exte '. fidid" i6lio'nf to 
the right to prevent an enemy envelopTg. ', miý, 6euvre., Presumably,., this. was 
done by each -sub-unit moving individually ýby wheeling and marching, a 
dangerous manoeuvre given that it would probably partially expose the 
_flaiiks'Of the sub-unffii to thi--e-nimy. Once in its new position the phalanx 
realigned its facing and compacted to assume its attack formation. This 
interpretation of events is supported by the fact that Philip formed the 
remnants of his skirmish screen, which included peltasts - troops that were 
ideally suited to covering the phalanx's flank -, on his right. Also the second 
half of Philip's phalanx was in position to deploy to cover the exposed left of 
his already engaged right flank. Livy's account.. for what it is worth, records 
that the phalanx was reinforced to prevent the battleline being broken 
referring to some action by the Macedonians. to avert disaster. Finally, 
Plutarch supports the case that the phalanx was properly formed before it 
charged; he records it formed in szo7aspismos To summarise, Polybios refers 
to a drill whereby the phalanx was shifted sideways to protect its flank; a 
dangerous, but not impossible, manoeuvre in the face of the enemy and a 
testament to the training of Philip's troops (166). 
Having deployed, the phalanx began its attack, in smaspismosformation 
if we accept Plutarch's evidence. The order to lower miimi was given, 
misunderstood by Livy, and the phalanx advanced down the hill. The weight 
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6f'thieýphilanx,. and their' _gpeciýf,, formafi6& f6 ,i 6ed I the Roman'jiii"! biick, - e- but 
d Id" i not breaVit, 067). -, 
It-is at'this battle began to , 
move in favour. oft1he', gomans. ppint. that 'the 
phalanx arrived, On the- left, of the , Macedonian armp the s'eco, 
nd"half of the 
but this force could not deploy quickly enough and Flamininus, the Roman 
general, launched a rapid attack with his right. His Aegioflani followed up a 
preparatory attack by elephants and the phalanx broke and fled, hardly 
striking a blow, caught as it was undeployed and disordered by a combined 
arms attack. Polybios stressed the poor command control of the Macedonians 
on their left; other sources point to poor terrain (168). It is worthwhile to 
contrast the performance of the two wings of the Macedonian army. On the 
one hand the right, which was under Philip's personal command, reacted 
rapidly to a developing situation. This half of the phalanx quickly assumed 
its compact formation from a column-of-march by a series of complex drill 
evolutions. It attacked the Romans with vigour, reversing a tactical situation 
that had almost been lost. On the other, the left was forced by its late arrival 
- one assumes it was the rear half of the reinforcing column - to enter the 
battle unprepared. We must note, however, Flamininus' tactical foresight at 
this juncture. He realised that the phalanx had to be attacked and dispersed 
quickly before it could form-up. In order to accomplish this he prepared the 
way with elephants, creatures that would have caused havoc amongst 
unprepared troops. This initial attack was then exploited by the legions, who 
swept the phalanx from the field. Here the strength of a properly formed 
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phalanx is contrasted rnark6dl ", 4it Ahe weakness, of; iinform6d. 'sýziiý*&rbi. 'ý 
Finally the actions of the Mk6domafi, right;, a( Cynosceoliaýa-: proves, it was- 
possible for the phalanx to engage', in rapýd,,, 'and'ýpcc6ssfidl'drill'evolution in 
the face of the enemy. 
As the Roman right followed up its victory it outflanked the victorious 
Macedonian wing. As the opportunity arose a Roman tribune detached the 
rear units - one assumes bixii- and directed them at the unprotected rear of 
the Macedonian right (169). All military units regardless of tactical doctrine, 
weapons etc., are at a disadvantage in such a situation and the phalanx broke 
in flight. We must note how vulnerable a "Aa phalanx would have been in 
such circumstances. Its men would have been locked together in their 
compact formation, and it might have been simply impossible for many men 
to turn to face this new threat. 
To conclude, Cynoscephalae underlines how dangerous a phalanx was to 
an enemy facing its front and how utterly weak it was when attacked from 
flank or rear. We must also note that on the Macedonian right the phalanx 
attacked, much like Polybios recommended Eucleidas should have done at 
Sellasia, and that this attack was conducted with the phalanx locked into the 
pmInosisfonnation, or even sim, 7spismo. 5; if we are to believe Plutarch. Until 
now we have highlighted the defensive attitude of phalanx conunanders. 
Cynoscephalae proves the phalanx could carry the battle to the enemy if a 
commander so wished. A cautionary note must, however, be sounded here. 
As at Sellasia, Philip V was faced with a deteriorating situation, and as such 
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e -3ai6ia'teJ,, j his infantry assault'rfi4y, hq` y-e: -4 b" ep,, ; ý. ýqFumý anc 
design. Further, this'ýattý6k'. -, w'a's', ýni"6't,, 'eýntirely;,,. ýsuccisýf6l:; it, sqg)ii,,, raii,,,. '. but. ", -, 6f-, - 
impetus and ground toa halfat , thefp6i'ýiý, 
iýý, hiff,, ThýI. Roýba'n'left, ýwasa e 
h -1ý -I to absorb and contain, this' attaci, `. ' of ý4he, ýph4anx,. 'ý` Per! ýýPýA eý, -manipular 
formation saved the, day- here,,, and eventually. the fleX'ib I ility-of'the legion 
gave Flan-dninus victory - the best example of this being the detachment of 
part of the legion to attack the rear of Philip's win'g, a-feat certainly beyond 
the capabilities of a Hellenistic phalanx. 
In 198 B. C. a Roman force was besieging the town of Atrax. An 
important incident occurred during the fighting which demonstrates the 
defensive capabilities of a phalanx when it could right in ideal conditions 
(170). A phalanx held a gate against a Roman attack whilst deployed, 
according to Livy, in caneag a word translated as "wedge" or "deep 
formation". Wedges are encountered in Hellenistic warfare as army, not 
sub-unit, formations and thus we can be certain that Livy meant here that the 
phalanx was deployed in a deep formation. The Roman infantry, which we 
must assume were legioRazii, advanced toward the phalanx and discharged a 
volley of pib into its ranks. Livy says that the phalanx was like a lestudo and 
the voHey was totally ineffective (171). This is curious as the Roman thsAudo 
was a close square in which the leginamiAeld their shields in such a manner 
as to cover all the sides and the top of their formation. This task was in part 
facilitated by the large body-shield, the scat=, carried by republican and 
early Imperial Aegina&7Z The Macedonian phalanx, as we have seen, carried 
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a small., buckler;, a 
lestudo. - Livy' obviouslý, 'ý,,, "dois'ý, 'ri6t, 'ý, m6ýii7, ýtbt, ýýt era y-,,,, jm,, 
ti6swer teslado, rather, tiiat'whilsf, m,, 5ý, 16,66n6l"Me 
; 1ý 
e, maU,, muchIke'the A round strength, of 'the do. th "s 
carried by the swimphomi would, have, - had -'iý6at., 
difficulty in stopping, an 
armour piercing javelin such as a pilvm. A closer reading, of Livy reveals 
that . the ý; iý . of the phalanx'- may'have - helped m. deflectmg nussiles. Liv Iy 
may be implying that the suaispivnos formation presented such a hedge of 
swuwto the'front, five per one and a half feet of front, as to deflect missiles. 
Polybios tells us of a similar phenomenon: the rear ranks of a phalanx held 
their mdmiat an angle to deflect missiles falling on the phalanx (172). The 
six, upismos, formation may have, therefore, been able to protect against 
missile as well as hand-to-hand attack. Further, if the smaspismos could stop 
a weapon as effective as a p, &m then what chance had a fight missile, javelin 
or arrow, of reaching its target? 
The incident at Atrax. is important because it shows the phalanx in an 
ideal defensive position. Livy makes the point that the phalanx was fmnly 
ensconced in the gateway and that the Romans could not manoeuvre to out 
flank it. Such a position demonstrates what a supremely strong defensive 
formation the phalanx was. 
The next battle of interest is Thermopylae, fought in 191 B. C. (173). A 
Seleucid army, of approximately 10,000 phalangites and a small number of 
cavalry crossed to Greece in 192 B. C. and was joined by Greek allied forces. 
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Thý '446mawmarc ifit6, the inýd 'aýff py 
it "own;,, Bfief1j., it, ",. c6iiýiry"ý't"the'ýpass"at-Ther"m"o'p"yl; a6'. ---, -Thiý bat6fi6id-"' 
p ýfiojj by s'ea, "on, the'--'§iopth, ý,, b "n , ta , ins.; Jhe' tictical is; &otectid, on, the n6rth 
situation was much like that faced bY -Phi4, VafAoos. 
Livy and Appian have both left aI eco=6 of the battle, but they diffe IriIn 
detail, particularly the role and activities of the Seleucid phalanx. Both agree 
that a fortification was thrown across the pass (174). This construction was 
substantial and artillery was mounted on its ramparts to shoot over the heads 
of the troops deployed in front of it. According to Livy the phalanx was 
deployed around the fortification, but it is clear from his account of the battle 
that only part of the phalanx was actually at the wall; most must have been 
deployed in front of the wall as later in the narrative they retreated into, the 
fortification. ' Further in order that this could be accomplished successfully 
gaps of some size and/or number must have been left in the wall (175). - 
Both sources agree that light troops were jeployed in'advance of the 
phalanx. These eventually retired and Appian wrote that the phalanx 
separated to let them through. We have already met this drill in the 
theoretical writings of the tacticians and in action at Sellasia. At 
Thermopylae either the pv, '1oY retreated through gaps between sub-units or 
along files when the phalanx was in its loosest order. Either could be the case 
as the phalanx was not being actually engaged when this manoeuvre took 
place. The important point here is that the phalanx could use a drill evolution 
to allow p&oito pass through its line (176). 
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The sources diverge once the battle pr6per, began. ppian s accoun 
places' the entire phalanx in front of the wall and'Ihis narrative 
rests on this assumption. The p&oi retired: through the phalanx which then 
closed its ranks to form a compact battle line; presumably either pukhodý or 
sanasp. ismos was formed to meet the Roman attack and the Romans were 
thoroughly frightened at having to face so many spears (177). The legions 
could not-penetrate this line frontally and it was left to a force under Cato 
which used a secret path, much like the Immortals in the Persian Wars, to 
outflank the Seleucid position. The phalanx broke in flight as soon as it 
discovered its predicament. 
Livy's account is somewhat different. Only part of the phalanx stood in 
the open to meet the Romans. They, with missile support from troops on the 
rampart and to their flanks, easily repulsed the Roman assault. As pressure 
increased the phalanx slowly withdrew inside the fortification. As with 
Appian's account the eventual appearance of Cato in the Seleucid rear caused 
the defence to fall into disorder and flee. It is noteworthy that Livy 
emphasises how formidable the line of svimi were in defence;, he says that 
they were like a wall (178). 
The two accounts probably derive from the same source, perhaps lost 
portions of Polybios. They are only generally similar, recording two versions 
of a Seleucid attack, followed by a circumspect retreat and defence. Certainly 
such tactics would fit those recommended by Polybios at Sellasia, although 
the ground upon which the two battles were fought is different. The writer, 
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hovýev6r; m6uld 
feat ta The- fortifi6tion, of 'the, pass ', 'Would, hivi bien', 'a', fbimidable,, -, 
'after , "gr6A effbit one engineering and could ý6hly -, haý'ý6, '- býeri. ', built'. 
would have expected it to form an'important part of"the. -Seleucid'battle plan 
an&only Livy gives it such a role. It is therefore logical'that Antiochus 
intended a tenacious defence, rather than any attack that might have gone 
wrong and compromised his phalanx. Both -accounts, however, 'refeF to -a 
serried line of mjimias being the key to a strong defence. 
The Romans followed their victory at Thermopylae with an invasion of 
Asia Minor under Lucius Cornelius Scipio (later Asiaticus). This campaign 
culminated in the battle of Magnesia, 189 B. C. (179). Appian and Livy again 
provide our narrative, both deriving from a common source - probably 
Polybios. 
Livy's account concentrates on certain critical points of the battle and as 
a result we are left with a rather distorted view* of events. In general Livy 
leaves us with the impression of a battle of very short duration. His account 
opens with an attack by. and the flight of, the Seleucid left. Fugitives from 
this debacle fled towards the still intact phalanx, which held the centre. These 
unfortunates attempted to gain shelter in the phalanx but were hindered by 
the long spears Cýpmeloqrg,? rzzw- h"taawi) of their comrades. The legions 
took advantage of the confusion caused by this, they closed in and hurled 
their pili into the disordered ranks of the phalanx. Elephants, which had been 
deployed at intervals in the phalanx, were wounded by these missiles causing 
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thý, ý nimals" to' b&orne'ý n6on d:. iinto', 
-that, confýs6d`ina'ss and swept th6., ýhalariiff6m- the,: field.;,, Liýyý, ', ie'c6rds -mo 
Mkýdonians, mere, ki'lled on, thi's `, day:. -thýn, i "a'ny-', oth'e'rýý'e, ncouýtei,,, b'o,, tiýýen-' 
legion and phalanx. 
Appian follows Livy closely with the rout of the Seleucid left, but here 
his- story diverges; in particular, the role of the phalanx in the battle is very 
different. He records, like Livy, that elephants were mixed into the phalanx, 
making it look like a city wall with towers. He also criticises the deployment 
of the phalanx as too deep at thirty-two men, and too densely packed (180). 
Appian probably refers to the depth of the phalanx when combat took place, 
after any counter-marching. The depth may have been caused by the 
problems of deploying such large numbers of men in a confined space rather 
than by an attempt to compensate for bad quality troops, as later Appian 
comments on the high state of discipline of the Seleucid phalanx. 
In Appian's account, after the Seleucid cavairy fled the phalanx formed 
square and the line of s=ýqphoroi opens ranks to allow fugitive jwYoiinto 
their protective formation, directly contradicting Livy's panic flight onto 
levelled mdw. ' The Roman legioaxiYwere afraid to approach the square, 
fearing the solidarity, discipline and desperation of the veteran Seleucid foot 
soldiers. The Roman cavalry then rode around the square, shooting at it with 
missiles. Appian tells us that the &vimphoroiwere enraged at this, not being 
able to use their military skills. Eventually the elephants stationed amongst 
the phalanx became frightened and they threw the infantry formation into 
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disorder, * and as'ý, W'e'4 li'av, ýeý-.,, -"sýe'e'a""", 'i'n"'ý"DtfieiI battlk-,,, this',, IspeIt i"the'i ehd'., f66`the, -,,, ý, "ý 'i -11. ,""I"-?,, ý i'y ýý : -ý ý", 
phalanx (181). 
tw Of the 6 a66ý*un rit6i". " 'ould,, prefirTA -"'I'Liv" ppian., y,,,,, assumes ý, W 
very pro-Roman ýstanýe in 0 gs.. ýaE&UW'oUMagn iýi es a all f 'his "writin 
portrays an easy 'vict6' for the le *on o imm rise eastern army- This ry gi s ver an e 
conceals what was probably a very hard-fou'ght battle. Livy omitted the long 
fight against the phalanx as this would have detracted from Rome's victory 
over the Seleucid empire. Appian's account has no such bias in his account 
of the infantry battle although, as will be shown later, he may have joined 
I Livy in failing to record the victory over one of the allied legions by the 
Seleucid guard cavalry. Of all the Hellenistic military establishments, the 
Seleucid was probably the best, and it is consistent with our knowledge of 
this well-tried army that its phalanx should have put up a stiff fight against 
the legions. It is noteworthy that the two sources agree on events whilst the 
tide flows in Rome's favour, but differ when the legions meet with 
difficulties. It is clear how these, recorded in Appian, were manipulated by 
Livy to present Magnesia as a great Roman victory. 
Other problems require attention before we can sum up the role of the 
phalanx at Magnesia. Firstly, the number of soldiers in the Seleucid phalanx 
is open to question. This writer believes that two blocks of infantry phalanx 
were deployed by Antiochus. On the right centre were 10,000 erlite 
arsyms'p, idag on the left were 16,000 colonist phalangites, giving a total of 
26,000 &visa-armed infantry in the Seleucid line (182). 
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Secondly' the phalanxý, 
6d 'A6 . 2rgyýavpv kv as was normal, in 
ýeilihiýtic warfare., " Cavalry.,, separat. 
6u'sý's, dus in mo, 6'd6tail lalec, suffi6e, ", it'to'saf- from the colonists. We shall'dis 
here that this caýalry had to deployed in the c'entre as n. o,, room'. ori,,, 
the, Seleucid right flank for its use. The phalanxes were spliflas a re, suli. b 
terrain considerations rather than as a novel tactical ploy (183). Thirdly, 
-elephants were placed in -gaps - between- phalanx - sub-units at'intervals --along 
the entire front. The motive for this deployment is not clear. The effect 
would have been to split the phalanx into sub-sections, but this does not 
appear to have achieved anything. For example, the phalanx did not acquire 
any additional flexibility. It may be that this ploy was intended to strengthen 
the defence, but this line of thought is tenuous, being based on Appian's 
reference. to the elephants looking like the towers along a city wall. 084). 
Little. can be drawn from this scheme; suffice it to say that the deployment 
was novel. In all other Hellenistic battles elephants were used as a separate 
force, often in a chain across the front of the phalanx. 
Magnesia gives us several insights into the use of the mdm phalanx in 
battle. The phalanx managed to al. lowpwlýoito pass through its ranks during 
the very crisis of the battle. It managed rapidly to realign and form a strong 
defensive formation when supporting troops fled the field. Although it was 
possibly, packed into a close area due to lack of space, nevertheless, as in 
other battles, it appears to have been deployed in a defensive stance. The 
Roman leginamii were unwilling to approach the phalanx, even to within 
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ilina, "'i'Despite', itsý e -'i 'e' WAh 
Ie 
amx-ý is-, under 
'Ahi r'-S ýPhalafix-mas e yy eý, "to, iýýW h6wi'V vefiiýifly. ý., d6fiýt6d..,, 4TMs', ' as"du 
that can Ji6l., ' applied to, 'afl Helleiiiýtic,,, wariAre., 'ý'Fiikly, -, the phalanx needed 
suppqFt ý troops: without these it was, prone. to stand and be shot down with 
missiles with no means of reply. Secondly, the introduction of elephants into 
the ranks of the -phalaý served'only W disrupt'the all important tactical- 
integrity of the phalanx's formation. 
Finally we come to the battle of Pydna which saw the final eclipse of the 
army of Antigonid Macedon (185). Perseus, king of Macedon, deployed an 
infantry force of some 40,000 men. He and his father had prepare4 the 
kingdom carefuRy for war, the country's manpower base had been expanded, 
equipment stockpiled and soldiers trained. The army of 169 B. C. was perhaps 
the best Macedon had produced since the days of Philip and Alexander (186). 
The Macedonian phalanx was deployed som6 Way behind a' stream and 
Livy comments that Perseus made his infantry ineffective as a result. 
Plutarch, in contrast, believed that the battle area had been specifically 
chosen for the Macedonian army. There was a plain for the phalanx to 
operate in, surrounded by rolling hills for outflanking attacks by jwYov* Two 
water courses scored the field, the Aeson and Leucius rivers, but at the time 
of the battle their water level was very low. Plutarch records that these were 
intended to provide an obstacle for the Romans rather then for the phalanx. 
The geography of both sources are correct; Perseus' battle plan is all that is 
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bias,,, 'gf Livy,, this ýwriter, ilwould'-`priferr,, tq in doubt. Given, the pro-Roma'n- 
h's version of Mdýedomqp intentions accept Pluta'rc 
The preliminary phase of th6'- battle, was, 'a sýirffiisW být*een--, the jiýlii 
screens of both armies. After this the heavy infantry forces of h, sides 
closed for combat. At this point we experience problems with Livy's 
sequence of events. Livy progresses straight to the point where the battle 
turns in favour of the Romans. He records that the phalanx was disrupted by 
a combined attack of le:, piowxii and elephants and that eventually the 
Macedonian line cracked and broke under the strain. Plutarch perhaps better 
preserves the first phase of the heavy infantry melee. His account has a rapid 
opening to the battle as the Roman infantry closes on the phalanx at speed, 
but they soon meet with a check. The phalanx had readied for battle, and 
II owered its shields and sajimi' The Roman commander, Aemilius Paullus, 
noted the strength of the Macedonian formation and it greatly frightened him. 
It is possible that Plutarch records a reaction to the sight of a phalanx in 
simusp. ismos As a result of the phalanx's peculiar fonnation, the initial 
Roman attack was unable to penetrate the Macedonian line (187). 
How do we reconcile these two accounts? It is clear from Livy that he, 
or his sources, believed the Macedonian phalanx was a force to be feared. He 
says that the phalanx was invincible whilst formed and bristling with spears. 
Once disrupted, however, the mjimphoroi had to swing their svimi from 
side to side, the result being a haphazard mess of men. Livy applies these 
comments directly to Pydna and he records that had the Romans maintained 
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a ýso, W, 'fiddilfie'n-' they''i iýid 
w ajýp-'iis'. (188). ",.,, -Liv Rxen'e'ral%'c e 
"'o Uthe. -. b'i' e., J t"i' S, UrAlyýNvith'i Phi6m ý&O' aid favo- h's 
therefore - pr6bAle that - Plutarch"s desc'n, 
iptiowoU, the, 'early reverses ý'of, the 
Romans are'correct and Livy, preserved, them'only, in his general observations 
on the phalanx. Livy's motive is clear, the pro-Roman bias that is so 
common-in his writing. 
We can, as a result, reconstruct the battle as follows. The Roman line 
advanced upon the Macedonians and fell on the phalanx with a will. Both 
sources record the heroic action of the Paelignians, Plutarch adding that their 
commander, Salvius, threw the - unit's standard into the enemy ranks to 
encourage his men. Urged on by this action the Paelignians launched a 
furious assault on the enemy line, but to no avail. Plutarch records that the 
Italians tried to push the Macedonians back with their shields, but the 
Macedonians held their weapons firm and pushed back. Their mdmieasily 
pierced the Italian defences; neither shield nor armour could protect them. In 
effect the Paelignians helped impale themselves on their enemies' weapons. 
Only when Roman troops fell back in front of the phalanx did they have 
any success. The Macedonians followed up their initial success, but the rough 
ground soon began to disorder their ranks. The Romans took advantage of 
this by moving into any gaps created. The sources say that this was done on 
the initiative of the centurions. Frontinus adds that the Roman fine was in 
wedge, and if this is true, the Romans used a formation that was specifically 
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designed to penetrate enemy formations (189). The Romans Were, allovýid. to 
approach within range of their swords and the mutual supp6r; pff6rd6d, by - 
phalanx's formation, which had until'this point kept them at a distance, 
began to collapse. Plutarch clearly recounts that the &visa and pelle used by 
the mjimphoroiwere no match for the large Roman scu&m and Spanish 
sword. From this point on the Romans slowly infiltrated the phalanx, broke it 
up and destroyed it. 
Pydna is the best illustration of the strengths and weaknesses of a &vim 
phalanx when confronted by the Roman legion. At Pydna the two tactical 
systems met without outside interference. For example, at Cynoscephalae one 
might argue that the use of elephants with their legions won the day for the 
Romans. At Pydna the Macedonians appear to have again deployed their 
phalanx in an essentially defensive position, hoping that a river course would 
disorder the Roman attack. Whilst stationary the phalanx was invulnerable to 
Roman attacks; indeed in launching such attacks the Romans invited heavy 
casualties. Plutarch tells us that the phalanx was formed up in the closest of 
formations; Frontinus adds that the phalanx was "doubled" at Pydna (190). 
We can conjecture that the phalanx was formed in sunispismos, The 
defensive strength of this formation is underlined by the opening phases of 
Pydna. Its weakness, however, soon became apparent once the phalanx came 
to advance. The terrain of Pydna soon produced enough disorder to open out 
the phalanx. Into the gaps created advanced the small maniples'of the Roman 
legions. Once inside the Macedonian weapons, it was only a matter of time 
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before swordsman triumphed over sxisapýoros. Jrt m verses ý&wsa battles 
es oi, ihe'ý ko". "' this weakness is not apparent, but cl early', th' flexible tacti 6 man':. -, 
manipular legion allowed it to firstly to fall-back- in front of ý'the,, -phal. arix, 
secondly to infiltrate its ranks. We must, finally, note that Pydna was a 
victory for infantry; most of the Macedonian cavalry escaped intact, 
suggesting a minor role for them in the battle (191). 
D) Conclusio 
The key to Hellenistic warfare was the concept of combined arms. 
Hellenistic armies were composed of many types of soldier: an performed a 
special role on the battlefield, and each also fitted into an overall scheme that 
emphasised mutual support. Thus a full evaluation of the phalanx must wait 
until we have reviewed the Hellenistic military system in full. At this 
juncture it is hoped that certain basic principles of phalanx-warfare can be 
established in preparation for our overall, conclud ing chapter. 
Hellenistic military systems followed the normal Occidental practice of 
fielding large numbers of heavy infantry. In this respect they followed the 
Classical Greeks and the Romans. How the sviw phalanx differed was in its 
equipment, tactics and the source of its manpower. All three combined to 
make the s2dw phalanx unique, with its own advantages and disadvantages. 
When opposed by a Classical hoplite phalanx, the former predominated, 
when by a Roman legion the latter. Our first task is to quantify these 
peculiarities. 
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The sinop, Most, influefiiW'-4dv"je, o faf6_wa`ý, ýý the mannei, 
in which la' e, nuihbers, -, of phalýfigitii-, ý'66uld A)ý I ep oye f 0' rg 
oti6e. ý.; Thiý', factor,, iuiiý. it 6iij, e classes of Hellenistic, society,, "aVs ort"n ii h 
11 ýý', Macedon m phalanx. As weý6ý'-` entire history of the md ve1'seen, -,, Philih'; ll' 
owed its survival and eventual rise to pow, erjo Aheý creation of an effective 
infantry force composed of peasants who until that point had been useless in 
a set-piece battle. The story isrepeated time and again through the period. 
The reason for this ease of recruitment was the inexpensive nature of 
mjimphoroi equipment. Armour was rare for these troops and in the final 
analysis the soldier only needed a swim and a mAle to take his part in the 
phalanx. The result of this factor was that Hellenistic phalanxes were very 
large, especially when compared with the manpower potential of a state that 
relied on the hoplite system. -The effects of this were twofold. Firstly, the 
poleis of Classical Greece could not match this mass of men; secondly, once 
the &vim system had become commonplace, states had to reform to the new 
order or face relegation to the status of second class power. Examples of this 
have already been examined, notably Achaea under Philopoemen and Sparta 
under Cleomenes 111. 
Another great benefit lent by the smim was the great strength of the 
phalanx when in defence. These long pikes prevented any enemy coming to 
close quarters in any effective number. Indeed, as we have seen at Pydna, 
enemy troops were risking impalement on the mnýraiif they pressed their 
attacks too hard. The ancients wrote that the phalanx was invulnerable in 
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defence (see'the ýdis'cuss: ioh`bf, ýAtiax f6i. an'exaffiole) 'and altholigh-this 
11-I"I'-, "I'ýý,, ý, "l, '.. is, of course, an-eiaggiiati6n, it, is n6t'altogetherl far, froirft', thi, tiuth. ", 'ý 
The defensi , vi strengtht of -'thCmjrt=j a n. ki-e x; ii ý`e`ven", ýio ý'n. - U*iss' es. 
No phalanx was- adversely affected by missýes- sh6i at it on the battle-. '-field; 
even the heavy Roman PJYUM seems to have had little effect on formed 
svimphoro., ' The phalanx was, therefore, a very firm tactical anchor, one 
which was virtually impregnable from the front. 
Some phalanxes could also complete very complex tactical evolutions 
and manoeuvres. This varied from army to army depending on the 
experience of the soldiers conceirled. Notable examples are the expansion of 
Alexander's phalanx as it left the defile at Issus, and the way in which Philip 
V's right wing phalanx deployed for action at Cynoscephalae. Ability to 
manoeuvre, can also be illustrated by Machanidas's deployment from 
road-column to battle- line and Philopoemen's redeployment of one part of 
his phalanx to protect his left at Mantinea. 
As we have seen, the complex drill in the tacticians facilitated rapid 
changes in phalanx formations. Also the sub-unit organisation used by the 
more advanced Hellenistic armies made the phalanx less of a single block of 
men, more a chain of units. This allowed for deployment and to some extent 
realignment of the phalanx. One can presume that only the more experienced 
armies could use these advantages to the full, and it is probable that a newly 
raised phalanx could do little more than shake itself into line before battle 
and lower its mdmito meet an enemy attack. As such this writer would 
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prefeOp". ieW, 'the-"tkti 'al flexibility", * bf the Hellihistic, phil uxury_, ý 
experiencýed by fit o e-ye or ýveteran infafitry, o the. I ined P Y: s in f, At 
note that, w0ithy't Hell ehistic., Phalanxes did not'siffir', "adveisely fi6nia'lack-of 
these advantages, as--they were. -not ne'cis's'ary for the. 
I in lýren 
If 
defensive 
strength of the phalanx to play its role in battle. 
Many of these advantages also caused the potentially crippling 
weaknesses of the &visa phalanx. The phalanx was only strong when it 
remained ordered. The ancients quite clearly believed that a disordered 
phalanx was at a crippling disadvantage. Thus all tactics centred on retaining 
the integrity of one's own phalanx, whilst disordering that of the enemy. 
Such tactics were dangerous to the formed phalanx because it was so easily 
disordered. 
The equipment of the phalanx was only suited to combat at the tip'of -the 
line of md&Y. ' If enemy troops could get beyond'this point they could cause 
immense'damage. As we have seen the majoritý of &2dsjph6roiwOre' little 
armour. Their shields were small and fixed to the forearm; they could not be- 
moved like a buckler to protect the soldier. ' Further the sadvaphoroshad little 
training for close hand-to-hand combat. This would have been most 
noticeable amongst the newly raised, lower class phalangites who would have 
had no training whatsoever in this regard. In contrast, Roman Aegýnaj&were 
expert swordsmen and even hoplites - who had little formal we'apons-training 
- would have been far better equipped than Hellenistic phalangites for close 
action. 'The long &visa which was so effective when the enemy was at a 
117 
-quarters. "ý n6ýý i6ilhiýeAbuoljhat" e distance, b&ame- a liability" at', 'clo"s" 
ponsian drawn', side, mdmphomi would have,, drooped theie,, -uhWietdy ",,, wea d 
arms, but this would have caused even" *more, codtiýsion.,, Tliis for! the'. 'i'61i'alani, ' 
-''ýbý, pre'slent'4'to't e'enemy, to be effective, a solid"line of mji-wineed4'to- h'" 
and this solid line would becomp dangerously weakened, if any disorder 
appeared in the ranks. Once this happened enemy infantry would have the 
chance to dodge past the mdmiand close in on the inadequately equipped 
sajimphro-I How then was disorder caused? 
The phalanx was only strong if attacked from the front; attacks against 
flanks and rear would throw an entire line of phalanx into disorder, thereby 
allowing a successful frontal assault. It became a basic tenet of Hellenistic 
warfare that the flanks of a phalanx must be protected at all times. In. the 
worst cases phalanxes would surrender once, their flanks became exposed. 
Why was this the case? it is a general military rule that by outflanking an 
enemy one gains advantage. This is normally- because armies are much 
narrower than they are broad; thus greater numbers can be applied to an 
exposed flank. In the case of the mdsa- phalanx this was made worse by the 
fact that the drill of a phalanx did not allow it to readily redeploy to face to 
the side. Indeed, the only real example of a general attempting to cover his 
flank was Philopoemen at Mantinea. He moved a sub-unit out of the line and 
wheeled it to face to the left. As it was, his enemy's (the Spartan) victorious 
wing did not close in and envelop the Achaean phalanx, preferring pursuit 
and loot to combat. As we have seen, the complex drills recorded in the 
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tactical ý, Writ&s ý, didi, nou, " allwýi-' f6r-i i6riep pn-,., gy, iýýny,,, oth ' "d* 6ctioh: thn, -T 
front. Furtfi' i, l6iir6d', the ranks of ithi: Oa arm ý must' aye' er-. onceýmqs Weii 
yýays become locked,, ' , 't e"lengt o theispears 
ýrey6htirýg',, any, side 
, p&rm' movement 
by the mdsj 
The rear of--the phalanx was obviously vulnerable. one might argue that 
the drills recorded by the tacticians might have allowed a phalanx rapidly to 
about turn. This writer would agree with such an argument, but would point 
to the fact that a phalanx would find it impossible to face to the rear when 
fighting or even threatened frontally. The best example of this situation is 
Cynoscephalae, when the victorious Roman right detached maniples of bixii 
to attack the rear of the Macedonian right. 
Perhaps the worse situation that caused disorder was movement over 
difficult terrain. This happened so often as to prompt the conclusion that 
even relatively uneven ground could disorder a mdsa phalanx. We have seen 
that Hellenistic infantry formed on very narrow frontages and this may have 
been the cause of this disorder. Polybios in his treatise on the phalanx 
believed that it was very difficult to find a battle field to accommodate the 
peculiarities of the Hellenistic phalanx (192). An examination of the 
topography of Hellenistic battle-sites demonstrates that often commanders 
were willing to risk their phalanx on ground that was perhaps unsuitable for 
anything but a, cautious advance, presumably with frequent halts to dress 
ranks. Clearly Hellenistic generals could not contrive to meet their enemies 
in better areas, since these were too few for it to be realistic to manoeuvre an 
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ene ftiY on'toj im'. ' 
This bein the case. we'c'o'm'e"""t''o""th6-'r"a'-th'erý''6'dd"'ý6ii6ltiýioiý, thýf'the", 'ý' 9 
d the p4alanx was to fiotihg. ý. pn' Tiýst `6P'th , gýoun im), 
'Helknistic 
world! It is clear, however, that th Ie advaptag es" of , th eý pýhalanx outwe ighed 
this factor. Further, Hellenistic generals were very cautious how they used 
their phalanxes. We have encountered this tendency in many of our battle 
surveys. Given this, how can we reconstruct the tactical doctrine that dictated 
phalanx deployment and employment? To successfully answer this question 
we have to re-examine the three types of opponent faced by the sxim 
phalanx. 
Against hoplites the mdsa phalanx had a hard right. It is clear from our 
battle reports that the svisvphoroi were expected to hold in position on the 
battlefield. Their role was to pin the enemy hoplites, a mission for which a 
hedge of mdsai was admirably suited. It appears that they were generally 
successful at this so long as no aggressive inoves were planned. The 
weakness of the Classical military system was a marked lack of good 
cavalry, an arm which the Macedonians had in abundance. The hoplites could 
not close with the mdmphoroiwhilst the latter's ranks held and it was only a 
matter of time before the Macedonian horse enveloped the hoplite army. It is 
clear from Classical literature that the hoplite army could move at the run 
across the battlefield. Not so swimphorm. ' As has been seen, when expected 
to move forward Hellenistic phalangites suffered disorder and heavy 
casualties. This writer would argue that more crippling reverses were not 
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": 7'of experienced whenjigýtinw hoýHI6 arn-des', simply,! b6c'a'use',, "qf, ' 
effective cavalry in, the ranks of th6 poleid'arrnies. Where the mpsa phalanx 
held the, advantage over the hoplit&pýaianx was in numbers, -ýafi: "Ailit IYt0 
deploy large numbers of proletarian soldiers. This, linked with the 
aristocratic cavalry of Macedon, proved the demise of the Classical military 
system. 
When swim met mjisj both sides tended to face one another off. The 
cautious tactical employment of the phalanx led to a holding action in the 
centre. This is most marked at Sellasia and Mantinea. Here the phalanx stood 
behind field fortifications waiting for an enemy attack. Under normal 
conditions phalanxes were only committed to action when events elsewhere 
on the battlefield dictated no other course of action. It was normally the 
threat of envelopment that forced the hand of the losing general. Again the 
best example of this is the actions of, Cleomcnes III's phalanx at Sellasia. Of 
course there were exceptions, stupidity being a. common cause of military 
catastrophe. At Mantinea the Spartan phalanx rashly advanced across a ditch 
to come to grips with the Achaeans, and was disordered and slaughtered 
despite the fact that the Spartan army had successfully outflanked the enemy 
left. 
Given the caution of commanders and the, tendency to commit the 
phalanx when no other alternative was available, can we conclude that 
"Aa-armed infantry were superfluous in the mid- Hellenistic period? The 
answer to this question is a firm negative. It is the case that combat arms 
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other than the phalanx seem to have, been m, ore important',, in, this 
However it is also the case that they still 'needed the, base aifoiý'ed**Ahe 
phalanx to operate successfully. Further, as in the the Classical period, battle 
could only be won by the defeat of the enemy's heavy infantry, and in the 
majority of our battle accounts this mission was accomplished by another 
phalanx, supported by other combat arms. The great tactical difference was 
that commanders would hold their phalanx in defence until the very last 
moment. 
The attack of the phalanx was, therefore, the essential part of most 
Hellenistic battles. On some occasions this attack was successful, as with the 
Ptolemaic infantry at Raphia, on others unsucce'ssful, for example the Spartan 
right at Seflasia. To ensure victorY in this phase of the battle 'Hellenistic 
commanders resorted to brute force. As defence, was stronger than attack one 
needed to entice the enemy phalanx forward. Commanders would attempt to 
create a tactical situation where the enemy infantry bad to be committed. 
Usually this meant outflanking the enemy centre and thereby threatening 
flank or rear attacks on the enemy phalanx. Two examples can be used to 
illustrate this point. Firstly, at Sellasia where Antigonus won the battle on 
Euas with sen+heavy, rather than phalanx, troops. Secondly, at Raphia, 
where the quality and numbers of the Seleucid cavalry gave'Antiochus III the 
upper hand from the start. 
Numbers and weight of formation could also be used to affect the 
infantry combat. Again Sellasia'and Raphia provide our examples. At the 
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04! a a, deep aiid--ý,, compacU former- a stationary Macedohi 
formation to defeat the aftackin-&S-P`arta`n 'At4aphia`, tIi6,;, r6verse,., 
'ptiidns, Were give the was the case: masses of newlyý rais'e-d'ýý 
attacking Ptolemaic infantry an advan6ge in numbers that off-iet any 
disorder caused by movement. Further on this occasion Ptolemy V provided 
important leadership, standing with his foot at the crisis of the battle, whilst 
Antiochus III rode off the field with his cavalry. We must emphasise that by 
far the most effective tactic was to force the enemy's hand by gaining 
tactical advantage elsewhere on the battlefield. 
The s2dm phalanx consistently fared badly when opposed by the Roman 
legion. Even the 'victories' of Pyrrhus were little more than bloody 'winning 
draws' for the Hellenistic military system. It is clear from our sources that a 
phalanx in a stationary, defensive position was a formidable opponent for the 
legion. Victory only came to the legion when the phalanx's serried ranks 
could be disordered. This occurred in many ways, since the small maniples; 
could outflank the phalanx. At Heraclea we are told that the legion could not 
operate effectively because the battlefield was too congested and did not give 
the Romans the room to manoeuvre, forcing a frontal attack on the phalanx, 
and hence defeat for the legion. At Cynoscephalae bixiidetached themselves 
from their parent units to attack the rear of part of Philip's phalanx. Most 
effective, however, was the ability of the manipular system to make a 
fighting retreat across the battlefield and we see this most clearly at Pydna. 
This factor is the single most important reason for the eventual defeat of 
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phalanx by the legio , n. 
As we have seen, the phalanx was most effective in defence. The legion 
could, however, engage the phalanx frontally' and then, slowly retreat. 
Inevitably some elements, if not most, of the phalanx would follow up local 
victories - we can only assume this is what would have happened when 
phalanx defeated phalanx, the difference being that the legion was less 
susceptible to disorder and hence kept its fighting efficiency. The Romans 
could retreat some considerable distance without flight, keeping, one 
presumes, out of reach of the enemy's weapons. Eventually parts of the 
phalanx would become disordered and at this point the superb local 
leadership of the Roman army would come into play. Centurions would lead 
small groups of soldiers into any gaps that appeared in the phalanx's line. in 
time this infiltration would cause the phalanxs' integrity to fall apart. Once 
this had occurred then the Romans, being expert swordsmen, were ideally 
equipped to prevail in the ensuing close man-to-man fighting. 
The manipular system enabled the Romans to bring the battle onto their 
level, one of individual combat rather then massed fighting. The hoplite 
phalanx had never been able to do this because its tactics involved a rapid, 
vigorous, massed advance to push the enemy off of the field, a tactic which 
was easily countered by the tactics and defensive capabilities of the mjisj- 
phalanx. 
It was the case that in time the mjim phalanx met an opponent that could 
take full advantages of the fundamental weaknesses of the phalanx. These 
124 
weaknesses had, however, been offset for some one hundred and fifty years 
by the advantages of the phalanx. It is noteworthy that the meritsý of phalanx 
warfare were retained until Magnesia"by the Hellenistic monarchies, after 
which they slowly converted to the manipular system. 
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Cbapter-11 - The Peltast 
A) Introd-ucli-on 
The peltast was a specialist infantryman who performed those tasks 
unsuited to the phalanx. In the Classical period he had been a light 
infantryman who fought from a distance with javelins. This style of fighting 
continued to be the province of peltasts in the Hellenistic period, but they 
may have taken on an additional role. The tacticians record that the peltast 
was an intermediate form of infantryman, halfway between the hoplite and 
the psilos (1). The former was a heavy infantryman specialising _ 
in 
hand-to-hand combat;. the latter appears to have taken on the role, pf the 
Classical peltast, adding sling and bow to fiis repertoire of missile weapons. 
This chapter will examine the evidence for such a new type of infantryman, a 
specialist who could perform both the fupctions of heavy and light troops. 
B) The Peltast in the Classical Period " 
Peltasts first appear as an important part of Greek armies in the 
Peloponnesian War (2). Modem scholars define these soldiers as light 
infantry. The Oxford Classical Dictionary, for example says, "Peltasts 
oe (-'MXTaCFTq,;. ) were Greek soldiers named for their small shield 
Originally they had no body-armour and their chief weapons were light 
throwing spears They are first recorded as derived from Thrace, 
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and were imported into Greece in the later fifth ý century: B. Ci-- to, act, as 
skirmishers. -Their style of equipment was adopted by Greek armies, and 
achieved numerous successes, especially under Iphicrates (q. V. ), and Chabrias. 
To lphicrates are attributed changes whereby the length of their spears, was 
increased by a half, and the size of their swords almost doubled. The object 
of these alterations was to enable the peltast to act as regular troops and not 
mere skin-nishers. After the rise of the Macedonian armies they apparently 
fell into disuse. " (3). As we shall see. this concise definition is open to 
criticism. 
The motives for the introduction of peltasts into Greek warfare have 
been well documented by scholars. There were good strategic and tactical 
reasons which originated with the Peloponnesian War. This war was a very 
new experience for the military systems of the Greek city states. Campaigns 
were of long duration and often armies had to fight a long way from home, 
which placed great stress on the military manpower of the city state. A 
solution was the hiring of mercenaries, who were almost exclusively peltasts. 
The strategies of the combatants and the large theatre of the conflict led 
hoplite armies into broken terrain, in which they were ill equipped to operate. 
Light troops of some sort were needed, and again mercenary peltasts were 
the solution. As time went on the theles of the city states copied the 
mercenaries and indigenous units of peltasts were created (4). 
It is generally accepted that peltast fighting techniques originated in 
Thrace and were carried into the Greek world by Thracian mercenaries. This 
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is incorrect because early peltasts fought as light armed skirmishers'and such 
troops - being the most primitive of troop types - are found in all warring 
societies. The Greeks had large numbers of light armed infantry even before 
the Peloponnesian War, for example at the battle of Plataea. Ancient writers 
also used words other than peltast to describe such troops, for example 
, gyinnefes, p5iloior nvzonov. 
' Classical armies therefore used troops similar to 
peltasts long before the later fourth century. This being the case, a precise 
definition of the Classical peltast is needed before we proceed to examine the 
peltast of the Hellenistic period (5). 
The word peltast originates from the Greek word for a small shield, 
pelle. Were Classical peltasts simply A&oiwho carried shields? If this were 
the case then the peltast would be a specialist troop-type, a new addition to 
the armoury of a Greek general. TI-tis conclusion is, however, difficult to 
support as evidence exists for the equipping of ? dhoe forces of p5iloiwith 
shields. For example, the Athenian j7avm-ch Thrasyllus equipped 5,000 of his 
sailors and towers as peltasts, and presumably he gave them shields. Another 
example comes from the fighting in the Peiraeus between forces of the Thirty 
and democrat militia. Democrat jz&oiwere equipped with improvised shields 
much as Thrasyllus' sailors were. This incident is of special interest because 
troops called peltasts appear in the text alongside the improvised p5iloi and 
they are tactically indistinguishable from each other. This evidence proves 
that the use of a shield was not the mark of the peltast (6). 
Classical peltasts cannot be differentiated by their offensive weapon, the 
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javelin. It is clear, however, that they' and many types of pýiloialso. used this 
weapon. It was an easily available weapon, simple to manufacture and 
common to many parts of the ancient Greek world (7). 
Another possible solution is that 'peltast' was a pseudonym for 
mercenary'; ancient writers may have added peltast to more common words 
for mercenaries as a colloquial or technical term. On many of the occasions 
that we encounter 'peltast' in the sources they refer to hired soldiers. 
Furthermore the term 'peltast' might have referred to a professional soldier 
rather than a man forced to fight light-armed as a result of poverty. This may 
have started with the influx of large numbers of Thracians during the 
Peloponnesian War and spread with the creation of 'professional' corps of 
native Greek light infantry (8). 
The ancients clearly differentiated between peltasts and other soldiers. 
For our purposes, however, the equipment and tactics of peltasts and other 
'light' troops were no different from one another; both were javelin armed 
light infantry. The only possible distinguishing factor may have been that 
peltasts were 'professionals'. In the Classical period peltasts were the 
equivalent of troops who will be cafled pvkiin our survey of Hellenistic 
light troops. In the fifth and early fourth centuries B. C. the tacticians' 
intermediate infantryman did not exist. There were only two broad categories 
of infantry, hoplites and light troops - the latter being called by various 
different titles. 
The mid-fourth century was a period of military innovation and two 
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sources record a reform' of peltasts by the famous mercenary leader, 
lphicrates, which'may mark the introduction of an intermediate type of 
infantryman into Greek warfare. These are worth quoting in full, firstly 
Diodorus, 
"For instance, the Greeks were using shields which were large and 
consequently difficult to handle; these he Rphicrates] discarded and made 
small oval ones of moderate size, thus successfully achieving both objects: to 
furnish the body with adequate cover and to enable the user of the small 
shield, on account of its lightness, to be completely free in his movements. 
After the trial of the new shield its easy manipulation secured its adoption, 
and the infantry who had been called hoplites because of their heavy shield , 
then had their name changed to peltasts from the light pe. 1le they carried. As 
regards spear and sword,. he made changesin the contrary direction; namely, 
he increased the length of the spears by half, and made the swords twice as 
long. The actual use of these arms confirmed the initial test and from the 
success of the experiment won great fame for the inventive genius of the 
general Rphicrates]. He made soldiers' boots that were easy to untie and they 
continue to this day to be called lphicratid after Mm. " (9). Secondly 
Comelius Nepos, 
"For example, he Rphicrates] changed the arms of the infantry. While 
before he became commander they used very large shields, short spears and 
had little swords, he on the contrary exchanged shield for the round pella - 
for which reason the infantry have been since called peltasts - in order that 
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the soldiers might move about and charge more easily when less burdened. 
He doubled the length of the spear and increased that of the swords; he 
changed the character of their breastpfates, giving them, linen ones. In that 
way he made the soldiers more active; diminishing their load and -still 
contriving to protect their bodies. " (10). 
Modern interpretation of these two references has been varied and suffers 
from a lack of evidence for use of the Iphicratean peltast in battle, there only 
being one dubious reference to aid scholars in this regard 0 1). Both authors 
agree that this reform, assuming for the moment that it ever took place, was 
of hoplite equipment. They stress the change in type of shield used and show 
that the success of a lighter shield led to widespread adoption of the velle by 
Greek soldiers. Weapons were lengthened, perhaps to compensate for the 
reduction in'protection by keeping an enemy at a distance. Nepos records 
that linen annour was issued, ornitting to clarify whether this was exchanging 
a heavy means of protection for a lighter one or the adoption of armour by 
troops who previously had none. Diodorus alone records the invention of the 
special boots. Reconstructions of the lphicratean peltast have been made and 
fit closely what might have been an intermediate form of infantryman (12). 
Some modem scholars have argued that the lphicratean peltast was the 
forerunner of the &visa phalanx (13). The reduction of shield size and the 
lengthening of spear is seen as evidence of an embryonic Miim phalanx in 
the later Classical period. This theory can be rejected as equipment reform 
has been confused with tactical innovation. It is clear that the reform was 
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intended to make the hoplite faster and more flexible. Such a reform would 
create a tactical system totally the opposite of the ponderous, close formation 
smisa phalanx that was to be invented by Philip 11 in 359 B. C. 
Others have linked the lphicratean reform to arguments for a reduction in 
hoplite armour in the later Classical period (14). Parke wrote, 
"If we recognise that the Iphicratean peltast was no skirmisher, it is 
easier to understand why Diodorus can write as if a new form of peltast has 
been evolved. " (15) In other words a lighter type of hoplite had been 
invented. The evidence that supports the argument for the light hoplite has, 
however, been discussed and rejected above (p. 7); nor does the lphicratean 
reform add any more weight to the light hoplite argument. The lphicratean 
peltast did not carry a shield large enough to stand in a regular hoplite 
phalanx and could not conduct a successful ohWsmos The fight hoplite 
theory affects infantry equipment not the basic tactics of hoplite warfare and, 
as such, the new peltast would be useless in the close-quarter role expected 
of the phalanx fighter in this' period. The lphicratean peltast could not, 
therefore, have been a special form of hoplite. 
Thirdly, it has been argued that the reform was an attempt at 
standardisation made necessary by the return of large numbers of soldiers 
from Agesilaus' Asian campaigns (16). Large numbers of peltasts in Greece, 
being barbarians at this period, needed to be integrated into proper units, 
with a standard organisation and equipment. It is difficult, however, to 
rationalise an amalgamation of peltasts and hoplites within the same units 
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without a radical change in battlefield tactics. 
A modification of this theory was proposed by Best (17). Ile argued that 
the 'Iphicratean' equipment -had been used by Thracian infantry for a long 
time -and that Diodorus and Nepos describe Greek soldiers taking up a 
traditional Thracian style. The shield, spear, and special boots are all, 
therefore of Thracian origin and even the adoption of the larger sword has 
Thracian connections as these people sometimes used the mxlkira or 
rhomph, zij. Best's argument is, however, flawed as he works from the 
precept that these new soldiers were formed from jzwilol, whereas 
the sources 
are emphatic that hoplites were the troops who were reformed. Furthermore, 
as we have seen, there is little to distingush peltast, Thracian or Greek, from 
psi7oi in the Classical period. More fundamentally, however. from the 
standpoint, of this discussion,, Best's argument discusses equipmentl reform 
rather than any tactical innovation that might have resulted from the reform. 
Anderson argues that Tphicrates invýnted this new style of peltast for an 
overseas mercenary assignment. At approximately the date of the reform, 
though we cannot be certain of it, the Egyptian satrapy of the Persian empire 
rebelled. Persia had light troops in plenty and so lpfdcrates re-equipped his 
peltasts as hoplites to fulfill a Persian employer's need for heavy infantry. 
Diodorus, however, emphasised the lightening of equipment - especially 
where the shield was involved - rather than creating a heavier type of soldier, 
which obviously overturns Anderson's theory (18). 
Academics do not agree on the matter of a possible date for the reform. 
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As we have seen, some scholars. believe that the lpýicratean'ý Oeltaýt had 
always existed. Others have proposed a date of 393/2 B. C., during the 
Corinthian War, on the assumption that Diodorus quoted the reform to 
enhance the reputation of lphicrates and the logic of introducing new 
equipment during a lull in major hostilities. Diodofus dated the reform to 
374/3 B. C. and many scholars support him, arguing that some time would 
have been needed for the operational advantages of the new peltast to 
become clear and gain widespread acceptance (19). 
Possible references to the new peltast in the field are few - the reform of 
the Phocian peltast corps, the battle of Leuctra, and an encounter between 
Agesilaus; and Chabrias in 378 B. C. None are precise enough in tem-dnology 
or narrative description to enlighten our discussion and they fail to supply 
modem scholars with irrefutable evidence for actual use of the new troop 
type (20). This has prompted the conclusion that the Iphicratean peltast is 
merely an aberration, a theoretical soldier that never took the field. It is 
noteworthy that Xenophon -a noted military authority - saw no need to 
describe this important tactical reform, which would have occurred during 
his military career. Some modem commentators have excused Xenophon's 
oversight, arguing that peltasts were not within his area of experience, i. e. in 
common use by the Spartans (21). Despite this it is clear from our sources 
that Xenophon respected lphicrates as a major contemporary military figure 
and would have noted any major advances this general might have originated 
(22). It is not, however, within the scope of this work to say categorically 
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that the Iphicratean peltast existed and was the forerunner of an intermediate 
Hellenistic infantry type. It is sufficient for our purposes to realise' the 
possibility of such a development in the Classical period. 
A second possible source for an intermediate Hellenistic troop type are 
Spartan hopfites of the later Classical period. Hoplites were vulnerable to 
peltastslýaýloiwhen unsupported in rough terrain as they could neither charge 
to push the light troops away, nor reply with missiles of their own. In such 
situations, therefore, the tactical options available to hoplites were limited. 
For the most part the hoplites had to stand on'the defence looking to their 
heavy armour for protection, on occasion - for example' in the case 'Of 
Demosthenes' force in Aetolia in 42716 B. C. - short controlled charges were 
used to keep the enemy out of effective missile range (23). To be fully 
protected, hoplites had to be supported by other arms, cavalry or psilov, but 
even so most hoplite armies could only keep light troops at a distance, 
reducing their effectiveness but not destroying the enemy. initially Spartan 
armies were equally ineffective at countering skirmishers - as the debacle on 
Sphacteria in 425 B. C. illustrates (24). But by the time of Agesilaus' 
campaigns the Spartan army had devised new. tactics. These are best 
illustrated by quoting Xenophon, 
"While he was making the sacrifice, the Acarn'anians kept up a 
continuous pressure. Hurling stones and javelins, they came in close and 
inflicted a number of wounds. Then Agesilaus gave the order; the men from 
age groups 20 to 35 ran forward from the hoplites, the cavalry charged and 
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Agesilaus followed them with the rest of the army. ". (25)., On this occasion 
the 'sally forth' from the phalanx was accompanied by cavalry; on other 
occasions the young Spartan hoplites cfiarged alone. This special tactic was 
probably used by the Spartans alone, as only they had the requisite skills, 
fitness and tactical organisation to both charge out of the phalanx at the 
precise moment and fall back to reform in its ranks (26). 
This tactic was very successful. At times it failed, but, for the most part, 
the Spartans had found an answer to light troops. so much so that Spartan 
troops came to ridicule peltasts and those hoplites who feared them. For our 
study the implications of this tactic go further: this Spartan tactic shows 
hoplites acting like light infantry; they are, in effect, an intermediate troop 
type capable of operating in phalanx or loose order. 
For the most part, therefore, the Classical peltast was no different from 
the pvlýoiof the period. By the later part of the period Spartan hoplites had 
devised techniques that made them intermediate troops. Perhaps the reform 
of lphicrates, took the Spartan anti-skim-lisher tactic another step by creating 
an intermediate-troop type that would be the forerunner of those used in the 
Hellenistic Period. Tphicrates' new type of infantryman, if equally trained, 
would be more than a match for a Spartan hoplite who had charged from his 
phalanx. The Iphicratean peltast would have a light shield and a long sword, 
better suited to man to man fighting than hoplite equipment, and, in addition, 
some authors have argued that this soldier would have carried javelins, 
giving him a long range capacity. Finally the long spear would have allowed 
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this soldier to fight in a phalanx though an inferior one. The Iphicratean 
peltast would have, therefore, neutralised the Spartan anti-peltast tactics. 
By the end of the Classical period evidence exists making the existence 
of small numbers of mercenary soldiers trained in a new style of warfare 
possible. Their absence from battle accounts may be due to their small 
numbers - well-trained troops were expensive and rare in. Classical Greece. 
The concept of this specialist infantryman originated with the Spartans and 
was perhaps taken a step further by Iphicrates as a result of his long military 
career and in an attempt to counter the Spartans. This new type of peltast 
may have been the forerunner of the intermediate Hellenistic type described 
by the tacticians. I 
C) Written Evidence for the Helleni-stic PeMst 
The tactical writers are the only sources which record that the peltast was 
an intermediate type of soldier in the Hellenistic period, and they must be the 
starting point of our study. This soldier would have presumably been much 
like that described in the final part of the last section, part hoplite, part jq&bs 
(27). 
The first task is to attempt to see if such a soldier appears in the 
historical record. Alexander the Great's corps of guard infantry, the 
h, vp-? sp. &&, is an immediate candidate for the intermediate infantry type (28). 
Some scholars argue that the hFýwspists were an ýRe unit of the smim 
phalanx, but such troops carried a shield akin to the pelle, which causes 
confusion in the sources and makes categorical identifications of troop types 
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difficult. Seleucus 1, for example, was handed a *Ale byý a, soldier upon 
dismounting from an elepbant: did be receive it from a*, peltast or a 
Salimphoros (29)? A strong body of opinion holds that the liyms , p. 
is& were 
peltasts and some writers actually refer to the hypuspist as an intermediate 
type of infantryman, linked with the peltast reform of Iphicrates. For the 
most part this school of thought has used tactical arguments to support its 
theory, notably occasions when the hypaspistswere used on-special missions, 
scouting or raiding ahead of Alexander's main army, and when they acted as 
a 'hinge' between phalanx and cavalry in set- piece battles (30). 
This second opinion needs examination. Firstly, much of the evidence 
used to support a 'lighter' hypuspistis spurious. It is the case that hypaspists: 
were used on special missions, but so were regular Xaxeisof the phalanx. The 
argument- for the tactical 'hinge' is also very difficult to* substantiate. 
Alexander's cavalry was always held back until the crisis of the battlejut 
once launched it soon outstripped the infantry centre. There is no evidence to 
support a special role for the hvpvspAtsin pitched battles other than as an 
61ile unit of the phalanx and firmly part of the infantry centre. The concept 
of the tactical 'hinge' is a'modern concept and does not fit into Alexander's 
operations, where cavalry were held back as a reserve and launched through 
the enemy's left centre - for the most part - after large numbers of their army 
had been pinned frontally by the phalanx and were unable to react to 
neutralise the Macedonian cavalry threat. 
It has been argued that the Greek mercenaries who served in Alexander's 
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army - as opposed to the soldiers supplied by the., Hellenicl League - were 
peltasts (31). This interpretation rests on the assumption that peltasts of this 
period were of the Tphicratean type. At this early date, however, peltasts may 
have been light, skirmishing infantry, as they had been throughout most of 
the Classical period. 
The only occasion that Greek soldiers fought in the line of battle is 
Alexander's campaigns was at Issus in 333 B. C. (32). Just before the two 
armies met there was a crisis on the Macedonian right: the Macedonian front 
line had to be extended and Greeks were moved up from the reserve to fill 
the resulting gap. These men fought on the right of the hypuspisls, but 
unfortunately the source is not specific as to the type of troops these men 
were. They were asked to fight in the front line and the Macedonians were 
attempting to cross the River Pinarus, broken terrain unsuited to close-order 
foot. Further the Persians used cxdaces to defend the river bank, troops who 
were probably themselves peltasts and certainly not close-orderfoot (33). Due 
to the tactical situation, these Greeks were probably not hoplites. Either they 
were light troops brought up to cover the flank of the advancing Macedonian 
phalanx, or they were intermediate troops. Parke went further and argued that 
Greek peltasts were also brought up to add weight to the rear ranks of the 
phalanx, but there is no evidence to support this view. 
In Alexander's wars there is only circumstantial evidence to support the 
use of intermediate troops. Despite the efforts of scholars, the majority of 
peltasts used in this early part of the Hellenistic period were probably light 
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infantry, like their Classical counterparts. What then of the evidence, for, the 
wars of Alexander's successors? 
Many accounts of Diodochi battles' have survived, but the existence of 
the intermediate peltast is, once again, open to doubt. In 31716 B. C. 
Antigonus devised a bold attack to strike at the very heart of Eumenes' lands. 
Ile chose to march through the territory of the Cosseans whose country was 
broken and suitable for ambush. Antigonus selected the best peltasts from his 
army, formed them into two divisions, and it was planned that they would 
form the van of the main army to secure the route. The sources do not 
expand on the tactics used by the peltasts to accomplish their mission, but 
later in the period peltasts in similar situations used tactics that are best 
described as those of intermediate infantry (34). 
At Paraitakene Eumenes deployed 3,000 hyp", Wisls and argyzasfidng 
both of which are subject to the hvp7spist controversy discussed above and, 
as a result, might be regarded as peltasts. It is clear, however, from their 
position in the centre of Eumenes' line and the devastating effect of their 
charge, that they are heavy infantry, probably mdsi-armed (35). Once again, 
as with Alexander's hvwspikýg they cannot be intermediate peltasts. 
Peltasts are next encountered at 'Antiochus I's battle against the 
Galatians, the so-called 'Elephant Victory, of which the date'and even the 
historical fact is open to question. The Seleucid army at this battle consisted 
mainly of peltasts and )vilov, together with sixteen elephants and a small 
number of cavalry. Lucian's account of the battle highlights the role of the 
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elephants at the expense of the other troops, but he does' record that the 
peltasts were the heaviest infantry available -to Antiochus, there being too 
little time for a full muster of the Seleucid an-ny to take place. The obvious 
implication is that these peltasts were more heavily equipped than psiloi, or 
that they had a tactical role more akin to line infantry (36). 
We next come to those sources that cover the later third century and 
beyond. Due to the breadth of the evidence, cases will be dealt with on a 
regional rather than a strictly chronological basis. 
Firstly, Macedon under the Antigonid dynasty. The first campaign for 
which records have survived in detail is that culminating at Sellasia, 222 B. C. 
Antigonus Doson had 3,000 peltasts in his army at the start of this campaign, 
and the reference is important because Polybios typically uses the word 
eazovoifor light infantry in his account of this campaign (37). These peltasts 
may have fought at Sellasia. under the guise of chj&,? spideg a unit of whom 
was I deployed on the right of the Macejonian/Allied line. These troops have 
been discussed above (p. 69), where it was concluded they were indeed 
peltasts, rather than phalanx troops (38). Suffice it to say here that these 
ch. 2&js, p, ides form part of the argument that has surrounded Alexander's 
hývpuspistsand various units of the Hellenistic period whose title was derived 
from the colour of their shields. The conclusion reached above that these 
ch-211.7spides were peltasts was based on the nature of the terrain on the 
Macedonian/Allied right at Sellasia, the other units with whom the 
chvlkaspides were brigaded and the tactics they used. 
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This unit are good candidates for the intermediate infantry type. The 
pidew quite evidence from Sellasia suggests a tactical role for the cha, &,? s 
unlike that given to pst7oi or phalarrx. The chalk, 7sppides were deployed in 
association with Iflyrians, troops closer to peltasts than heavy infantry. This 
mixed force, either in alternate units alongside one another or in alternate 
lines one behind the, other, advanced up a broken hill and engaged a Spartan 
phalanx of considerable size. They were supported by Xiloiand, ultimately, 
hoplites (39). Polybios' account of the fighting on Euas is confusing, but it 
appears that the Illyrians; and challispides launched some kind of combined 
assault that eventually dislodged and broke the Spartans in rout. Polybios 
adds that it would have been better for the Spartans if they had launched a 
limited assault, driven the enemy off the hill and then resumed their positon 
on the crest (see above pp. 73ff). 
With regard to this discussion two points need attention. Firstly, that as 
the Macedonians advanced they were vulnerable to attack; "they could have 
easily have been put to flight", says Polybios (40). Secondly, that once 
Eucleides had made his mistake in not attacking, his &visa phalanx was 
actually at a disadvantage against what were 'lighter' troops. To surnmarise, 
the chalkaspides and Illyrians were peltasts; hence Polybios' assertion that 
they could have been forced back by the phalanx with ease, but once the 
battle had become static the phalanx had no answer to these troops. folybios 
also records that the Spartans were at a disadvantage because of their 
enemy's special formation. Polybios' account of the fighting on Euas is 
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unclear as to details, but it is possible that some kind of tactical innovation 
was used by the Macedonian/Allied force that was related to their equipment 
and formation, a tactical innovation io which the phalanx had only one 
answer, rapid attack, and to which static defence was no answer. 
The battle on Euas might be reconstructed as follows. The combined 
Macedonian/Aflied force advanced up Euas in a chequerboard formation of 
small units - speirai- to reduce the effects of disorder, the ihvo contingents 
being either intermixed or one behind the other. During the advance the men 
within each unit would have been dispersed and operating like pv, 'Im' If the 
Spartan phalanx had interfered with this advance with short controlled 
charges then the'lalyrians and chalk,? spides would have been swept back to 
their start point, or even beyond. As it was the Spartan psiloihinde'red the 
advance by a flanking move, but this was beaten off by PhilopOemen's 
timely cavalry charge. It is also worth noting that had the Spartan phalanx 
attacked it would have eventually encountered the Achaean hoplites stationed 
in reserve of the llyyrian1ch,? Ajspid assault troops, and that the Spartans 
would have had to advance' through a hail of missiles from the'second 
support line, composed of 
Polybios' account does not detail events once the Hlyrians and 
chvllwspides reached the summit of Euas and engaged the Spartan phalanx. 
We can conjecture that the Illyrians and ch. 711,7spides formed a regular battle 
order and perhaps an o6ismos took place. Alternately fighting would have 
been on a man-to-man basis, with missiles being shot into the stationary 
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ranks of the phalanx or localised attacks mounted by small units of men. 
Either way, the phalanx became so disconcerted that'it, began to retreat; this 
caused its formation to become disrupted and its defensive integrity to fall 
apart. Perhaps at this point small units of peltasts: began to infiltrate the 
phalanx as gaps appeared in the otherwise serried line of smimv' Eventually 
this loss of cohesion was disastrous for the phalanx and resulted in retreat 
tur! iing into rout. 
The fighting on Euas may be the first reference to intermediate troops in 
action in the period. It has all the ingredients of a success by such a 
troop-type. A special formation was used, perhaps a chain of small units 
designed to maintain a missile barrage by dispersed peltasts supported by 
comrades standing in formed ranks. The peltasts operated on ground unsuited 
to a phalanx and they managed to stand in close cornýat with, a phalanx until 
the enemy broke. The fighting on Euas cannot refer to a simple push of pike 
like most Hellenistic battles. The terrain is too broken and the Macedonian/ 
A ied troops too light - even if one were to accept that part of the force, the 
chvllhup, ides, were phalanx. Nor is it a battle between phalanx and pu'loi, for 
the mixed forced advanced with too much resolution for such a 
reconstruction - for example, it was inconvenienced, but not thwarted, by the 
Spartan p5iloiattack. Finally, the mixed force actually defeated the Spartans, 
a feat that jwiloicould not accomplish in the Hellenistic period in a set-piece 
battle. Despite the problems of Polybios' account, therefore, Sellasia is the 
I 
first instance in the Hellenistic period where intermediate peltasts can 
144 
plausibly be argued to have been used in battle. 
Another reference from Polybios shows that the peltasts at Sellasia could 
potentiatly have formed a proper battle. formation. He records, peltasts 
crossing a river and deploying into sumsoismos, a characteristic phalanx 
formation, in the face of Aetolian cavalry (41). The equipment of these 
peltasts and their formation was obviously enough to deter a cavalry charge 
since the Aetolians did not advance to clos'e *qua'rters. 
Peltasts continued to be a feature of the Antigonid army, either as an 
dile guard formation (42) or as line'troops. In 219 B. C. Philip VdI eployed an 
army that included 10,000 phalangites and 5,000 peltasts (43). In 218 B. C. 
Philip V broke camp and marched out of Larissa with 3,000 ch, 711, aspides 
perhaps the guard, 2,000 peltasts, 200 Cretans - pt&oiarchers - and 200 
cavalry; as balanced a fighting force as one could expect for the period (44). 
Philip V often used peltasts: and pvl'oi in conjunction in his military 
operations. An example is his use of such a mixed force, though Polybios 
actually uses the word cvzowoi instead of jx&oi, ' to screen his passage of 
defiles at Thalamae and on the march to Thermum (45). Both troop types 
could also form rear guards in difficult terrain, even setting ambushes from 
cover for unsuspecting pursuers (46). It is noteworthy in the retreat from 
Thermuni that nvzowolp5iloi were detached to screen the rear of the 
Macedonian column whilst peltasts took up an ambush position. Clearly 
Philip placed more reliance on his peltasts to succeed in a' situation that 
might require hand-to-hand fi ghting. This episode also demonstrates that both 
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eizzowoljviloiand peltasts could assume screening roles, suggesting that both 
were missile armed. 
Similar mixed forces could be detached to raid, for example in the 
Peloponnese, and Aftica (47). Peltasts could also form special advance forces 
to delay enemy attacks, as at the Aoos pass' where they supported cavalry, 
again hiding in ambush (48). - They were also noted for what we would today 
call commando missions. For example 1,000 peltasts and 500 Agrianian 
javelinmen (psiloi) were sent forward to attempt to take Chalchis by coup de 
main (49). Peltasts and euzowo. 4psiloi were also used in conjunction around 
the city of Lissus (50). 
The activities of Philip V's peltasts in strategic operations are many and 
varied. Peltasts and combinations of peltasts'with other types of soidier were 
obviously Very effective, though on occasion they failed. For example Philip 
V used peltasts as part of his army in his Laconian campaign. In the advance 
on Sparta he sent forward peltasts, mercenaries - probably psiloi - and 
Illyrians to storm a valuable hill which was situated on the other side of a 
river defended by Spartan troops. This was a dangerous mission, across 
difficult terrain, against an enemy who occupied a strong defensive position 
and who, according to Polybios, had better armaments. The initial 
Macedonian attack faltered and was repelle d, and Philip was forced to recall 
his detached force to his main line of phalanx, which had by'now deployed 
from march column. Obviously, in this episode, peltasts were not strong 
enough to defeat missile-armed wiloiin such a strong position. It n-ýight be 
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ye4ns, the case that the intermediate troop-type was. equipped -with 
ýut was 
either not as expert as dedicated psiloior-perhaps suffered from a shortage of 
ammunition (51). 
The above are examples of the use of peltasts engaged in strategic 
operations, raiding, rear and advance guard missions. Due to the terrain 
prevalent in Greece, Philip V fought this type of warfare on a very large 
scale and several important points arise from the use of"sPecial forces in his 
campaigns. Firstly, peltasts were often used in concert with other troops, 
jwiloior cavalry. Peltasts may have been asked to form some kind of 'heavy' 
support for jmilov. ' Secondly, peltasts could be expected to assault difficult 
terrain, as the example from the Laconian campaign shows. Thirdly, peltasts 
could be expected to make rapid strategic movements, keeping up with psiloi 
or even cavalry, which suggests that they could move without the march 
discipline and impedimenta we associate with the heavy infantry of the 
period. In the strategic field the value of Philip's peltast corps is obvious; 
they gave him the strategic flexibility to wage war across a wide area and in 
varying circumstances, and they allowed him to construct fighting groups of 
several different troop-types tailored to his objectives. On occasion Philip's 
peltasts failed in their missions, but overall they were a resounding success. 
Philip V also used peltasts in set-piece actions, such as Cynoscephalae, 
which was his largest land baffle. At Cynoscephalae peltasts may have fought 
as part of the Macedonian advanced skirmish line and certainly held the 
extreme right of the Macedonian line once battle proper was joined (52). 
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There is also a small possibility that the peltasts marched from the 
Macedonian camp with their heavier brethren (53). 
The sources only record the position of the peltasts in the battle; they 
give no detail of their role in the fighting. They may have taken part in the 
complex drill that formed the right wing of the Macedonian phalanx for 
battle, and if so they could vary their density and depth of formation just like 
'heavy' troops (54). They may also have fought alongside the Macedo nian 
psiloi who formed the skirmish line that contested the lower slopes of 
Cynoscephalae with their Roman counterparts. This dual-role, of skirmishers 
who later fell in to form the main line of battle, may point to an intermediate 
infantry force -in action. The sources are, however, too vague to make 
anything mOre than a tentative conclusion. 
Peltasts'also formed part of the Macedonian army in the reign of the last 
Antigonid king, Perseus. Livy records that 5,000 peltasts - he uses the Latin 
c, aelk? bý- were present at the parade that marked the opening of the Pydna 
campaign (55). 2,000 of these were 'specially picked men, probably the 
guard. We hear little of them in the actions preceding the main battle at 
Pydna, when psiloiand cavalry performed most of the strategic tasks, but 
they diý play a part at Pydna. 
At Pydna the peltasts formed up separately from the phalanx: they were 
deployed to its right, in a siraliar position to the one they had held at 
Cynoscephalae (56). Accounts of the battle record that the Macedonian 
phalanx was drawn up in two divisions, the Imbs 
. Wpides and 
the ch. 211.7spides 
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(57). ' Some scholars have added the peltasts and the guard Cagema [581) to 
the main body of the phalanx on the assumption that they were mnm-armed 
(59)., At Sellasia we encountered chalkasp-ides serving in an Antigonid army 
and it was concluded that they were peltasts. The same conclusion cannot be 
drawn for the clklkas , p. 
idesat Pydna. 
It is clear from the sources that there were at least four units in the centre 
and on the right of the Macedonian army, two large units of phalanx (the 
Aetzkas, Eflidesand challaspidets), the infantry guard G&emw) and 'line' peltasts. 
Livy's account posts the peltasts (c,? e&.? tn) separate from the phalanx (60). 
Plutarch does the same with the infantry guard; they march out of camp 
before the chaffi7spiolesand take their position in the line (61). Clearly the 
guard and the peltasts were not part of the main phalanx. We can also be 
sure that the guard were peltasts. Livy records -that 3,000 of them were 
picked from the peltasts (62). Plutarch does not contradict this even when he 
describes the decorated panoply of this torps, and indeed we will meet later 
troops who used peltast tactics and wore heavy armour (63). We must note 
here that generally weight of equipment does not dictate tactics -a naked 
Gaul is as much a heavy infantryman as a Greek hoplite, if both fight 
shoulder-to-shoulder. At Pydna, therefore, the peltasts and the jgem.? were 
intermediate troops, the Anvcvspides and chalkaspioles phalanx. The chalkas- 
pides were not 461ife troops, and certainly not the same as challasoides at 
Sellasia as their numbers and tactical role at Pydna do not match the earlier 
baffle. In short the ch-71kaspidesof Sellasia have become the agema at Pydna, 
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and for whatever reason a unit of line phalanx has acquired the title given ýto 
the guards in Polybios' account of Sellasia. 
Given that the ?, gea, 7a - who may have wom armour - and the peltasts are 
intermediate infantry, then Pydna is an example where this troop-type stood 
in the main line of battle. Unfortunately the sources do not record the 
battlefield role of these troops in detail. The terrain to the right of the 
Macedonýian line was broken and Perseus may have intended his peltasts to 
operate there, but since the sources do not record the actions of these troops 
in detail, this is only conjecture. Plutarch does record that the ogem,? fought 
to the last man, highlighting, perhaps, the ability of 61i? e intermediate 
infantry to fight in hand-to-hand combat (64). 
We turn now to the Ptolemaic army. Only two references are of interest 
and only one refers directly to peltasts, the other to the .7 ,, c,,, e, 7i,?, which might 
be the equivalent of the Antigonid foot guard, i. e. trained to fight as peltasts. 
Both examples come from the Raphia cimpign, 217 B. C., where the peltasts 
numbered 2,000 men, the a , gema 
3,000 (65). 
The equipment of the , gem.? 
is open to discussion and follows the 
general debate regarding Hellenistic guard units from Alexander's hypaspists 
onwards. In the Ptolemaic case, the . 7gem.? were probably intermediate 
infantry rather than &? d-wphoro. 1. ' It has been shown that svimphoroi were 
deployed in large blocks on the battlefield and that they needed mutual 
support to be effective. The phalanx needed closed flanks if it were not to be 
outflanked and disordered. At Raphia the ?, gema was separated from the main 
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body of the Ptolemaic phalanx by 2,000 peltasts (66). It would be tactically 
unsound to deploy an aile phalanx of only 3,000 men in such an isolated and 
exposed position. Such a deployment would invite an enemy to strip flank 
supports from the phalanx, envelop it and destroy it. We must assume, 
, gema were equipped and 
fought as peltasts. therefore, that the men of the a 
At Raphia the ? Sema and peltasts were deployed on the left, between the 
Ptolemaic centre and the cavalry wing. The battle opened with a combined 
Seleucid cavalry and elephant attack on the cavalry of the Ptolemaic left, 
which fled after being outflanked. The Ptolemaic elephant screen, which had 
been deployed in a chain across the front of the ? gema and peltasts, was 
forced back onto its own infantry, and must have disrupted the infantry line. 
A combined force of Seleucid elephants and infantry - probably peltasts - 
then fell -on the Ptolemaic infantry who were forced back and -eventually 
broke in rout (67). The defeat of the Ptolemaic peltasts is easily explained: 
they were rapidly outflanked by the *successful Seleucid cavalry attack, 
disordered by their own elephants and then faced- infantry of equivalent 
weight combined with elephants. Ptolemy used his peltasts at Raphia to close 
the flanks of his infantry phalanx. They were deployed on the left, the side 
most often the subject of a major cavalry assault and covered by elephants, 
maybe as a protection against a frontal cavalry attack. What is important for 
the purposes of this study, is that they do form part of the battle- line proper, 
although, of course, they are not expected to hold the centre against an 
enemy phalanx. These troops were not used in a skirmisher role as a screen 
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or flanki support-force. Once the action began, they, did - not falt, back 99 
behind 
-or 
to the side of the main line; rather they were expected hold their 
ground and battle it out at close-quarters if necessaryý That they failed in this 
regard was'not due to a failing in equipment or tactics; rather they were 
caught in a tactical situation from which few troops could expect to survive. 
The Ptolemaic army therefore deployed peltasts which stood in the main 
line-of-battle on the flanks of their mrisa phalanx. What then of the other 
great eastern power, the Seleucid Empire? Firstly the Seleucid guard infantry, 
the argyraspideg needs some discussion. This 10,000 strong corps, like the 
, ýRe units of Macedon and Egypt, is often discussed as part of the debate that 
has surrounded Alexander's hyp2spis& Unlike the guard units of Antigonid 
Macedon and Ptolemaic Egypt, however, the Seleucid ar'&zaspides were 
swisa-armed phalangites and not an intermediate troop-type (68). This matter 
dealt with, we can go on to survey the evidence for Seleucid peltasts,, all of 
which comes from the reign of Antiochus'111. 
At Raphia the Seleucid. deployed a force of Greek mercenaries to the 
right of their phalanx. This force attacked the Ptolemaic left and may have 
been peltasts - see above for their effect on the Ptolemaic' line (69). No 
details, however, 'are forthcoming from Polybios' account of the action; all 
that can be added to our study is that Seleucid peltasts on that Occasion 
actually attacked the enemy line, suggesting they were equipped for 
hand-to-hand combat. 
The Seleucid crossing of the Elburz range in 210 B. C. is more 
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informative (70). The'S'el .e, ucid a, ý, e'qgý"id in a gn '4ý, agains I t, th e g_ F4Mpai 
Parthian king Arsaces. ý Thq:. Elburz. mo'u'nýfain. chai In blocked An'ti I ochus' 
advance into Hyrcanii and special troops'were needed to clear a path for the 
main army. The intermediate peltast was ideafty suited to such a mission. 
Upon reaching the Elburz it became clear that the heavy troops and 
baggage could not be expected to cross in the face of resistance, so 
Antiochus detailed a special force to. clear the way. This force was split into 
three divisions, the first consisting of psiki (archers, slingers and 
javelinmen), the second of Cretan archers, the third of the thareophomiand 
IhomVIx. * The phalanx was to bring up the rear. The role of the p&oiwill 
be discussed later under the relevant section, but of interest here are the units 
of thureophoroiand thorvHtw. Thareophoroiwere named after the long oval 
shield they carried, the thureog and troops of - this kind can often be seen in 
Hellenistic art. Tho. -jkilui are more difficult to identify: one possible 
representation has survived from Sidon -and this soldier appears in Achaean 
armies (71). We will discuss him in more detail later, but suffice it here to 
say that he was an armoured peltast. 
The Seleucid plan of action appears to have been as follows: the a&oi 
were to advance and deal with enemy skin-nishers - one presumes that 
missiles were to be their main weapons; the lhureqphoroiand thomElaiwere 
to follow and deal with any knots of organised resistance. We can presume 
that the latter were expected to fight hand-to-hand and as such they must 
have been suitably equipped. Reconstructions show these troops equipped 
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with thareos, helmet, 'sword and long spear, and some add a javelin; the 
thormUlaipresumably wore armour. 
Seleucid peltasts also fought at the battle of the Arius River, 208 B. C. 
(72). Polybios begins his account three days before the action. He records 
that the Seleucid army approached normally for the first two days. Then on 
the third, Antiochus took 10,000 peltasts, his psilbi and his cavalry, and 
marched through the night to the river Arius. The Bactrian army had fallen 
back to spend the night in a town some twenty stades distant and upon 
hearing this the Seleucids crossed the river. The main action began next day 
with a Bactrian attack on Antiochus' advance guard. It is clear from 
Polybios' account that Antiochus' men were not properly deployed when the 
Bactrians attacked and further that the main Seleucid army had not yet been 
brought up. - Polybios records that the Seleucid advanced force deployed into 
utlpdaq -and ouAavo w" The former was an infantry formation, the latter a 
cavalry formation. The Bactrians attacked, but were unable to break the 
Seleucid line. Eventually Antiochus took 2,000 of his mounted bodyguaid 
and counter-attacked, carrying the field. 
Several points can be drawn from this encounter, despite no reference 
being made to peltasts in the actual battle. It is probable that the troops in 
sememi were peltasts - the 10,000 mentioned in the approach to the river - 
for it would have been foolish to deploy mi7oY to repel cavalry and the 
phalanx had not yet arrived. Bar-KoC'hva argues that these 10,000 peltasts 
were infact the jrgyraspid guard (73). His argument rests on numbers - the 
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argmspides were indeed 10,000 strong - and the general confusion in' the 
, pelle, an 
ite' of 'quipment used by both ph nx ancient sources over the me ala' 
and peltasts. But Bar-Kochva clearly believed that the mgmspides were 
miis, -. armed phalangites, and as a result his analysis can be rejected. Phalanx 
troops were not the ideal troops to be sent forward as an advance guard to 
cross a river in the face of the enemy. We should take Polybios at face value, 
arfd accept 'that 'th& -10,000'peltast§'-wdre Just that, troops ideally' suited to 
special operations. This being the case, this was the largest force of peltasts 
deployed in the period. 
The Baffle at the River Arius demonstrates the use of small units of 
peltasts and cavalry hurriedly deployed together to repel cavalry. The 
formation worked well. We can presume that the weight of the defence fell 
on the peltasts, perhaps formed in sixaspimios -a formation in which we 
have previously encountered them. Perhaps the Seleucid cavalryý made 
limited counter-affacks to break the impetus of the Bactrians. After the 
enemy horse had exhausted themselves, Antiochus launched a devastating 
counter-attack with his guard, sweeping all before him. It might be well to 
note that the peltasts would have needed an anti-cavalry weapon, a long 
thrusting spear, to be successful in their role. Again peltasts are encountered 
in the line of battle, performing an essentially hand-to-hand mission. - 
Seleucid peltasts were also - present at the battle of Thermopylae, 191 
B. C. (74). Bar-Kochva again identifies these troops as . 7rgyraspides, but Aie 
Seleucid army at Thermopylae was largely destroyed and yet we find the 
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j, rgyraspides a year later at Magnesia. It is highly, improbAk, that a guard 
unit could have been reconstituted in so short a time. Also these. pqltasts 
fought, according to Appian, in advance- of the main Seleucid p4ala! Lx,, hardly 
a position suitable for guard &? iisaphoroi' Again Bar-Ko'chva must be 
rejected and it will be assumed that these troops were peltasts; proper. 
Appian records that peltasts and psiloi were deployed in front of the 
main body of the phalanx (75). Livy's account does not mention peltasts; - lie 
has only levis arm, 71ume (Greek : p5iloi) in this position (76). These soldiers 
formed a screen for the phalanx, which, according to Appian, retreated when 
the Roman attack began in earnest. Appian makes no mention of peltasts in 
his description of this maneouvre, but it is reasonable to assume that they 
accompanied thepsiloiand fell back through the phalanx. 
At the -Arius river the peltasts fought as 'heavy' infantry. ' Thermopylae 
saw them in their role as light troops. It must be assumed that they were 
equipped with missile weapons to, shoot at the Roman line. Perhaps 
Antiochus also wanted to stiffen his skirmishers with soldiers equipped for 
close combat, the intention being to ward off an attack by Roman, veb'lew- 
who were better equipped for close action than most Hellenistic pvlýoi- and 
forestall a debilitating m8leýe such as we have encountered at Cynoscephalae. 
Seleucid peltasts are last recorded in action at Magnesia in 189 B. C. Livy 
records that 4,000 Pisidian, Pamphylian and Lycian c.? e&&, 6i (Latin for 
peltasts) were deployed on the Seleucid, left, between the phalanx and the 
cavalry (77). Appian's account is at odds with Livy since he places jwiloiin 
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the same position (78). This conflict of sources does not concern us since the 
role of the peltasts in the Seleucid battle plan is not recorded by either 
Appian or Livy. They may, therefore, have fought as part of the general 
Seleucid fight screen - hence the confusion in nomenclature (79). 
So much for the large armies of the period. Peltasts can also be found in 
the ranks of certain Greek rrýinor powers. The concentration of power into 
huge monarchic st . ates in the inimedia . te post-Alexandrian period did nothing 
to change the fragmented political structure that had characterised Greece 
from the earliest times. The traditional polis system was suPplemented by a 
series of multi-state leagues, all of which maintained military forces of 
varying size. The intermediate peltast can be found in many of these arrrýies, 
which is not surprising when one considers the terrain and nature of war in 
Greece. Such a soldier was ideally suited to the fighting that went on in the 
region throughout the Hellenistic period. 
The mountains to the north of the ýGulf of Corinth were united in this 
period into what modem historians caU the Aetolian League. Epigraphic 
evidence exists to show that peltasts were used by the army of this state. It is 
interesting to note that the inscription from which this evidence is drawn, 
uses a three-tier categorisation of infantry much like the tacticians. 
Unfortunately despite the many raids and wars fought by the Aetolian army 
no direct reference is made to peltasts in action (80). 
More substantial evidence survives for the use of peltasts by the army of 
the Achaean League. Plutarch, Pausanias and Polyaenus record a reform of 
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Achaean infantry in which-'pýltas6 appear io", bave' been'ýdnv`e'rted into S'.? rls, 7 
phalanx (81). Ofspecififinterest is'th . eir' iefirences t0 the-ýequiiprnent. used by 
Achaean troops prior to the-'ref6rm. Plutarch'records that the Achaeans used 
dorala and thamol, Pausahias short domb and long oval liopla - like the 
Celtic Iliarms or the Persian gemh,?. Polyaenus follows Plutarch's line, 
adding that the Achaeans, had been hoplites before the reform. Plutarch's 
_ýCcdla -t_. I I- - -. - _. na so gives sbm6 insight intdthe-tktidsý used by pre-reform A-chaean 
infantry. Unfortunately, however, he appears to contradict himself. Ile 
records that the Achaeans were lightly armed and fought well at a distance, 
implying they used javelins, in addition to spears, yet they formed a solid 
phalanx without division into spebm. ' Further he says that their line was weak 
and easily broken because they had neither interlocking shields nor mriw. * 
Plutarch's account may be reconciled by assuming he refers to intermediate 
infantry, composed of militia drawn from an area we know to have been 
backward and poor in resources (82). These troops were good at long range 
combat, reflecting the traditional pvl'oiskills of the Greek urban poor and 
hill dwellers (both types existed within the boundaries of the Achaean 
League). Psr7oiwere, however, of limited use, and the League needed some 
kind of heavy infantry base for its army. Hoplites were out of the question, 
because the League was too poor to supply them in large numbers. The 
League therefore tumed to the peltast as a poor substitute. The peltasts we 
have encountered so far have largely been small bodies of well trained 
professionals, in many cases mercenaries. The Achaean League deployed a 
peltast force composed of militia whose battlefield efficiency was question- 
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able and who - could do little, more, than stand in the battlefield in a, large 
unwieldy mass. Eventually Philopoemen re-equipped these troops with szd&zi 
converting them into a highly effective ýhalanx. 
Achaean peltasts were used in action at the battle of Caphyae (83). An 
all-arms Achaean force was in pursuit of Aetolian raiders. The Achaeans 
caught up with the Aetolians in the region of Caphyae. Polybios' narrative of 
the-6affle"aind his analysis of the t- actics . used is excellent. The A-etolians 
rushed for the safety of a nearby range of hills as soon as they were aware of 
the presence of a force of Achaeans in close pursuit. Once he encountered 
the Aetolian raiders, Aratus, the Achaean commander, sent forward his 
cavalry and psiloito engage the enemy rear- guard, which was composed of 
cavalry. When the Aetolian rear'gUard retreated to the main'Actolian force, 
by now in a line of Hls, Aratuý advanced a force of thomEtaitc, reinforce 
his front line (84). 
The thorvK&i advanced at the double and the Actolian reaction was to 
counter-attack with their cavalry. Polybios says that they struck lead-units of 
the Achaean force, the implication being that either the Achaeans were in a 
column - which is unlikely - or echeloned - which is more acceptable. 
Regardless of their formation the Achaean force was rolled up, their cavalry 
being struck first and fleeing in panic. The Aetolians then followed up their 
victory, riding down the thorvkilat, * who'had been disordered by their rapid 
retreat and also took to flight. 
Several important observations can be made on the role of the thoraUlai 
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at Caphyae. They were initially held back. Arattis first deployed an aqva, nce 
force of p&oiand cavalry whose mission was to attack and pin the rear of 
the retreating Actolian army, loaded down, no doubt, with loot. The 
thormUlai were only placed in the line when the Aetofians withdrew and 
reformed their cavalry. The tenor of the combat had changed, the Aetoj=ians 
had given up skirmishing to protect their rear - note that no record is made 
of their cavalry engaging in close combat until the charge - and the time had 
come for either a full scale Achaean attack or a solid defence. Aratus may 
also have felt that his fhor.?, U1, W would provide a solid base off which his 
other combat arms could operate and perhaps become a ready, advanced 
strike force to engage in hand-to-hand combat should the opportunity arise. It 
is also noteworthy that the thomN1,7i were able to advance at the double to 
catch up with their advance force and, one presumes, keep up with that force 
as the action proceeded; their armour did not reduce their mobility. Aratus 
also had a phalanx to hand but chose to hold that out of combat: it formed up 
far to the rear of the advance echelons. ThoraEldwere obviously preferred 
to hoplites when it came to operating with light advance forces against an 
enemy deficient in heavy infantry. 
The attack of the Aetolian cavalry is also of interest. Peltasts have been 
encountered facing off cavalry in simaspismos after a river crossing and at 
the battle of the Arius river. This being the case, why were the thomli&i 
ridden down at Caphyae? The answer is clear from Polybios' account. I 
The 
Ilior-71AW were disordered because they had advanced into position at the 
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double, and Polybios makes much -of the speed and vigOur of the Aetolian 
attack. Thus the cavalry probably caught the IhorjUIaitota. Ily unformed. The 
incident is important because it underlines the importance of formation for 
even specialist intermediate infantry. 
Achaean II,, or.?, k-A? iwere also used the baffle of Mantinea, 207 B. C. (85). 
They were deployed to the left of Philopoemen's phalanx, together with 
psjZoiand cavalry. Polybios is not clear as to their exact positioning or role. 
They may have been preceded by a line or screen'of either or both the other 
two arms. Polybios also 'gives no indication of the number 'Of 117or. 7k. AV 
present, but it is clear that the force was not 'substantial. In particular, the 
lhor, d-iWdid not hold a'substantial sector of front as, for example, the 
. ge=? 
did at Raphia. Their tactical roli is Ptolemaic or Seleucid peltasts and .7 
also open to discussion. Probably they we re I expected'to support'the p&oi 
and the cavalry, and t. o provide a mobile defence linking the flank of the 
phalanx to the rising, 'broken ground ofi the left of the Achae'an army. We 
cannot tell Which part of their intermediate role, light or heavy, the thorakilai 
were expected to take up; probably both as circumstances demanded. As it 
was, the thorvElaiand. their comrades were swept away early in the battle by 
a rapid attack. by the Spartan right. 
Finally, Achaean peltasts fought with Pergamene troops at the battle of 
Magnesia in 189 B. C. (86). A mixed force of Achaean and Pergamene 
peltasts formed part of the allied force which held the right centre of the 
Roman line, under the command of Eumenes of Pergamum. This -force 
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extended the Roman centre much as the Ptolemaic, and Seleucid peltasts did 
at Raphia. Their role at Magnesia is not made clear by the sources, but. 
Eumenes' command as a whole counfired and destroyed the attack of the 
Seleucid chariots. We can, however, make. little of this incident since the 
sources only specifically mention cavalry and pvl'oibeing involved. 
There are other references in sources, literary and epigraphic, to peltasts - 
serving in the annies of otfier Greek rrunor powers. Unfortunately no detailed 
record has survived as to their tactical employment. Furthermore, certain 
references in the sources may disguise a wider use of peltasts beyond those I 
examples cited above. The peltast was often a mercenary soldier and it may 
be the case that mercenary became synonymous with this troop-type. If, 
therefore, all references to mercenary infantry in the sources are in fact 
references to peltasts, then the troop- type was used very widely indeed (87). 
It is difficult, however, to press this point with any force. Suffice it to say 
here that peltasts were used widely across Greece and the Near East in the 
Hellenistic period. 
D) Art Evidence for the Hellenistic 
Troops called thareophoroi have occasionally been encountered in the 
sources and it has been concluded that these soldiers were equipped with a 
long shield, the thyreog and fought as peltasts (88). Although written 
evidence for thzweolohoroi is uncommon, art representations are relatively 
profuse. This may suggest that this type of peltast was more widely used than 
literature suggests. This section will examine art pertinent to our analysis and 
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in so doing comment on peltast equipment in the Hellenistic period. 
The Greeks often named soldiers after the type of shield they carried, 
hoplite, peltast, etc. and so too the thureopliorug who was named after the 
thmeos. This was a long, oval shield grasped by a central handle and was 
probably similar to the Roman legionary shield of the Republican period; 
indeed, legionaries are sometimes caUed lhaFeq , pl., oFo. 
i in the sources (89). 
Often the thareos was reinforced by a rib along the centre of the face of the 
shield. This type of shield is often shown in Hellenistic art (90), but many 
authors have identified it as of Gallic origin (91). This may well be the case, 
but this writer rejects the argument that Hellenistic soldiers depicted with 
lh, vreoiare always of Gallic orgin. There are too many references to Greek, 
or rather non-Gallic, thareophoroi in our sources and art evidence is too 
widely spread to support this conclusion. Gallic mercenaries were used by 
Hellenistic powers, but not on a scale to warrant the'conclusion that all 
thumophoroidepicted in art are Gauls. ' 
Other scholars have identified these soldiers as mercenaries, perhaps 
garrison troops. Another theory is that a frieze from Sidon of an armoured 
11-wreophoros shows a member of the 'Roman guard' known to have been in 
Seleucid service during the reign of Antiochus, IV (92). Yet armoured 
thareophoroirnay have existed in the Hellenistic period; the sources refer to 
such soldiers as tho. -,? kY1,?, t' 
Due to the nature of art evidence it is obviously difficult to reach hard 
and fast conclusions. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that there are 
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examples of soldiers equipped with the. thareos in Hellenistic art. Such 
examples indicate widespread use of such equipment, more so than do our 
written sources. Further they show what equipment might have comple- 
mented the shield of the 6areophoroi- tall Macedonian boots, helmet, long 
sword and spear; the Sidon example adds mail body armour. 
The equipment depicted in such art obviously does not belong to phalanx - 
troops, and appears very similar to that carried by lphicrates' peltasts. They 
may, therefore, show what the intermediate infantryman carried into battle. 
The long shield would have been better suited to dispersed warfare than the 
small pelle of the phalangite as it covers more of the soldier's body. The 
long sword suggests a soldier who fenced as an individual, like a Roman 
legionary, rather than a fighter in a mass formation like a hoplite or 
S'? dS'? V17o. -os, both of whom depended on their fellows for offensive power 
and defensive protection. Art also shows a long spear, a weapon that could 
obviously been used against other infantry, but was more importantly an 
anti-cavalry weapon. Finally these soldiers are equipped with varying 
quantities of armour. Some have only their tafl boots and helmets for 
protection, whereas one example wears a complete suit of mail. If javelins 
were added to this panoply, then we have a picture of an infantryman who 
would have been very close to the theoretical type suggested by the 
tacticians. When art and literary sources are married it becomes clear how 
the soldiers in the fighting in the Porphyrion pass or at the Axius river could 
have cleared away light troops defending strong positions or repelled massed 
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cavalry attacks. 
E) CD-ndusion 
The sources, on balance, do support the existence of an intermediate type 
of infantryman. An origin for the new type can be deduced from later 
Classical evidence when reforms were made to the standard peltast and 
Spartan counters to peltasts were taken into account by commanders of light 
troops. From these beginnings, a new breed of specialist was bom. Initially, 
small groups of experienced professionals added an additional dimension to 
Greek warfare, providing annies with troops capable of undertaking 
dangerous missions in rough terrain. In time this new type of peltast came to 
be a common part of the Hellenistic commander's tactical repertoire and can 
be found fighting in many of the actions of the period. 
Given our acceptance of the veracity of the original staternent of the 
tacticians that a peltast fell between hoplite and p&os we need to gather 
together the evidence to establish precisely how a Hellenistic peltast fought 
and how he fitted into the overall tactical system of the period. 
The Hellenistic peltast was equipped to perform a special role in both 
tactical and strategic operations. This dual role was reflected in his 
equipment and at times this created problems in his defensive equipment. 
The peltast was lightly equipped - most did not wear, body armour, the 
exception being thoraHiji - and this would have placed the - peltast at a 
disadvantage when faced by formed, armoured infantry in hand-to-hand 
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combat. Further, these peltasts were not equipped with a -Yyeapon, like. 'the 
miisg, a weapon designed to protect the unarmoured infantryman by keeping 
. pismos 
Polybios enemies at a distance. Peltasts could, however, form ý%=? s 
specifically refers to this formation once, and other references imply that this 
reference is not isolated. Sunasppidng however, when used by peltasts, must 
refer to close formation rather than literally locking shields, as with a 
phalanx. Peltasts would not have been able to form a mutually defensive 
shield-wall, like the hoplite, or a serried line of saFimz If peltasts were 
equipped with the traditional peAle then their shields would not have been 
wide enough to overlap, nor would their spears have been long enough to 
compensate for this lack of protection as happened in the smisa phalanx. If 
the thareos was carried, then it was altogether the wrong shape. It seems, 
therefore, that peltasts could not normally be expected to hold the main line 
of battle. The references cited for the poor quality of mass Achaean peltasts 
when used in a main line role supports this argument. Further, in those 
battles where peltasts supplemented the mdsj- phalanx, they are always 
deployed on the flanks of the main infantry centre, often opposite similarly 
armed troops. The peltast did not, therefore, usurp the &vim phalanx as the 
infantry base of a Hellenistic army; his equipment simply was not up to 
facing a swim phalanx on its own terms. I&, 
If the peltast could not face the mdm phalanx on level ground then what 
of broken terrain? Here a proper tactical role in a set-piece battle existed for 
peltasts. Where sectors of the battle field were broken by rough ground, the 
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special tactics of peltasts allowed them to -challenge"even the, -&visa phalanx. 
The outstanding example is Sellasia, where Macedonian peltasts fought, with 
considerable success on the slopes of Niount Euas against Eucleidas' phalanx. 
It is clear that. any rough ground gave the peltasts the chance to meet the 
enemy on their - terms, i. e. in a situation where individual prowess in battle 
counted rather then strength of formation. The critical weakness of the miim 
phalanx- was its- formation, Which, once disrupted, mad6 the individual - 
phoros very vulnerable. The tactics used at Sellasia made maximum swis.? 
capital out of this weakness. We have presumed small unit attacks using a 
combination of hand-to-hand and missile weapons slowly wore down the 
integrity of the Spartan phalanx until, it was reduced to a swarm of 
individuals. In such circumstances the tactical roles of phalanx and peltast 
were reversed, and the latter's equipment gained the upper hand. One might 
question how successful the intermediate peltast would have been when 
opposed by a Classical hoplite phalanx, whose equipment was more suited to 
individual fighting. Further it is noteworthy that peltasts did not cross 
weapons with Roman legionaries, soldiers whose tactics would have been 
similar to peltasts and whose protective equipment was better. 
Against missiles the peltast would have been amply protected. As most 
n the Hellenistic period did not use shields, peltasts would have been 
better protected in any missile exchange. On the one hand, the', pe/le would 
have been an excellent shield when opposed by missilemen, since it was light 
and easy to manipulate. Ancient missHes were slow enough to be dodged or 
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caught on such a light shield. . On the 'other, ' the, - 
Mix-cios; was: a -, long., 
body-shield which protected the carrier from neck to knee. - and it too would 
have offered adequate protection., Against mi7bithe'peltast would have been 
amply equipped to exchange missiles. When the offensive weapons and 
flexible light infantry, tactics are taken into account, the peltast would -have 
become a formidable opponent for Hellenistic psiloi. ' 
The peltast was well equipped for offensive action; indeed this writer 
would argue that they were second only to the &visa- phalanx in this respect. 
Evidence shows that long swords and spears, and perhaps javelins, were 
carried. It would be logical to assume that peltasts could have operated either 
as individuals or in closed formation. The equipment carried by peltasts 
would certainly point towards such a conclusion. The shield carried could 
have been gripped in one hand and used in individual combat much as a 
Roman legionary would have fought with sword and sevA= The peltast 
could have fought shoulder-to-shoulder with long spear and shield should the 
tactical situation warrant it. They certainly could not stand up to a phalanx, 
but one presumes they would have been the match for any other types of 
infantry on the Hellenistic battlefield. 
Where peltast close-order tactics occur most commonly in the sources is 
when they are fighting cavalry. The one occasion where the simasppismoswas 
formed is one such example. Once more their weapons would have been 
amply suited to fending off cavalry and this would have given the troop-type 
a massive advantage when compared to josi7ol. 
' Fdloi had little -answer to 
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cavalry as their one great defensive advantage, fleetness ofJobt, was of no 
effect when faced by mounted soldiers. A skirmish screen could, therefore, 
be easily swept away by relatively small numbers of cavalry - witness the 
actions of Philopoemens's cavalry at Sellasia as an example. Peltasts were 
under no such disadvantage. They could skirmish with an enemy line and 
form a dense anti- cavalry formation, bristling with long spears, should 
eneifiy mounted- -troops come near. The best example - of- the strengths of 
Hellenistic peltasts in this area comes from the Axius river. The peltast line 
at the Axius must have withstood many charges by the Bactrians before 
Antiochus intervened with his guard cavalry, and from what is known of 
Bactrian cavalry of the period they were akin to Hellenistic lancers: indeed, 
they may have been more heavily equipped, since the region had such a long 
cavalry tradition (93). At the Axius, therefore, peltasts probably withstood a 
sustained mounted assault equal to any recorded in military history. 
The offensive equipment and tactic§ of Hellenistic peltasts would have 
been greatly enhanced by their being commonly deployed on broken ground, 
where maintainance of rigid formations would have been impractical. In such 
circumstances they would have been superior in close action to any other 
troops of the period. 
Peltasts were also employed in strategic roles and it is clear from the 
sources that they were critical to the army's success. Hellenistic arinies 
operated over an area of the world that contained all types of terrain. The 
sources record that peltasts were called upon to fijht in situations where 
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phalanx and cavalry were useless, and where pvl'oi lacked the necessary 
hand- to-hand capabilities to ensure success. Peltasts, often with the support 
of p&oi, could be expected to secure all types of hostile ground. The 
examples of mountain fighting illustrate the unique quafites of the peltast in 
strategic operations. The thzz. -eoWI,, oroi and fliovalitai who fought for the 
Porphyrion pass, used missiles and close combat to dislodge a series of 
strongly emplaced enemies. The equipment of these troops and their high 
professional standards were essential to the success of the operation. Given 
the flexible and fast moving nature of Hellenistic warfare, the peltast had a 
key role as scout, conu-nando and member of flying column. Without the new 
peltast, Hellenistic armies would have faced many strategic bottle-necks in 
I 
their campaigns across Greece and the Near East. 
The strategic functions of the peltast far overshadowed their tactical uses. 
Although they could fight as skirmishers or as close-order infantry, it was 
clearly to the specialists, the phalanx and p5ilol, * that the main weight of these 
areas of responsibility fell. There were fewl occasions where unusual, terrain 
allowed the peltasts to contribute their skills to an army's tactical operations. 
For the most part, e. g. at Raphia, Hellenistic commanders had no special 
place for their peltasts and in such cases peltasts were placed on the flanks of 
the phalanx next to the cavalry. It is la reasonable assumption 
that no special 
role was intended for these peltasts, the intention being simply to keep them 
out of the way of the enemy's mnýzrarmed infantry - against whom peltasts 
would have been little use - and to extend the battle line to make an 
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enveloping movement by hostile cavalry that much more difficult 
Battles such as Raphia show that commanders deployed their peltasts in 
line simply because they were there, to place more, bodies in the front rank. It 
is noteworthy, however, that peltasts could be trusted to stand in the main 
line of battle, in a manner that peltasts of the Classical period never had 
been. Classical peltasts were deployed in the same fashion as Hellenistic 
psdoj, to the flanks or the rear of the main battle line. 
The intermediate peltast fits well into the all-arms concept that was the 
hallmark of Hellenistic warfare. A troop-type of his kind had many important 
roles to play in the operations of armies committed to fighting in rough 
terrain and against a variety of enemies. The tacticians are the only ancient 
sources to specify this intermediate role -a footsoldier who was at one and 
the same time a line- and a light- infantryman. The- historical sources, 
however, record so many examples where such an infantryman is surely in 
action, that we must accept the tacticians' at face value. The new peltast was a 
specialist that facilitated success in all types of terrain and in all military 
situations. It seems that these soldiers were prized and that they formed part 
of the armoury of all Hellenistic states, large and small. Without them 
Hellenistic commanders would have found war more demanding and have 
faced strategic and tactical situations to which they would have had no 
answer. 
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Ch6pla-Ul - 
A) Introduction 
This chapter examines the equipment and tactics of light infantry in the 
Hellenistic period. In particular the light infantryman of the period will be 
studied within the overall structure of the Hellenistic military system. The 
Greeks used many words for light infantry; for the sake of continuity we 
shall refer to such troops by the term a5iloi(D. 
RsiWwere a feature of almost all ancient armies. They fought with little 
or no armour in loose formations. Their tactics were based on shooting from 
a distance and they used fleetness of foot to keep out from danger. In 
Classical and Hellenistic warfare pvl'oiperformed those vital operations that 
were beyond the capabilities of the heavier infantry, for example fighting in 
rough terrain or scouting. 
FkYoiequipment was comparatively inexpensive when compared to the 
hoplite panoply. Fsz7oiwere not dependent on the resources of the Greek 
, po, 
ffs or the Hellenistic monarchies, nor did they need the support of a 
complex agricultural system. This allowed, firstly, Greeks from the lower 
classes to serve in the army and, secondly, the more backward areas of the 
Greek world to deploy powerful, effective forces of jw7oi. * In the Hellenistic 
period the great monarchies could also supplement their manpower with 
subjects from the more backward areas of their kingdoms who were 
specialists in light warfare. Certain peoples in the ancient world became 
experts at avl'oi warfare, notably the mountainous areas of central Greece, 
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Aetolia and Arcamania (2). 
In the' Hellenistic 'period p&oi formed a specialist brdnch* of the army. 
They We I re reconnaissance troops and rough terrain specialists, either on or 
off the battlefield. Fsiloioften performed those tasks associated with modern 
guerillas or commandos. In many Hellenistic armies psiloiwere drawn from 
the native population and they fought in their own traditional style. On some 
occasions the sources show masses of psiloiin action; on others p5iloiwere 
small professional bodies of men. Many different types of light infantry are 
encompassed by the general term jajilov, each having distinct ethnic 
backgrounds, dress, weapons and traditional ways of fighting. 
FmYop'warfare was very sophisticated by the Hellenistic period. Forrnal- 
ised psiloitactics, however, originated in the Classical period and so it is in 
the earlier period that we shall begin our survey. 
B) Pc; ln; in the Classical Period 
F&Aoiwere a common feature of Greek armies throughout the Classical 
period; for example large numbers were present at the battle of Plataea in 
479 B. C. (3). Our examination, however, must concentrate on the later 
Classical period because it was then that pvkitactics began to be placed on 
a formalised footing. In the early Classical period pv. '1oi appear to be little 
more than poorly armed mobs; for example many of the )wiloi at Plataea 
were helot servants, with little to contribute to warfare. The strategic and 
tactical demands of the Peloponnesian War, however, changed the nature of 
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war; forcing the Greekslo - bring pvkiw'a'rfare onto a, More', formalised 
footing and make it an important adjunct to the hoplites Who had until then 
dominated war. 
The nature of hoplite warfare meant that the hoplite was the superior 
troop-type in formal set-piece battles. There were, however, many military 
tasks that were beyond the capabilities of hoplites. Before the Peloponnesian - 
War commanders had accommodated these deficiencies within their armies, 
but the changing strategic climate at the end of the fifth century forced them 
to incorporate new support elements into their armies. 
The vulnerability of an army that was composed mainly of hoplites and 
was deficient in psiki is best iflustrated. by Demosthenes' campaign in 
Aetolia in 426 B. C. (4). Demosthenes blundered into central Greece with 
very little appreciation of the strategic problems that would face a- hoplite 
anny. The terrain of the region was broken, wooded and hilly, poorly suited 
to hoplite tactics. His men suffered terribly in the fighting. They were 
surrounded by enemy light javelinmen and were shot down without being 
able to reply. It was only with the greatest difficulty that Demosthenes and 
his army made its way out of the mountains and to the safety of the coast. 
The campaign of 426 B. C. demonstrates the tasks to which fisiloiwere 
best suited. Hit and run warfare was their speciality, especially in broken 
terrain. They fought a guerilla war against more organised opponents. They 
also excelled at reconnaissance. Thucydides' account records that on the one 
hand the Aetolians had ample warning of Demosthenes's approach, on the 
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other the hoplites fought blind. Campaigns like that fought, by Demosthenes 
became commonplace in the Peloponnesian War (5). If hoplite am-des ývere 
to survive in such an environment, they needed to support their heavy 
infantry with light troops. Fortunately for the hoplite . generals, psiloi had 
always been available for service in their armies, but had been generally 
ignored. What the Peloponnesian and subsequent wars in the Classical period 
did was to give psiloia higher priority in the military system of the time. 
Classical warfare was fundamentally changed by the Peloponnesian War, 
and for the rest of the Classical period Greek affnies had to cope with the 
problems posed by a large theatre of operations with diverse terrain. Once 
)viloi became a part of the Classical army, they stayed; indeed the low 
intensity operations for which psdoi were ideally suited become common- 
place in the sources. In the Corinthian War, for example, psiloiare not. only 
found fighting in, the rough terrain of northern and central Greece, but we 
also find them in the open, flat land of the south, raiding, harrying and 
carrying out all manner of military activity as Xenophon's account amply 
demonstrates (6). In short, by the later Classical period, warfare had changed 
and armies that relied on hoplites alone were obsolete. Light support troops 
were needed to screen the heavy component of an army. 
Sociological factors also influenced the expansion of p0oinumbers in 
the later Classical period. We have already seen that the rowers of fleets or 
the urban poor could easily be equipped as p0oi(sce above p. 127). The 
expansion of the area and time in which war was fought placed considerable 
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pressure on the military population of Greece. Increased use of pvAoiallowed 
the lower classes of the city-states to contribute to land warfare, men who 
until. this point had only served the state as rowers. In a4dition foreign 
mercenaries, most of whom were asiloi- for example Thracians - could be 
imported to supplement the manpower of the city-states. The larger areas of 
operation in the later Classical period prompted larger armies and accelerated 
the t- rend - towards a general adoption of', qs-iloi as a regular component of 
Greek armies. 
Finally, pyiloiformed the bands of mercenary soldiers that became ever 
more popular as the Classical period went on. Leaders such as lphicrates and 
Chabrias perfected psiloi tactics and made this arm a professional fighting 
force. Many of the mercenary units of the period were better trained and 
motivated than their hoplite counterparts. This trend acted as yet another 
factor that prompted wide adoption of light infantry in the armies of the later 
Classical period. 
Fsiloi became an invaluable part of the armoury of the Classical 
city-state. As the period went on, generals learnt to use )uiloito screen their 
hoplites in difficult terrain, to scout and raid, and pvZoi assumed a central 
role in the strategic battle. In the tactical sphere, however, Classical warfare 
was stifl dominated by the hoplite battle. The hoplite remained the only arm 
by which war could be won. Fsiloiwere auxiliaries whose mission was to 
supplement the ý hoplites in special strategic situations, but in battle jauki 
contributed little to eventual victory. 
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C) E-quipmmt 
The tacticians record that p&oiwere the lightest type of infantry, who 
fought with missiles from a distance, javelins, bows, slings, even rocks (7). 
By implication, the tacticians did not believe it necessary for these troops to 
carry a shield, but, as will be shown, evidence shows that some psiloicarried 
such equipment. Armour was not worn by avlkv, since, firstly their mission 
required them to be fast, and, secondly, psi7oiwere recruited from groups too 
poor to afford armour (8). Clothing would have been inexpensive, simple and 
traditional. Very little specifically military dress would have been wom by 
psiki and national costume would have been most common (9). The 
emphasis would have been on ease of movement. Heavy or bulky clothing 
would have slowed down the p5ilhg potentially fatally, and n-ýght have 
hampered javelin throwing. 
It is not clear how common shield-use was amongst p0oi in the 
Hellenistic period. We have discussed this question above (p. 127) with 
regard to peltasts and the conclusion was that the Classical peltast was 
essentially the same as the Hellenistic pyilos Thus some Hellenistic j7siloi 
may have carried the pelle. Several literary sources from the Hellenistic 
period also indicate Cretans used shields, which is puzzling as these troops 
were archers and would have required two hands to use their bows. 
Republican Roman velileg javelinmen, also used shields and it may be 
inferred that some Hellenistic javelinmen followed suit. Later slingers are 
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also sometimes shown with shields. Javelinmen and slingers - and Cretan 
bowmen - may, therefore, have been equipped with shields, and indeed the 
former two would have been able to use a small shield such as a pelle whilst 
still wielding their one handed missile weapons (10). 
The use of sidearms by psiloi, be they sword, axe or dagger, also poses 
problems. There are instances in the Hellenistic period where advance groups 
of psiloi fought at close quarters and in some campaigns hand-to-hand 
combat between skirmishers seems to have been commonplace. It is also the 
case that psffoiare sometimes depicted in art wearing side-arms. Although 
there are no direct literary references to such weapons, they would have been 
of use to light infantry and within the economic reach of these soldiers (11). 
We can assume, therefore, that most p0oi carried some form of light 
hand-to-hand weapon. 
Fstkiwere expected to shoot from a distance, and thus any side arms 
were secondary weapons; what mattered were the javelins, 'slings and bows 
carried by these soldiers. We shall start our examination of ancient missile 
weapons with the javelin, perhaps the most common missile used by 
Hellenistic, pvAoi. 
The Greeks refered to'this weapon as the 6obu or a'XOVTLOV, and we 
shall call this sub-group of pvki by their common ancient name 
Alofidst,? i carried a number of javelins in order that a sustained barrage 
could be shot into enemy formations. We cannot be certain as to how 'many 
were carried, but one source, the Jewish Rule of War, refers to seven (12). 
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The javelin was a common subject for ancient artists and ýt appýars`to 
have been a slim weapon approximately four feet in length. Some- 
illustrations show the javelin realistically vibrating in flight, indicating'the 
speed at which the weapon travelled to its target. The ancient javelin was, 
however, robust enough to be retained for hand-to-hand combat (13). The 
psilos appears to have thrown the javelin much like a modern athlete does, . 
with a -run up of some distance- followed by"an 'overarm throw. -, &n 
occasionally illustrated variant is the under-arm throw, which is still used 
today by primitive cultures: it is inaccurate but capable of propelling the 
javelin a considerable distance. Fdloimay have, therefore, varied their style 
of release to gain distance or accuracy depending on the prevailing tactical 
situation (14). 
The range and accuracy of the ancient javelin was increased by the use 
of a device caUed. an mmtym or a'yxu), il, (15). This was a thong wound 
around the midriff of the javelin. Evid6nce indicates that this was done in 
two ways. Firstly, the thong was a long, thin strip of leather, probably four 
feet in length. The soldier wound this around his javelin before release. 
Secondly, the thong was made an integral part of the weapon in the fonn of 
a permanent loop attached to the centre of the javelin. This loop appears to 
have been attached to all military spears, be they designed for hand-to-hand 
combat or as missiles. It was probably not only a fail-safe device should the 
soldier accidentally drop his weapon, but also a help in slinging the weapon 
for carriage on the march. Throwing-spears often have a much longer thong 
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which could be wrapped around the spear shaft, producing an effect similar, 
but probably inferior, to the proper throwing-thong. The'major difference 
between the two styles was that the sec6nd gave the soldier a ready supply of 
ammunition prepared before combat, giving a higher rate of missile 
discharge. 
Modern tests have shown that the use of a throwing-thong greatly adds to 
the p- erformance of a javelin. The spin imparted by the thong makes the 
javelin more accurate and it also adds to the leverage exerted on the weapon 
as it leaves the thrower's hand. In effect the thong makes the thrower's arm 
longer and as a result the javelin's range and force upon impact increases. A 
pottery illustration from Attica admirably shows the thong in use (16). The 
example shows a cavalryman releasing a javelin at a close target. The javelin 
is of the looped type and although the javelin has left the horseman's hand, 
he still retains hold of the thong, adding momentum to the missile. 
Several modem authors have discuskd the range of the ancient javelin. 
A javelin could be expected to travel twenty metres without a throwing- 
thong and not withstanding the efforts of modem athletes with their superior 
diet. and scientifically_ controlled training, this figure is probably accurate for 
the ancient 
'soldier. 
A colonel in Napoleon III's army conducted tests on 
javelins with thongs and concluded that this simple device quadrupled the 
range to eighty metres. If this figure is correct, and modern tests support it, 
extreme ranges for hand-hurled missiles may have approached the effective 
range of bows (17). 
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The sting, compared to'the javelin. 'was a specii-list's iýe'apon. Cerfiin 
Mediterranean peoples were noted for their expertist and a0pear as 
mercenaries in armies of the period, for exar'nple Balearic or Rh6dian 
sfingers. When we encounter slingers in Hellenistic armies they are in small 
groups of well-trained, professional soldiers. 
The sling was a simple leather thong some four feet in length. A pouch 
was fitted to the centre of the thong, into which the missile was placed. To 
shoot, the slinger grasped the two ends of the sling in his right hand. The 
rnissile was placed in the sling and the thong rotated around the slinger's 
head, the end of the sting reaching, speeds around eighty kilometres per hour. 
The slinger then released the one end of the thong, the other being tied to or 
gripped fim-dy in the hand. The bullet left the weapon, travelling at a tangent 
to the are inscribed by the sling's rotary motion. 
The bullet shot by'a sling could be made of lead or stone. The former 
were cast specially for the task, were more aerodynamic and probably carried 
further than the second type, which were pebbles selected for their shape. 
Sling bullets recovered from excavations are sometimes inscribed with 
messages, like 'take that'. Others have the names of monarchs: for example 
bullets from Olynthus are inscribed with Philip 11's name, and this may 
indicate the use of central arsenals for ammunition. Other types of bullet 
were fashioned as a compromise from clay, aerodynan-ýisrn coupled with ease 
of and inexpensive production. Missiles have been found to vary in weight. 
One modem scholar gives a maximum of one hundred and eighty-five grams, 
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a minimum of of thirteen grams. The volumes of these examples also'vary, 
from five to sixty-five 'Cubic centimetres. It is possible that stingers could 
have carried missiles of varying weigfits, selecting the most suitable bullet 
for the range and target. 
The range of the sling is open to debate. Xenophon recorded that 
Rhodian slingers marching with the Ten Thousand could outrange Persian 
bowmenl It is probable that there was a lot of variation in performance due 
to the type of shot used and the skill of the slinger. Korfman calculated a 
range of four hundred metres for the ancient sling, an approximation as good 
as any. 
Trajan's column shows Roman auxiliary slingers carrying shields and we 
can conjecture that this practice may possibly have been used in Hellenistic 
times. Unlike the bow, the sling requires only one hand for operation and in 
combat this ability to use a shield with a ranged weapon would have given 
some advantage to a slinger faced by an archer (18). 
Livy records the use of a second type of sling, a staff-sling or 
1esfts, vhej7db, aa The weapon was perhaps a stave the height of a man with a 
la rge sling thong attached to the top of the staff, fixed at one end, looped on 
at the other. It shot a large stone or dart. The staff was loaded and held 
overhead in a horizontal position with 'both hands. By jerking the sling 
forwards and downwards the looped thong end would detach and the missile 
would leave the weapon. Livy states that the Aes&osWhej7doj7e was developed 
to penetrate the shields of Roman legionaries by the Macedonian king 
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Perseus. The late Roman writer Vegetius supports Livy with regard to the 
power of this weapon (19). 
Finally we come to the bow, a weapon commonly used by Oriental 
soldiers, both on foot and mounted. Modem scholars have reached a general 
consensus that the range of the ancient bow was some five hundred metres, 
based, notably, on Turkish archery records set in the last century. These 
figures were set in near perfect conditions, with special bows and master 
archers. Ancient soldiers might have expected to shoot an arrow at most one 
hundred and eighty metres, with an effective range of no more than one 
hundred metres (20). Blyth showed that beyond this range performance fell 
off dramatically, with the result that any armour would stop all but the most 
superficial wounds (21). 
The ancients used two types of'bow, the self and the composite (22). 
There could be a long or a short version of each of these, the advantages of 
the former being that more energy is imparted into the arrow instead of being 
absorbed into the bow's anns. The Persians used a longer bow than many 
ancient peoples, but true longbows were rare, being confined to the Carducii 
and Indians (23). The composite bow was made of several types of material 
placed in relation to each other so as to produce a spring; a self-bow was a 
one constructed from a single piece of wood. Composite bows were common 
across the Orient in the Hellenistic and later periods. They were widely used 
by horse- archers because they were short, yet powerful, giving the mounted 
soldier a handy weapon easy to shoot to either side ý of his horse. The 
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Seleucid army deployed large numbers of Oriental bowmen:, other armies 
used smaller contingents. Of the Greeks only the Cretans mastered the use of 
the bow in large numbers. 
Hellenistic armies, with the notable exception of the Seleucids, did not 
deploy large numbers of bowmen. They normally used small bodies of 
professionals, often mercenaries, in the same way as slingers. The archer 
was, however, an important specialist, with. an effective role to play in the 
Hellenistic military machine. 
D) The-lfftdive ess of &&PW&apmis 
The effectiveness of ancient missile weapons can be determined in two 
ways, by comparison with similar modern weaponry and through the use of 
the sources. For the latter we must be aware of a possible bias. Westem 
warfare has been generally fought at close quarters, light troops being an 
adjunct to those who fought in the main line of battle. Western literature has 
echoed this trend, fighting at a distance being seen as unworthy by ancient 
authors. Thus our sources may play down the effectiveness of missiles, to the 
detriment of our study. 
The most useful scientific analysis of the effectiveness of ancient 
missiles was written by Blyth (24). His study centred on the effectiveness of 
arrows from the period of the Persian Wars, but in completing his thesis he 
included analysis of the other Ivilbiweapons. Blyth showed that armour of 
any sort seriously degraded the effectiveness of missiles, but he also 
demonstrated that in theory shooting rnissiles at an enemy had a far higher 
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chance of inflicting injury than hand-to-hand'coinbat. 
References to the effectiveness of missiles in the sources are scattered 
and for ease of reference they will be analysed according to the tactical 
situation in which they arise. Firstly, assaults on defended positions. At the 
battle of the Granicus river the Persians lined the bank of the river with 
cavalry and showered the advancing Macedonians; with javelins as they - 
crossed. Arrian records that the volley was so dense that the javelins collided 
in the air, but despite this the Macedonians managed to force a crossing. We 
must also note Arrian's comment as to the superiority of the Macedonian 
lance over the Persian javelin (25). 
At Issus the Persians also deployed with a view to shooting down the 
Macedonians as they advanced and, although Alexander also won this 
encounter, it is noteworthy that he took the precaution of advancing quickly 
to reduce missile casualties (26). A more light-hearted example comes from 
the siege of Harlicanassus where two drunks made an assault on the city 
under intense missile bombardment; they came out of the encounter 
relatively unscathed, indicating how ineffective the Persian missiles were 
(27). 
A second category is accounts of individuals being wounded or killed, by 
missiles. In general ancient soldiers seem to have survived missile wounds 
well, ancient weapons not having the deadly shock effects of gunpowder 
propelled bullets. Many examples come from Alexander's Persian campaign. 
Amyntas died of a javelin wound, a fatal case although he appears to have 
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survived for some time before he died. Abreas was killed by an arrow wound 
in the face. Darius also met his end at the point of a javelin, but be too 
survived long enough to die in the arms of one of his Macedonian pursuers. 
Craterus and many others were wounded in the attack on Cyropolis; most 
seem to have survived with only minor injuries. In the Scythian attack on 
Andromachus' detachment, initially a good number of soldiers were killed by 
arrows, but it is noteworthy that Arrian emphasises mortalities as though they 
were unusual. Alexander was wounded by missiles many times, often very 
seriously. Most notable was his experience in India when he was shot in the 
chest by an Indian longbowman. This wound seriously incapacitated him, but 
it did not kill him. In the same fight Peucestas received three javelin wounds, 
but survived to fight later in the Diadochi Wars. At the Hydaspes the Indian 
king Porus was heavily wounded by missiles and once more he fully 
recovered from them. At Megalopolis when the Spartan king Agis was 
transfixed through the thighs by a javýlin he fought on until he collapsed 
from loss of blood, and it took a direct spear thrust in the chest to kill him. A 
similar incident happened to the Achaean general PHopoemen at the battle 
of Sellasia. He survived the wound and fought on in the battle. Finally, 
Pyrrhus' horse was shot from underneath him at the battle of Sparta, 
demonstrating that horses too suffered from the attention of psiloi(28). The 
evidence appears to show that wounding in battle by missiles was probably 
fairly common, but that these wounds were rarely fatal. 
Psiloicould also be used defensively, slowing or halting attacks with the 
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volume of their fire. We can especially see this ýq sieges, where'sallies by the 
defence were beaten back, into the city by missiles. den6rallY', however, the 
effects of missiles appear to have been on troop morale and actual casualties 
inflicted were very small in number (29). 
Continuous harassment by missiles could provoke an enemy into a rash 
attack. For example the Triballians were tempted into open ground by - 
shooting from Alexander's archers and slingers (30). Inability to reply to a 
missile attack would obviously have disconcerted soldiers and forced rash 
moves, as an earlier example illustrates. In 479 B. C. the Spartans at Plataea 
had great difficulty holding under the fire of the Persian army and the 
Tegean contingent of their force became so pressed that they attacked 
without orders (31). 
Fifthly, battles oc'CUrred between opposing groups of pyilot* These 
confrontations either preceded a major engagement or were part of larger 
skiffnishes. These were very long-drawn-out affairs, once again indicating the 
generally low levels of effectiveness of jw7o! weapons. An example which 
iflustrates this point is a skirmish fought during the pursuit of Darius III by 
Alexander. The Agrianians met a force of natives'in hills south of the 
Caspian Sea. Arrian records that they prevailed, but only after a hard, 
protracted and long-range exchange (32). Another example comes from 
Alexander's campaign in India, where a force under Ptolemy was isolated. 
Arrian says that the Macedonians were only saved because they had the 
better of the long-range righting (33). Overall fighting between miloi only 
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caused casualties after -long periods of fighting. There are' fiw,. 'occasions 
where forces were destroyed by missiles. On two of these, detachments wereý 
cut off and isolated, the first being, the destruction -of Andromachus' 
contingent during Alexander's campaign against Spitamenes, the second a 
massacre of a Roman force just before the battle of Pydna (34). The third 
reference is to an attack on a marching column, the destruction of Brennus' 
Gauls (35). The Gallic warriors Inked pvkiand were slowlY shot down'by 
the Greeks, 'a situation echoed in a battle between Philip V's army and the 
Dardanians in Livy (36). In afl these examples p&oineeded a lot of time and 
special circumstances to utterly destroy an enemy detachment. 
Some situations hindered shooting. At Magnesia wet weather made bow 
stnngs and javelin thongs useless (37). The tactical situation could also affect 
shooting, -an-example being Curtius' 'account of the crossing of the Thanais 
(38). The Macedonians were opposed by Skythian horse-archers and 
Alexander decided to use jmikias parf of the first wave to cross the river, 
and protection screens were fitted to the boats to give cover. The weapons of 
these psikiwere of little effect when actually crossing the river as they had 
difficulty shooting whilst sitting., Once at the other bank, however, they stood 
and let off an almighty volley - one presumes with javelins or, perhaps 
slings. Obviously pvlki had to shoot whilst standing up to be effective. 
Height also gave )wiloi advantages when 'shooting and there are many 
occasions where psiloiattempted to gain high ground in order to shoot down 
on an enemy (39). 
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Finally, regardless of tactical situation, the sources sppport Blyth's,, thesis 
that armour of any sort would reduce the effectiveness of missiles diastically. 
For example Alexander was shot in the shoulder by an arrow whilst fighting 
in India, but Arrian records that the wound was not serious and his thomr 
stopped most of the impact (40). Altematively failure to wear armour gave a 
soldier a higher chance of becoming a casualty, Porus was also wounded in 
the-shoulder, "notably the only 'part of his body not protected by armour (41). 
At the siege of Tyre Macedonian soldiers were decimated during 
construction work because they were not wearing armour (42). 
Shields also gave Hellenistic and Roman soldiers excellent protection 
against misilqs. King Agis of Sparta's exploits at Megalopolis are an 
example: he either dodged missiles or caught them on his shield before 
eventual-ly being shot through the thighs by a javelin (43). The large oval 
snv&m of Republican Roman Aeginaj& proved itself to be proof against 
missiles in all but the most extreme circumstances. For example, during the 
fighting in the Aoos pass, Livy records how the scal.? of the legions were so 
effective a protection against arrows that the Cretan archers resorted to 
throwing stones (44). The frequent success of the Roman festado also 
supports the general effectiveness of the scuta against missiles. The only 
reference to a phalanx being affected by missiles comes from Curtius. He 
records that missiles drove back an attack by Macedonians on the Susian 
Gates because they were neither in lestudo - presumably he means sua-aspides 
here - nor able to reply (45). We might assume, therefore, that a formed 
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phalanx was generaRy safe from missiles, as Livy records at Atrax (46). 
Finally there are several references to jzsiloi shooting onto the slueldless 
flanks of infantry and causing casualties (47). 
We must, therefore, keep the effects of missiles in proportion. The 
casualties caused by these weapons were, even in extreme cases, very low. In 
particular missiles alone could not decide a set-piece battle; their effects were 
largely confined to skirmishes, ambushes and the like. Curtius leaves us with 
a stark illustration of the ineffectiveness of missiles. After Alexander's death 
a fight broke out in the dead king's chamber and Curtius records that 
numerous javelins were thrown in this confined space, but nobody was killed 
(48). Testament indeed to the low effectiveness of the javelin. 
Having accepted that psiloi weapons were not very efficient at killing 
soldiers in ancient times, we need to fit casualties caused by pvkiinto their 
proper historical context. It is the case that ancient casualty lists were very 
one sided, the winner of a battle losing few men, whilst the loser was 
decimated. This was because ancient armies only became vulnerable when 
they turned in rout. Missiles, therefore, are part of a general truth, that 
ancient weaponry was not as deadly as, for example, black powder muskets. 
Given this, the actual casualties caused by pv'loi, although few, were 
probably equal to hand-to-hand casualties inflicted before the moment of 
flight. Missiles may have had a very real morale effect on soldiers over a 
prolonged period of time and hence influenced the outcome of a pitched 
battle. Further our sources are almost always silent as to the numbers of 
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wounded caused by fighting and it may be the case that missiles wounded 
many thousands of soldiers in any given battle. On one occasion, for 
example, the the majority of men in an army returned to their camp wounded 
(49). If this number of wounded was typical, then the effects of missiles 
would have been very real. - 
In conclusion, the casualties caused by Hellenistic psiloi were few by - 
modern standards. Most types of armour could stop missiles. On the other 
hand, however, most ancient weapons were similarly ineffective in combat 
and, as such, pst7oimay have been able to have had a real impact on battle in 
the period. In order to evaluate this we need to examine the tactical role of 
p5iloiin the period. 
E) The Tactical 
-Strategic 
Role of Psgoiin the-LWIenisfic Period 
It has already been shown 'that jxv7oi warfare predated the llellenistiý 
period and, as such, ' many of the rules governing their employment were 
already well tried. In this section we shall concentrate on the role of the 
, psiloiin set-piece actions and specialist strategic operations. We shall 'also 
only differentiate between the various types of psiloiwhen it is relevant to 
the analysis. 
iIII 
Fsiloiare the most difficult of all the Hellenistic combat arms to analYse 
in a tactical context. These soldiers did not contribute to the decisive 
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moments, of battle, either as solid infantry- lines, or boýq, attacking cavalry. 
Often their role is very subtle, involving small'numbm of men; they fight 
before and, after the main action. Bec , ýuse of this our sources often ignore 
piloi, concentrating on what was seen as the more glorious or decisive 
actions of battle. Fsiloi appear in a better light in their specialist strategic 
roles, where their exploits were not overshadowed by the heavier combat 
arms. These- tactic-al- and strattgic-toles can be -categorised and- we shall 
examine each situation in turn. 
(a) The Use of as a Skirmish S reen 
Fk7oiscreened both line of battle and line of march, and as a result this 
function can be found in both strategic and tactical situations. 
In battle, screens were nonnally deployed at the beginning of the action, 
the psiloi moving to the flanks or rea_r of the main body once the heavy 
troops closed and the fighting proper began. This tactic brought many 
advantages. It concealed an army's deployment, depriving the enemy of vital 
intelligence. on occasion commanders discovered the enemy's deployment 
and hence some indication of his plan of battle. For example, at Gabiene 
Antigonus could look down on Eumenes' line; at Gaza Ptolemy and Seleucus 
received information from a deserter as to Demetrius' deployment and they 
changed their battle plan accordingly (50). A screen of pmkiwould also 
protect the heavy infantry and the cavalry in the initial stages of battle when 
both sides were drawin up their lines. It is'not 9 eworthy that deployment for 
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combat was conducted without interferenceý in, all the major set-ý pieces of the 
period. Opposing' screens seem to have rarely engaged in hand-46-hand 
combat, so presumably fighting was-limited to long range, largely indecisive, 
skirmishing. A notable exception to this is Cynoscephalae, where a furious 
battle between psiloiescalated and caused the combat proper to begin (5 1). 
In most actions psiloiscreens: are only recorded in the initial stages of the 
battle. Once the main lines close the asi-loi disappear from the account as 
they fell back to flanks and rear. The sources have recorded how this 
withdrawal was completed. At Sellasia Xiloi on Mount Olympus were 
recalled by trumpet, presumably falling back through the phalanx to the rear 
(52). We have already determined that the loosest phalanx formation had a 
gap between files of six feet (see above p. 53ff and note 88 for discussion), 
enough for a dispersed formation of miloito pass easily through the line, as 
Appian records happening at Thermopylae (53). Alternatively they may have 
passed through gaps between sub-units. Once again some phalanxes formed 
in "alternate sjoeb-, 71', presumably with gaps along the line between 
sub-units. Another method, if there was room and time, was to pull the jz&oi 
out to the flanks of the heavy infantry. Examples of this can be found at 
Cynoscephalae and perhaps at Magnesia (54). A possible disadvantage of this 
tactic might be a sudden enemy attack which might pin retreating josiloionto 
the main battleline, disordering the heavy infantry just before contact. 
The use of mviloias a screen in set-piece battles was not a Hellenistic 
innovation. For example screens of light troops were used in the fighting 
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outside Syracuse in 415 (55). The size' and increased sophistication of ý, the 
all-arms Hellenistic armies may have made screens a more, of a necessity - 
than they had been in Classical warfare. 
Fsiloi were also used to screen. marching columns. In general pviloi 
formed up to all sides of a marching force, but local circumstances 
sometimes led to a strengthening of certain faces of the column. For example - 
a retreating army would protect its rear more than its van, as the Aetolians: 
did at Caphyae (56). 
The screen could also be placed at varying distances from the main body. 
Psiloi could act as an early warning device or they could fight their way 
through difficult terrain, preparing the way for the main army. On occasion 
, p5iloi and other arms could 
be broken away from the army to act as an 
independent force, screening the army in a truly strategic sense - this is dealt 
with in detail below. The flexibility of Hellenistic pvZoimade them adept at 
this style of warfare. It was general military doctrine to cover any army in 
movement with clouds of jvsr7oi' As a result Hellenistic armies were very 
efficient at protecting themselves from surprise attack or fighting in rough 
terrain. No Hellenistic army suffered from the "guerilla" style tactics used 
on Demosthenes' Athenian army in Aetolia or a large ambush like that 
inflicted on Flaminius at Lake Trasimene (57). 
(b) RdaiUscd as Part of a Flying Colu 
The equipment of p5iloi lent itself well to independent operations. A 
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flying column has, been, a- standard, strategic instrument, throughout military 
history. Normally - they have consisted of fast moving, - lightly-, equipped 
soldiers. The normal technical term for their missions is coup de ivain the 
seizing of strategic objectives by audacity and surprise. In the HeHenistic 
period flying columns could consist entirely of psiloior forces of ffiloiand 
other arms, most often cavalry. The flying column was more widely used . 
than in*'the Classical pefiod, - perlia-ps'due, t6 1he'rnuch la'rger-area of operation 
and varied terrain faced by Hellenistic commanders. 
A common strategic target of Hellenistic commanders were 'choke 
points', for example, mountain passes, that might slow down an army's 
advance. Many examples of this strategy in action come from Alexander's 
Persian, campaign, most striking being his attempts to capture the numerous 
'Gates' that periodically blocked his advance (58). Use of -flying columns 
became a common technique in the Near East to clear strongpoints of small 
forces that could potentially delay an entire army. 
The motives for using flying columns in Hellenistic Greece were 
different. ýThe capture of strategic nodal points was, of course, still critical, 
and the numbers of cities in Greece added another factor, momentum, to the 
use of flying columns. In the later Classical period, in particular during the 
Corinthian War, 'fortified places dominated campaigns. Even in the 
Hel-lenistic period, when siege warfare was comparatively sophisticated, 
walled cities could hold up armies for long periods of time. Fast strikes 
either to catch strong points unawares or simply as an alternative to inactivity 
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became a normal feature'of war in Hellenistic Greece. Many -- examples of 
these techniques inaction come from the history of Philip ýI's Macedonian 
army (59). 
Flying columns could also cause a good deal of economic damage, 
especially in a geographically confined area such as Greece (60). In the 
Classical period detachments from armies roamed the countryside burning - 
and looting, and in the Hellenistic period this strategy became more 
widespread and systematic. In many ways warfare in Hellenistic Greece was 
dominated by this type of warfare, so much so that pitched battles were 
relatively rare in the period. 
The composition of flying columns varied, but jwiloiwere almost always 
used, supplemented on occasion by other troop types. Fsiloi were at an 
obvious advantage in this form of warfare: they could fight in any type of 
terrain, and their tactics would keep them out of hand-to-hand combat 
allowing them to choose when to avoid combat. Cavalry were the second 
most common type of soldier found in flying columns and it is noteworthy 
that the sources only rarely record that psiYoiwere unable to keep up with 
their mounted comrades, a notable example being the juiloi contingent of 
Alexander's force in pursuit of Darius, five hundred of whom had to be 
mounted on spare horses to keep up (61). 
Peltasts were also sometimes brigaded with p0oi to form a flying 
column (62). The intention may have been to provide the jasiloi with a 
partner, capable of forming a proper line of battle, yet able to move quickly 
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across country. There are 'also -a, few examples, most, coming from 
Alexander's Persian campaign, of phalanx-troops, being used in conjunction 
with pulki on independent missions. This has influenced the debate over 
phalanx equipment (see above p. 29). On these occasions, the role of the 
psiloi may have been protective, to shield the phalanx from dangerous 
situations such as being attacked by enemy light troops whilst unscreened. As 
we have -seeii aboVe with Demosthenes' Athenians, this could spell disaster. 
(c) Pmkiand their Relationship to Chariots and Elephants 
FkYoiwere often used in concert with elephants, either as escorts or as 
anti-elephant troops. This special relationship was so common in the period 
that it needs some examination. 
Mixed detachments of pvlýoi and elephants first appear in the Diadochi 
Wars; for example at Gabiene, where both sides deployed ýwiloiin the gaps 
between their elephants (63). As the Hellenistic period went on, pvki 
became usual companions to elephants on the battlefield. Both Diodorus and 
Appian refer to elephants deployed on the battlefield 'with their usual guard' 
or 'the unit that always accompanied them. Bar-Kochva has examined the 
evidence and concluded that in the Seleucid army each elephant would be 
surrounded with fifty jz&o,,, ' men and animal acting as a single tactical unit. 
These escorts could be equipped with any of the standard p5iloi missile 
weapons, although bowmen and slingers predominate, archers always 
forming part of the guard. We must also note that these troops were 
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specificafly attached to the elephants; they are not -simply sup ' it troops PO, 
drawn from the general piloi contigents in an army as an ? dhoc measure 
(64). 
The function of this guard is not explained in the sources. On 
examination the elephant/piloi combination might perform two functions. 
Firstly, the psiloi would protect the elephant. Elephants were vulnerable to - 
harassing tactics ýy ýaýloi, by attacking'certain. weak points, for example the 
animal's eyes or the mahout, and ancient weapons could kill an elephant 
outright or injure it, making it panic. Placing friendly missile troops in close 
co-operation with elephants would serve to keep enemy p&oiat a distance, 
forcing them to shoot at the elephant from outside effective range. 
Furthermore elephants could not expect to charge psiloi effectively as they 
might a phalanx. Unescorted elephants could only stumble into piloito be 
absorbed by the flexible pvki formations, surrounded and shot down. The 
addition of an 'escort would have prevented elephants being hatted by a 
screen o1t troops. 
Secondly, the psiloi would have been protected by the elephant, 
especially against enemy cavalry. Rvkiwere very vulnerable when faced by 
cavalry, since they did not have the equipment to form a phalanx to face up 
to mounted soldiers, nor could they outrun horses. FkYoi faced disaster if 
caught by cavalry in the wrong situation, an example being the charge of 
Pffflopoemen's cavalry at Sellasia, where they swept through a Spartan centre 
composed almost entirely of jw7oi (65). Elephants frighten horses and 
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generally keep cavalry at a distance (66). Such a tactical rnix would have 
been doubly dangerous for cavalry, the horse being una . ble to close with the 
elephants and subject to missile fire from the psiloi' 
The sources record numerous instances where elephants fell foul of 
psiloi. * From the first encounter of the Hellenistic military system with 
elephants, at the Hydaspes, psiloibecame the standard anti-elephant weapon. 
At Gaza, in 312 B. C., Ptolemy modified normal tactics, equipping his-, pyiloi 
with chained obstacles to keep enemy elephants at a distance, confining their 
movements and making them better shooting targets (67). As the period went 
on, escorts of psikiwere added in an attempt to neutralise the vutnerability 
of elephants to light troops. Overall, the use of jusiloitogether with elephants, 
both as allies and adversaries, is a good example of the Hellenistic military 
system at work, close co-operation between different combat arms in 
response to a varied battlefield threat. 
Fsjkiwere equally effective against chariots. All chariots used in the 
Hellenistic period were attack-vehicles, as opposed to platforms for archers. 
The mobility of p&ov, their dispersed formations and missile weapons made 
them an ideal counter to this type of chariot. Hellenistic armies first met 
chariots at Gaugamela where Darius launched a frontal scythed chariot attack 
at the Macedonian phalanx. It failed because the phalanx opened ranks to 
allow the Persian vehicles to pass through its formation. once in the rear, 
Macedonian Xzkidealt with this threat with ease (68). At the battle of the 
Hydaspes, Porus, the Indian general, sent forward his son with a force of 
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chariots to fight Alexander's outflanking force (69). These vehicles were 
partly neutrafised by horse-archers, but a large measure of the credit! for the 
Macedonian victory must go to the light infantry. The most spectacular use 
of psiloi against chariots was at Magnesia (70). Here p5iloi and peltasts 
stopped a Seleucid chariot charge almost before it had started. 
The same factors that gave a&oian advantage over elephants also acted - 
against chariots. Chariots relied on an a hard hitting charge; if they rode into 
psiloi they would be absorbed by the infantry's flexible formation and 
eventually they would run out of impetus. Once this happened the psibi 
would shoot down horses and drivers. Chariots were even more vulnerable to 
this tactic than elephants due to the large numbers of horses needed to pull 
these vehicles and a general inablity in ancient times to protect horses 
effectively against missiles. Presumably one horse dead in the traces would 
stop a chariot as effectively as if all had been shot down. 
Our records show no instance when a chariot attack succeeded in the 
Hellenistic period, often due to the actions of )wiAm. ' None of the sub-types of 
psil& were preferred for anti-chariot operations. The inherent abilities - 
dispersed formations, fleetness of foot and missiles - of ns., iloigave them all 
marked advantages over the chariot. 
Wo. . d-Cavalry 
The sources for the Hellenistic period often record XMoi used in close 
conjunction with cavalry (71). This co-operation falls into two broad 
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categories; strategic and tactical. We shall deal with each in turn. 
It has already been demonstrated that pmki and cavalry were often 
grouped together in task forces or "fly'ing columns" and the motives and 
advantages of this were discussed in part (see above p. 196). In this section 
we shall see that this peculiar rnix may have been in anticipation of the 
development of a tactical situation. The lengths to which commanders went 
- -in-seeking to maintain a mix of cavalry and pmýloiin strategic movements are 
noteworthy, an example being the hot pursuit of Darius by Alexander where 
Macedonian p, &oiwere mounted on cavalry horses (72). 
Cavalry and psiloi are also found in close co-operation in the tactical 
sphere. This tactical combination predated the Hellenistic period, evidence 
suggesting that Jason of Pherae used such tactics. Furthermore in the later 
Classical period, specialist cavalry trained to fight in close co-operation with 
psiloicalled hmnbiý)ýwiwere used by the Boeotian army. Some scholars have 
argued that they formed Epaminondas' cavalry screen at Mantinea. 
do not appear in sources for the HeUenistic period, but despite 
this it is clear these tactics pioneered in the later Classical period remained in 
use (73). 
The first Hellenistic reference to close cavalry and psiloi co-operation 
comes from the battle of the Granicus. Arrian records that during the fighting 
on the Macedonian right the Persian cavalry were inconvenienced by psiloi 
who became intermingled with the cavalry. It is not clear who these juiloi 
were. Diodorus' account of the battle suggests that they were Persians who 
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accidentally 'became entangled in the'ýmelee, disrupting the'if own' cdvalry'. 
Arrian, however, makes no such reference and'a: s Diodorus' account is so'at 
variance with the primary source it is'possible to conclude that"these 'were 
Macedonian fim7oideliberately fighting alongside their own horse (74). 
Another example of such close co-operation comes from Arrian's 
account of the crossing of the Oxus River (75). Skythian horse-archers had 
formed up on the northern bank of the river, threatening to attack the 
Macedonian army piecemeal as it disembarked from boats on the northern 
bank of the Oxus. Alexander sent across a contingent of cavalry first, the 
Skythians closed in on this force and began to shoot the cavalry down. The 
Skythians were careful to wheel and retreat to keep their distance from the 
Macedonians and nothing could be done to counter these tactics until a body 
of psiloicrossed. Arrian records that the Skythians were unable to shoot with 
impunity once the cavalry andpsiloiwere mixed. It is clear from his account 
that the psiloi concerned were in part archers and slingers, allowing the 
Macedonians to trade blow for blow with the horse-archers. 
The co-operation of cavalry and psiloihas already been discussed in part 
with regard to the battle of the Hydaspes. On tl-ýs occasion Tauron's archers 
worked in conjunction with allied horse-archers, the combined speed and 
firepower of this force serving to defeat the Indian chariots, commanded by 
Porus' son, with relative ease (76). 
For our next reference we have to move to the Second Macedonian War 
and an encounter between two forces, Roman and Macedonian, of mixed 
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X., 7oi and cavalry (77). Livy records that the, Macedonians were initially 
confident, anticipating success using their, standaro tactics, but were defeated 
by the Romans. Livy also records a simi'lar skirmish in more detail. Philip V 
had sent out a force of'300 Cretans and 400 Trallians, respectively probably 
archers and stingers, with an equal force of cavalry. They encountered and 
fought a similar Roman force, of cavalry and velifes (who were generally . 
equiýpid as alohdslab. Uvy records _tliýt the'Macedonians- expectied -the 
fighting to follow its usual course, cavalry alternately charging and retiring, 
Cretans showering the enemy with arrows and the "swift Myrians" 
(presumably akow&1w) occasionally darting out to attack. Livy probably 
derives his account from Polybios and may be referring to a standard 
Macedonian battle-drill. As it was the Romans launched a furious assault, 
closing to hand-to-hand combat *as fast as possible shooting with javelins as 
they went. Once in combat the Roman cavalry either dismounted to fight or 
mingled with their vefftes The Romans had developed combined cavalry/ 
jwki tactics in the Hannibalic War and in this instance tactics based on 
vigorous attack rather than manoeuvre and shooting carried the day (78). 
Cynoscephalae was perhaps the largest example of combined cavalry and 
jxvkioperations, and was initially fought between mixed forces of both sides 
(79). Little of interest can be gleaned from this action for our survey, save 
that the fighting was frontal with no manoeuvre and that it escalated from 
what had been a skin-nish between advance forces. Cynoscephalae does, 
however, demonstrates how the fate of what had been auxiliary arms in the 
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Classical period were of the greatest importance to a Hellenistic commander. 
Philip's son, Perseus, also used mixed pgilodcavalry units in the Third 
Macedonian War. Some were native Macedonian troops, others were 
mercenaries hired from the peoples to the west and north of the Macedonian 
kingdom. Notably Perseus used the Odryssians of Cotys, a force of 2,000 
men, infantry and cavalry trained to fight in close co-operation with each - 
other. He foolishly sent these men away without fully paying them after early 
successes in the campaign. Similarly he rejected the offer of Genthes, king of 
the Bastarnae, to supply 20,000 such soldiers (80). 
The most detailed example of juiloiacting in concert with cavalry in the 
subsequent campaign is Livys account of the fighting at Callinicus hill 
during the Third Macedonian War (81). The wings of the Macedonian army 
were composed entirely of nixed cavalry and pvlýoi formations, of especial 
note being the Odrysians of Cotys, 1,000 cavalry with 1.000 infantry trained 
to fight alongside them. The deployment of the Macedonian centre is less 
clear; Livy records that mixed units of ? uxiWj and the Macedonian royal 
cavalry held this sector of the line. Either they were also intermixed, or 
perhaps more probably the royal cavalry were held back as a reserve. The 
Romans were in similar, mixed formations. Both arrnies also deployed a 
screen to cover the main forces; - Eumenes' Cyrtii, probably slingers, and 
Gallic cavalry for Rome; 71=Ystaiand shgers for Macedon. Despite Livy's 
detailed account of the dispositions of both armies, he falls into generalities 
once the action begins. It appears that the battle was bloody hand-to-hand 
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combat rather than the running fight normally described as the common 
tactics of Macedonian psilokavalry formations. It may be the case that 
between Aoos and Callinicus the Macedonians had adopted a more 
aggressive form of combat in response to Roman tactics. It is noteworthy that 
they won Callinicus by these 'Roman' tactics. 'Furthermore later in the 
campaign, a Roman column was thrown into panic by the appearance of a. 
mixed Macedonian force, attesting perhaps to a renewal of the prestige of 
such troops after their failures in the Second Macedonian War (82). 
These examples illustrate specific aspects of integrated psilokavalry 
operations. It must be noted that the sources commonly link psiloi and 
cavalry. Some of these are coincidental, for example those that refer to 
advance guard or scouting units. It can, however, be inferred from the large 
body of evidence that there was widespread use of p5iloiand cavalry in close 
tactical co-operation throughout the Hellenistic period. NVe must also be 
aware that several non-Heffenistic amues also used this tactic. We have 
already referred to the Roman use of cavalry with velites, also Germans used 
cavalry in concert with light infantry (83). 
A question arises as to how this tactic came to be adopted by Hellenistic 
arn-ýies. Two main strands can be identified. Firstly, the peoples of the 
Steppes and the Balkans had a great influence on the military systems of the 
Macedonian state. We have already seen how Macedonian infantry were the 
product of a Balkan tradition, fighting as peltasts; it must also be noted that 
equestrian contacts must have existed with the north, for example Philip 11 
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imported Skythian horses (84). It is lo&al that any advantageous, lipht 
infantry-cavalry combination would have -originated on the Steppes where, 
mounted warfare was the order of the day, 
Secondly, we must look to the hmnhippoi of the Theban army for 
influences on Philip 11's Macedonian anny (85). It is widely acknowledged 
that Philip learnt something of Theban militarY science whilst a hostage in 
that City. This work has rejected the -thesis that Ife copied the deep phalanx- of 
the Thebans to produce the svi-krarmed formation of the Hellensitic period. 
It is not unreasonable, however, to suggest that the light infantry-cavalry 
tactical concept was brought north. Indeed Philip may have simply seen a 
regulated form of a tactic that was already within the military tradition of his 
country. He would have learnt of the use of the tactic with regular infantry 
Enes, something that did not exist. in the Balkans or the, Steppes at the time. 
In short he would have had experience of the tactic in use within an overall 
tactical framework that was very close. to the combined arms techniques of 
his 'first' Hellenistic army. 
Clearly, then, a logical route of development ý exists for this tactic, but 
was it used in all Hellenistic armies -throughout the period? Aside from the 
numerous passing remarks referred to above, most of our evidence has 
originated from conflicts in Macedon and Greece. Certain references do exist 
in eastern warfare that might be taken to imply the integration of cavalry and 
p0m, * an example being the battle of the Arius river (86). Polybios' account 
implies a close relationship on a unit level, i. e. oal, =oiand semeiat, between 
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the cavalry and the'peltasts and jx&oi* But this is not the close interminglifig 
of the two troop-types that we have encountered so far in our survey., It may 
be the case, therefore, that the tactic was 'unsuited to battlefields in the 
eastern part of the Hellenistic world, a point we shall discuss in greater detail 
below. 
The method by which psiki intermingled with cavalry is not made clear 
by the historical accounts of actual combat. It may be that the foot pushed 
into a m8lee as and when they could, in a haphazard fashion. There is, 
however, a drill described in the tacticians that would allow psi7oi and 
cavalry to mix in a regulated fashion, purmlaxis or parembole (87). This drill 
allowed pvlýoi to be placed in the intervals between ranks or files in the 
phalanx. It is possible that the same idea could have been applied to cavalry 
formations, which were far more dispersed than those of the phalanx. 
Another alternative is the insertion of p5iloiinto the gaps between cavalry 
sub-units. This would have been more orderly and would have allowed a 
formation to manoeuvre more efficiently. The lowest units of organisation 
used by Hellenistic armies were small and this alternative would have 
resulted in close co-operation, without the potential confusion that actual 
intermingling would produce. Our analysis of which of these methods was 
used is dependeni on an evaluation of the advantages that coordinated psiloi 
and cavalry on the battlefield would have produced. 
The use of two combat arms working in close co-operation is part of the 
overall doctrine of combined arms that pervades all levels of the Hellenistic 
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military system. - Commanders ofý the period understood ý that an army, had to 
function as a whole, the strengths of each combat arm could be enhanced and 
its weaknesses reduced by interaction with another arm., Firstly, the tactic 
gave defensive advantages. Fg7oY were vulnerable to cavalry (see above 
p. 198) and close cavalry support would have helped neutralise this weakness. 
Hellenistic cavalry also had shortcomings, especially with regard to, missiles, 
with which few of them were equipped. F5iloiwould- obviously lend their 
fire in support of their mounted comrades, as the action on the Oxus against 
the Skythians demonstrates. Secondly, the tactic was offensive -, once again 
psiloicould support a cavalry attack with missiles. Fdloicould also engage 
in close combat in support of cavalry once a charge had contacted an enemy 
and a standing mAlHehad developed, as for example, at the Granicus. In such 
cases the pvlýoiwould have intermingled with the horse. Xenophon tells us 
that the cavalry soldier needed a helmet that afforded good all round vision, 
and he recommended the Boeotian style (88). The fighting at the, Graniýus 
shows us why Xenephon offered this advice and how attached pdloicould 
have caused havoc in the enemy's ranks (89). The miliýe was confused, with 
friend and foe alike intermixed: Alexander nearly lost his life several times 
from enemy attacking him from outside his vision. Add to this scene pvZoi 
crouchinglow against the ground: these men would be below the vision of a 
mounted soldier, who would have been concentrating on enemy cavalry 
around him. They could easily tumble men from their mounts, hamstring 
horses, etc. The advantages of being on foot are further enhanced by the 
difficulty a soldier without stirrups would have reaching an infantryman with 
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a sword or lance, at the same time defending himself from enemy cavalry. 
Several points can be drawn from the evidence. Ailoicavalry 
co-operation took two main forms in the Hellenistic period. Firstly. ' mixing 
together small sub-units of the two troop types to provide mutual support. 
Secondly, the actual intermingling of infantry and cavalry in m4Mýe. The 
former would be more common since the latter really needed a static cavalry - 
action, a rare occurrence in the warfare of the period. Further, this 
intermingling was probably rarer in the east, where mounted warfare was 
more open and prone to rapid, sweeping charges. A third general point is that 
at some point in the period the mutual support tactics changed from small 
units manoeuvring at speed supported by missiles, to rapid aggressive 
attacks. It has been noted that this may have been the result of Macedonian 
troops facing Romans. who used their own form of p0hkavalry combined 
tactics. We cannot tell how far east this got before the period came to a 
close. Finally. it can be safely assumed'that this tactic was commonplace, and 
utilised as and when it would give. tactical advantage. Once again this 
mitigated against widespread use of the tactic in the east where large 
numbers of horse were common and room for small unit tactics involving 
infantry were rare. overall, however, this aspect of light infantry warfare is 
part of the wider combined-arms concept that is commonplace in warfare in 
this period. 
e) P. 0oiused as Rough Terrain Soldier. -- 
Operations in difficult -terrain were ideaHy suited to the light equipment 
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and dispersed fthting order -of *iloi, * andtMs 'was I as much"the'casein'the 
Classical'as in the Helleniýtic period In such lerraiw other tY'Pes'of soldier 
were at a grave disadvantage, becoming disordered, being'unable to use their 
weapons, etc. In the Hellenistic period a major function of the pmYoiwas to 
take and hold diffiCult teffain. 
Fsiloi played a critical role in battles where rough terrain appeared; - 
examples "of this are, however, uncommon. Commanders in this period 
tended to seek battle on large flat areas of ground in order to facilitate 
phalanx and cavalry operations. Where poor terrain does appear in the 
sources it is, therefore, often around the edge of a chosen battle arena. PmYoi 
would be stationed in such rough terrain to attempt and prevent enveloping 
manoeuvres. An example of the defensive motive is Issus, where, Alexander 
deployed )mki to cover his right wing which rested on steep hills upon 
which were deployed Persian troops (90). The offensive motive is illustrated 
by Pydna where Plutarch records that Perseus chose the ground partly 
because the hills around the field would aflow p5iloito surround the enemy 
(91). 
Difficult'terrain that actuaUy formed part of the battle- front proper was 
more of a problem as it disrupted a formed battleline: At Asculurn Pyrrhus 
deployed jx-47oi to'hold such ground (92). At Sellasia Cleomenes went 
further. He attempted to infiltrate avlkithrough the enemy centre along the 
line of the river Oenus, and it was only a charge by Philopoemen and the 
Achaean horse that foiled this plan (93). A variation was to use rough terrain 
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as a coverJor ambush; Philip V used this to effect in, the, fighting -around 9 
Lissus (94). Rough terrain created a hole in the line of - battle, thro6gh -which 
enemy pukicould infiltrate, creating a defensive-offensive pToblern ideally 
suited to armies with high-quality light infantry. This point is critical given 
the importance to a Hellenistic army, especially its phalanx, of maintaining a 
cohesive front and preventing enemy outflanking manoeuvres. 
The role of javlýoias a screen for marcl-fing columns has already been 
discussed. All that need be added here is that when Hellenistic armies were 
moving through rough terrain, this mission became even more important. 
Hellenistic armies deployed forces consisting entirely of jziloiin areas 
where difficult terrain predominated. Alexander's campaign into the Cilician 
mountains was conducted by alophsýtjiand archers alone, as was the fighting 
in Aetolia against Brennus' Gauls. Philip V inflicted heavy casualti es on the 
Dardanians, who lacking either p&oi or cavalry, had no reply to Philip's 
harassing tactics. Perhaps the best documented example of pwlýoisuccessfully 
operating alone is Manlius' campaign in Anatolia against the Galatians (95). 
Quite simply an army without proper support troops courted disaster if it 
ventured into close terrain. This had, of course, always been the case, but in 
the Hellenistic period the -theatre of operations was much larger, and thus 
difficult terrain a more common feature of campaigning. Pkzoiwere less a 
luxury, more a vital component of an army. 
Often psiloihad to occupy difficult terrain for their own safety. We see 
this during the campaign which culminated in the battle of Caphyae (96). An 
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Aetolian raiding force was contacted in the region of Caphyae by a superior 
Achaean army under Aratus. Polybios records how the Aetolians, cavalry and 
, vsiloi, made 
for the safety of a line of hills and he criticises Aratus for 
halting to deploy his troops rather than attacking the Aetolians in the open. 
Another example of jwiloioperating in rough terrain for their own well-being 
comes from the battle of Megalopolis (97). 
As jýwiloiwere equipped with missile weapons, they could reach out from 
positions of safety to harass enemy troops. Pvl'oiwere used in this way in the 
fighting in both the Aoos and Thermopylae passes (98). On both occasions 
javl'oiwere deployed in the hills to the sides of the passes to harass the flanks 
of advancing enemy troops and on both occasions the Romans advancing 
through the narrows did not have enough light infantry to clear the foot hills. 
Curtius'records how a Hellenistic army could counter such a tactic - when, 
during Alexander's attack on the Cilician Gates, light armed Thracians were 
sent forward supported by archers occupying elevated terrain (99). 
The equipment and tactics used by pvki made them ideal troops for 
rough terrain missions. Other types of soldiers often helped, especially 
peltasts, but jwki always formed at least Part of assault forces used to 
capture broken ground. The methods used by pwAoj, * and any other attached 
troops, can be illustrated by a series of examples. 
Fsiloiused missiles to aid their attacks, either forcing enemy troops out 
of defended positions with fire alone or laying down supporting fire for an 
assault by heavier troops. An example comes from the fighting at Termessus, 
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caRed Telmissus in'effor by'Arrian. A mixed force of archers; j&ýWand 
more mobile hoplites - presumably'a, picked force - were used to capture 
Termessus during Alexander's campaigý in Asia Minor. Tbeaviloiforced the 
defence back from a very strong position with a storm of missiles. The 
Macedonians then occupied theýpositions of the defenders as they fell back. 
This manoeuvre eventually led to the fall of the town (100). Missiles were 
-, - -- -- --also- used - tcf- force-the -A spassi- from7 prepared -positions during-Alexander's 
attack on their tosvn (101). It may have been with this technique that 
Alexander cleared the many mountain passes that faced his army during his 
wars. 
During Philip V's advance through the narrows of Thalmae, jwki and 
peltasts were sent ahead to clear the way. Philip considered this' task so 
important that h6 personally commanded the. attack (102). Polybios' account 
of the fighting is not detailed, but it is possible that the missiles of the agki 
were used to support an assault by the ixltasts. '- 
Hellenistic commanders often used p&oias part of a complex multi-arm 
formation to storm defended rough ground. An example comes from Philip 
V's campaign in the Eurotas vafley in 218 B. C. The Spartans chose to 
contest a hill called The Menelaion which blocked the Macedonian advance 
on their city. It was rocky and difficult to climb, and the approach was 
blocked by the river Eurotas. Philip V personally led a force of mercenaries 
(probably pvkj), peltasts and Illyrians across the river and against the hill. 
The mercenaries engaged the enemy first, but became bogged down trying to 
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assault. the objective. Polybios specifies that the Spartans had the, better 
position and adds that they also had heavier equipment. The mercenaries, 
however, remained in combat until thi peltasts came up in support and the 
Illyrians could outflank the defenders. How the mercenaries fought we are 
not told; either they simply skirmished or they actually crossed weapons with 
the Spartans. Either way, their actions were enough to pin the Spartans in 
plam and-allow then to-be- out-manoeuvred (103). - 
Polybios records two attacks on defended rough terrain by multi-arm 
forces in great detail. Firstly, the storrning of the Porphyrion Pass in the 
Seleucid campaign in Coele-Syria of 218 B. C. (104). A Ptolemaic force 
commanded by Nicolaus held the pass and had strengthened their Position,. 
throwing up fortifications. Antiochus advanced a force of p&oi under 
Theodotus the. Aetolian to scout the area. Evaluating the strength of the 
position he detached his heavy troops and advanced on the pass with a mixed 
force in three divisions. Each division had a specific mission. The first, under 
Theodotus, was to attack and force the enemy line at the foot of Mount 
Libanus. The second, under Menedemus, was to attempt a passage of the 
spur that lay along the central axis of the pass. The third, under Diocles, was 
to attack along the seashore and, at best, outflank the Ptolemaic position, at 
worst divert attention away from the other sectors. Antiochus and his 
bodyguard took up a central, reserve position. Polybios does not give a 
break-down of the composition of the forces, so we can only assume they 
were mixed formations, possibly different types of jx&oi and peltasts - 
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perhaps, as Polybios refers to Antiochus' bodypard, even'cavalry. 
The Seleucid assault was taken up all along the line, Theodotus' men 
being the most successful, 'capturing -Mount Libanus and swinging in to 
outflank the Ptolemaic position. Bar-Kochya attributes a pinning role to the 
other two forces, but it seems more probable that the attack was designed to 
probe the entire Egyptian front for weakness, with three different plans - 
enacted simultaneously, the intention being to overload the defence until one 
attack was successful. It only needed one to be successful, since fear of 
envelopment would have then forced Nicolaus to quit his position. The 
stationing of a reserve under the king's personal control, in order to take 
immediate advantage of any wavering in the enemy line, suggests such a plan 
r 
was the more probable. 
Polybios' second detailed account of a pass clearance comes with the 
Seleucid crossing of the Elburz range in 210 B. C. (105). Again a mountain 
range blocked the advance of Antiochus III's army, and on this occasion, too, 
the assault force was split into three divisions: the first, under Diogenes, 
consisting of archers, slingers and mountaineers skiHed in rock throwing; the 
second, under POlyxenidas of Rhodes, with 2,000 Cretans, archers who were 
equipped with shields; and finally there was a force of thmeophoroi and 
lhor.?, U&i(troops discussed above pp. 163ff. ) under Nicolaus the Aetolian and 
Nicomedes of Cos. 
The road across the mountains followed 'a broken river bed. The 
defenders had added to the natural strength of the pass by building an abatis; 
215 
they also rol-led rocks down on the Seleucids as they advanced. Polybios' 
account details one attack made by the specially picked Seleucid. troops. 
Diogenes' men may have held the van because they were the first to 
encounter the enemy, who were lodged behind an obstacle. fie manoeuvred 
his command to one side onto higher ground and proceeded to shower the 
enemy with missiles. The defenders retreated, allowing engineers to advance . 
a, nd re -m. ove the -abatis. - Diogen'es' iiien`tfiýiri'held'16_66 hijher 'gr-o-uiid ind 
advanced in dispersed formation to search for and occupy favourable 
positions, from which they could shoot at the enemy. The Cretans then 
advanced, parallel to Diogenes' conunand. slowly and in good order, 
providing further support. Nothing is said of the 117, vreo , phomi or 
tlmraHlm' 
We have already concluded that these were the intennediate type of 
Hellensistic peltast and perhaps it was intended that they fought in, close 
combat those defenders who could not be dislodged by missiles. 
Clearly weight of fire forced the enemy back from their positions in this 
example. One can presume that the Seleucid troops repeated Diogenes' 
manoeuvre as many times as it was necessary to reach the summit of the 
pass, the entire process'taking eight days. 'Only there r did the enemy make a 
stand and fight'a set-piece battle, and even then jz&oi contributed to 
Antiochus' victory, outflanking the enemy position during the night. 
The positioning of the pvki divisions in this example is of interest. 
Bar-Kochva believed the role of the Cretans was to act as bait, but this 
analysis is not convincing. The Cretans were noted archers in the ancient 
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world and, Very - valuable, so it, would have ý been, more logi. cal, to - use more 
expendable troops for such a dangerous op - eration. Rather, Anti6chus 
intended to pressure the enemy' fr6m two directions to prevent any 
manoeuvre aimed at chasing away the Seleucid p5iloi. ' The enemy could not 
attack either force without exposing an open flank. The Cretans were 
equipped with shields, and one presumes they could have engaged in 
hand-to-hand combat had a-favourable situation presented itself. - Furthermore, 
the cross-fire created would have served better to disconcert the defence. 
Finally, the holding of elevated ground would have reduced the effect of any 
cover. Overall the crossing of the Elburz can be marked out as a classic 
p9iloioperation using position and fire-power to achieve an objective. 
The tactics and equipment of jw7oi were therefore ideaffy suited to 
fighting in difficult terrain. Fsiloi became an army's cutting-edge when 
Hellenistic armies encountered rough ground in strategic or tactical 
situations. Arrnies who fought withouf jxiiloi as part of their order-of-battle 
were, therefore, courting problems in the maintainance of an offensive. The 
nature of war in the Hellenistic period made this far more telling than it had 
been in Classical warfare. Hellenistic armies ranged over a much larger area 
of the world; they faced poor terrain as a regular part of their warfare. On the 
battlefield Classical commanders had been content to select ground suited to 
a hoplite battle rather than to take advantage of rough terrain to gain tactical 
advantage. The use of jw7oiin rough terrain was not fundamentally different 
from the Classical to the Hellenistic periods; rather the opportunities for 
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using jwYoiincreased, the tactical gambits used ý expanded and pOkitook- on 
a more important role in warfare at all levels, simply because. of their'ability 
to operate where other troops could not., 
F) BgrZajOrganisation and Drill 
The tacticians record details of p&oiorganisation and as in their writings 
on the phalanx, this organisation is 'square' and highly stylised (106). The 
organisational structures laid out in the tacticians must be used with care 
when applied to javki formations. Those juiYoi who were irregular troops 
probably did not fight in regular-sized units and the evidence of the tacticians 
can only be applied to those light infantry who were under the influence of 
Macedonian military systems and philosophy. Even so, only the lower levels 
of the tacticians 'square' system were probably used, the larger formations 
being either hypothetical or having an' administrative, rather than a tactical, 
function. 
The smaHest unit of p&oiin the tacticians' organisational system was, as 
with the phalanx, the lochos or rile. This unit was eight men strong, 
indicating that the tacticians expected jw7oi to operate in formations eight 
deep. Four lochoi made a s"&xis, from this point on sub-units were 
combined in twos to create new units within the structure, a 'square' 
organisation. The first level at which special supernumerary troops were 
added was the 'heIjIoj7&rcH,?, a formation of one hundred and twenty-eight 
men. The addition of the supernumeraries indicates that the tacticians 
believed this formation was the basic tactical sub-unit for use on the 
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battlefield. Until this point their organisational system would only have been 
used to carry out drill evolutions. The supernumeraries must have been added 
to translate orders from the overall armý command-structure into action. 
From the I., eI-.? fo, 71arcHa the system progressively 'squared' until the 
largest unit, the phalanx, of eight thousand, one hundred and ninety-two men, 
Nvas reached. If the phalanx Nvas designated an epik? Sm?, a supporting force, 
then eight additional supernumeraries were added, four of them being 
generals. We have already encountered historical references to forces of 
psiloithat might be called epifqWm,?, i. e. large forces of psiloiwith special, 
independent missions. Therefore, the higher levels of the tacticians' 
organisation may have been used in the field on special occasions, although 
we can presume that the specific numbers recorded would have rarely 
featured. What is important is the concept that a large force of -, pwkicould 
be massed under independent command, with its own internal structure, for 
special n-ýissions. 
References to specific pulkisub-units are rare in the historical sources. 
Arrian mentions the &ds and chiArrhy as units used by avl'ol(107), Livy 
maniples of Aepis xmwtarve and cohorles of Thracians and Cretans (108). 
Ptolemaic papyrii do not refer to pvki sub-units, which is understandable 
since cleruchs were either cavalry or phalanx soldiers. Aside from this the 
only extant evidence that n-iight be of use are specific references to the 
numbers of soldiers in pvki contingents, some of which bear close 
resemblance to the numbers recorded by the tacticians. This evidence is, 
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however, haphazard in its nature and difficult to use as proof of a system of 
p5i, /oiorganisation in use in the Hellenistic period. 
It may be argued that some kind of formal organisation would have 
aided Xifoi operations, and indeed that regular pDlki, such as Alexander's 
famous Agrianians, would have had significant tactical advantage over 
irregular, pyiloi. As we have seen, psiloioperations involved rapid movement, 
forward ,s, and &ack-ward-s, on- the -battlefii1d. "If is not -an--easy taA for large 
numbers of soldiers to move rapidly without becoming disordered. A system 
of organisation, and the subsequent chain of command, would have greatly 
facilitated smooth psiloi operations. An example of this would have been 
evasion of an enemy attack. Evasion by sub-unit under the command of 
officers would have prevented a tactical withdrawal becoming a rout. 
Furthermore sub-units would have to return to the fray after such an evasion 
if constant missile pressure was to be kept up on the enemy line. Once again 
the use of a proper chain of command would have been of advantage. 
Shooting may also have been more effective if directed by officers 
commanding SUb-units, rather than by individual soldiers. For example, a 
hekalontarch& might lay down a barrage of missiles on a specific part of the 
enemy line, rather than individuals dissipating fire. 
To conclude, the tacticians are the only major body of evidence which 
indicates that pyiloiwere properly organised, and only fragmentary historical 
evidence supports their writings. The advantages that organisation would 
have given pvilov, however, make it possible that the evidence of the 
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tacticians is, indeed, correct and it is logical thatregular bodies"of Helleni4ic 
psiloiemployed some form of organisation. 
The tacticians also record a number of standard drills for piloz* Firstly 
'insertion', which has already been discussed in the context of the phalanx 
(109). Fsiloi used this drill in two forms, either inserting themselves into 
fonnations of other troop- types or into other units of psilov' The insertion of - 
psiloiinto fonnations of other troop types has already been considered and 
there is no evidence that wiloi operated from within the phalanx in the 
HeHenistic period, although the technique may have been used to aHow p0oi 
to fall back through the phalanx. The use of psffoiwith cavalry, however, has 
been shown to have been a common tactic of the period, and insertion may 
have been used to intern-ýingle units of pviloiand cavalry. It is not clear what 
the tacticians mean when they refer to insertion to intermix two units of 
p5ilb. l. ' They may record a drill to intermix two types of A&oj, for example 
, aloads&i mixing with a body of archers, but it is more probable that they 
refer to a drill similar to the countermarch of 'the phalanx to make a 
formation of jw7oidenser. Polybios' account of the Elburz crossing'supports 
this hypothesis since he records thatasi7oinlade their formations denser upon 
capturing a position. As long as a5z7oidid not anticipate attack, to evade 
which they needed a loose formation, "a drill to 
-make 
their formation denser 
would make shooting more effective since more men would shoot per metre 
of ground (110). 
The tacticians also note that regular drills were used to enable p5iloito 
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take-up their baffle, positioM. - in the vm apd to - flanký and, ýear.. 11). This. 
may also refer to qmYoimoving through formed, ffien4lyI: b44ies,, for'example 
a screen of p&oimoving from front t6 rear of a phalanx. Movement to, the 
flanks of formed troops would also have been a major task as the distances 
involved would have made the possibility of a screen being caught in front of 
its phalanx by a swift enemy attack very real. The tacticians do note in detail 
how these movements should take place, and it is noteworthy. that they-saw 
such manoeuvres as important. Clearly they would have been a common 
feature of Hellenistic warfare. 
The tacticians do not examine p&oi operations in the same detail as 
those of the phalanx. This may simply have been due to the high degree of 
organisation needed for successful operation of the phalanx as opposed to the 
more free-form fighting conducted byp5iloi. * The lack of attention paid to the 
, a&oi by these 'armchair' generals might tempt us to dismiss their evidence 
for p&oi operations. This would be -a mistake, however, despite lack of 
substantial information of the tactical writings from historical sources. Much 
of what the tacticians say about jwYoioperations is logical; pmki operations 
would have needed some organisation and drill - though not on the same 
scale as the phalanx - for this type of soldier to have been as successful as he 
obviously was in the Hellerdstic period. 
G) Conclusio 
The implications of this survey of p&oi operations in the Hellenistic 
period are numerous and most are contained in the relevant sections above. 
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We shall here, therefore, confine comments to the, overall. qýjective, of 
illustrating' interarm co- operation and the all-arms concept that pervaded 
Heflenistic warfare. 
The most fundamental conclusion that can be drawn is that p5,, doi were 
more widely used in the Hellenistic period than they had been in earlier 
Greek warfare and, furthermore, that the responsibilities of psiloiin strategic . 
operations rriýltiplied, especially in eastern theatres. 'Psibiwere a vital part of 
the Hellenistic commander's repertoire, and armies who fought without ju&oi 
as part of their make up invited disaster. This was a result of an advance in I 
the'complexity of war and the wider ranging campaigns fought by armies in 
this period. 
A second general conclusion is that psiloi were frequently used in 
conjunction with other types of Hellenistic soldiers. This was especially the 
case with troops such as cavalry and elephants, but jq&oi could supplement 
the fighting abilities of all parts of the Hellenistic military system. This was 
due to two reasons. Firstly, p&oi were a fragile weapon and needed the 
protection' of the more aggressive combat arms. Secondly, they were 
equipped with missiles that could reach out and damage an enemy, whereas 
most other troops could influence the battle by close action. The result was 
that armies that did not embrace the use of jwiloiin mixed formations could 
be shot down without reply. It is also clear that this use of pvlki was 
extremely subtle, allowing for complex combinations to achieve specific 
tactical objectives. 
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Psiloi came in many forms, but three main types existed; categqrised by 
the missile weapons they carried, javelins, slings and bows. - This sub-division 
was, however, complicated by the addi6n of hand-to-hand weapons, shields 
and other items of equipment. Once one takes into account the various 
mixtures of pwiloi that were used, the complexity and versatility of this 
combat arm is appreciated. A commander could mix different types of psiYoi 
to- conduct specific tasks and to enhance the fighting strengths of his 
formations. We have seen how different forms of p5iloiwere used to link 
two types of missilemen; for example slingers were mixed with bommen, or 
bowmen with akonfilm, to neutralise enemy strengths and adapt weapon- 
mixes to varying tactical situations. It is clear from our evidence that p5iloi 
took easily to such tactical interaction and that their fighting tactics were 
very flexible in this respect. 
The weapons used bypyiYoiwere paradoxically very ineffective as killers 
on the Hellenistic battlefield. This does not, however, detract from their 
importance in the tactical system of the period. No ancient weapons were 
devastating in the initial stages of battle. Heavy casualties were only caused 
in ancient warfare during the pursuit of a routed army which had lost its 
cohesion and ability to resist effectively. In most battles the casualties 
inflicted on a winning force were negligible when compared to those of the 
vanquished. Thus, the impact of missiles on combat needs to be kept in 
perspective. It is clear from the sources that shooting could turn a situation, 
hence the mixing of jw7oi with other combat arms, and that pvAoi could 
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overwhelm enemy positions, especially in. difficult terrain, -with the-aiq,: -of 
shooting., Shooting, therefore, may have been ineffective when comp'a'red 
with the fire of, say, black powder warfare, but in the context of the 
Hellenistic period it contributed a substantial amount to victory, especially in 
strategic operations. 
Psikiwere essentiafly troops who fought as part of, or contributed to the - 
success of, the fluid manoeuvre tactics of the period. This was despite a 
development in pD. Zoi tactics in Greece in the later part of the Hellenistic 
period, when the use of more aggressive tactics became more common. This 
may have been the result of encounters with Roman Felites, who appear to 
have been more prepared to engage in hand-to-hand combat than Hellenistic 
psiloi. ' For most of the period, however, miloioperations at close-quarters are 
rare and normally the result of atypical tactical I situations. For example, 
Alexander's jwkifought in the cavalry mike at the Granicus because of the 
difficulty of dislodging the Persians froM their strong defensive position on 
the opposite river bank. Most A&oioperations in the Hellenistic period, even 
when combined with other troops, were related to manoeuvre. Aside from 
phalanx warfare, Hellenistic tactics emphasised fast moving combat, with 
rapid shifts in attack axes. This was especially the case with cavalry warfare. 
Since javl'oi were commonly deployed in conjunction with other arms, 
especially horse, they participated fully in this war of manoeuvre. Indeed the 
light equipment and flexible fighting methods of the pvlkimade them ideally 
suited to such situations. 
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FdIoY could not, and did not, win battles alone in the final analy'sis, 
Hellenistic battles could only be won by break-Ing, the, oppoýing'phalanx and 
unless generals were extremely skilful, or-lucky, this objective could only be 
achieved by hand-to-hand combat with another phalanx. Battle, however, is 
only the cuhnination of a process largely dominated by strategic operations, 
and in this wider strategic sphere pvkihad a vital role to play. As strategic 
operations directly influence the outcome of battles, the activities' of'psiloi 
were vital to the final decisive clash of arms. In the strategic field they were 
the only troops who could defend or attack the numerous natural obstacles 
that were features of campaigns in this period. They were ideally equipped 
for raiding, which was also a conunon feature of the 'total war' practised by 
Hellenistic states. Tactically the great asset possessed by jx&oi was the 
ability to enhance the tactical effectiveness of other combat arms. Fkki 
could be the extra weight that tipped the balance in a situation that would 
otherwise rely on luck. The flexibility of jz&oi tactics and weaponry, and 
their ability to enhance the effectiveness of other combat-arms made them an 
invaluble part of the Hellenistic military system. ' 'Aff Hellenistic armies 
deployed jwiloi and often entire campaigns rested on the success of their 
operations. 
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Chaptei- IV - The Cavalry 
A) IntQduction 
Cavalry performed an important role in Hellenistic warfare. on campaign 
they scouted and raided, tasks that have been the responsibility of cavalry 
since man first used the horse in war. Tactically Hellenistic qavatr was of y 
great importance. The arn-ýies of the period deployed large numbers of 
cavalry whose role was to break through the enemy line of battle by a series 
of massed charges. This tactic was very successful, but only because the 
Hellenistic military system gave its cavalry arm the support of a strong 
infantry base, the phalanx, and the support of light troops in areas 
inaccessible to horsed soldiers. Thus, this combat arm cannot be viewed in 
isolation. The period was not, as Tam said, essentially an age of cavalry: it 
was an age of A arms co-operation (1). 
Cavalry had also been a feature of war in the Classical period. For 
economic reasons only the richest members of the southern city-states could 
afford to fight as mounted soldiers, and, as a result, the cavalry forces of 
these cities were numerically small. Furthermore, the dominance of hoplite 
tactics on the battlefield relegated cavalry from a tactical to a secondary, 
strategic role. On the battlefield Classical cavalry were little more than 
skirmishers; they only fought other cavalry and found it impossible to attack 
the phalanx (2). There was, therefore, a marked difference between the 
essentially fight cavalry of the Classical period and the heavy, shock cavalry 
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of the Hellenistic. 
The development of cavalry into a shock force in the Hellenistic period 
was the result of several factors. Firstly, the kingdom of Macedon already 
possessed an effective cavalry arm when Philip 11 came to the throne in 359 
B. C. Philip's aristocracy were horse owners on a large scale and traditionally 
fought from horseback. S econdly, Macedonian cavalry were, from Philip's 
time onwards, equipped for hand-to-hand c'"ombat -and operated as charging 
cavalry of the battlefield. Thirdly, the Macedonians used new smaU unit 
tactics to increase the effectiveness of their mounted arm. All of these factors 
continued into the Helenistic period proper and were expanded upon. Of 
special note is the cavalry of the Seleucid state, which took the Hellenistic 
cavalry concept further by creating heavily armoured formations of horse and 
utilising the cavalry tradition of the Iranian highlands (3). Hellenistic cavalry 
fell into two general types, those that fought at close quarters and those who 
shot from a distance with missiles. Both will be dealt with in the same 
chapter in order to maintain consistency. Once again evidence faUs into two 
areas, theoretical references and accounts of cavalry in action. The equipment 
and tactics of Hellenistic cavalry will be surveyed and analysed in an attempt 
to reconcile these two types of source. Finally, Hellenistic cavalry warfare 
will be placed in context with the other arms of the military system of the 
time. 
B) Cavalry in the Classical Period 
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The Classical Greeks used cavalry on a smaH scale to conduct various 
strategic operations. Cavalry in this period raided enemy land and linfited the 
damage of such action on home territory. They formed up on the flanks of 
the army in battle to harry any outflanking moves and to hinder pursuit 
should the hoplites be defeated. Lacking in technique and numbers, cavalry 
had little effect on war in the early part of the Classical period (4). 
To some extent the Peloponnesian War caused cavalry to take on a 
greater role in war. This was caused by the prolonged nature of the conflict 
and the large area over which it was fought. Many states developed almost 
professional units of cavalry, Athens being a notable example; she 
maintained a force of 1,000 horse drawn from the upper classes of Athenian 
society. This trend had progressed to such an extent by the mid-fourth 
century that Xenophon, who was by Greek standards an expert on mounted 
warfare, praised the effectiveness of contemporary cavalrymen (5). Despite 
these advances in technique and organisation, however, later Classical 
cavalry did not take on the battle winning role that it did under Philip, 
Alexander and their successors. To understand why we must examine the 
equipment and tactics of the time. 
Cavalry in the Classical period were drawn from the richer sections of 
Greek society because of the cost of buying and maintaining a war horse, 
which was considerable given that southern Greece was far from being good 
horse country. The equipment of cavalry in this period reflected the high 
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status and wealthof this horse-owning class. Anderson reviewed the evidence 
and his conclusions show that the'equipment of Classical horse only'differed 
from that of the Hellenistic period in detail. Most Classical cavalrymen were 
armoured, wearing cuirasses similar to those worn. by hoplites (6). The 
Greeks did use cavalry without armour, but Anderson argues that these 
troops would not have formed separate bodies as happened in the Hellenistic 
period, and that their existence is probably due to foreign influence, both on 
actual warfare and the - artists - who produced 
the ceramic evidence that 
supports unarmoured cavalry in this period (7). 
It is generally held that Classical cavalry did not use shields. Written 
evidence for the period strongly suggests this-to be the case; for example 
Xenophon's treatise on horsemanship does not mention shields. Some' 
ceramic evidence shows cavalry with shields, but, this has-been successfully 
dismissed as pictures of wealthy hoplites travelling to battle on horseback 
and dismounting to right (8). 
As for other protective equipment, Classical cavalrymen are shown 
wearing many types of helmet in art of the period. Xenophon recommended 
the Boeotian type to mounted soldiers of his day since it gave superior 
all-round vision (9). We cannot tell how far his advice was taken up. 'There is 
little evidence to support the use of greaves by Classical cavalry. - 
Offensive equipment consisted of sword, lance or javelin. Xenophon 
recommends the m,? chah-, &, a heavy, curved sabre in preference to a straight 
sword (10). He also criticises the lance, advising cavalrymen to carry two 
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javelins, one for throwing, ý' one for fighting at close quarters. It will be clear 
when tactics are examined that the majority of Classical must have been 
equipped with javelins rather than lanciý if they were to be effective U 1). 
The most important and expensive item of equipment used by cavalry 
was, of course, the horse. The horse, especially one trained for war and hence 
useless for agricultural work, was not a common animal in southern Greece. 
It is noteworthy that Xenophon's treatise places so much stress on the care of 
horses, because the breeds of southern Greece were generally'held to be 
weaker than others. This would have placed cavalry mounted on such horses 
at a disadvantage in combat. The best horse country in ancient Greece was in 
the north, Thessaly and Macedonia. These areas had the plains necessary to 
breed good horses in large numbers. The horses, and hence the mounted 
arms, of these states were considered to be of higher quality. They -failed, 
however, to make a proper impact on the military history of Classical Greece 
because of their lack of good infantry tb match the hoplites; of the south (12). 
Cavalry tactics in the later Classical period which are admirably 
described in Xenophon's two works on cavalry warfare - were the product of 
the deficiencies of the hoplite phalanx. Strategically they raided, scouted, etc. 
Tactically cavalry were generally skirmishers: they might be expected to 
engage enemy horse in hand-to-hand combat, but never the phalanx. It is 
clear from the sources that cavalry were not even employed to attack hoPlites 
in the flank or at some other time of tactical disadvantge. On the Classical 
battlefield the hoplite reigned supreme, and horsemen had little to contribute 
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to victory. This was the case even with the higher'qu4lity, ", c avalry,, e'm'' lq'yýd 
by the northem Greek states (13). 
Finally, some evidence indicates that, the Boeotian army was b6gmf'ung 
to use cavalry shock tactics at the close of the Classical period (14). The 
sources make confused references to the role of Theban cavalry by Pelopidas 
against Alexander of Pherae, and at Leuctra and Mantinea. Xenophon's 
-- -Maritinea, * inpartkular, 'gives a leading role h' Theban -cavalry account of -to te 
in the fighting on the left of their line. This evidence has been used to 
support a case for outflanking tactics involving hand-to-hand combat for 
Theban cavalry in this period. If such tactics were used they are obviously a 
precursor to HeHenistic fighting techniques. Our sources, however, are so 
confused that it is difficult to reach any satisfactory conclusion. The bulk of 
the evidence, some very detailed, demonstrates that cavalry were skirmishers 
and it would be logical to follow this course with later Theban horse. Their 
role 'may have been more aggressive- in the actions cited, but it is more 
reasonable to assume that skirmish tactics were used to disrupt the enemy 
line, the innovation being that the Thebans fought in much closer 
co-operation with their infantry. 
To summarise, Classical cavalry had an iinportant strategic role in war, 
which increased during and after the Peloponnesian War. Even the best 
Greek cavalry of the period could not break a hoplite-phalanx frontally, nor 
was it the case that they sought to outflank the enemy fine to gain a position 
of advantage whereby the defensive capabilities of the phalanx could be 
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negated. Classical cavalry were deployed in small numbers and were drawn 
from the richest sectors of society. 
C) Cayalry-FAuipmtnt-inAk-HellenLqic-ari-Qd 
a) Rc&nkYadathons 
In --a geograpl-ft area as vast as- that don-ýinated -by the Hellenistic 
monarchies, it was inevitable that cavalry tactics should be influenced by 
native traditions. In particular the fighting techniques of the peoples of 
central Asia, the Iranians, and the inhabitants of the Russian Steppes, led to 
developments in cavalry warfare in the east that were not repeated in the 
west. This was exacerbated by the differing military needs of the powers of 
Greece and Macedon and those who dominated the near east. It is difficult, 
therefore, to generalise about cavalry equipment in this period since regional 
variations always existed. 
Another result of regional developments in equipment is the creation of 
ethnic troop types. Our sources refer to certain types of. troops by ethnic 
titles. On some occasions, an ethnic title refered to, a certain style of 
equipment and fighting, for example Tarentine. On others, no such reference 
is made and the title is simply military nomenclature denoting a specific unit 
of troops. An example of this are the various ethnic hoparchies of the 
Ptolemaic army, Galatian, Thracian, etc. These were simply the titles of units 
and they did not denote differing equipment or tactical styles. Ethnic cavalry 
titles and their relation to real styles of equipment and tactics is a major 
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source of problems when studying this subject (15). -, 
In short regional variations in equipment divide Hellenistic cavalry into 
two main groups, western - i. e. Macedonian and Greek cavalry- and those 
used in the east. Eastern armies tended to deploy larger numbers of cavalry. 
They also introduced fully armoured cavalry, cataphracts, and horse-archers 
into their armies. All affnies tended to use an unshielded heavy cavalry - 
lancer as the mainstay of their mounted force, but western armies 
re-equipped with javelin and shield as the period progressed. This 
development does not appear to have influenced eastern cavalry. 
b) The Intermediate Type of Cavalryman 
The tacticians split cavalry into three types, armoured cavalry called 
cataphracts, light cavalry - elaphroi - and an inteffnediate type, variously 
called xysto phorm, lonchophomi or Inalophoroi (16). This section will 
discuss the intennediate type which, unlike its infantry equivalent, the peltast, 
appears to have been the most common cavalry type used in the period. 
The tacticians refer to this type of cavalryman by the weapon carried, 
some type of spear. If a more precise definition is needed, the troopers were 
armoured, whereas their horses were not. They were equipped with a spear of 
some kind and a sword. They did not carry a shield for most of the period. 
although this item appears later in the western regions of the Hellenistic 
world. These cavalry charged in line or wedge to defeat the enemy in 
hand-to-hand combat. This definition is by its nature broad and some 
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variations existed, which will be identified as they arise. To understand 
tactics we need first to discuss equipment. 
The tacticians give various titles for this cavalry type, all related to the 
type of spear carried. This causes a major problem as the Greeks were 
imprecise in their terminology for the word 'spear'. The Greeks used four 
Nvords for spear, 6tQu,. Xoyxtj-, ýva-r6vand ; OVT'Oq in addition cavalry called 
&'71imThoroiare also recorded. Latin authors use one, Azasla, a generic term 
for spear. Greek sources are not consistent in the use of these words and it is 
difficult to deterniine if they refer to specific types of spear, such as a lance 
as opposed to a throwing spear. 
A6Q, j is the generic Greek word for spear. Technically it applied to the 
wooden shaft of the spear. The dbiv could be wielded on foot or from 
horseback. It could also be thrust or thrown; for example the tacticians say 
that Tarentine cavalry used the doum either way. The term had other uses; it 
was military parlance for the right side of a formation. It is very difficult to 
apply any significance to the word when it appears in the hands of cavalry in 
the Hellenistic period (17). 
Lovehe is another Greek word for a spear that has a specific technical 
meaning, this time referring to the head or point of the weapon. it is clear 
that the word was also used to denote a spear in general, for example when 
Demetrius warns his friend Nfithridates by writing a message in the sand with 
his lonche having been sworn to silence by his father 0 8). 
The term ý-uaTov is exclusively applied to cavalry weapons in the 
235 
Hellenistic period. Once again it was a specific technical term; r6ferrifig' to,: - 
the shaft of the weapon as opposed to the head. The battle of the Granicus, 
river provides evidence for cavalry use of this weapon. Arrian records"ethat 
Alexander used a Yyslov, although he uses the word dom earlier, in'his 
account - indicating the haphazard way in which even first class Greek 
military writers used technical military terms. Arrian is most useful when he 
compares the Macedonian xysta with the javelins of theý Persians, which were 
tluown rather ineffectively at the oncoming Macedonian horse. Once in 
combat the comel xystj were far better suited to hand-to-hand fighting than 
the Persian weapons. In this account the xyslow is shown as a long cavalry 
thrusting spear (19). 
The tacticans alone record the use of the %ovTos; this was slang for a 
spear, derived from the Greek for a punting pole. Kowfosdoes not appear in 
our historical sources and may refer to weaponry in use by the Roman army 
at the time Arrian was writing his technical manual. On other occasions he 
refers to units of con&n7 which were in use by the Romans in the second 
century A. D. It is noteworthy that Arrian included kowtos as a word to give 
meaning to a contemporary readership for cavalry weaponry in the 
Heflenistic. period. Our evidence shows that in the second century the. AoRtos 
was a long cavalry lance (20). 
Finally there are references to the mjim being used from horseback by a 
unit in Alexander's army known as the proorlomoi or svimphomv. ' Some 
scholars have concluded that the "im was the typical Hellenistic cavalry 
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weapon, the cavalry version being shorter an. d, lightei than that used by the 
infantry. Markle, however, took an extreme position and concluded that there 
was no difference between the infantry and cavalry Version. He reconstructed 
a mii-w, based on a find from a cist at Vergina and the various references to 
the length of the &vim in the sources, and demonstrated that this weapon 
could be used by a rider without a saddle or stirrups (21). 
The written evidence is confused as to the precise nature of the spear 
used by the intermediate cavalry-type in the Hellenistic period. Some sources 
even on occasion record that cavalry spears were thrown (22). To gain a full 
picture of what cavalry used as their main offensive weapon in this period 
we have to turn to art representations to support the written sources. 
The Alexander Mosaic is perhaps the best representation of Heflenistic 
cavalry in action (23). The mosaic shoivs Alexander and his Companions 
fighting around Darius' chariot at Issus. In the foreground is Alexander. He 
is mounted, equipped with lkothorar, sword and lance, but he is not shown 
with a helmet. The lance is held underarm and parallel to the ground. As the 
mosaic is damaged we cannot determine the length of the spear with 
certainty, but if the spear is being held at its centre - shown by Markle to be 
the most logical way of using a lance due to weapon balance - then it could 
be up to twenty feet in length. A stele from Shiatby supports this general 
conclusion that Hellenistic cavalry spears were taller than a man, perhaps 
even longer (24). The Shiatby horseman once again holds his lance 
underarm, but at an angle. The copy of the Kinch tomb painting is another 
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example where a horseman uses a spear underarm to kill a Persian foot 
soldier; again the spear is very long (25). 
The Alexander sarcophagus also indicates that Hellenistic cavalry used 
long spears (26). Two figures are of interest. One, an armoured horseman, 
uses a spear over arm; the other, commonly believed to be Alexander, attacks 
a Persian infantryman with an underarm thrust. The actual weapons are 
missing from the sculpture - scale replicas of the spears and other pieces of 
equipment would have been affixed to the sarcophagus in ancient times - so 
once again we cannot categorically come to a conclusion as to the length of 
the spears. Suffice it to say at this point that the scale distance between 
'Alexander's' hand and his target, the stomach of a Persian infantryman, is 
approximately twelve feet. Other art evidence shows the Hellenistic cavalry 
spear used in an overarm position, for example the wall painting from 
Marissa and a figure on a dish from Trasilica, in Calabria. on these examples 
the rider grasps the spear just behind t he mid-point and thrusts down to kiH 
game. With both examples the spears are substantial weapons (27). 
Several numismatic examples also depict Macedonian horse (28). 6i 
particular interest is that depicting Patras of Paeonia attacking an infantry 
soldier and the many surviving coins showing Alexander fighting Porus, the 
former on horseback, the latter on an elephant. The restricted field of a'COM 
does not allow equipment to be shown in proper proportion, but for this 
survey what is important is the evidence for the positioning of ' the 
cavalryrnanýs hand, which is always close to the centre of the lance. 
238 
In order to evaluate this evidence effectively some discussio , n, as to bow 
this weapon might have been used is needed. No evidence exists showing 
lances used couched or with two hands, either above the head or across the 
horse's shoulders (29). All Hellenistic evidence shows the lance used in one 
hand, either underam, or overam, much as the hoplite spear was used. It has 
been shown above that infantry svimiwere used two handed and held close 
-to the buft; "PolY-bios says as much dnd the hu&-couhtervveiglit f6brid. -at 
Vergina gives substance to his evidence. A cavalry weapon could not have 
been used in this way. It would have had to have been grasped close to its 
centre of gravity if it were to be used effectively. Furthermore, it would not 
have been practical to balance the weapon with a heavy buttspike without 
making it too cumbersome for use from horseback (30). If this conclusion is 
correct, then it can be tied to, the art evidence discussed above and an 
estimate as to the length of the Hellenistic cavalry spear can be made. 
As has been said, Markle took the extreme position that the, Hellenistic 
cavalry spear was effectively the same size as the infantry &vim. He even 
cited the Kinch painting as proof for the use of a central sleeve like that 
found in the Vergina cist., He concluded that the weapon was fifteen to 
sixteen feet in length. Other scholars have not been as categorical, the 
general conclusion being that cavalry used a lance in this period. Where 
Markle's analysis is fundamentally challenging is in regard to the weight of 
the weapon, which, he argues, would have been the same as an infantry 
. 5wi-q, fourteen pounds. Other scholars have disagreed; for example Manti 
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argued cavalry lances would have weighed approximately, four pounds'(31). 
Evidence demonstrates that cavalry lances in tfie Hellenistic p, eriod may 
have been as long as infantry WaMlt, ' It also shows that the weapqn I was used 
differently, one handed and held near the centre of the weapon. Thus, 
whereas Markle's conclusion as to the length of this weapon can be accepted, 
his position that the weapon was as heavy as its infantry counter-part cannot. 
This is supported by the only detailed record of combat with cavalry lances, 
Arrian's account of the fighting at the Granicus river (32). Arrian was an 
experienced soldier, albeit in a military system some four hundred years after 
the event, and he based his account on the history of Ptolemy Lagou, another 
veteran and eyewitness of Alexander's campaigns. The fighting was fast and 
furious; lances were broken as the Macedonians tried to kill their enemies. 
The manner in which Alexander wielded his weapon is typical of lancers of 
later ages, the weapon being manipulated swiftly and directed at a series of 
opponents. The implication is that the weapon was light, yet strong enough to 
remain serviceable, although, as the narrative demostrates, it could shatter in 
combat. The conclusion that must be reached is that the Hellenistic cavalry 
spear was a long, light lance. 
The manner in which the lance was used deserves attention. Hellenistic 
cavalry did not couch the lance, in the medieval fashion, nor did they use it 
two-handed as the steppe warriors of antiquity or the auxiliaries of Rome's 
imperial arn-ýes did. The way the ancient lance was used was related to the 
fact that the stirrup was not introduced into the west until the seventh century 
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A. D. Scholars have for generations qiuesiione4 - how, lance-armed - cavalry 
could have been effective without this simple' technological iteým. Mýrkle 
demonstrated that his reconstruced sarAj could be used irom horse back 
without stirrups and there are many instances of charging stirrupless cavalry 
being effective in the ancient period, from the Companions of Alexander to 
horse barbarians from the Steppes. It is clear that the lack of the stirrup did . 
not'de'c-Fe"a'ý& the'-'Zf f idltvines's-'O- f hbik -iigniif i&dfitly- (33) -Thýf bdin'g--tlie 'c'as'e 
it did affect the way 'in w1iich the lance was used. 
As has been shown, Hellenistic cavalry used the lance single-handed in 
two ways, underarm and overarm. Markle demonstrated that his reconstruc- 
ted &vim could be used both ways and that neither was any more fatiguing 
than the other. He did note, however, that it was difficult to change from the 
overarm to the underarm thrust and vice-verm, and that such a manoeuvre, 
would have caused ý confusion amongst cavalry drawn up in military 
formation. 
The reason why this single-handed style was preferred over the couched, 
two-handed style is difficult to determine. Neither single-handed technique 
could have used the momentum of the horse in the same way that couching, 
or to some extent the two-handed thrust, would have. This was because of 
the lack of both stirrups and a proper saddle by Hellenistic cavalry, both of 
which are needed if a cavalryman is to use effectively the weight and speed 
of his horse whilst remaining mounted. The underarm and overarm thrust of 
the period reflect this deficiency in cavalry technology. Markle argued that 
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the two-handed thrust was not usedýbecause of theJo'ss of'. hoise. contr6l,,, that, 
it caused, which - as will be demonstrated - would haye., been critical - for, '. the 
success of the fast flo'wing tactical-iystem ýused by'Hellenistic cavalry 
formations (34). Despite this, Hellenistic cavalry was clearly effective. Under 
what circumstance each type of thrust, was used is difficult to determine from 
the sources. The art evidence cited is inconclusive. The underarm thrust is 
used, against-infantry, the overarm against - game; - but since-both are-similar 
targets, there appears to be no reason to ascribe advantage to either type of 
thrust. Of the two techniques, the underarm seems the more natural, allowing 
dismounted targets to be attacked or the horses of enemy cavalry. The 
overarm may have been the favoured anti-cavalry technique; marking out the 
mounted soldier rather than his horse as the target. Written evidence does 
nothing to help solve this problem. 
The overarm thrust may have evolved from Classical practices. Gardiner 
argued that the most comfortable way to carry a ready javelin was point 
down, the rear of the weapon resting on the shoulder, in a way very similar 
to the later Hellenistic practice (35). It is clear that cavalry equipped. with 
javelins were expected to fight with these weapons should they become 
engaged in hand-to-hand combat, Xenophon said as much (36). Classical 
cavalrymen may 
-have 
found the overarm thrust the logical close-combat 
position after holding their javelins ready for throwing. The use of this 
position in the Hellenistic period may, therefore, have simply been the result 
of military tradition. 
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It is difficult, therefore, to determine why, two styles '6. f fightin'g, wit4lhe 
lance were used in the Hellenistic period -and the possible advantages of 
either. The conclusions that may be refthed, ho. weyýr,, are- that once, chosen 
the trooper had to keep to his fighting style, as chan e in stance would have 
ý9' 
caused disorder in the cavalry formation in which he stood. Furthermore 
cavalry combat in the period was not in the style of a breakneck medieval 
-, - charge knee-to-knee -with couched lance; rather it was in the form - of 
individual fencing matches in which the momentum of the horse played little 
part. At the Granicus Arrian records that the fight was unusual, close packed 
like an infantry mgeýe, the implication being that a cavalry battle would 
normally have been an open-order affair, where individual weapon handling 
and horsemanship skills would be paramount. In such a situation lances 
would be plied until they broke, whereupon the soldiers would fight on with 
either the butt ends or resort to swords (37). 
A debate has arisen regarding the use of the shield by Hellenistic cavalry. 
The accepted view is that Hellenistic cavalry did not use the shield until later 
in the period. There were some exceptions, for example a cavalry type 
known as 'The Tarentine' existed. This type is recorded as early as the 
Diadochi Wars and scholars have argued that these soldiers may have used 
the shield. The actual date at which the shield was taken up by Hellenistic 
cavalry cannot be determined with certainty, indeed many writers on this 
subject have been content that to accept Alexander's cavalry were shieldless 
and that the Diadochi introduced this item of equipment (38). It is important 
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to attempt to determine the date of shield introduction with more precision in 
order to evaluate any possible effect it may have had on tactics. 
References to shield use appear early in the period, during th e reign of 
Alexander the Great. Arrian records an incident where cavalry, sent forward 
to seize a hill, rode to the position *and dismounted with shields (39). Modem 
scholars have debated the importance of this evidence, since the soldiers - 
refered to were not ordinary Macedonian cavalry, but somalophylakes, the 
special bodyguards of the king. As such, they may have had servants with 
them to carry their shields when they were mounted, a common ancient 
practice. Further the shields refered to were is , p. 
ide. g a Greek word normally 
used for infantry rather than cavalry shields. Many scholars, therefore, reject 
the evidence as indicative of widespread use of the shield by Alexandrian 
cavalry. 
A second incident comes from Plutarch's and Diodorus' account of the 
battle of the Granicus River (40). Both record that Alexander used a shield. 
Arrian, however, the primary source for this action, makes no mention of a 
shield in his detailed account of the fighting, and hence Plutarch's and 
Diodorus' evidence has been rejected by scholars. 
Post-Alexandrian references to shielded cavalry are equaRy scarce. 
Appian records Antiochus III using cavalry called ar&r,? sEPides at Magnesia, 
implying these horsemen were equipped with silver shields (41). It is clear 
that Appian confused Seleucid guard-cavalry with the argyzaspid infantry, a 
well documented erlife infantry unit of the Seleucid army. 
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In book six Polybios records how Roman cavalry adopted Greek shields 
because they were more sturdy and better for offensive use (42). He 
describes a thamoscovered in ox-hide With a large boss. Polybios' reputation 
as a military writer gives a lot of weight to this statement, and this is the first 
conclusive evidence for shield use by Hellenistic cavalry. 
Polybios' evidence may be supported by the cavalry representations on 
the Aen-ffliUS- Paullus monument at Delphi, which celebrated the Roman 
victory at Pydna (43). There are many mounted figures on the frieze and it is 
difficult to determine without doubt to wfýich army they belonged. A. 1. 
Reinach identified the cavalryman on the north-east face as a Macedonian, 
the rest as Thracians from an incident at the beginning of the battle of Pydna. 
He conjectured whether the Macedonian was a member of Perseus' royal 
guard or an Odrysian. The former, although logical given the monument's 
propaganda function, is conjectural. The use of the frieze as evidence is 
further complicated by the large numb; er of national contingents in Perseus' 
army. Despite these problems, the monument does give general support to 
Polybios' evidence that the shield was in use by mounted soldiers in Greece 
and Macedon by the time of the Third Macedonian War. It may also be noted 
here that this monument is the only art representation of any type of 
Hellenistic cavalry equipped with shields. 
The tacticians make reference to cavalry called thareop1mnov, i. e. cavalry 
carrying the long shield (44). They do not elaborate on the tactical role of 
this type of horseman. The tacticians may ýe referring to the equipment, of 
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Roman Imperial cavalry. This is especially the case' with, Afrian's Work, ' the 
cavalry sections of which are devoted to the horse of ý the' Imperial Ro'man 
army of the second century A. D. 
The evidence therefore suggests that the shield was only used by 
Hellenistic cavalry in Macedon and Greece towards the end of the period. 
The cavalry of Philip and Alexander fought without the shield, as did those - 
of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies. The motive for the adoption of the 
shield in the west is twofold - firstly, the geographical proximity of these 
areas to western Europe where the cavalry shield was in common use 
throughout this -period, and, secondly tactical peculiarities, of war in this 
region. 
It is a conunonly held view that the shield was adopted by Greek and 
Macedonian horse from Italy, perhaps as' a result of Pyrrhus' campaigns there 
in the early third century, perhaps crossing the Adriatic later (45). A problem 
exists reconciling the very early date of the Pyrrhic War with the evidence of 
Polybios, which is from the later Hellenistic period and which also 
paradoxically states that the Romans modified their cavalry shields after 
encounters with the Greeksl A solution might be to attribute the introduction 
of the shield to the Celts, who used cavalry equipped with the thzweos. It may 
be from this people that the evidence of Polybios - and perhaps the Aemilius 
PauHus monument - derives (46). Celtic military dress affected Roman 
equipment to a great extent and may have had a similar effect on the western 
HeHenistic powers, providing them with a shield with a stout 'boss, the 
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typically Celtic 'barley corn' boss. Celtic soldiers, - were also a common 
feature of Ileflenistic, warfare, either as mercenaries or invaders, thus 
providing the avenue by which their military influence would have entered 
the Hellenistic world. 
It must be emphasised that the shield spread no further than the 
westempart of the Hellenistic world. The reason for this may have been 
extraordinary tactical problems faced by cavalry in this region that did not 
appear in the east. Firstly, whereas cavalry was used on a massed scale in the 
east, it was only deployed in small numbers in the west. This affected tactics. 
Cavalry was used in large, often decisive sweeping attacks in the east, but in 
the west it formed a more equal adjunct to the other fighting arms. The result 
of this may have been a need for greater ý protection. The sheer weight of 
numbers and the speed of attack would have. protected the shieldless lancers 
of, eastern armies. Small numbers of horse deployed in the west, on the other 
hand, may have been vulnerable to missiles prompting the adoption shield 
when it became available. Secondly, the javelin may have replaced the lance 
as the main cavalry weapon in western armies, the threat becoming a 
skirmishing rather than a charging enemy. It is noteworthy that the shield 
recorded by Polybios was the large lhureog rather than a small target, 
implying missile defence by the area covered by the shield, rather than 
hand-to-hand defence which might have been better afforded by a smaller 
shield that could be manipulated more easily. 
Protection was also afforded by body armour. for the head, torso and 
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perhaps the legs. - Modem scholars have generally accepted. that'Xeno phon"s 
preference for the Boeotian helmet continues into the Hellenistic- period., '-7 its 
advantages are discussed above. Many other helmet styles have, 'however, 
been discovered. It is clear that no uniformity existed and some troops would 
sacrifice the good visibility qualities of the Boeotian type for the greater 
protection of others (47). 
Evidence, both art and literature, shows that intermediate cavalry wore 
annour to protect the torso. The evidence shows two general types, the 
1h7olhoraxand a cavalry version of the muscled cuirass - with a flared waist 
for ease of riding. Cavalry were a high prestige arm ofHellenistic armies and 
often formed from the upper echelons of Hellenistic society. Under such 
circumstances metallic armour would have been normal, economic factors 
taking a low priority in determining the expense of equipping a mounted 
force. The role of the inten-nediate type as the striking force of the army 
would have also encouraged the use of the best equipment available. It is 
logical to conclude that all intermediate type cavalry troopers were provided 
with protection for the torso (48). 
Protection for the legs was an important consideration for cavalry in the 
ancient period. The thighs would have been the primary target for infantry 
fighting cavalry, and a major wound in the thigh can rapidly cause death. 
The thighs, would typically have been, protected by the plely, th , ffes of e 
soldier's body armour. The lower legs, however, appear to have had no such 
protection. The evidence is fragmentary and indicates that cavalry of the 
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period relied on high boots to'protect this area (4? ). 
Xenophon recommended a flexible arm defence mUch like that tised by 
later Roman gladiators for defence of the right arm (50). No Hellenistic 
source supports the introduction of such armour and the evidence shows no 
protection for the arms aside from clothing or perhaps the cavalry cloak 
which may have protected the left arm. 
Finally the intermediate type were equipped with swords. These weapons 
were for use in prolonged meeýe when the lance broke, but even so it appears 
that the buttspike of the lance was preferred to the sword. Xenophon 
recommended the sabre-like m,? chvýv and it is clear that this type was used 
in the HeHenistic period, in the form of the AqpA Many types of sword have, 
however, survived from the period and it is impossible to determine if any 
one type was favoured (51). 
The equipment of the intermediate type of cavalryman, the backbone of 
the Hellenistic mounted force, differed in small. but important, respects from 
that of Classical cavalry. Both types were armoured, largely due to their high 
social position and hence large reserves of wealth. Both suffered from lack of 
stirrups or proper saddles. The great difference, however, was the offensive 
weapon carried by the Hellenistic trooper, the lance. The intermediate type 
was a shock cavalryman whose role in battle was to break the enemy line. 
This is fundamentally different from that of the Classical trooper whose role 
was one of skirmisher and auxiliary. In the west Hellenistic cavalry evolved 
further, taking up the shield and perhaps the javelin. As will be shown, their 
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role, in battle reverted to a more secondary one. In the east, however, - the 
intermediate lancer dominated mounted warfare and remained 'the mainstay 
of this fighting ann until the close of the period. 
0 lbr, 
-Cataphract 
A heavier type of cavalry was used by the Seleucid anny. These soldiers 
were called cataphracts and both man and horse were fully armoured (52). 
Cataphracts were of oriental origin, probably invented on the Steppes and 
spreading south into the Persian empire (53). The Seleucids inherited this 
type of horseman and deployed large numbers of cataphracts; in the wars of 
the later third century. Later the Romans, Parthians and Sassanid Persians 
continued the tradition, making cataphracts a common feature of eastern 
warfare through the early part of the Christian era and beyond into the 
Nfiddle Ages (54). The CIassical Greeks met cataphracts whilst fighting 
Persia, but despite the advice of Xenophon they did not use such troops mi 
their arn-ýies (55). Cataphracts were an innovation for the Hellenistic military 
system and need to be examined for their effect on battlefield tactics. 
The sources depict the Hellenistic cataphract as exceptionally well 
armoured. This image is common in ancient literature from Herodotus to 
Amrnianus Marcellinus (56). It is difficult, however, to reconstruct the 
equipment of this troop-type precisely from Hellenistic written and 
archaeological sources alone. An examination of cataphract equipment must, 
therefore, draw upon written and pictoral evidence from the ancient period as 
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a whole. 
The most striking piece of equipment used by the catýphra'cfwas horse 
armour. Evidence shows two general types, half armour covering the'front of 
the horse and full armour, much like an armoured blanket, with neck and 
head protection added. The former can be seen on the Pergamurn reliefs in 
the Hellenistic period, but is hardly ever attested in evidence from other . 
periods of ancient warfare. It may be the equipment of the Seleucid guard 
cavalry at Magnesia, who were said to be equipped as light cataphracts. Full 
armour, on the other hand, is a conunon feature of ancient art, although no 
example has survived from the Hellenistic period. An example of such 
armour, from the middle Imperial Roman period, was found at Doura 
Europus (57). This armour must have been a great encumbrance for the 
cataphract horse. 
Horse armour could be manufactured from several types of material. 
Written evidence is not clear as to whether the protection of man, horse or 
both is in question. Despite this armour could be made of metal, the example 
found at Doura being made of bronze, perhaps to counteract the corrosive 
effects of the horse's sweat. Hom and felt armour are also found in the 
sources, written and art, perhaps in an effort to reduce the weight carried by 
the horse and once again to combat possible corrosion (58). Despite the 
efforts of ancient armourers, it is clear that cataphract horses -fought 
encumbered. Indeed the sources refer to a special large breed of horse, the 
Nisaean, being developed by the Seleucids to mount their cataphract corps 
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(59). 
The Pergamurn reliefs may depict cataphract armour (60). It is'difficult 
to relate the pieces of armour to each other due to the subject of the' frieze, a 
trophy of piled arms in no apparent order. Items similar to Xenophon's arm 
protectors are shown, which may have been used to protect the cataphract's 
arms, and perhaps his legs. Later reliefs show cataphracts with leg protection 
and written sources attest to the vulnerability of cataphracts; in this region of 
the body (61). The reliefs also show helmets with masks fitted to protect the 
face, which may also have been cataphract equipment. Linothorakes and 
muscled cuirasses appear on the reliefs, but as they are standard Hellenistic 
equipment it is difficult to attribute their use to cataphracts alone. The 
muscled cuirass has been used in reconstructions of Seleucid cataphracts, 
simply with the addition of tubular defences for arms and legs - Gamber 
substitutes greaves - and a helmet with face protection, but although the 
reconstructions are based on logic, they are obviously speculative (62). It is 
difficult to determine if the cataphract carried a shield. With such heavy 
armour the added protection may not have been'necessary, and most of the 
art evidence show cataphracts without shields. Finally, it would have been 
logical for Seleucid cataphracts to have followed the standard Hellenistic 
practice and deploy shock cavalry without the shield. 
It is generally accepted that the offensive weapon of the cataphract, in 
this and later periods, was the lance. The only Hellenistic evidence that 
supports this view is Livy's statement regarding the Seleucid guard cavalry at 
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Magnesia, , who, he. says, were equiýped -, Iikethe cataphracts but with lighter 
armour (63). Livy, probably used Polybios; as his'source for, Magnesia and it 
is noteworthy that this experienced 'cayalry., general, did not see fit to 
differentiate in affnament between the cataphracts and the guards. Hence both 
must have been equipped with the standard Hellenistic offensive cavalry 
weapon, the lance. It would also be logical to accept that a sword or cavalry 
axe nýght have been added to complete the cataphract's panoply. 
To conclude, by the late third century the Seleucid affny had 
amalgamated its Macedonian and Oriental traditions. The mounted shock arm 
of the Hellenistic military system had been supplemented with the heaviest 
cavalry type known to the ancients, the cataphract. It is noteworthy that only 
the Seleucids developed this type of cavalry, the geographic location of the 
empire - including as it did the Iranian plateau - being the reason. Added to 
this was the fact that horse armour was generally only adopted in the ancient 
world to stop arrows wounding horses, not as protection from hand-to-hand 
weapons. Of the Hellenistic powers only the Seleucid empire, bordering as it 
did the steppe-lands of central Asia, was faced with large numbers of 
bow-using enemies (64). 
d) LightCm-aky 
0 
Light cavalry formed the third type of cavalry deployed by Hellenistic 
armies. It fell into two broad categories, horse-archers and mounted 
javelinmen. Hellenistic armies used both types in varying numbers depending 
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on avaHability. Both, styles of fighting were highly developed ý in the 
Hellenistic period. 
The horse-archer had developed long before the Hellenistic period on the 
steppes of central Asia. Such troops formed the main military strength of the 
peoples of this area up until the nineteenth century A. D. Tl-ýs style of 
fighting was exported to the sedentary cultures to the south, either through 
the use of mercenaries, through conquest or by imitation. So strong was 
steppe influence on horse-archer tactics that the Greeks referred to any horse 
archers as 'Skythians', the steppe nomad nation with which they were most 
familiar, regardless of the actual nationality of such soldiers. 
The primary weapon of the horse-archer was a composite bow short 
enough to be used from horseback. The ranges of ancient bows has been 
discussed above (see pp. 183ff. ); suffice it to say here that horse archery was 
probably effective up to one hundred yards. It is not clear how far being 
mounted affected accuracy, but it is clear from the sources that infantry 
bowmen outranged their mounted counterparts. Hence foot-archers became 
the tactical counter to the horse-archer (65). 
The combination of bow and horse dictated horse-archer tactics. A 
combination of advance and retreat, never actuafly coming into combat, was 
used to cause confusion to enemy formations. Feints were used in an attempt 
to pull enemy units out of the line. If successful, such unfortunates could be 
swamped by horse-archers - isolated, surrounded and shot down. In pure 
horse-archer armies these tactics were practised on a mass scale over a long 
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period of 11 tir . fie, a prime example . being Crassus' 'Parthian campaignof'53 Eý. 
C. It is impoitant, however, to appreciate'that victory only came to the 
horse-archers after prolonged fighting, often over a period of days (66). On a 
smaller scale, horse-archer tactics would'have been used to supplement the 
other combined-arms doctrine inherent in HeUenistic warfare. 
The horse-archer carried a lot of anu-nunition. Bowcases that have been 
found may have contained up to one hundred arrows, and scholars have 
concluded that several such cases may have been carried into action. Rates of 
fire were high: Cerrenko estimated up to twelve arrows could have been shot 
per minute. The fighting at Carrhae in 53 B. C. demonstrates the large 
numbers of arrows that could be expended in a prolonged engagement, for 
the Parthians replenished their supply from pack-camels posted specifically 
for this purpose (67). * 
Horse-archers may have been equipped with shields, for there are several 
Skythian artifacts representing shielded horse bowmen. Arrian also records 
that a Skythian had his shield pinned to his breastplate by a Macedonian 
ballista-bolt during Alexander's crossing of the Oxus (68). Despite the 
predominance of unarmoured representations of Skythians and other steppe 
types in the archaeological record, it is clear that armour could also have 
been worn by these soldiers (69). This added protection did not, however, 
radically effect basic horse-archer tactics, which emphasised keeping at a 
distance from the enemy and overpowering him with arrows. 
Hellenistic armies did not deploy horse-archers in large numbers. 
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Alexander and the Seleucid dynasty - used mercenaFy horse-archers in their 
armies, and as such must have used horse-archer tactics at a smaUer, 
auxiliary level (70). The only detailed record of Hellenistic troops facing, 
large numbers of horse-archers is Alexander's campaign to secure the 
northern boundaries of his empire. It was during this fighting that an isolated 
detachment under Andromachus was destroyed by horse-archers (71). The 
Seleucid- army- must-also -have - fought- border skirmishesi if not small wars, 
against Steppe peoples. Indeed the Seleucids may have introduced 
cataphracts into their army to protect the horses of cavalry fighting Steppe 
invaders (72). 
The second broad type of light cavalry were those equipped with 
javelins. The javelin has been discussed above (see pp. 178ff. ) and it may 
have been more effective when used from, horseback.., Mounted, javelinmen 
would have been able to ride within a very close distance of the enemy, 
release their weapons and retire. This tactic was not available to p&oiand, 
despite the speed of the cavalry, was dangerous., Xenophon's description of 
mounted javelin drill supports this view, as does certain art evidence (73). 
Javelin-equipped light cavalry also come into the problem of the use of 
the shield problem discussed above with regard the intermediate cavalry type 
(74). A specialist shielded,, javelin-equipped fight cavalryman may have 
existed in the form of the 'Tarentine'. Scholars are not clear why this type of 
light horse was singled out in the sources, One explanation is that they were 
shielded, but evidence for this is scanty. Coins from the Greek city of 
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Tarentum, located in southern Italy, depict light caýalrý--,,, u. sin'4'-, "shi. elds', - 
'ýee Further, the theory of an Italian origin for Hellenistic shield7use,, has". 'n' 
used to argue that 'Tarentines' carried shields. It would' have. been logical to 
equip skirmishing horse with shields as their tactics involved fighting at a 
distance and made them prone to engaging in missile exchanges. The 
evidence is, however, inconclusive (75). 
A third type of light cavalry was those equipped with the lance, who 
were presumably expected to fight in close combat. Most notable amongst 
this type are the mdsvp1wroi or pmdromoi of Alexander's army. Scholars 
have debated the true function of this corps and it is clear that they 
performed two roles. At the Granicus they both screened the advance of the 
army and fought with the Macedonian right in the river crossing. It must be 
I emphasised that the lance was a typical fight cavalry weapon in later periods, 
for example the Cossacks of Russia or Napoleon's Polish lancers. However, 
in the context of this study the pra-fromoi are best categorised as 
intermediate cavalry. Strategically they performed light cavalry functions, but 
then so did most of the mounted force of a Hellenistic army. Tactically, 
however, they fought at close quarters, and this was not the function of most 
Hellenistic light cavalry, their role being that of a battlefield skinnisher (76). 
Armour may have been worn by Hellenistic fight cavalry. The definition 
'light cavalry' is the result of tactical function rather than equipment. The 
can be defined as ntermediate cavalry because they engaged in 
close combat on a regular basis. Conversly, armoured cavalry that used 
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skirmishing a's their main' battlefield ta'c"tic ffiia'y be', defioed', as'-", 'lj0'-'1V, ' . -A 
percentage of the cavalry force in the Classical period were armoured 
without this affecting their essentially light cavalry- tactics., It is important to 
be aware that this may have continued into the Hellenistic period. Armour, 
ranging from helmets to full body, protection, may have been wom, by a 
varying number of Hellenistic light cavalry (77). 
Finally it is clear that ja'Velin-equipped light cavalry may have carried 
sidean-ns of some kind, swords or daggers. It is not possible to establish any 
form of pattern to the use of sidearms. It is important, however, to appreciate 
that these troops could engage in hand-to-hand combat if circumstances 
dictated and that this would have influenced tactics. 
D) Cayalry Organisatio 
The tactics used by Hellenistic cavalry fonnations were directly related 
to the organisational system used in the period. Cavalry were deployed in 
small units which allowed rapid, flexible movement on the battlefield. These 
small units also allowed cavalry to use special fonnations such as the wedge. 
Thus we must understand the organisational system in use in the period 
before we can understand the tactics used. 
Much evidence for Hellenistic cavalry organisation has survived. The 
tacticians record a complex system of organisation in detail which is, unlike 
the cases of previous arms surveyed, supported by a large body of historical 
references. It is clear that Hellenistic cavalry used a common organisational 
258 
system, debate ý only arising when - the actual strengths of . the, sub-units is in 
question. 
Advances in cavalry organisation were already underway in the later 
Classical period. Xenophon records proper organisation for horse in his 
treatise on the cavalry commander. There is also evidence that the Athenian 
army was using a proper system of organisation by the later Classical Period. - 
These later Classical units were approximately one hundred men strong (78). 
The use of small formations as the basic tacical unit continued into the 
Hellenistic period. The sources commonly refer to units such as i1j. 4 and this 
formation wiU be the starting point for our survey. The strength of the Ae is 
not uniform throughout the sources, numbers ranging from fifty to three 
hundred men, and this lack of precision has produced debate amongst 
scholars (79). For our purposes it is enough to say that the ile was the 
smallest unit of manoeuvre; actual numbers varied, but stood around one 
hundred and fifty men. 
The sources record that ilaiwere used by Heffenistic armies throughout 
the period. Alexander's army deployed eight Aziof hel,?, irm, one of which 
was a guard unit, and four of prodmmov, * at the beginning of the Persian 
campaign. The Thessalian and allied Greek horse may also have used the Ae 
(80). Arrian is the primary source for this period and he does not detail the 
size of the Alexandrian j7e. It is primarily from the Alexandrian evidence that 
scholastic argument over Ae numbers stems. 
The hIe was used by the Diadochi in their wars for control of Alexander's 
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empire. ý, - Of particuiar -note are ý references' to iM at Gabiene. ' , DiodprUS' 
account records AW of respectively fifty and three hundred in the saine 
action; somewhat confounding any attempt. to define the formation in terms 
of numbers of troopers- (81). Polybios compared the organisation of Roman 
cavalry with that of the'Achaean League at the turn of the third century. He 
emphasised how the ile was a sub-unit of a larger formation. Livy, writing of 
the- same Period, - uses-.? /.? e or, lulm-ve to describe similar formations. Both of 
which are small units of around one hundred men (82). 
The tacticians also give details of ilat' Once again the formation is small, 
approximately fifty men, and the basic unit of manoeuvre. A minor problem 
with the tacticians is that Arrian, at least, may confuse Hellenistic fighting 
units with those of the Roman army of the second century A. D. (83). 
Units larger than Ad were commonplace in the Hellenistic period, the 
most common being the hi!; jýwrc& Armies of the period used H)ý7, azrcHes in 
t-ýo ways. For the smaHer armies of Greece, the term denoted the entire 
cavalry command of the state. For the large armies of the eastern monarchies, 
the HppurcAr was akin to the cavalry regiment of more modem times, the 
i/aiperforming a similar task to the squadron and being grouped together for 
ease of tactical deployment and administration (84). 
The Hppurchy was introduced in a proper military sense by Alexander 
the Great, probably in 330 B. C., references before this date probably being 
anachronistic. The introduction of the hipwrcAv has caused debate amongst 
scholars, although only some of the points need examination here. 
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Alexander's hef,? iroiwere initially composed of eight ilaz' In 330 B. C. he was 
forced to divide the command as a whole in two, because 'Of an influx of 
reinforcements and to prevent the helaý-oibecoming a dangerous weapon for 
possible political rivals. At first there were only two hipwrchieýg but as time 
went on the number increased, scholars argue over the final figure, but there 
were at least five. The Alexandrian army still retained the ile, hippmchies 
simply being composed of -groups of these smaller units (85). 
There were strategic motives for the introduction of the hip, 3ourcl.,, v Up to 
Gaugamela, Alexander's campaigns had been dominated by two large airrues 
manoeuvring to and fighting a series of set-piece battles. After 330 B. C. the 
nature of the warfare changed. Alexander was faced with the problem of 
pacifying the large areas of central Asia and countering hit and run raids by 
remnants of the Persian army. Alexander led a series of all arms columns to 
sweep the area and bring the enemy to battle. Eight AWgrouped into a single 
corps of -he&hvi were not suitable for such fighting. Alexander therefore 
reorganised his cavalry into larger battlegroups; the HppjrcHeg and allotted 
them to task-forces as the situation demanded (86). 
The hipparchy also had a tactical function, as is illustrated by the battle 
of the Hydaspes (87). Here the Macedonian horse deployed and manoeuvred. 
I in h1pparchieg whereas previously they are always recorded as fighting as 
Ad The hipparchy was, therefore, also a way of moving large numbers of 
horse around the battlefield. 
Evidence for later use of the hipparchy is less closely related to battle 
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accounts. Polybios records the existence of. a: hi0jp2rý11in hisý': sfiqrt tteatise., on. 
cavalry tactics (88). In this case he refers to the, comrhande'r, 'of a ptat e's, e'ýiire 
cavalry arm - note also the post was ý"seniof political, 'office. Papyrological 
evidence from Ptolemaic Egypt proves that the hipparcltty, was in - common 
use in that state (89), and of course, there is the evidence of the, tacticians 
who all refer to this formation and how it was broken down into sub-units 
(90). That the hippurcArwas used in battle- after -Alexander- can- only be - 
inferred from the sources. There are substantial units that fight much like the 
Iiippa, mWes of Alexander's day, but there are not constant clear references to 
the Hppwrhyas a specific unit in sources for this period. 
The size of the hipparchy has been the subject of debate, the most 
common estimate being a unit of one thousand men. It is clear that 
hippj=Hes were always composed of numbers of An, once again prompting 
a debate over numbers. Galili took a rather different line in his'analysis of 
the cavalry forces at Raphia. He argued that a large ffe of five hundred and 
twelve men was used, a formation that would have functioned, presumably, 
much like a hoparchy(91). Once again, for the purposes of this analysis a 
detaUed discussion as to the numerical strength of the hipparchy is without 
benefit; suffice it to say that it was a large formation of horse composed of a 
varying number of Av. 
Other organisational U'Mts existed for cavalry in the Hellenistic period, 
notably the lochos and lemmchy of the Alexandrian period '(92), but 
considerable debate surrounds both- units. They were either part' of 
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Alexander's reform of his heldWinto hipWcHe. % used as transitional units, 
or they became a permanent feature of Macedonian military organisation. 
The le&zrcly is a difficult unit to ideriiify. - Modern opinioft tends towards a 
fefi; 2rchy composed of four i1ji as a transitional unit during conversion to a 
proper hipparcAy organisation. The leliaFchýv may have, therefore, dis- 
appeared from the Macedonian system of organisation once the hi%wrcAy 
-- Was id place; -6r 'it'rnay have -been retained -when special task-forceg were 
needed. The lefrarchy was an Alexandrian formation, and, whatever its 
function, later armies did not use it. Scholars are more in agreement with 
regard to the lochoswhich is seen as a unit one step below the Ae. Generally 
it is accepted that two lochoirnade. one Ae. Particularly interesting from a 
tactical point of view is Polybios' reference to how he believed Aochoi and 
dilochoiwere used. He records a drill where Aochoiand, dilochoicould dash 
out at the enemy (93). These small units may therefore have been used in 
I 
harassing manoeuvres. 
Polybios often records the use of small forces of cavalry, often in units 
he calls ozdamoA94). This term has been interpreted in several ways. Some 
scholars see it as a Polybian term for daz* This conclusion cannot, however, 
be used in all situations, in particular where Livy transliterates the term into 
the Latin, taimae, units of some thirty men. Of particular interest is Polybios' 
and Livy's account of Cynoscephalae where the Romans sent forward ten 
oalamoillwmve of cavalry, which would have totalled between two hundred 
and fifty and three hundred horse. Therefore unless Livy is mistaken in his 
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temiinology, the, oulamoswas consideraýly smalle'r than the'-ile. 
As has been noted, Polybios uses the term omlamoi in reference to 
cavalry drill. He shows that they were used to deploy larger bodies of horse 
and mano'euvre them efficiently on the battlefield. Of particular significance 
is his evidence that cavalry should be trained to dash forward and then return 
to the ranks of their oulamov, ilav, or hippurchy. By implication he proves - 
that this formation was the smallest in a chain of organisation that went up to 
the hýWchy. It is also clear from his work that ilaiwere the basic fighting 
formation and that the sub-units of oal,? moi were intended to facilitate 
effective use of tactics by the dm' The one exception to this was the battle at 
the Axius river in 208 B. C., where oalamoi fought as separate units. This 
does not, however, contradict the analysis as the righting at the Axius was 
confused, the" Seleucid army being deployed in an emergency' formation to 
repel a surprise Bactrian attack. It is noteworthy that victory went to the 
Seleucids when Antiochus attacked with the 2,000 cavalry 'accustomed to 
fight around him', presumably the qgemw and the hefahvi, probably operating 
as two hi , pfiwrhiesusing standard tactics 
(95). 
Polybios once records the use of a formation smaller than the oulkmog a 
0 semeiv ( oq[xia) (96). The size of these units is unknown: they may have 
been the equivalent of the Alexandrian lochos Their role is unclear, but they 
must have once, again been designed to facilitate the smooth running of the 
higher elements of the organisational structure. As with the avlamoiPolybios 
does not record that these units fought independently. 
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-FinallyAhere are references in-Ptolemaic papyri to a -formation called'a 
olel, as(97). The dekaswas obviously a unit based on ten; indeed Polybios 
refers to a Roman formation called a ; (ekasled by a ilecaiina. The word is 
also used by Xenophon in reference to a cavalry formation. There is no 
extant battlefield reference to the dekas. 
It is therefore certain that a complex system of organisation existed 
amongst Hellenistic cavalry. The larger states of the east deployed cavalry in 
hi)P'3oarchies of perhaps one thousand men and used the Ae within these larger 
formations as the unit of manoeuvre. -In the smaller armies of Greece the 
larger formations were not used. 'These states, however, still used the same 
basic organisational concept as the eastern, powers, but on a smaller scale, 
deploying their. cavalry in ilai and ov1,? moi' This system was prevalent 
throughout the - period and the advantages 
it gave , mounted troops need 
explanation. 
The first advantage was flexibility in deployment. This factor operated 
on both the strategic and tactical level, for example, the use of the-hioiparchy 
in Alexander's campaigns in central Asia (98). Until Gaugamela. ' the 
Macedonian cavalry had been essentially a battlefield -force acting under the 
close supervision of the king. As such, it was organised into . 17,7z, no 
larger 
formation being -necessary. After the defeat of the main Persian army, 
however, the strategic role of the cavalry expanded. New, larger formations 
were introduced - leh-&Thiesthen hipfiwrchktg These formation were large 
enough to act in a semi-independent, strategic role, such as in the pacification 
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of central'Asia, whqre they formed the core of various task-forces' deployed 
by the, Macedonians. 
The Hellenistic organisational' structure also aided the deployment and 
use of the large numbers of'horse. The armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms 
expanded the size of their mounted arms far beyond that which had been 
used by Philip or Alexander. If one accepts Tam's assertion that the 
hi%w, rcI, y was generally 1,000 strong, then the eastern armies would have 
deployed six to eight hioiparcHes as a matter of course. The use of the 
hipparchy as a permanent organisational unit would have allowed for more 
effective massing of horse on the battlefield, in effect delegating the minutiae 
of the deployment of the AV to the hipparc& The hipmrchy would have 
also aided fast and efficient manoeuvre once the battle got underway, once 
more by delegation to *the A*parclis Evidence for use of the hipwrchj, in 
this fashion comes from Gaza and Raphia (99). 
It is also noteworthy that the introduction of the hippzrcAy into the 
AlexandAan army was accompanied by the infusion of Orientals into the 
ranks of the he&iý-& (100). One of the motives for this was clearly to 
integrate the new comers into an existing tactical system. This would have 
remained the case in later armies, and troops who constantly served together 
in the same hoparcAywould have developed into a well-oiled fighting unit, 
more efficient in battle than groups of ilaithrown together at short notice in 
an adhoc faslýon. 
The use of the hlpp,?,, rhy by the Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies may have 
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also afforded their governments administrative advantages-, when it came to 
the allocation of land to military settlers and raising cavalry in time of crisis 
(101). It is clear from Egyptian evidence that clerachs were allocated to 
llip'Wchies on a long-term basis, since they are quoted in papyri with their 
Spparc4itr number or ethnic designation. There is far less evidence for the 
Seleucid empire; we can only conjecture that a permanent organisation would 
--have -made'-recruitment-niore -efficient. Of'courseý, in-Hellenistic Greece, --the 
Ali 
. 
ý)PpurcAy would have performed a similar administrative function, but on a 
smaller scale. 
Hellenistic cavalrY therefore used a far more complex organisational 
structure than had their Classical Greek counterparts. This was partially -a 
necessity as the numbers of cavalry in Macedonian armies expanded. It was 
also, however, the result. of a change in tactics whereby small'unit charges 
and manoeuvre became the order of the day. In the next section we shall 
examine the tactical systems used by Hellenistic cavalry and link them to the 
complex organistional systems devised in this period. 
E) Cavalry Tactics 
a) Introductio . 
Cavalry tactics in the Hellenistic period differed markedly from those 
used in the Classical period. Cavalry changed from an essentially auxiliary 
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skirrnishing and scouting force to an arm of decision, capable of turning the 
tide of battle. This can be ascribed to three main changes in the nature of 
mounted warfare from the Classical 
ýo the Hellenistic period. Firstly, the 
equipment of the troops, as has been shown above, was more orientated to 
hand-to-hand fighting. Secondly, the numbers of cavalry increased. Finally, 
more advanced fighting formations were developed. When placed together 
-- theiilfid6is pr"6d-uce'-a'- c-omplex-aind -nov6r ýyisrcffi of Eittl6f i6ld't6dGEs. ' -" --- - 
The advances in cavalry tactics in the Hellenistic period must be taken 
within the overall all-arms framework that is characteristic of the military 
systems of this period. Some historians have taken the advances in horse 
warfare too far, attributing to cavalry a decisive role in battle that they did 
not have (102). It is the case, however, that an effective Hellenistic army had 
to have an effective cavalry -arm, especially the new types of horse that 
charged into action. Generally an army that lost cavalry don-driance on the 
battlefield was liable to envelopment and faced the collapse of the morale of 
its other troops. 
A balanced view of Hellenistic cavalry tactics puts them into the 
combined-arms scheme of an army, of the period. Their role was rapid attack, 
to open the combat and outflank an enemy, or to take advantage of tactical 
circumstance. They were the arm that paved the way for the victory of the 
foot soldiers. That Hellenistic cavalry could fulfil this role is a result of their 
tactical systems, which can be broken down into, firstly, the use of special 
formations and secondly, the tactical procedures themselves. 
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b) Cay-alry-Eomiatiom 
Hellenistic drill and formation structure is remarkably uniform in our 
sources (103). Forrnation was used on two levels. Firstly, the i/aiwithin a 
could be deployed in various ways, giving a commander a series 
of combat formations. Secondly, the i7Wthemselves could assume different 
sub-unit formations, dependent on period, nationality or tactical mission. 
obviously this was the result of the organisational systems employed in the 
period (104). 
The smaller units were the building-blocks of the larger cavalry 
formations, and the simplest formation used by the sub-unit they used was 
the square. All the tacticians speak of its use (105). They say that it was used 
by Greeks, Persians and SicHians, and by implication the square must have 
predated the Hellenistic period. The advantage of the square was case of 
deployment, Arrian adding that it allowed a formation to hit the enemy in an 
ordered mass. 
The sources do not agree on a standard depth for the square. If late 
Classical references are included, the the depth of cavalry units varied from 
four to ten ranks, with eight being the standard. This lack of standardisation 
was also the case with the width of cavalry formations (106). one important 
point stands out from this confusion, that cavalry did not rely on depth for 
victory as did infantry, because horse could not push on horse; indeed, it may 
have been the case that close formations would have been disordered by 
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animals biting and kicking each other (107). 
Only Polybios records what frontAge a'cavalry ' square would have 
occupied. He states that eight hundred'cavalry would have occupied one 
slade in eight ranks of one hundred files. He also wrote that a gap equal to 
one ile should be left between ilai, to ease manoeuvre. Given this, one 
trooper would have occupied approximately three feet of ground. Asclepio- - 
dotus' standard unit -a square, sixteen men wide would have occupied 
forty-eight feet of ground (108). if Polybios' information is correct, 
Hellenistic cavalry took up a lot of room on the battlefield. They did not 
deploy. in depth, but in lines composed of single units; a hi)OmrcAr might 
occupy two-hundred and fifty yards. The tactical implications with regard to 
command and control are obvious. 
The square had disadvantages; for example, it would have been difficult 
to wheel or turn in battle. The tacticians record that officers were plicedat 
the comers of the formation, clearly to counteract disorder. Further the gaps 
between , Yai recorded by Polybios' indicate' that squares of horse needed 
plenty of room tomanoeuvre. 
There is no direct evidence for the use of the square in battle accounts, 
but this is not to say that the square was only a theoretical formation. The 
opposite is more probably the case, the square being so common a formation 
as to evade the attention of the historical writers. 
The second formation recorded by the tacticians is the rhomboid (109). 
This formation appears only in the tacticians and is never mentioned in 
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historical accounts. The tacticians record that the" fýrrafion"waý` mtroýdlicid 
by Jason 'Of Pherae and that it was a Thessalian- speciality. - The great 
advantage of the rhomboid was its manoeu'vrability. The rhomboid'was 
formed in such a fashion as to place officers at the four points of the 
formation. The tacticians say that the men found it easy to maintain station 
inside the rhomboid since they simply followed their officers, 'as in the case - 
of a. fli .g. ht - of cranes'. The - rhomboid , woul -d, havelýen a far more efficient 
formation than the square to wheel and turn on the battlefield. It is a pity that 
none of the historical sources record this formation in action. 
The wedge, or Ilipoko; , was a modification of the rhomboid and is 
found far more regularly in the sources 0 10). It is important to note that this 
study deals with a wedge formed from a single Ae of cavalry. The ancients 
also used a larger 'grand- Octical' wedge, for example at Gaugamela 0 11), 
to break the enemy line. The wedge was simply half a' rhomboid, , and 
presumably it retained the rhomboid's advantage of manoeuvre with a saving 
in manpower. The wedge formed the shape of a delta with the point towards 
the enemy. As with the rhomboid, the positioning of officers was important: 
they fonned up at the tips of the triangle. The tacticians tell us that the 
wedge was able to pierce the enemy line, more of which later. The wedge 
appears to have been a standard cavalry formation in the Hellenistic period. 
The role of these formations is not obvious from the sources, but it is 
probable that each formation was a different stage in the development of 
cavalry formations. It is clear that the square was the earliest formation and 
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that the rhomboid and the wedge -we're intr6du6edlo Graeco-Macedonian 
warfare either later or from outside the Greek world. The tacticians agree 
that the rhomboid was a developmentý by Jason'of - Phern's Thessalian horse, 
whilst the wedge was adopted by the Macedonians from the Skythians and 
Thracians. 
From these developments in formation stemmed changes in tactics and - 
the battlefield role of cavalry. Classical cavalry tactics were essentially two 
fold. Firstly, hand-to-hand fighting was restricted to other cavalry; they were 
not expected to break enemy hoplife formations Secondly, they fought as 
skirmishers. Xenophon records the square in use for the former role, and he 
alludes to its use in the latter. An incident from the Corinthian War clearly 
demonstrates the use of the square in close combat. In this fight, from 
Agesilaus's campaign in Asia Minor in 39615 B. C., the two bodies of cavalry 
simply charge one another and the Greeks are vanquished. Xenophon's 
cavalry treatise adds, however, more dkail to the nature of cavalry operations 
in this period. In his reference to the mock training battle, he records two 
groups of horse in loose formations, loose enough for both sides to 
interpenetrate each other's formation 0 12). 
Xenophon also records that squadrons should swiftlY pursue and retire, 
producing an occilating effect. This may be training for skirmishing, 
javelin-throwing practice also being reconunended in his treatise 0 13). 
Cavalry skirmish combat was not simply a haphazard affair with clouds of 
horse milling around and shooting whenever they saw a target. When large 
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numbers of horse were involved in this type of warfare they needed 
regulation, or else their numbers became a hindrance. The, square, coupled 
with Xenophon's toing-and-froing tecluiique by squadron, would have been a 
method by which cavalry could have advanced on the target, released 
weapons and retired to rest their horses and prepare more weapons. If 
conducted properly a constant pressure would have been placed on the 
tmmy line- f6ra'16ng-period of time. - 
The rhomboid may have been a development of the square as an 
anti-cavalry and skirmishing formation. This formation was only used by the 
Thessalians, a people well within the Greek cavalry tradition. Its use is not 
attested in battle, but the tacticians emphasise its manoeuvrability. The 
rhomboid would have made the tactics already used by the cavalry square 
more effective; it was simply a modification of an existing military 
technique. 
The wedge, on the other hand, may have been a major departure from 
traditional Greek cavalry tactics. It was, according to the tacticians, taken 
from the Thracians and Skythians by Philip 11 for his Macedonians (see note 
110 above). - Evidence suggests that it was Philip's intention to make an 
already formidable Macedonian mounted arm into an aggressive mounted 
striking force such as had never existed in Classical Greek warfare (114). 
This new formation was linked to the introduction of the lance as a standard 
cavalry weapon (see above pp. 235ff. ) The number of Macedon's mounted 
arm and the introduction of a solid infantry base for the first time in 
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Macedon's rnilitary, history. gave Philip's cavalry a. tactical'advantage to 
" "'I ` sys; em, a np. answer., -A 4,4 
Ji, 
e ed e, 
c6iiiiii6fititp , fs,;, a, gpe,. fl, laC., th A", e,,,, st ing, - yyei P 
its",: abilýiyý-`to' pierce an ene'my"' no' ehf , ý, -ý' *i r" "ý li id -wnte s, -have 
conqluded'that a cavalry wedge could penetrate a line of phalanx, either by 
shock alone or by striking the sub-unit gaps within the infantry fonnation 
(115). This writer, on the other hand, is sceptical about the possibility of this 
except in the most extreme of circumstances. Afterall, there is no source 
which directly supports such an assumption. The method by which this 
abifity to rupture the line was achieved has been somewhat taken for granted. 
Aside from the analogy of an arrow striking a target, no examination of the 
mechanics of wedge-tactics has been made. 
The first point is that despite the obvious similarity of the cavalry wedge 
to an arrow, the formation was composed of 'individuals and liable to 
disorder. This weakness was exacerbated by the fact that cavalry could not 
push upon one another as would infantry. The wedge must, therefore, have 
had properties other than its shape. To understand what these might have 
been, a basic picture of the nature of a mounted combat is required. 
It has already been noted that Xenophon gave the impression'that cavalry 
at full tilt would tend to - interpenetrate each other's formations. This is 
further supported by Arrian's account of the crossing of the'Gran'Icus (116). 
He records that the battle was more like an infantry than a cavalry action, 
with horse pressing on horse and man on man. The implication is, obviously. 
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that cavalry, battles would be open affairs, like the, image conveyed - by 
Xenophon. This is not confined to the ancient period', a quotation from the 
eighteenth century is useful, 
"When-two squadrons are made' up of men and mounts which are 
equally experienced in war and equally well trained, the charge proceeds 
as follows - the ranks run at each other, the horses seek the intervals [for 
ffellmislic cavalry &is would be the three feet belffrea each trooper 
jj7ej7b'oj7ed.? boml of their own accord, the riders engage'in hand-to-hand 
combat, the forces are so completely intermingled that the two squadrons 
cross and emerge from the other's rear 0 17). 
This tendency for equally matched cavalry units to interpenetrate one another 
is clearly a basic part of 'mounted warfare, no matter what the period. Given 
this the wedge had clear advantages over the square: its narrow front, its 
depth and the ease by which it could be manoeuvred by'its officers. Finally, 
the psychological effect of'a wedge charging a line would have been to 
induce individuals in the latter to shy away from the attack, further opening 
up and weakening the line formation. 
Arrian records that a square was a good cavatry formation because it 
allowed a unit to hit the enemy in an ordered mass (118). The problem, 
however, would have been actuafly to strike the enemy at the same moment. 
Cavalrymen have always sought for this advantage, but because of the 
broken nature of terrain and the difficulty of maintaining the dressing of a 
line whilst on the move, it normally eludes them. The wedge did not suffer 
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from this problem. The tacticians make it quite clear that it would natural-ly 
maintain its formation whilst on the move, 'like a flight of cranes'. Added to 
this ability to strike in the proper fashion would have been the great 
manoeurability of the wedge, which would have allowed it to be directed at 
gaps in the enemy formation caused by sub-unit division and/or disorder. 
The narrow frontage of the wedge would also have been an advantage - 
(119). Officers were stationed at the tips of the wedge, and presumably the 
best troopers would have held a similiar position, clustered at the tips and 
along the leading edges of the formation., It was the case with infantry 
formations of the period that the most experienced men formed the front 
ranks, and this would also logically have been the case for cavalry (120). The 
compact nature of the wedge would have allowed a core of experienced 
soldiers to have been used to far greater effect than in a square, because the 
wedge had a shorter frontage and these experienced soldiers would have been 
more concentrated than would have, been the case in a square. The narrow 
front of the wedge would also have had a disrupting effect on a square, 
assuming the given tactical situation was that both sides were charging at fun 
tilt towards one another. As wedge struck square, those involved in the 
impact and subsequent mNeýe would have slowed down, causing the wings of 
the square to continue. The tactical effect would have been to disrupt the 
square's formation and to isolate individual soldiers. Of course a tactical 
disadvantage might have been that the wedge would have been outflanked by 
the enveloping square. It would have been imperative, therefore, that the 
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wedge complete its work at speed'a6d ciýse'the'enemy m, orale to fall'to's6ch' 
a level that they broke in flight. 
The wedge was also by its nature a deep formation (121). If one accepts 
the theory that cavalry baffles were essentially open affairs with two units 
mutually interpenetrating one another, then depth of formation is a clear asset 
in the wedge. Quite simply, each soldier in the square would have had to 
pass more troopers in the wedge to emerge from the rear alive. The casualty 
rate in a square formation would have been far higher than in a wedge. This 
would be doubly the case if soldiers of higher calibre were deployed along 
the front edges of the wedge. 
The shape of the wedge would have also given it an advantage in a 
j7i&ýa The effect of combat would have been uneven in the initial stages of 
a mdlHe, when the wedge first entered the square. The effect of this would 
have been to disrupt, perhaps even 'burst open' the formation of the square. 
If this happened, then the square would have deteriorated into a swarm of 
individuals fighting against a proper rnilitary formation with all the 
consequences for mutual support etc. that this entails. " 
This theoretical picture demonstrates the marked advantages a- wedge 
would have had in combat with a square. The square would have been 
ruptured in such a manner as to leave dead and wounded concentrated in a 
smaH area. The wedge formation - or formations, for, as wifl be shown 
below, Hellenistic cavalry would have launched such an attack with many 
ilai - would also have broken through to the rear of the line of squares, a 
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factor which, when coupled, with the: damage -'done in'- the -, righting, would 
have seriously affected the morale of a line so penitrated. In additiom, once 
through the line,. the wedge would hav: e been ideally, suited to wheeling -and 
attacking the flanks or rear of the enemy formation. 
The morale effect of such an attack would have been vast, and a properly 
timed attack by a force in wedge on a line of squares would have been very - 
difficult to stop. In short, the troops in square would have had great difficulty 
in surviving such an attack as a coherent military force. 'Indeed, th'e only 
possible counter to such tactics would have been to deploy one's horse in 
depth in an attempt to absorb the wedge attack, and in doing so the 
commander would have, had shorten the line and face possible outflanking 
and envelopment manoeuvres in which the highly mobile wedge-formation 
excelled. 
It is difficult to locate a reference from the sources - aside from the 
general information quoted above at note 112 Fis-j-Fis the open nature of 
cavalry warfare - to support the analysis above. * Ancient battle accounts do 
not record the' minutiae, of the fighting. Tam's comments on Alexander's 
cavalry attack at Gaugamela do, however, show the effect' of a perfectly 
directed wedge attack (122). Tam argued that Alexander carefully 
orchestrated the action on his right to prepare the Persian line for a cavalry 
charge. He drew out the enemy left by slowly feeding the flanking forces of 
the Macedonian army into action. The Persians as a result slowly thinned out 
their line as they attempted to outflank and envelope the Macedonian right. 
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At the critical moment Alexanoer released his belwývi, a rese! ve, of eight AV 
of eRe cavalry. Alexander led the charge' Personally, so important was the 
control of the timing of the attack, ancf the he&iroitore through the Persian 
line, disrupting their army to such an extent as to bring about their eventual 
defeat. Gaugamela does not give us the detail of the action, but the effect of 
the he4vý-oi charge is very similar to the hypothesis presented above. It is 
clear- that the wedge enabled cavalry -tactics to- step forward and gave the 
cavalry commander the ability to break the enemy line of horse in a decisive 
manner such as had never previously been possible. 
The wedge was therefore a standard Hellenistic cavalry formation and it 
was ideally suited to breakthrough and exploitation. A series of wedges - 
normally formed by 6Wor possibly ov1,? md- would have been grouped 
together in a hiojparchy. The manner in which this larger formation was 
deployed is of concern because it effects how wedges would have been used 
tactically. 
Polybios addresses himself to this problem in his critique of Callisthenes 
(123). He records that a gap equal to the frontage of an Ae must be left 
between Azito facilitate manoeuvre. Polybios supports this in his section on 
Philopoemen's training progranune for Achaean cavalry (124). He says that 
an advancing body of horse should take care to maintain the spacing between 
oul, amoi' presumably for the same reason. Polybios also records that cavalry 
should attack by sub-unit and return to their respective oul. 7mm, ' i7. W and 
hippxrhy, indicating that sub-units maintained their station within the 
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organisational struýfure. No other source record's the deployment "of small 
units in such detail, but given Polybios' reputation in military matters, we 
can safely'accept his evidence. 
To summarise, Hellenistic cavalry probably used all of the formations 
their Classical predecessors had. They, however, developed the wedge, a 
tactical formation ideally suited to the mounted shock tactics of the period. In 
battle these wedges would have been formed by the smaller units of the 
Hellenistic organisational system. Inside the hipparcAv, numbers of Aji 
would have been deployed, according to Polybios, in a rather loose, 
fragmented formation. This allowed them to utilise the advantage of 
manoeuvre that was the hallmark of the wedge. It also allowed a series of 
controlled charges to be launched and gave the ile a point to rally on and 
reform if it faded in its mission. This basic position defined, we can. now 
proceed to battlefield tactics proper. 
c) Battlefield Tactics 
Earlier we discussed infantry tactics in the Hellenistic period and the 
conclusion was reached that infantry forrned up in the centre of an army in 
essentially large and unwieldy blocks. Cavalry was usually deployed on the 
flanks of the infantry and used the phalanx as a solid base off which to 
launch attacks (125). Cavalry tactics were far more complex than those of the 
infantry since horse had to move fast and manoeuvre to be effective. Cavalry 
actions appear to have been over in a short period of time and thus attacks 
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had to be organised to a much greater level of competence if they were to-, be 
successful. We shall deal with battlefield tactics from the, highest level, the 
deployment of entire wings, to the loývest, the use of small units. We will 
concentrate on the 'lancer', the main type of shock cavalry; more unusual 
troop types will be dealt with separately. 
The first tactical decision facing the Hellenistic commander was how to 
draw up his mass of horse. Usually cavalry were placed on the wings of the 
army, which is entirely logical. Cavalry was the fastest troops of the, period 
and one of their main, missions was to outflank and envelop enemy wings. 
Deployment of horse in the centre of the army was rare, Sellasia and 
Magnesia being the only two recorded examples (126). Deployment in the 
centre was dangerous. Cavalry needs to charge if it is to be effective - it 
cannot hold a position like infantry. Cavalry deployed in the centre of the 
line might be forced to charge home on opposing troops, who were normally 
foot, and against they stood little chance of success. 
Cavalry was normally distributed evenly to both flanks. Alternatively one 
wing could be weighted to gain local advantage, the most notable example of 
tl-ýs being Gaza (127). A more common tactic to gain superiority on one 
wing was to concentrate gile units on one flank. Non-nally Hellenistic 
commanders followed Greek tradition, reinforcing the right with quality 
troops at the expense of the left. This often resulted in a 'revolving door' 
effect as each army's right was victorious and outflanked the enemy left. 
Gaza is a notable exception. Ptolemy and Seleucus acted on intelligence and 
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resolutely sought to oppose Demetrius' weighted flank'with- their own. Th6y 
sought a decisive confrontation and prevailed, their action turning the battle 
in their favour (128). 
At the simplest level, *a cavalry wing would be deployed in a single line 
of units. Each wing would ride forward into action hoping to win the 
subsequent m8leýe and - if the victorious horse could be rallied from pursuit - 
outflank the enemy phalarrx. Hellenistic generals, however, enhanced their 
chances of success by using a series of special wing formations to 'gain 
tactical advantage. normally this involved advancing or refusing certain 
points of the wing. I 
A defensive formation used in the period was called the Xoýq TaýL;, a 
wing pulled back at an angle or refused. On occasion the formation was 
refýrred to as E'--uxa"PMLOý, or bent in, curved or crooked. This fonnation was 
used at Gaza where Demetrius held back his right to slow down the 
Ptolemaic attack (129). r 
The loxe &xis was usually only used on one wing, most Hellenistic 
armies designating one wing as offensive, the other defensive. At Gaugamela, 
however, Alexander used the . 
1oxe lads on both wings (130). Further, 
Gaugamela stands out as an excellent example of the advantages accruing to 
the defender from the 
. 
1oxe &vsý formation. - it is normal to assume that 
refusal of a wing gained time by forcing the enemy to advance further to 
combat. This is, however, patently not the case. Especially with'cavalry, the 
extra distance would, only have added minutes to the advance of the 
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attackers. Rather the loxe &xisgave the, def6ndei, -th6 o pp., ni Y46-disr-upt 
an enemy advance, forcing him to realign,, his ýttack,,, and hepce. 'gauung 
appreciable time for the defence to influence, the battle elsewhere. 
A strength of the love Azris was that if made conduct -of an outflanking 
manoeuvre by an enemy predominant in cavalry - more difficult * than would a 
line. Firstly, the love Aaxis could form a front facing an enemy flanking 
move, forcing a realignment of front by the attacking force. Secondly, the 
formation was especial. ly well suited for the launching of small unit spoiling 
attacks. At Gaugamela Persian cavalry attempted ý to outflank Alexander's 
right. The Macedonians held the Persians with a series of counter-attacks 
launched by individual i7aiwithin the . 1oxe taxk Despite an obvious disparity 
in numbers and the fact that this tactic only slowed the Persian attack,, the 
Macedonian plan worked. Eventually the Persians had to commit so much of 
their mounted strength into defeating the loxe tjz&and regaining the tactical 
initiative, that they weakened their line elsewhere, allowing Alexander the 
opportunity to break through their left centre with his helm; vi* 
Another tactical ploy was to skirmish with the enemy on one wing, like 
the Ioxe &ds buying time for an attack elsewhere. This tactic was best 
conducted by light horse, of which more later, but a force of mixed cavalry 
types could skim-dsh'on'a grand tactical level if pressed. The best, and one of 
the few, examples of this tactical ploy comes from Gabiene (131). Antigonus 
confounded the attack of Eumenes' strengthened right by light cavalry 
supported by XYSIO'johoroj. This tactic was so successful that Eumenes had to 
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reinforce his right by drawing: light ý cava. lry from 'his' le , ft'. Cabiepe As, 
noteworthy because it shows that in the right circumstances light horse; in 
this case Diodorus specifically notes the effectiveness -of arrows in the 
combat, could confound Hellenistic shock troops. 
A third tactic, and the most unsubtle, was to anticipate an enemy attack 
and simply ignore it. Throughout military history cavalry has been notorious 
in its inability to rally after victory. There are many famous occasions from 
outside the Hellenistic period where a battle has been lost by a victorious 
cavalry wing leaving the field in pursuit, never to return, with no thought of 
wheeling into the centre and attacking the enemy infantry from the rear. Tam 
has used this general tendency to unfairly denigrate Hellenistic cavalry in 
particular (132). 
Ipsus and Raphia are the best examples of this tactic in use (133). At 
both battles the commanders allowed the enemy to defeat their left. Note that 
on both occasions tactical ploys were used either to enhance the chances of 
victory - at Raphia a modification of the. 1oxe tat&was employed - or nullify 
the defeat - at Ipsus, Seleucus deployed a chain of elephants to prevent the 
victorious Antigonid right from interfering in the centre. This tactic, despite 
the refinements referred to above, was very negative. It in effect cancelled 
out the cavalry of each army and placed the responsibility for victory to 
firmly in the hands of the infantry. 
Several forms of the loxe Aadswere also used in attack. The first was the 
reverse of the refused . 
1oxe tadg a quite common formation (134). This 
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formation consiýsted of a line of Azi echeloned 'forward,. one, llank,,, being 
anchored ý on the'infantry centre. Thiý oblique 'attack obviously lent'lisielf -to 
the rolling attacks in waves of Ajithat was a speciality of cavalry in this' 
period. It may also have made outflanking moves more effective. Finally, it 
was an obvious counter to the defensive refused Aore /,? Xigý the two 
formations simply cancelling each other out. 
The advanced Aoxe lads could be formed by an entire wing or by 
sections of a wing. At Raphia the Seleucids deployed half of their horse on 
the right in line, adjacent to the infantry centre, half in Aoxe laVg which 
formed the extreme wing of the army. The intention was probably to fix the 
enemy frontally with the line, then outflank with theloxe &iis(135). 
Another variant was in effect a double advanced IoA-e &VA This 
formation was used by Alexander at the Granicus river and it would have 
looked like a 'V' - the two arms facing towards, the point away from the 
enemy (136). This formation was composed of two chevrons - one with the 
left advanced, one with the right - placed side by side. At the Granicus the 
right arm of the 'V' was formed from seven iY-Wof helzb-ov, led by the 'jYe 
has"e, under Alexander's personal command. The left was composed of the 
p, rodromoiffour iYziof mdsa-armed light cavalry), the Paeonians, and was 
led by Socrates' i7e of the he&iýoi. ' That the two wings of the 'V' were led 
by erlite units is of importance, their role probably being to keep the complex 
formation in order. 
The formation served two functions at the Granicus. Firstly, it allowed 
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two'rollihg'ý attacks to be launched, both under close supervision. Secondly, 
the left arm of the 'V' attacked first and although this assault failed it pinned 
the Persian line in place. A viable tactic for the Persians would have been to 
quit the river line after they had shot at the advancing Macedonians with 
javelins, and pyll back onto the plain where their superior numbers would 
have been more telling. The 'V' formation, therefore, allowed Alexander to 
launch two--rolling -attackg, --each of- seven 47.2i of, horse and each- in -close-- 
succession. Socrates' attack was repulsed, but it paved the way for 
Alexander's charge at the head of the hel-zirm' This example demonstrates 
well how the . 
1oxe &ds enhanced the fighting potential of a series of 9.71, 
each presumably in wedge. 
. The 
loxe Azr& may have also been a vehicle, by which columns of 
cavalry could swing out of the line and outflank the., enemy. Two examples 
of this variant of Ithe . 
1owe 4mis are Gaza and perhaps Raphia 0 37). At Gaza, 
Ptolemy and. Seleucus reinforced their'right upon receiving intelligence that 
this wing, would bear the full brunt of Demetrius' attack. The battle opened 
with Demetrius launching his weighted left at the enemy. Diodorus records 
that Demetrius' cavalry was at least partially deployed en echelow and that 
the. advance guards of the two armies engaged first, which may imply that 
the Ptolemaic horse were similarly deployed. Nevertheless, the fighting 
initially went Demetrius' way. Ptolemy and Seleucus then led part of their 
cavalry out of the line - presumably to hold. a flanking position on 
Demetrius' engaged wing - and then attacked in depth and in a series of 
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charges which came eventually toj fighting"I with', swords, lances bein& 
shattered. The Ptolemaic forces prevailed. 
A similar tactical evolution; notý&, by:, GaIilfi,, '-maY have -occurred at 
Raphia. The Seleucid, right deployed with half its horse in, Aoue &ris These 
troops numbered 2,000 and may have been the - Seleucid royal guard (138). 
The Ptolemaic left was pinned frontally by a similar force of 2,000 men in 
line, whilst the division idloxe &rzýmoved ouýfto the right of the'battlie, area. 
This force skirted a chain of foothills and fell on the Ptolemaic left, causing 
it to flee. 
ý The similarity of these two incidents is obvious, but because of the 
confusing nature of the sources, difficult to interpret. The loxe lax& may 
have been used as a means by which a line of horse could rapidly form 
column, manoeuvre, andIorm-line again. A reconstruction of events'might 
be as follows; a. 1oxe &xisof staggered sub-units was deployed on the flank 
of the cavalry line. These units turned forty-five degrees to form a line 
d astern' facing out of the battle area. They then moved off, in column, one 
behind another until they began to outflank the enemy line. They then made 
another turn to face the enemy, presumably abreast, and charged. They were 
allowed to complete this manoeuvre without interference because in each 
case, other _units of 
their army were pinning the enemy frontally.,, Also the 
complex movement of such large numbers of horse was personally 
supervised by the commander-in-chief, respectively Ptole'my and Antiochus 
Ill. If this grand-tactical manoeuvre was carried out in good order and with 
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ged'f! qýtAHY would speed, --then ý its effects on an enemy force already, enga 
have been devastating- 
Finally, gene'rals of the pýriod"occasionally used a reserve'of cavalry. In 
01 ne way reserves were a fundamental part of H61lenistic cavalry-tactics, with 
their use of rolling attacks, feeding fresh units into an already developed 
situation-, here the writer refers rather to the use of a grand-tactical reserve, a- 
substantial force of cavalry held uncommitted, to exploit success or check 
defeat. 
Given the nature of cavalry, the advantage of a reserve is obvious. Iforse 
do not slowly press forward to victory, rather they charge home and break 
through ý- or are repulsed - in a single rapid manoeuvre. Further, horses 
become tired if they gallop too long or too often, and it has always been 
difficult to rally horse who have. been repulsed and send them back into 
action as an effective righting force. In essence a general can use a fresh 
force of cavalry to tum the tide of ýattle. 
In the Hellenistic period, the use of cavalry reserves was rare. The 
examples can be divided in two, those where the numbers involved were 
relatively small. ý not often more than five hundred men, and situations where 
larger forces were involved. At Gabiene Eumenes held three hundred select, 
fast cavalry in reserve. At Thermopylae Antiochus III held back five hundred 
horse - they only appear in the sources as part of the Seleucid army that 
escaped the battle - obviously they were never committed in what was 
essentially an infantry action. At Gaza Demetrius deployed two hundred 
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guard cavalry around his person, perhaps as a tactical 'reserve (139). In 
addition, the use of bodies of erlite cavalry who fought beside their monarch 
was common in this period, though unfortunately we cannot be certain that 
these troops were held as a reserve. They were certainly used under the close 
supervision of the king, but often this entailed combat in the front line (140). 
A larger reserve of cavalry appears at the battle of the river Axius where 
Antiochus 11 held a reserve of 2,000 cavalry. This Seleucid king may also 
have used a substantial reserve at Panion, perhaps the helxý& and the 
h, vpusp,. &! ýg At Asculum Pyrrhus deployed 2,000 cavalry in reserve (141). 
The only detail of the commitment of a reserve comes from Gabiene, and 
note that Diodorus does not refer to the small body of horse mentioned above 
(142). At Gabiene, Eumenes' main attack had been stalemated by the actions 
of Antigonus' light horse, whereupon Eumenes relocated a body of light 
cavalry from his left and personally led them in a charge against the exposed 
flank of Antigonus' left. This instance shows the effect of an attack by fresh 
cavalry on committed forces. But it is not the use of a tactical reserve in the 
truest sense. Eumenes completed a grand-tactical redeployment, a very 
difficult procedure, but succeeded due to luck rather than judgement. 
The use of reserves is rare and the sources suggest that Hellenistic 
commanders only resorted to this measure as a result of special 
circumstances or to hold a handful of cavalry uncommitted. Hellenistic 
commanders normally faced a tactical situation that would start evenly, but 
would develop rapidly. In set-pieces they normally deployed all their horse, 
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obviously to gain the maximum advantage in the initial clash of arms. On 
occasion they used small bodies of cavalry in a reserve, position. These units 
would, one presumes, be committed to action to add extra impetus and clinch 
victory. The use of larger bodies of cavalry in this role appears only rarely, 
and often in odd tactical situations. The examples from Panion and Asculum 
deal with battlefields that were very congested. The generals could not 
deploy, their full number of cavalry effectively from the start, so they held 
large proportions of the mounted strength in reserve. In actions where the 
battlefield was large enough to allow the deployment of the army's full 
complement, cavalry generals did so, for example at Rapl-ýia. The Axius river 
incident is also extraordinary,, in that the Seleucid army was forcing a 
defended river line in the face of a surprise enemy attack. It is clear from 
Polybios' account of the action that Antiochus had to resort to emergency 
measures and that the cavalry was held as a shock force either to bolster the 
line should it begin to break, or to take advantage of any mistake made by 
the enemy. As it was, the latter occured, the Bactrian cavalry being halted by 
an adhoc Seleucid infantry defence, and Antigonus led his cavalry to break 
the stationary enemy line and carry the day. 
Generally Hellenistic grand tactics show a great degree of sophistication. 
They were designed to maximise the effectiveness of large numbers of 
cavalry on the battlefield. There were problems, of course, the major one 
being control. Throughout our sources, we are constantly reminded of the 
rapid nature of cavalry warfare and the need for good command and control. 
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evidence for small unit, tactics is quite extensive and for, lonce, 
theory Js 
supported by battlefield accounts. 
The objective of small unit tactics in the Hellenistic period was gradually 
to escalate pressure on a very small portion'of the enemy line. The tactical 
formations used in this period were specifically designed to this end. The 
wedge was intended to break through an enemy line at great speed and the . 
organisational structure of the period was designed as a series of il,? iwithin 
larger hoparchies. This facilitated attacks with waves' of AW so that the 
pressure on the enemy could be maintained over a period of time, instead of 
depending on a single charge. The system was also designed to allow small 
units to manoeuvre for maximum effect. Of course, there was a disadvantage 
in this tactical doctrine. It did not allow a single all-out attack to be made on 
the enemy line, as a more traditionat charge en haye would have done. 
Hellenistic tactics sacrificed some of the shock of the charge for a prolonged 
pressure on the enemy and small unit flexibility. 
There is evidence that Hellenistic cavalry was well trained in small unit 
tactics and their application to larger combats. Polybios records the training 
given to the cavalry of the Achaean League upon Philopoemen's election as 
hipparch (143). The individual horsemen were trained to wheel their horses 
to the left, right and to make full one-hundred and eighty degree turns. The 
drill was obviously intended to instil good discipline in' horse and rider and 
develop basic equestrian skills. 
Polybios also describes training in small unit tactics (144). He records a 
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sI eries of wheeling techniques which were conducted by'. 1ochoiand "dilochot' 
Each is a wheeling drill whereby a cavalry unit could be turned though 
ninety, then one hundred and eighty degrees. The manoeuvre was carried out 
by sub-unit, not by turning individual troopers. Rapid changes of attack-axes 
and movements onto enemy flanks were the hallmarks of cavalry tactics in 
the Hellenistic period and Philopoemen's training would have stood his men 
hi - g6cid stdad in such bn envirohinefit. Whe'elifi g- 'manioeuvres are diffic- lult f6r 
cavalry to complete successfully, and it is noteworthy that Polybios records 
that the drill was completed by small sub-units, perhaps to ensure close 
control by junior officers in an attempt to prevent disorder in the face of the 
enemy. Use of the lower levels of organisation would also have improved the 
reaction times of cavalry formations, giving them a decisive edge in the fast 
moving combats of the period. The importance of tl-ýs drill is indicated by 
Polybios' statement that such movements '... required no practice, as it was 
much the same thing as falling into marching order'. This may also indicate 
that this drill was standard Hellenistic practice rather than an invention of 
Philopoemen. 
Polybios also records that cavalry should be able to charge and retire at 
speed whilst maintaining. their formation. He stated that the distances 
between oulamoi should be maintained - which is repeated later in his 
critique of CaHisthenes (145) - and emphasised the need to hit the enemy in a 
cohesive mass rather than in a series of dispersed units. Here Polybios 
appears to refer to, a co-ordinated attack by a number of Ajidesiped to hit 
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the enemy at the same moment. This'drill would concenirate"'the"shdckof the 
assault instead of allowing the attacker to'maintain pressureý by A, rofling. 
attack, which appears to be a more normal Hellenistic tactic. 
Finally, Polybios describes a rolling attack by small units. He says that 
cavalry should be able to dash out from the centre or the wings - of a larger 
formation one presumes - by ddochoiandlochov, attack the enemy and then 
rein in to return to their ovlamoi, daior Np,? p. 2rcHe. R It is not clear whether 
Polybios refers to skirmishing or shock tactics here; other evidence (see 
below p. 309) implies that the drill was used for both. On the one hand, he 
may be describing a system whereby the majority of the sub-units within, 
say, a hoparcAr remained in reserve, as a support, whilst a number of 
sub-units sallied out to shoot missiles into the enemy line, returning to rest 
their'horses and replenish weapons. On the other, this may be a reference to 
a rolling assault, such as the one already discussed at the Granicus (see above 
pp. 285ff. ), with a contingency for falling back to reform on supporting 
friends, should the attack fail. In each case, one presumes that sub-units 
moved in sequence to maintain a constant pressure on the enemy and to 
cover eachother's retreat. 
Another small problem with this evidence is Polybios' use of the 
smallest units in the Hellenistic organisational structure. If Polybios meant 
that this drill was used to launch hand-to-hand attacks on the enemy and that 
the tactic was commonplace in the period - both acceptable premises - then 
such small units would have been overwhelmed by larger numbers on an 
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eastern Hellenistic, battlefield. It may. be: the, -, case, therefore, ýthat, Polybios 
writes in the context, of Philopoemen's reform, but implies a wider use of the 
tactic. In Greece the dilochosand locl; osmay. have been of an effective size 
due to the generally small numbers of cavalry used in that region. In the east, 
however, the units used for this tactic simply needed to be scaled up to ilki. 
This is acceptable - afterall many authors would argue that a diloclmswas an 
i7e(146). - 
Polybios, therefore, presents two forms of cavalry attack, one all-out; a 
mass of horse striking the enemy at the same moment, the other a series of 
attacks to maintain pressure. The latter may also refer to skirmisher tactics, 
as will be'discussed later. Over and above these conclusions, however, are 
three more fundamental principles of cavalry warfare in the Hellenistic 
period.. Firstly, that cavalry must be properly organised and trained to 
maintain formation if they are to be effective. Secondly, the organisational 
structure used in the period allowed horse to be rapidly manoeuvred and 
deployed to gain maximum tactical advantage. Thirdly, the importance of 
supporting units which protected attacking sub-units and helped to maintain 
pressure on the enemy line. He summed up these principles by saying, '... just 
as a building will be solid if each brick is laid with care, so in an army it is 
the careful instruction of each man and each company which makes the 
whole force strong. ' (147). 
No other source details training in this period, but there are many 
references to cavalry in action that support and elaborate on Polybios' 
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evidence for the manoeuvrability of the cavalry, of the period. Dionysio . Sý, of 
Halicamassus compares the Greek and Roman cavalry tactics Used at the 
battle of Asculurn in 279'B. C. (148). On, the one, hand, the Romans fought 
Re infantry, reining in* and fighting stationary hand-to-hand combat. On the 
other, the Greeks employed flanking and deploying manoeuvres. Dionysios 
records that the Greeks would break away from combat whenever the fight - 
was going against them'. -They wou-Id iWiiiý_to th-e-right, countermarch past 
one another and throw themselves anew onto the enemy line. It is clear from 
the narrative that the Romans were not capable of employing such complex 
tactics. Here is evidence for the rapid redeployment of horse in an attempt to 
outflank or set up new axes of attack. Faced with such tactics, relatively 
static troops, such as the Romans, were at a severe disadvantage. 
Similar tactics were used, according to Quintus Curtius, by Thessatian - 
cavalry to thwart an attack by Persian cataphracts at Issus (149). The heavily 
armoured Persians charged and rode down an ile of Thessalians. The 
Thessalians, however, were able to redress the situation by manoeuvre. They 
wheeled their horses round, split up and returned to the attack. The Persians 
were disordered by their charge and handicapped by their heavy armour, and 
were defeated. Curtius does not record the episode with the detail of 
Dionysios's account of Asculum, but the tactics are essentially the same. The 
Thessalians were capable of out-manoeuvring a more cumbersome enemy. 
An example from Livy also highlights the manoeuvrability of Hellenistic 
cavalry (150). In the fighting around the Aoos pass Livy records an 
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encounter between two mixed forces of c'*a'ý'airy,, 'a"n"'ci"'p'-'v'74o, i""116ýsa' , t6t; 'the, 
Macedonians expected the fight, to follow - an . accustomed 
I f6imat, ". '; with 
cavalry alternating between' advance and retreat -dis''chai'ging',, th6ir,. W, iaýons at 
the enemy. In the intervals Cretan archers would cover the cavalry with their 
arrows. The Romans disrupted this tactic by -simply launching an all-out 
charge and as a result they defeated the Macedonians. Here Livy probably 
refers to skirmishing tactics and it is' n6teWorthy how similaf his- evidericd is 
to that of Polybios discussed above. 
Finally Polybios' account of the fighting at the Axius river is noteworthy 
because it may show the employment of waves of hi ppa rcHes - 
demonstrating that the general doctrine of rolling-attack could be employed 
at a level higher than the bai- together with small unit'defensive tactics 
(151). the Bactrians launched such an attack on a mixed line of Seleucid 
cavalry and infantry. The Bactrians failed to break the enemy line and were 
eventually defeated after a charge of ý, 000 Seleucid cavalry which had been 
deployed as a reserve. Polybios does not give details, but it may be that the 
small units, called oulamoiJought a delaying action using small unit attacks, 
much as Alexander's right did at Gaugamela. It is also noteworthy that the 
large scale Bactrian charges, by hoparchie. % failed against a mixed, flexible 
and co-ordinated defence. 
The evidence, therefore, indicates that a general tactical system was 
employed at small unit level in the Hellenistic period. Rapid manoeuvre and 
realignment of attack was the order of the day in an attempt to catch enemy 
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formation .sý off 'guard. The maintenance, of a loc I al tactical, reserve I was also 
v p-zrcA criticatto co'er movements of the. &iwithin the hip, ly, and to provide a 
local commander with the strike-force needed-for rapid exploitation of any 
enemy weakness created by his formation's attacks. Against a stationary 
enemy, such as the Romans at Asculum, or an enemy who Was disordered or 
too heavily equipped, such as the Persians at Issus, these tactics were very 
succegsful. -On other occasions, where the enemy'was prepared to'make'a 
bold and decisive charge, for example the episode at the Aoos mentioned by 
Livy, the tactics were not so successful. One might, however, speculate as to 
how such an aggressive charge would have worked on an open battlefield 
against large numbers of enemy, for example in the eastern part of the 
Hellenistic world. One might guess that such a charge would have been 
blunted by the Hellenistic system of manouvre and its own success, much as 
happened to the Persians at Issus. 
The evidence also demonstrates how Alexander'might have employed his 
horse on the right of his army at Gaugamela. This work has already touched 
upon this incident as one'clear example of Hellenistic small unit -tactics 
applied to a larger battle. Alexander's cavalry c6uld have used the tactics 
outlined by Polybios, firstly to cover the right flank of the, advancing 
Macedonian army, and, secondly, to ensure that the charge of the helairoi 
was decisive. Furthermore, similar small unit tactics would have been equally 
successful in the later Hellenistic battles, discussed above in the' section on 
large battle formations. 
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The fonnations , used by Hellenistic cavalryi, discussed above,, lent 
themselves well to these tactics. The wedge and rhomboid, were ideal 
formations for rapid manoeuvre and-decisive. hand-to-hand combat. The 
organisational system employed in the period allowed small units, firstly, to 
conduct their operations with flexibility; secondly, to act under the control of 
a higher officer -a hipparch - who had under his control a body of horse of 
such a mass- as to make a substantial hole in the enemY line should the 
opportunity arise. Finally, the cavalry of the period was deployed in 
grand-tactical formations that were specifically designed to enhance small 
unit tactics and allow them to be delivered with the maximum chance of 
success. 
Polybios records a maxim of Philopoemen, that there was nothing more 
dangerous than a disordered and fragmented cavalry formation (152). In this 
regard Hellenistic cavalry held a precarious n-ýiddle position, with a 
fragmented front to enable manoeuvre, which might, if improperly handled, 
cause Philopoeman's fear to become reality. The use of manoeuvre, however, 
made this dispersed formation very strong - if order and control could be 
maintained. The sources demonstrate that Hellenistic cavalry fought in a 
manner whereby each Ae supported another. Against such tactics, a more 
compact enemy formation could be enveloped - even if, as at Issus, some Ae 
had been ouflanked and very badly handled by the enemy. Of course, the key 
word here is control. Obviously disorder would have severely reduced the 
effectiveness of a Hellenistic cavalry formation. It is noteworthy, however, 
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that Polybios shows how well trained and ,, 
disciplined,,, -, the. 
'Fay; 
4ry,,,, bf 
ý .. -, -' .. "I ._ , ý- 11 
Philopoemen was. If this was common in the period, th6n commanders, took 
measures to combat disorder and maintain formation. 
e) Lig tC valry Tactics 
Up to this point we have discussed the tactical methods of mounted 
lancers, soldiers that made up the majority of the shock cavalry of the period. 
Light cavalry was very much an auxiliary arm on the Hellenistic battlefield, 
its main military role being strategic. There are, however, enough instances 
where light horse did fight in set-piece actions to merit some discussion of 
their tactics. 
The tactical writers could not divide cavalry functions as easily as they 
could infantry. Asclepiodotus wrote that there were three types of cavalry. 
The first group were all those who fought at close quarters, lancers and 
cataphracts. Both of the other types appear to be light cavalry, one fighting at 
a distance as Skythians - obviously a general ethnic term denoting 
horse-archer - the other an intermediate type equipped with javelins or, 
paradoxically, bows! Asclepiodotus further sub-divides the latter into 
horse-archers operating on an army's flanks, and mounted javelirunen who 
might be armoured and form an intermediate type. Finally he sub-divides the 
mounted javelinmen into those who fought at close quarters, aor#pot, and 
those who fought at a distance, whom he calls 'Tarentines'. To simpfify 
Asclepiodotus' confusing account there were two types of light horse, those 
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i ;, th who shot trom a distance and 'those'- wA6, 'codd 'ýIose`jorl' com, 6 , -'wi, 
mounted javelinmen predominating in the laftei ý'ategoiy (153). 
Aelian's'division of mounted types is sornewýAclýarer than Asclepiodo- 
tus' (154). The lightest cavalry were aXQOfO. XLGTa't:, and were equipped with 
either bow or javelin. Aelian follows Asclepiodotus in recording a series of 
sub-groups of Amobo&lm, * cavalry equipped with the javelin OýQ'u) being 
tenned 'Tarentines', those with bows 'Skythians' or Hppolavolaz* He further 
divides the 'Tarentine' class into those who shot and those who could close 
for combat. 
Arrian's division of cavalry is much the same as Aelian's (155). He adds, 
however, two examples to illustrate the jLrobo§s&i class, Armenians and 
those Parthians who did not fight with the lance, both familiar enemies on 
Imperial Rome's eastem border. He also records a series of sub-types of light 
horse beyond archer and javelinmen. 'Tarentines' were soldiers who 
frustrated the enemy from afar, who could ride close together in a circle 
shooting constantly at the enemy. Elvphroiwere cavalry who skirmished with 
the enemy, with javelins, and could close to hand-to-hand combat - despite 
an earlier assertion that a1robolistaidid not enter close combat. Arrian then 
goes on to detail Roman cavalry techniques, obviously those of his own time, 
the second century A. D. 
The tacticians provide a frustrating plethora of light cavalry sub-types 
and often confuse the modem reader with their role in battle. They do, 
however, agree on several broad points. Light cavalry were equipped with 
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either the bow or the javelin. Some of, the mounted avelinme"ný, cýujd-ent6r 
close combat, whereas horse-archers only shot-atihe e'ne'rnYý'from' 
I i'di ,s't, an 
, 
ce., 
Historical accounts of light cavalry in action ý demonstrate, the v'ericitý'- of 
these broad points and* that an exhaustive discussion of the rhinutiae of the 
tacticians' various sub-types is unproductive. 
Of all the light cavalry types discussed by the tacticians the borse-archer - 
is by far the easiest to isolate in battle accounts. This type of soldier was 
common in the ancient and medieval world. The horse-archer originated on 
the Steppes and became the mainstay of armies originating from that area. 
Horse-archer tactics were well known to the ancient Greeks. Herodotus 
describes them as rapid advances and withdrawals, tactical envelopment, 
feint, ambush, hit-and-run attacks on columns and so on (156). 
Horse-archers, normally mercenaries, were used by Hellenistic armies 
from the time of Alexander onwards. They are mostly found in the armýies of 
the factions or states that occupied the middle and near east, the area 
bordering the Steppes. Alexander used horse-archers as scouts or, as at the 
Hydaspes, as an advance guard (157). Antigonus Monophthalmus may have 
used horse-archers' on his right at Gabiene. This wing was ordered to 
skirmish with and envelop the opposing flank. In the fighting some of 
Eumenes' elephants were shot down by arrows. Diodorus does not record 
which Antigonid contingent carried out this action, and both foot, and 
horse-archers were deployed in that sector of the battlefield. The course'of 
the battle suggests, however, that the Antigonid threat was horse-archers. As 
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Eumenes' - right - wa's overburdened. With, horse,, and -, -elephants, 
it can,.: be 
assumed ., that, these troops could * have . neutiýlised, a" fdOt7archer: 'threat. 
Mounted bowmen, however, may, have, -been able to evade direct, attack and it 
was perhaps this that forced Eumenes' to bring light cavalry from his left to 
redress the situation (158). 
The Seleucid use of horse-archers is documented by Polybios and Livy. 
Polybios records the Skythian Dahae tribe as part of the Seleucid order of 
battle at Raphia. where they were associated with Carmanians and Cilicians. 
Their station in the battle is unknown, but it may be assumed they stood with 
the Carmanians and Cilicians, on the extreme left of the Seleucid line. There 
is no record of their tactical role in the battle. Livy also notes that this tribe 
served with the Seleucid army. He records that they could shoot as well in 
retreat as in the advance, clearly a reference to feigned flight, a tactic known 
popularly as the Tarthian shot'. Livy also notes that Skythians held the 
extreme Seleucid right at Magnesia, ' and they may have enveloped the 
Roman left, perhaps breaking through to the enemy camp (159). 
Paucity of evidence means it is only possible to draw general conclusions 
about the role of horse bowmen in the Hellenistic military system. Firstly, 
this troop-type was not widely used, being confined to arn-ýies with access to 
central Asia. Secondly, one can envisage a major role for such troops in 
strategic operations. The tactics of the horse-archer would have been ideally 
suited to raiding, scouting and so on. The sources, unfortunately, only refer 
to such operations in Alexander's wars. Thirdly, the horse-archer had only an 
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auxiliary role on the battlefield. Extant references p6int-, 'toýhaiassfiiefif oV. 
cavalry advances, such as at Gabiene, that 'could be`e-asilyýc`6yfi., tered, `by 
suitably equipped troops. Envelopment - of an enemy wing - an examplý'iriay 
be Magnesia - was also'the province of these soldiers. There is not, however, 
a major horse-archer victory in the period, such as Carrhae., Evidently the 
combined arms tactics of the Hellenistic military system lent themselves well 
to countering the peculiar tactics-6f the horse-archer and the troop-type never 
assumed the prominence it achieved in other periods. 
Evidence for the use of the mounted javelinman is more common in the 
period. The majority of references are to strategic operations, which could be 
conducted by most of the cavalry types in a Hellenistic army. Evidence for 
the use of mounted javelinmen on the battlefield is rarer. 
Polybios made a comparison of Thessalian and Aetolian cavalry (160). 
He records that the former, were, irresistible in phalanx or lye - that is in 
closed, ordered formations - whilst the latter were experts in dispersed 
warfare. Livy supports this assertion, noting that the Aetolians were the best 
cavalry in Greece, although their numbers were small (161). Clearly Polybios 
refers to a body of cavalry who were the leading exponents of light cavalry 
tactics in Hellenistic Greece, a factor that might explain why they appear in 
so many armies of the period. He further illustrates his assertion in 
describing the action at Caphyae, an encounter in which Aetolian cavalry 
played a major part (162). 
Caphyae was a rearguard action fought between a retreating Aetolian 
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raiding force and a pursuit force of the. A'chaeari, LeAgue -under, 
Aratus., Jhe 
battle needs examination in detail, if the role, of- the, ýAet6lia'ýn'ti'ght,, cavairy is 
to be fully understood. Polybios describes ý theý, b"aitlefiqld as -a 
. plain býu'fided 
by a series of hills, which became the objective of the retreating Aetolians. 
The battle started as the Achaeans encountered the Aetolian column spread 
out on the plain as it marched towards the line of hills, its rear screened by 
cavalry. Upon sighting the enemy, the Acheans despatched a mixed force of 
psiki and cavalry to harass the column, meanwhile deploying their main 
force for action. Polybios criticised this, believing Aratus' best course of 
action would have been to attack the Aetofians with his main body right from 
the outset. He records that the, Aetolian tactics and armament were unsuited 
for fighting on the plain, implying light armament for both their infantry and 
cavalry. Despite Polybios' comments, the initial stages did not produce a 
check for the Achaeans, whose am7oiforced the Aetolian cavalry back into 
the foothills. Here the battle entered its. second phase. 
The Achaeans fed more infantry into the combat - mostly semi-heavy 
troops or thoriEtai- and deployed their phalanx in support. The advance of 
these fresh troops prompted an immediate reaction from the Aetolian cavalry, 
who massed in close-order and charged. The attack struck the Achaean 
advance guard first and it fled. The Aetolians followed up this success and 
eventually the lhor, 2&ziand the phalanx were carried away in the rout. 
Polybios' description of the Aetolian cavalry at Caphyae fits closely the 
tacticians' intermediate light horsemen who could both skirmish and engage 
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in hand-to-hand combat.., Initially they screened, the rear . of their army in 
classic light cavalry style, but when the opportunity arose, they were able to 
form up and, charge, carrying away the *bulk of the enemy force. 
Other evidence for the period supports this dual role. In Philip V's 
western campaign of 219 B. C., Actolian cavalry caught a force of 
Macedonian peltasts crossing a river, but despite their obvious tactical 
advantage the Aetolians simply observed their enemy, again much like the 
classic light cavalry picket (163). It is noteworthy, however, that Philip took 
precautions to protect his men by forming hiý peltasts in svajs 
implying he feared an attack by the Aetolian vedettes. The role of the 
Aetolian contingent at Cynoscephalae also supports this dual role (164). Livy 
records that the initial skirmishing was won by the, Romans largely due to 
their - Aetolian horse. According to Polybios it was the Actolian cavalry 
which steadied the Roman line and prevented a general rout in the initial 
stages of the battle. He states that the*Aetolians were superior to any other 
Greeks in single or detached combat -a reference to light cavalry combat. It 
can be assumed that the Aetolians formed part of the Roman left in the main 
part of the battle, a sector of the Roman line that came under heavy pressure 
from the Macedonians. 
Other cavalry may also be of this intermediate type. Livy records how 
Illyrian and Macedonian cavalry lost a skirmish because they entered combat 
without shields, armour or swords. The implication being, firstly, that these 
items were normally used and, secondly, that in this instance some other 
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offensive weapon, was carried - perhaps their skirmishers' jaVelins: (165).,, 
The prodhomoiof Alexander's army may also be an 6iamýle'oflighi 
horse who were able to engage in hand-to-hand 'combat (166). The 
pivdromoi have, been the subject of' many academic arguments regarding 
their tactical function and equipment, but they were probably equipped with 
the swis,? and performed both scouting and combat missions. The clearest - 
evidence for their dual role are the events leading immediately to and the 
battle of the Granicus river. The pmdromoi forM'ed part of Alexander's 
advance guard during' the approach to the river, and part of the right wing 
upon which Alexander placed his hopes of puncturing the Persian line. The 
dual role of these soldiers is clear, but some scholars have had difficulty 
reconciling the lance with light horse. Quite simply this is not a problem. 
The lance has been a light cavalry weapon throughout history, for example 
the famous Cossacks of the Russian army. 
These references give credence to the tacticians' intermediate mounted 
javelinman, able to right from a distance or close in. It may be that in the 
case of Aetolian light horse, they were equipped with armour. ' which would 
have aided them in their close-action role. This does not diminish the 
probability of the existence of a fight cavalry type that shot and rode into 
combat; it merely underlines the foolishness of equating tactical function 
with weight of equipment alone. 
Given that some javelin-anned - or mds3wmed in the case of the 
pmdromoi- light cavalry in the period could fight at close quarters, what of 
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the shooting tactics employed in the period? Hellenistic, ciýaljýy., maý"'have'- 
used a driff to co-ordinate shooting by formations of. light - cavalry. -. 
P, olyýilo's'. 
record of a drill for sending forward small units and recalling them, ýo'a-maifi 
body has been discussed with reference to hand-to-hand tactics (see above 
pp. 295ff). There are other instances in the period that show, this drill may 
have been used for shooting. Livy records that at the Aoos pass, Iflyrian and 
Macedonian cavalry were surprised at the aggressive tactics used by the 
Romans (167). He says that they expected the combat to be as normal, with 
cavalry alternately advancing and retreating. He records that they also 
expected close support from Cretan bowmen, and refers to a final rapid 
charge by the Illyrians, perhaps a close quarters attack on an enemy 
weakened by shooting. Livy's description of this action is very similar to the 
drill designed by Philopoemen and recorded by Polybios. It may have been 
standard tactics in the period; hence Livy's reference to Philip's cavalry 
expectation that the action would follow a set pattern. 
Such, a drill would have been very effective, making a skirmish a 
confrontation between formed bodies rather than swarms of individuals. 
Hellenistic light horse were numbered by the thousand, and co-ordinating 
such large numbers would have been a major feat of arms. The drill 
described by Livy and Polybios would allow mounted javelinmen to maintain 
a constant pressure on an enemy line, whilst allowing the skirmishing cavalry 
time to reorder their line, replenish weapons and rest their horses. 
Furthermore, Polybios refers to the importance of maintaining a reserve and 
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Livy implies that the commanders of the period, would have. expected sUch a 
force to faH on the enemy at the correct moment,, turning a skirmish, into a 
breakthrough. Once again the organisational structure and the Hellenistic 
penchant for training and tactical doctrine shows through in light ý cavalry 
warfare. A system for maxirrýising the effectiveness of light cavalry appears 
to have been commonplace at least in Greece in this period. 
Arrian records another shooting formation, a circle, that may have been 
in use in the period (168). He describes a drill whereby light cavalry rode 
around in a continuous circle. They presented a moving target to the enemy 
and could discharge their weapons at one point of the circle, thereby shooting 
a sustained, heavy barrage of missiles into a small sector of the enemy line. It 
is possible that Arrian refers here to contemporary tactics in use by the 
Imperial Roman army, but it is also possible that Hellenistic fight cavalry 
used the shooting circle. 
Other detailed references to pure skirmishing light cavalry do not appear 
in the sources. The sources refer to various nations in orders of battle which 
might be mounted javelinmen, but there are no details of their performance 
in battle. Arguments e Aewdo must of course be applied with caution, but 
the activities of light cavalry would not have been of great interest to the 
ancient writers. Their role would have been harassment and so on. The 
battlewinners of the cavalry arm were the lancers - and the cataphracts as 
will be discussed below - and thus the troop-type under discussion does not 
find its way into battle accounts. The sheer number of references to those 
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various ethnic groups which traditionally consisted of mounted skirmishers, 
and the basic nature of the tactics and equipment used, support the 
conclusion that the pure javelin-armed, mounted skirmisher was a common- 
troop type in the period. This troop-type undertook many important 
responsibilities in the strategic sphere, but due to the nature of its equipment 
was not decisive in set-piece battles. 
The tacticians record one other type of light cavalry, the Tarentine (169). 
Tarentine cavalry appears in many of the armies of the period, but the 
troop-type is very difficult to define and has been the subject of great 
academic debate. The evidence of the tacticians suggests that Tarentines had 
special equipment of some kind - for example, Arrian records that they had 
swords in addition to missiles. Livy adds other evidence, writing that they 
used two horses, a feature not unknown in ancient warfare, but rejected by 
Griffith (170). Alternatively, they may have been light horse equipped with a 
shield (171). Launey argued that they were cavalry, equipped with javelins 
who were specially trained to harass the enemy, but also noted that they were 
prepared to engage in hand-to-hand combat and as such should be included 
in the intermediate type discussed above (172). 
The origin of the type in the Greek city of Tarenturn in Italy is regarded 
by scholars as significant. Originally the type would have been specialists 
equipped and fighting in a particular way. As time went on, the title came to 
refer to a specific form of light cavalryman, rather than a native of Tarenturn 
(173). Scholars argue that either Pyrrhus or Antigonus Monophthalmus 
310 
introduced the type into the mainstreani of. Helleniitid warfare. 
An understanding of this troop-type ishoi greatly epbanced by baitktiýld 
accounts. Antigonus used a force of 2,100'Tarentines in I his. wýr with 
Eumenes, and deployed them alongside other cavalry on his left at Gabiene, 
the intention being to skirmish with- the enemy; unfortunately Diodorus' 
account of the fighting is not detailed (174). This general skinnisher role is - 
also hinted at by the positioning of Tarentines at Panion (175). They were 
deployed in concert with elephants as a screen for the Seleucid phalanx. 
At Magnesia the Seleucids deployed Tarentines on their left, together 
with their main cataphract force (176). Once again we can only infer their 
role, the Seleucid left being defeated very early on in the battle, and perhaps 
they were to screen or support the cataphracts. Demetrius used Tarentines in 
a similar position at Gaza, deploying them in concert with his xyslophor, ýi 
(177). Once again no detail of their role in the righting has survived. 
Tarentine cavalry were a common feature of the armies of the Hellenistic 
Greek states, and their inclusion in the mounted forces of the noted 'cavalry 
states' of Aetolia, Boeotia and Thessaly is of importance (178). Many of 
these soldiers were mercenaries, prompting the conclusion that the title 
applied to hired, rather than native light cavalry, in the later part of the 
Hellenistic period. Indeed, the tacticians refer to an unit called a 
I&rw&, zrcH.?, perhaps a self-contained mercenary unit for hire (179). This is 
tentatively supported by epigraphic evidence which refers to a 'commander 
of Tarentines' as a military appointment (180). 
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There are three major references to Tarentine horse in action in, Greece 
in this period. The first comes from the Diadochi Wars, where Demetrius 
ordered Tarentines to pursue the army of the Athenian general Phocion, a 
typical light cavalry operation (181). Both the Spartan and Achaean affnies 
used Tarentines in the campaign of 193 B. C. Livy records an encounter 
between Tarentines and Cretans - pulkiarchers - of the two armies (182). 
They foughtý for- some-time, -- then the Achaeans -retreated, - luring the -Spartans- --- 
into a pre-planned ambush. This reference implies that Tarentines were 
trained for close combat, although it must be noted that no heavy troops were 
involved in the action. 
Finally, Polybios records that Tarentines fought on both sides at the 
battle of Mantinea in 207 B. C. (183). The Achaeans deployed their 
Tarentines on their left flank and they were used to neutralise the Spartan 
artillery line that threatened the Achaean centre. Unfortunately Polybios does 
not say whether they were used as sOrmisher or close-combat troops, but 
either tactic would, surely, have disrupted the lightly equipped artillerymen 
of the period. Of more interest is the role of the Spartan Tarentines. 
Polybios' account is very general, describing an attack by the Spartan cavalry 
and mercenaries. Plutarch, however, adds more detail, recording that 
Machanidas and his men routed the enemy Tarentines and akoRdstaiwho had 
been deployed in advance of the Achaean line (184). Again the evidence 
shows that Tarentines could be used as close-combat troops, at least against 
light armed opponents. 
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Tarentine cavalry, therefore appears to be very close t'o"the' intermediate 
light cavalry type that could skirmish an&engage in fiand-to-hand combat. 
They may have been specially equippýe'd for this role - reference has been 
made to the use of two'horses and perhaps shields. The distinctive feature of 
this light cavalry type appears to be their use as separate units, probably as 
mercenaries, and their high quality. 
Finally a tactic common to the period was the use of light cavalry and 
jxv7oY in close connection. This has been discussed in full above in the 
chapter on A&oi(see pp. 200ff). Suffice it to say here they each arm was 
ideally equipped to support the other and that this co-operation demonstrates 
again the sophisticated tactical systems in use in the period. 
To conclude, in the Hellenistic period light cavalry were used in both the 
strategic and the tactical fields. In the former they operated as scouts, raiders 
and so on. On the battlefield they contributed to victory by screening heavier 
troops and performing outflanking operations. These activities had always 
been the province of such troops, but in the Hellenistic period they were 
incorporated into a complex military system which was composed of 
all-arms. In short light cavalry in this period were deployed to enhance the 
other parts of the army. Light cavalry were not devastatingly effective on 
their own - as were for example the horse-archers of Turkish or Parthian 
armies - rather they gave other cavalry and infantry an edge on campaign and 
in battle that would eventually lead to victory. In order to achieve this 
objective, Hellenistic generals deployed a special type of cavalryman, willing 
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to enter close combat, to supplemeni the more traditional mpUnt6d 
skirmishers. In those Hellenistic armies weak in cayalry, such as those of 
Greece, this innovatory horseman maj have formed the mainstay of their 
mounted arm. Hellenistic light cavalry do not assume a leading role in the 
sources, such a position was reserved for the decisive combat arms; but they 
did enhance the military potential of the annies of the period. 
D Cataphmcb 
Cataphracts were not a HeHenistic innovation: they are encountered in 
Oriental affnies before the period. The period did see, however, this 
troop-type integrated into Graeco-Macedonian military systems for the first 
time. The equipment of the cataphract has already been discussed: suffice it 
to say that these troops were heavily armoured, both man and horse. Their 
tactical role was to supplement the. more common Hellenistic mounted 
lancer, as charging, close-action cavalry. Only the Seleucid army used 
cataphracts in large numbers in two battles late on in the period. By 
necessity, therefore, much of the following discussion is conjectural and 
based in part on evidence from outside the Hellenistic period. Despite this, 
however, one general point can be made with confidence. The cataphract was 
of Oriental origin, but was a logical extension of Hellenistic cavalry tactics. 
Armies of the period used cavalry as an offensive tool to open up the enemy 
line as a preliminary to victory. The heavy equipment of the cataphract 
simply added more weight to this initial phase of battle (185). 
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The , tacticians, believed, catapracts ýwere the heaviest tyPe of , cavalry 
employed in the period (186). They record evidence for the equipment used 
by this troop-type, but beyond references to their being close-combat troops 
they make no reference to cataphract tactics. Historical references to 
cataphracts are more informative on this point. 
Alexander faced Persian cataphracts at the battle of Issus (187). These - 
soldiers were deployed on the Persian right and they launched a charge on 
Alexander's Thessalian cavalry. Initially the Thessalians were ridden down, 
but they were able to recover and counter attack, out-manoeuvring the 
Persians and defeating them. Cataphracts appear here as powerful but 
unwieldy troops. Darius also used cataphracts at Gaugamela, where they 
formed part of the Persian left (188): they were drawn from his central Asian 
satrapies. However, the sources do not record the role of-, these armoured 
cavalry in detail. The Persian plan appears- to have been to envelop the 
Macedonian right with this force, but this movement was countered and 
eventually neutralised. by a series of charges in Ae strength by Alexander's 
flanking force. In might be inferred that once again cataphracts failed against 
an enemy who used superior tactics of movement and manoeuvre. 
The Seleucid army used 'cataphracts ý at the battles of Panion and 
Magnesia. Polybios' account of Panion is a critique of the incompetence of 
the historian Zeno with regard to military matters and is, as a result, very 
confusing (189). Bearing this in mind, the Seleucid cataphracts were 
stationed on a hill to the right of their infantry centre. They appear to have 
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been opposed by a weak detachment of Aetolian cavalry. The cataphracts 
charged the Aetolians. swept them from the field early in the action, and rode 
off in pursuit. The cataphracts returned -from their pursiut later in the day and 
their appearance to the rear of the Ptolemaic centre caused it to surrender. 
This example does not enlighten us as to the capabilities of cataphract 
cavalry in the period. The cataphracts charged from a superior position into a 
- -Nveak opponent. The-Aetolians do not appear to have manoeuvred to counter 
the attack, a tactic at which they were expert. In short the breakthrough could 
have been achieved by any heavy Hellenistic cavalry. 
The role of the Seleucid cataphracts at Magnesia is also open to different 
interpretations (190). The Seleucids deployed a large force of cataphracts in 
two contingents. The first was 3,000 men strong and formed part of the left 
cavalry wing. The other held a position in the centre between the main 
phalanx and the mdsa armed -vgyr-aspid guardsmen. This force was 
composed of 3,000 'line' and 1,000 Ale,? Semi cataphracts 
The Seleucid left put up a very poor shoWing, their advance force of 
chariotry and camels being put to flight by Achaean peltasts and psiloi* The 
chariots and camels fled back through the Seleucid cavalry line, disordering 
it to such an extent that it could not resist a very aggressive Roman cavalry 
attack and fled from the field. Livy and Appian do not detail the role of 
Seleucid cavalry in the centre. They record an attack on the Roman camp by 
horse, but identify the force as the Dahae who had stood on the extreme 
Seleucid right. Many modem scholars have accepted this 'account, but 
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Bar-Kochva believes that it was the cataphracts of the Seleucid'centre *Who 
attacked the Roman camp. This belief is based on the account of Justin and 
an argument that Livy sought to conceýl such a Seleucid success for patriotic 
reasons. 
Other factors besides Justin support Bar-Kochva's analysis. The 
positioning of such a large force of cataphracts as part of the Seleucid centre 
is of importance. The river Phrygios closed off the Seleucid right, making 
that wing unsuitable for use by large numbers of charging horse, but 
Antiochus chose to deploy a major force of cavalry as part of his infantry 
centre rather than using it to bolster his left. His intention must have been to 
attempt to break through the Roman line opposite, formed of legionaries, 
with a frontal charge. Such a feat would not have been beyond the 
capabilities of 4,000 cataphracts, 1,000 of whom were eWle troops. The 
Roman legion of the period was ill-equipped and trained to face a massed 
cavalry attack. It was deployed in a 'chequerboard' formation with gaps 
between each maniple. Furthermore, the legionaries were trained and 
equipped to fight as swordsmen. They fought in loose order, perhaps 
occupying as much as six feet per man. Only the hi&2X about one fifth of the 
legion's heavy infantry strength, were equipped with a long spear. The 
piii7cipes and hislad fought with pil-? and sword, neither weapon being 
effective weapons against cavalry (191). If Bar-Kochva's interpretation is 
correct, then Magnesia was the high point of cataphract tactics in the 
Hellenistic period. The charge would have burst through the best part of an 
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entire legion to attack the camp, a feat, of -arms. with few', parallels in mi. lit y, Fr 
history. 
To conclude, the sources only record 'caiaphiacts mi'use by''th e Seleucid 
army, and they probably adopted the troop type after Antiochus III's central 
Asian campaign of 210 B. C. These soldiers were very heavily 'armou'red, 
both man and horse, and they probably fought With the lance. Cataphract 
tactics'"-weri -"si-m'ple, -a- fronial ch at"i0iich1hij ixEellid. Thiilý-best 
demonstrated by the charge by Seleucid cataphracts at Magnesia which 
possibly shattered a Roman legion. Theywere vulnerable when faced by an 
enemy adept at the manoeuvre tactics which were an integral part of 
Hellenistic cavalry warfare. It is significant, therefore, that the Seleucid army 
used as cataphracts a special arm alongside a strong force of lancers. In the 
post-Hellenistic period cataphracts remained part of the armies of the, Orient 
and were later adopted by the Roman army. 
F) Conclusion 
Philip 11's introduction of aggressive cavalry tactics into warfare in the 
mid-fourth century was a major step forward in the military art. Philip 
grafted Greek and Balkan innovations in mounted warfare onto Macedon's 
native cavalry tradition to create a formidable battlefield strike force. This 
invention changed the face of battle at once; when married to the defensive 
strengths of the Macedonian phalanx, Philip had made obsolete all the 
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military systems of the Mediterranean world.. The. effectiveness. of the 
combination ý of massed infantry and aggressive, atta'Ck-ýcav4ry allowed 
Macedon to dominate first the Greek. Zity-states, then the powerful. Persian 
empire. The cavalry traditions set by the armies of Philip and Alexander 
were carried on by the Diadochi and cavalry remained a major force in 
Hellenistic warfare until the final eclipse of the phalanx-cavalry combination 
-- --- --- at the hands --of -the, manipular legion. - Further, -even- in the later Hellenistic 
period, cavalry remained a potent battlefield force, as the victory of the 
Seleucid cataphracts at Magnesia possibly testifies. This long period of 
success was the result of two factors, the creation of a tactical system 
specifically designed for decisive attack, and the linking of cavalry warfare 
I 
into the complex all arms-system that was the basis for Hellenistic warfare. 
In the fonner, case,, a series of inventions and innovations were 
introduced into cavalry warfare that changed horse from -battlefield 
skirmishers to a force capable of breaking the enemy line. These inventions 
and innovations spanned all aspects of warfare, from equipment, through 
small unit tactics, to grand tactics. A complex organisational system was 
introduced and soldiers trained and drilled in these radical tactical systems to 
create a shock force of outstanding effectiveness. 
The equipment of the Hellenistic cavalryman emphasised close action. 
He was equipped as a lancer and armoured. More importantly, however, a 
system of smaH unit tactics that emphasised manoeuvre were introduced, to 
maximise the effectiveness of this equipment. Cavalry battles at the tactical 
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level became fist'inoving hit-and-run affairs, withýilaiof horse'wheeling'and 
realigning attack-axes to gain maximum advantage. In order that wMeýe be 
decisive, the wedge was introduced to give Hellenistic cavalry -comManders, 
an assault formation that could tear through an enemy line in as short a time 
as possible, 'and with maximum damage, inflicted on enemy units. Once 
broken apart, the enemy would fall foul of the manoeuvrability of the small . 
udits--bf-a- Mleniýtic cavalry'f6rce, arid ihitial s6&6ss '6ould' be 'rapidly 
exploited to tum local victory into overall success. 
On a grand-tactical level, a series of battle formations were employed 
once again to enhance the small unit effectiveness of the Hellenistic tactical 
systems. Commanders could weight a cavalry wing with numbers and special 
combat formations. The various love &t-, & formations ideafly illustrate this 
point. Commanders could, with skill and forethought, deploy their cavalry 
forces and operate them in a sequence so as ý greatly to increase the 
effectiveness of their initial attacks. Here the best example is Raphia, where 
the Seleucids'pinned the enemy frontally with half of their right wing, whilst 
they out-flanked the enemy with the other half of their force deployed in 
loxe tarik ý 
The Hellenistic cavalry system emphasised aggressive attack, as should 
any military system that utilises large forces of rapidly moving and hard 
hitting tr6ops. Cavalry is a formidable, yet brittle weapon. Iforses easily 
become tired and their combat formations are difficult to maintain in good 
order when subjected to the stress of battle. More importantly, cavalry must 
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move for'ward to be effective; it cannot hold ground like infafitry.. Thiý means 
that cavalry has to complete'its tactical mission in as short atifne'as possible 
and with 'maximum effectiveness. dommanders with inferior forces of 
cavalry attempted to draw out combat and slow down the action so as to 
deny their superior enemy the decisive moment - this has always been the 
case in cavalry warfare. Hellenistic cavalry tactics were tailored so as to- 
minimise- inertia - and - maintain - the shock of the attack for the maximum 
possible amount of time. Their large formations were designed to place the 
enemy at a, substantial tactical disadvantage from the outset of the action, 
their small unit tactics to maintain a rolling attack. In short Hellenistic 
cavalry warfare was designed to keep up the all important shock effect of 
charging horse for the maximum period of time and to ensure that it was not 
wasted. 
Further to enhance the -effectiveness of the tactical system, Hellensitic 
mounted warfare placed great store in leadership. The Hellenistic organisa- 
tional system was designed to break down command and to provide small 
units with formations easily controlled by their officers. Here the writer 
refers to the Ae as a sub-unit and the wedge as a formation of attack and 
manoeuvre.. Leadership at the lowest levels, was supplemented by larger 
formations, the hipparcAjv, whereby one thousand horse - approximately - 
could be controlled on the battlefield. At the highest level the army general - 
often the king, for example Alexander or Antiochus III - frequently led the 
cavalry assault wing. Tl-ýs use of leadership - and more importantly the 
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tactical system that allowed the decisions of . 
the leaders to become ý action 7 
ensured again that cavalry attacks were as successful 6spoSSible. 
The advances in the effectiveness of cavalry' in the Hellenistic period 
would have. come to nought had not the cavalry formed part of the overall 
scheme of the Hellenistic military system. Philip 11 not only introduced a 
new form of cavalry warfare to the western world, he also invented the 
Macedonian phalanx. Without the firm base of the phalanx, Hellenistic 
cavalry would have been useless. In the Hellenistic period cavalry and 
infantry complemented each other to produce a successful military system. 
This relationship is most starkly seen in Alexander's battles against the 
Persians. 
The Macedonian and Persian military systems were radically different; 
hence it is easier to demonstrate the value of infantry to cavalry, and Fice 
verm, in the Hellenistic military -system. In short the phalanx acted as the 
'shield', the cavalry as the 'sword'. Alexander always deployed and 
manoeuvred his phalanx as a slow moving, centrally placed block. Its 
mission was to pin the enemy and provide his cavalry with a shelter that 
allowed him to initiate the cavalry action upon his, rather than the enemy's, 
decision. Once Alexander launched his cavalry, it was devastatingly 
effective. This was partially because of the reasons discussed above, but it 
was also because the use of a firm infantry base allowed Alexander to 
control the battle and dictate the moment of his attack. ' 
The role of the phalanx did not change in the later Hellenistic period, 
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rather the use of sin-fflar weapons and tactics m"adp '! he jqle ý', 'of 4he; 
phalanx less obvious. Nevertheless, the cavalry acti_on'slin"'b*attlesýsu'ciý. 'as 
Gaza and Raphia were still dependent on the phalanx to provide'a base", for 
action. 
From the perspective of the phalanx, cavalry had a critical role to play. 
As has been shown, the flanks of the phalanx were extremely vulnerable in 
Hellenistic warfare. It has been shown that various semi-heavy and light 
infantry types could be deployed so as to protect the flanks of the phalanx. In 
the final analysis, however, only cavalry could provide the phalanx with the 
security it needed to complete its mission in the centre of the battlefield. In 
some battles cavalry wings simply cancelled each other out, and victors rode 
from the field in pursuit of vanquished. In others, however, a cavalry success 
and the subsequent threat this posed to the wing of a phalanx would decide 
the battle. It is noteworthy that this was even the case in Hellenistic Greece 
where the numbers of cavalry deployed were relatively small. 
The support role of cavalry and their integration into the Hellenistic 
system as a whole was not limited to the shock lancers who provided the 
bulk of the mounted forces of the period. Hellenistic generals used many 
types of light horse to support their armies on the battlefield and - more 
importantly - on the operational and strategic levels. The Hellenistic period 
saw the introduction of a radically new type of mounted shock warfare. This 
innovation was facilitated by Macedon's cavalry traditions and the creation 
of the phalanx by Philip IL Once introduced, these Macedonian tactics 
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became an essential part, of - Hellenistic warfare. Cavalry provided Hellenistic 
arn-ýies with -a shock force of great, effectiveness, and fhe-c'ombini, tion 6f such 
a force with a solid infantry base like the &vim phalanx, produced a military 
system that dominated- Greece and the Near East until the arrival of the 
Roman manipular legion. 
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-Cbapter 
V- Conclusion 
This work has sought to show how the Hellenistic military system 
combined. a series of combat-arms, and how they linked to form a complex 
and effective military machine. The system was the product of the social and 
political organisation of, initially, fourth century Macedon and, later, of the 
successor states to Alexander's empire. An emphasis was placed on 
balancing the brute force of large numbers of &visa-armed infantry with the 
tactical finesse of eýff'le mounted and specialist arms. In this chapter we will 
discuss how the various combat-arms of a Hellenistic army interacted, how 
their advantages were enhanced and their disadvantages reduced'to prcducý a 
coherent and effective fighting force. In particular, the strategic and tactical 
strengths this system gave Hellenistic armies will be demonstrated. Finally, 
we will discuss how the Roman manipular legion exposed the wealinesses of 
this system and brought about its decline and eventual downfall. 
Central to Hellenistic warfare was the concept of combined- arms. Put 
simply, without the mutual support 'of the various parts of the army the 
weaknesses of the Hellenistic tactical system would become apparent and an 
army cease to be an effective fighting force. The need for close co-operation 
between arms began with the &visa-armed phalanx, the base upon which a 
Hellenistic army rested. 
The mdm phalanx was a formation extremely resistant to frontal attack. 
Many examples have been quoted above that demonstrate this to be fact. This 
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great strifigth, 'however, 'roduced the phalanx's' basic"iactical shortcoming' - p 
a- need for maintenance of order in its ranks - Nyhich made the phala nx 
relatively' immobile on, the battlefield. The ýsmisa phalanx could fatally 
disrupt and disorder its serried array even by the simple action of advancing 
upon the enemy. This was the case, despite a complex system of organisation 
and, in many cases, a high level of drill; as witnessed, for example, on Philip - 
V's 'nght at C- ynoscephalae. Added to this was 'the vulnerabifity of the 
phalanx's flanks and the difficulty of realigning a basically unwieldy infantry 
force to counter attacks from unforeseen directions. Smim tactics were, as a 
result, static. The phalanx was not a very efficient assault force and it was 
most effective as a solid base from which the assault-arms of the army could 
operate. 
The defensive role of the phalanx should not, however, be decried. As 
the phalanx was part of a more complex whole there was no need for an 
aggressive infantry force, such as the Classical hoplite phalanx, in Hellenistic 
tactics. As long as the mdm , phoroicould 
hold their ground, then a battleline 
would remain intact and a 'springboard' would exist for the assault-arms of 
the army. In most of the actions discussed above, two bodies of mdsi-armed 
phalanx faced one another off across, the centre of the battlerield, one or 
another only advancing - with the inevitable disorder - when events 
elsewhere had forced the decision to attack. It is important to note, however, 
that it would not have been possible for the other elements of the victorious 
army to achieve the localised successes that led to overall victory, without 
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the presence of a solid block of infantry in the centre of, the - army. Thýis 
contribution to victory is, best illustrated by comparing the ý role of, the 
&visa-armed phalanx in the Hellenistic system with that of the hoplite 
phalanx in Classical times. 
In Classical warfare the charge of the hoplite was the battle winner. In 
the earlier part of the Classical period this is obvious; little tactical finesse 
was added to the charge of the hoplites and the batile would be'deciýd'ed'by 
weight of numbers, the individual prowess of the hoplites, and not a little 
luck (1). Later advances in' organisation. and tactics led to the charge 
becoming more sophisticated; for example parts of the phalanx could be 
refused, as at Epaminondas' battles, or the phalanx as a whole could break up 
to take advantage of inner flanks created by enemy break throughs - for 
example as at the Nemea (2). These advances, however, simply enhanced and 
reinforced the basic doctrine of hoplite warfare, i. *e. that a massed charge of 
heavily armed infantry carried the day. ' 
In Hellenistic warfare, the battle winner was the cavalry - acting in 
concert with the other parts of the army. The role of the mdsi-armed centre 
was to bar the advance of enemy forces for long enough to allow the cavalry 
to do its job and outflank the enemy position. The only offensive role 
envisaged for the svisj- phalanx was to deliver a covp de gmce on an 
already defeated enemy army. 
The role of the Hellenistic phalanx was, therefore, fundamentally 
different from that of the Classical phalanx. The Hellenistic phalanx was part 
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of a larger system rather than a means to victory, in itself., The im Ortanc6ýof'. 
the &visa phalanx is best illustrated by the example of the battle of Cunaxa 
(3). In this battle the forces of Artaxerxes were victorious as the result of the 
success of their cavalry arm. They were unable, however, to overthrow the 
10,000 mercenary hoplites of Cyrus' defeated army because they did not 
have an effective close-order infantry force. The only method the 10,000 
dbijld' have been- defeated -would have been to pin them frontally with 
close-order infantry and then envelop them with a superior cavalry force. 
This would have disrupted the integrity of the Greek phalanx and exposed 
them to defeat in detail. The Cunaxa example, when transposed to a 
Hellenistic tactical situation, demonstrates the key role of the md-w phalanx. 
Without a solid infantry centre, any quality infantry possessed by an enemy 
could have simply walked through the centre of a Hellenistic army, before 
any cavalry could meaningfully contribute to the overall outcome of the 
action. Indeed one might speculate -as to the outcome of battle of the 
Granicus had the Persians decided to fight a set-piece on the plain to the east 
of the river - using their mercenary Greek hoplites as the centre of their army 
- rather than contesting the Macedonian crossing with cavalry alone. 
Therefore the existence of a solid infantry centre was critical to the overall 
success of the Hellenistic tactical system. 
Finally, the &vim phalanx was relatively inexpensive and could be 
deployed in very large numbers. The anning of large numbers of men by the 
state created a solid base for Macedon, a country that-had always had good 
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cavalry; but had been unable'to use them with effect in set-piece batt'les'-, This'- 
trend continued, and Hellenistic battles were characterised by the appeaýra, _'n'ce 
of large bodies of phalangites in the centre of the line. Often these forces 
were hastily raised from the lower stratum of society. This was very different 
from Classical warfare, where the hoplite infantry base of the army was, for 
the most part, provided by the middle class of Greek society. This more 
efficient use -6f manpower in the Hellenistic system was, thei6f6re, a major 
reason for the overall success of the &visa-armed phalanx. 
The assault-force of a Heflenistic army was its cavalry. The aggressive 
role of this force is made obvious by the reliance on hand-to-hand weaponry 
- for the most part Heffenistic cavalry were equipped with lance and were 
armoured - and the use of grand- tactical and tactical formations specificýlly 
designed to break through an enemy line. Once again this was a phenomenon 
not seen in Greek warfare until the time of Philip 11, Alexandei and the 
Successors. 
It is important to note, however, that the creation of the Hellenistic 
cavalry arm was only partiafly due to the adoption of the cavalry lance. The 
cavalry force that provided the shock force of the period was also reliant on 
the provision of a solid infantry base, the &zdm phalanx. Macedon had 
always had, by Greek standards, an outstanding cavalry force in its 
horse-owning aristocracy. What was missing from their tactical system was 
an infantry force that would allow the quality of the Macedonian horse to tell 
in a set-piece battle. The creation of such an infantry force by PhiEp 11 
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transfonned the role of cavalry and changed the face of war entirely. 
The relationship between phalanx and cavalry on the battlefield was a 
critical part of Hellenistic tactics. The close order, svisa-armed infantry of 
the period were the perfect anti- cavalry weapon. It is no surprise that the 
sources make no reference to cavalry breaking viisa-armed infantry 
frontally. On the other hand Hellenistic cavalry were a fast, hard hitting 
instrument of exploitation. Given the right opportunity the horse of the 
period could outflank and envelop a phalanx in an instant, an event that had 
a decisive effect on the outcome of the battle. It was this enveloping 
manoeuvre'that dominated the offensive tactics of the period. 
As was demonstrated above, a number of cavalry formations were 
developed by which entire wings of horse could be deployed to gain tactical 
advantage on the battlefield. Basic decisions such as to advance, or refuse, 
this or that wing dominated the deployment of the armies of the period. The 
importance of cavalry can even be seen in the battles in Greece, where 
relatively small numbers of horse could influence the tide of battle 
decisively. On all the occasions where one side gained cavalry dominance the 
other was forced to Capitulate or launch 'a cumbersome attack with the 
sai7sa-armed phalanx, risking disorder and defeat. It is rare'indeed that we 
find armies prevailing after they have lost cavalry don-dnance of the 
battlefield. 
Cavalry have always been a difficult arm to control. Like all regular 
troops Hellenistic cavalry had to be properly formed to have maximum effect 
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on the enemy; hence. the -'elaborate small unit. 446tics ýse4jp, 66 period. ý, N 
basic problem ' of - cavalry warfare throughout milit#Y, historyý, has been' the 
maintainance 'of the formations and . tactical t integrity of even a victorious 
mounted force. Cavalry'is an active arm: it advances upon the enemy -to gain 
local advantage, and in the Hellenistic period -given the formations and 
weaponry of the troops - tl-ýs advance must have been at the gallop for at 
least Jh6lifiil--ýdit'of_ the-chýrk&. - Such rapid 'ffidViffiefit lnevitAly' leads to 
disorder; hence so many of the sources refer to the need to drill and train to 
maintain formation. Hellenistic cavalry was highly organised and, we can 
suppose, very well trained; yet time and again the sources refer to a 
victorious wing leaving the field in hot pursuit, in effect cancelling out the 
immense tactical advantage gained by its victory. In some cases, one may 
assume this pursuit was necessary - to prevent a defeated enemy, rallying - in 
others it. must have been due to a loss of control by officers and a 
disintegration of discipline. Hence at battles such as Gaza and Raphia initial 
tactical advantage was lost and the two phalanxes had to cross md=, "With 
all the attendant dangers such action entailed. 
It must also be noted that generally the commanders of the period stood 
with their offensive cavalry wing to ensure close control of the initial charge, 
perhaps the critical part of the battle. Alexander at Gaugamela and Antiochus 
III at Raphia had close control over the movement of the assault wing and 
went to extreme lengths to manoeuvre for maximum tactical advantage 
before the attack proper took place. It is noteworthy that in most encounters 
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of the period only one charge was delivered; clearly, - command. and. control 
was too primitive to give commanders any chance of. reoireýfing an - attack 
once it had been set in motion. It is alýo noteworthy. that, most armies of the 
period maintained quite substantial bodies of dile horse as part of their 
establishment, and that these troops were at the thick of. the fighting, often 
under the personal leadership of the commander-in-chief. Once again a 
method by, which- the--ge-tyeraIg --of -the- period'hbped to'maintain a hold - on 
events once the action began. 
Cavalry was usually deployed on the wings of the phalanx, in a position 
whereby they could outflank the enemy army, but also because the tight 
formations of the phalanx precluded any supporting role for horse directly 
behind the centre of the army. The only time such troops might have had a 
chance to come to blows with the enemy would have been when their own 
phalanx had broken in flight, and hence, the battle was already lost. Those 
occasions where cavalry were deployed as part of the centre - notably 
Sellasia and Magnesia were exceptions, and the result of terrain 
considerations. 
In addition, the Hellenistic powers built upon the cavalry traditions of 
Macedon, Greece and the Near East, incorporating mounted specialists into 
their armies on a regular basis. All Hellenistic armies used mounted 
skirmishers of some kind and notably the Seleucid army used a plethora of 
special types, notably horse-archers and cataphracts. In the latter case they 
took the Hellenistic concept of offensive horse to its logical conclusion. 
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So much for the phalanx centre and cavalry wings: what of the area 
space between these two arms and the role of the intermediate and miloi 
forces in set-piece actions? The intervening space between phalanx and 
cavalry wing has drawn comment from scholars; it is into this area of an 
army's deployment that scholars place various tactical Iýinges' - notably the 
h, vp7spistsof Alexander's army. Small bodies of psiloior peltasts often held 
- 'this pos-ition"in- the lin- e, být, as has - been - demo'hstrated, the role of these 
troops is difficult to interpret. 
There is very little evidence for a special role for peltasts in battle, 
certainly as far as a fast moving 'hinge' linking centre to wing is concerned. 
Indeed it has been concluded that the favoured candidate for such a role, 
Alexander's hypasp. &! ýg were very probably rýlile phalangites rather than the 
intermediate troop-type. Aside from the arguments surrounding this unit the 
general theory of a tactical 'hinge' is flawed. Given the speed of the cavalry 
advance, after some tentative manoeuvring for position, it is difficult to see a 
role for any foot soldiers, be they of a light or intermediate type. It is clear, 
therefore, that the immediate wings of the phalanx were occasionally covered 
by troops other than close-order infantry, but that these troops stayed in close 
proximity to the main infantry centre, rather than making any attempt to link 
dismounted centre to mounted flank. 
Such a tactical doctrine is entirely logical. The flanks of the phalanx 
were obviously vulnerable and any move to outflank the infantry centre, or 
indeed 'lap round' if one side had an advantage in numbers and hence 
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frontage of phalangites in a face- to-face combat, - would -have had disastrous 
effects. The Achaeans demostrated that they could detach- s*omtsý-, of 
phalanx at Mantinea to face to the flank, but they were - an - extraordinarily 
well drilled formation, 'fighting in a relatively small action, in an enclosed 
space. In most of the battles of the, period it would be more effective to 
deploy troops such as the Hellenistic peltast - with their high training and 
__ interihiediate"taictics - to-hold the' immMiate flank of the centre and"logical 
that such a closing force was unable to support a cavalry wing in any useful 
way. 
Furthermore the phalanx of the centre was there to provide a lasting 
resistance to their opposite numbers, until an enveloping manouevre could be 
completed. If one assumes that the immediate flanking supports to the centre, 
peltasts for the most part, were to link foot to horse, then this implies that the 
phalanx was intended in some way to manoeuvre, to aid the cavalry in their 
attack: how else could the rapidly expanding gap between horse and foot be 
linked by a small unit of peltasts if the mass of the phalanx did not move 
forward? This is patently not supported by either the sources or this thesis' 
reconstruction of the role of the phalanx in Hellenistic warfare. 
Further, what possible good could a small unit of peltasts expect to do if 
the phalanx remained stationary? The 'hinge' theory presumes they would 
advance into the gap - already noted as 'rapidly expanding' - in an effort to 
support both horse and foot. Such a manoeuvre would accomplish neither 
task. In the former it would place the peltasts too far from the flank of the 
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phalanx creating what is called an 'inner flank' (4)., This invited aý 166alised 
outflanking manoeuvre with potentially disastrous consequences lilhe'lattei 
case' the relative speed of the cavalry and the 'hinge' would have led ý to the 
peltasts becoming dangerously isolated, in an area where normally, large 
numbers of hostile cavalry were operating. Such a small force, wl-dch peltasts 
inevitably were, would have fallen easy prey to enemy horse, despite any 
-AfitPeavalry-equipment* they might' be-carrying -Jor example long-spears. 
Therefore peltasts could be used to seal the flanks of the phalanx, but would 
not have been expected to link infantry centre to cavalry wing. 
The role of psiloiin the main battle-fine is easier to chart. It is clear from 
battle accounts that Hellenistic armies routinely used psiki in set-piece 
actions. Psiloiwere used in conjunction with other troop types, for example 
elephants, to enhance their capabilities. Pdloi could be placed behind the 
main line, or even - according to the tacticians - incorporated into the ranks 
of the phalanx, to provide missHe support. This writer has emphasised the 
relative ineffectiveness of missile weapons in ancient warfare, but we must 
not underestimate the value of these soldiers. Hellenistic generals developed 
many complex and varied techniques to enhance the effectivenesý of their 
own Xikiat the expense of that of the enemy. In particular A&o.; missiles 
would have contributed to the cavalry actions on the flanks of the arrnies. 
Where peltasts and jwYoireally carne ito their'own in this period is'in 
extra-battlefield situations. The most spectacular feats of arms performed by 
these troops comes from this area of military activity. In many ways parallels 
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for developments in'this sphereýl abound i- fi th . e, ClassýicaL-` ý&'iiýdie&light 
d troops were specifically introduced irýio'. -'G reek -'warfare, as'ý fig 
from the 'hophte friendly' plains to tge-rou'g4,,, woody. hi''O''ýýOS-ofý, Gieece 
during the Peloponnesian War. What is outstanding in the -Hellenistic period 
is how armies built on this tradition and added the military skflls of the 
peoples of Alexander's empire to produce higWy skilled and specialised 
formationg of -rough'teffaiwtroops. -Theý military mission- of -both -the-eastem- 
monarchies, with their vast area of operations, and the new powers of 
Hellenistic Greece, centered as they were in the more broken areas of 
Greece, made the activities of pvkiand peltasts vital to the overall success 
of operations in this period. Indeed some campaigns were entirely composed 
of skirmish actions and the like - take for example many of Philip V's 
campaigns in Greece. These two 'irregular' arms therefore contributed much 
to the Hellenistic all-amis concept; a general of the period could not expect 
to successfully bring his cavalry and phalanx to battle without the aid of his 
light and intermediate forces. Furthermore the comprehensive Hellenistic 
attitude to war, whereby the objective was destruction of the enemy state, 
was greatly aided by the light infantry components of the army, who were 
ideally suited for raiding and coup de m. 7i, 7. 
The great innovation of the Hellenistic period was to create a balanced 
afl-arms: force in which each component of the army supported and 
supplemented each other. T4e main assault force of the period was massed 
cavalry, equipped, organised and trained as a shock force. This mounted 
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force was nurneriýally-, strppg by,, t4e stahdiidiýof th6'Classical; world. 'jhe 
P, Y. , 
ýýl, diýgýth"-"m'ain-line, ý'bf- mjisi-armed phalank com lement6d the cavair 
battle. This produced a 'swirigin'g -door' effect: In most. Hell. enisti . c. battlis as 
each side raced to break through with their respective assault- wing, and take 
the enemy's infantry in flank and rear. To ensure that the enemy could not 
penetrate the centre, the &visa phalanx was envisaged as a solid, closely 
packed -defensive- formatioty-It, was so -successful -in- this -that -many -ancient - 
writers refer to it as a city wall and most of the battles of the period testify to 
its resilient, stolid resistance in action. The phalanx, however, paid for its 
defensive strength by being cumbersome in attack; hence its reliance on the 
cavalry for support and aid in any confrontation with equivalent enemy 
infantry. Therefore, once again, mutual support was the order of the day in 
the military system of the period. 
Rounding off the army were specialist forces of intermediate infantry, 
called peltasts in the Hellenistic pefiod, and pv. '1o., ' The former were a 
Hellenistic innovation, producing a highly effective, specially trained'all 
round soldier, both for the battlefield and, more importantly, for the mdt 
S, v=e that made up much of the fighting in the period. Pkki forces were 
expanded and refined to produce all-terrain missile armed infantry to 
supplement the annies' operations again both on and off the battlefield. , 
What made the Hellenistic military machine so successful was the 
manner in which the cost of its maintenance was distributed. It deployed a 
mass of infantry that did not rely upon a specialist group in society for its 
337 
ma. I npower. In effect any* able'b6died- man, could be'e'qt'ýipii6d'ýhd,, ýiiýic'ally 
trained to fight as an effective phalangite. That is not to''say that iýlile 
i)ooies 
of phalangites; ý did I not exist. The high, 16vels of drill and tactical finesse 
demonstrated in the sources by some units testify to the high levels of 
professionalism that could be achieved. Rather, the minimum level of 
equipment and military competence required was far 'lower than that - 
demanded by hoplite warfare. 
The expense of Hellenistic warfare lay with the cavalry, but this was not 
a crippling burden on the states of the period, many of which were very poor 
and econornically underdeveloped by Classical standards. A horse owning 
aristocracy of great quality existed in Philip 11's Macedonia and, once 
re-equipped with lance and trained in wedge and manoeuvre tactics, could 
easily overcome the mounted forces of the Classical arrnies of Greece. Once 
the Persian empire fell to Alexander and his Successors ample land existed 
for the maintenance of the large cavalry forces required by the tactics of the 
time. What was critical to the system, however, is the relative combat 
effectiveness of the cavalry- &vim combination when compared to the 
hoplite phalanx. Put simply, a cavalry breakthrough could take place in an 
instant and its effects were devastating. What is mOre, ' a far smaller 
percentage of the army was needed to effect this breakthrough. For the most 
part, Hellenistic cavalry proportions did not rise over ten percent of the, total 
army strength. On the other hand for hoplite attacks to be effective the vast 
majority of the fighting force had to be hoplites. In comparison, the 
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Hellenistic system, based as it initially was on a, vast block- of Macedonian' 
peasants, was cheap and tapped the'rnifltary manpower of the state, more 
effectively - than'did the Classical system. Once Alexander had conquered the. 
Persian Empire and -passed it down to his Successors the massive resources 
of the Near! East could be placed behind this new military system, finally 
making hoplite tactics obsolete after the abortive Lamian War. In Greec6 
proper, afeýYthat-hdd-bebri back*aters-ift'AWClais, ýkal period*embraced the 
new style of warfare and raised vast arrnýies - by Classical ý standards - of 
miArarmed infantry supplemented by small bodies of cavalry and, support 
troops. 
The Hellenistic military system created by Philip 11 dominated warfare in 
the Near East until the arrival of Rome and it is useful briefly to sum up the 
failings of the Hellenistic milit . ary s. ystem. wh . en compared with that of Rome. 
Rome's military machine was, as it emerged from the Second Punic War, 
superior to that of the Hellenistic world in two main respects. Firstly, the 
smim phalanx's weaknesses became obvious when opposed by the manipular 
legion. Secondly, during the war with Carthage, Rome had developed an 
aggressive cavalry force that was the match for the Hellenistic lancer. These 
two factors combined were the death knell to the Hellenistic military system. 
The use of effective cavalry by the Roman army dates from the end of 
the war with Hannibal and this part of the Roman army performed 
consistently well in the wars in the Hellenistic east. Notably, Livy 
commented on the effectiveness of Roman cavalry weapons in the Second 
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Macedonian -Var; and, at the battle -of Magnesia a, combination of l'bad 
deployment and inactiveness by the Seleucids, and opportunism and 
aggressiveness by the Romans and their allies allowed the large force of 
cavalry - many of them c. 71.7plywts - deployed on the Seleucid left to be 
driven from the field with relative ease. The effectiveness of Rome's 
mounted-arm in the later third and early second centuries contrasts well with 
-- the- performance of her-cavalry-in the-wars- against-, Pyrrhus, -ifliete clearly the - 
Hellenistic troops had the upper hand. In the majority of the set-piece actions 
fought between Rome and the Hellenistic powers in the post Ilannibalic War 
period, Rome's cavalry performed well. Why this was the case was examined 
above: it is sufficient to note here that the Romans emphasised aggressive 
attack over manoeuvre, and that overall this tactical doctrine was successful. 
Given. this to be the case, then a major pillar of Hellenistic battle tacticsI -, a 
reliance on cavalry to achieve break-through - was put in doubt. 
This deficiency was made worse 'by the failings of the &v7sa- phalanx 
when faced with the manipular legion. Alexander's armies had faced -the 
Persian army, which had an exceHent mounted arm, and prevailed because an 
absence of an effective close-order infantry arm nullified the Persian cavalry. 
In the case of Rome, however, the phalanx faced veterans of the Punic War, 
with better equipment and fighting tactics. 
It has been shown that the pila and sword armed legion could make little 
impression on a static phalanx. This was the case in the Pyrrhic wars, where 
- as has been demonstrated - the battlefields were constricted and the legion 
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had little room to manoeuvre. Faced, however, wiih'ýa situation sých'%'as, -., -. 
Cynoscephalae or Pydna, where tactical circumstance forced,. th6-"6fialini., to 
advance, the, legion came into its own. The small, unit orianisafiop';, ano 
leadership of the legion at this period was of exceptional quality. 
Furthermore, the tactics of the manipular legion, based as they were on small 
unit manoeuvre and individual fencing, were ideally suited to absorbing the 
-attack of -theplialafix-aind taking'advantage-of -any -disorder -in the ranks-of-the- 
Sj'd'WWhorW. * At both Cynoscephalae and Pydna initially powerful, solid 
formations of phalanx fell apart after a period of time, allowing the 
individual parts of the larger formation to be destroyed piecemeal by the 
Romans. 
This is not to say the Romans did not have difficulties with Hellenistic 
arrnies; quite the contrary. Whenever legionaries made reckless attacks on 
formed units of phalanx they were always defeated. Also, as at Magnesia, the 
manipular legion showed itself markedly vulnerable to the chaTze of Seleucid 
cataphracts. Rather, the combined am-is tactics of Hellenistic warfare were 
neutralised by Rome's army of the post-Hannibalic War period. Although 
individual parts of the Hellenistic system -a s=js , p. 
iales of phalanx or 
charging, lance-armed cvtj , phrads- might check the 
Roman legion, there was 
no overall system that could link together the entire Hellenistic military 
machine to bring victory. Just as the innovation of lance-anned cavalry 
combined with masses of mdsa-anned infantry brought about the eclipse of 
hoplite warfare, then so the manipular legion - again based on mass 
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conscription (5) - linked to aggressive cavalry %m7N;? wartdýi'. ý;, 
In its heyday Hellenistic warfare was the. dominant tactical stem"Or 
Greece and the Near East. It combined a sophisticated system bf-ifiterrelAted 
troop types that interacted on the battlefield to produce victory. This system 
could deal with all the aspects of warfare to be found across the vast area of 
the Hellenistic world. Hellenistic tactics were not only effective, but - as the - 
majority of the army could be composed of peasant infantry equipped with 
the mjim - relatively inexpensive. With the invention of this method of 
warfare by Philip 11 of Macedon in the rnid-fourth century came the rapid 
military collapse of the Greek city-state and of hoplite warfare. No longer 
did the state rely on a hoplite class, with all the attendant political 
implications; the Hellenistic military system needed large centralised, 
monarchies or city-leagues, with state arsenals and sophisticated land 
management systems to maintain the forces of cavalry and swimphoroz' The 
complexity of the system also promoted more professional attitudes to war, 
the creation of a winning military doctrine that could be applied to arn-ýes of 
tens- of-thousands of men. Perhaps this change in attitude also made war 
more ruthless as each Hellenistic state's goals became domination of large 
geographic areas and the total destruction of the enemy, rather than the 
limited war of Classical times. 
The Hellenistic military system held centre stage in the eastern 
Mediterranean for some two hundred years. Like hoplite warfare, however, it 
had flaws, which Rome's military machine brought into stark contrast. Once 
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the manipular legion linked to aggressive, ifý, un, ý. ubt_le, ca. v4ry. `*ti. cs, +ro,, ke 
the equilibrium that had been based on a-balinicje of mutual supj k-býfwlcen 
combat- arms, then the days of & HqI'lenistic, tact ical system were 
numbered. It is notable that just after the closing date of this thesis, the battle 
of Pydna, the Heflenistic powers began to rearm in the Roman fashion and 
legion to replace phalanx in the east (6). 
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Notes to Ch pteLl 
1. Despite modern convention aaQ(ua is spelt'with one xýpw in ancient 
literature, cf. Liddel and Scott A Greek-EnWlish Le. iricoa, Oxford, 1944, 
p. 1584, s. v. aaQCcra 
2. Liddell and Scott, qpci?, p. 1913, s. v. ffAAAI--; literally "a roller". 
3. Polyb. 18.29 quoting Homer lliadl3.131-3. Of course, the reference is 
used by Polybios as a literary device, the phalanx. of Homer bears only 
a superficial resemblance to the Hellenistic phalanx. the translation is 
that of 1. Scott- Kilvert in Polybios, The R&e of the Romm Emphr, 
Penguin, London, 1979, p. 510 
4. Thuc. 4.96. 
Note that the Greeks could use the word phalanx as a general term for 
a body of soldiers. Eg. Persian cavalry at the Granicus are called a 
phalanx, cf. Arr. 1.14.1. 
For hoplite warfare see the excellent V. D. Hanson, The Westem lvq, ýy 
of Mir, - the IY,? j7&y Bj&le iv Cla&vc,? l Greece, London, 1989; V. D. 
Hanson, (Ed. ), Hopliles: the C&ssih? l Greek Bmle Expadei7ce, 
London, 1991. For other general works on this period cf. A. Andrewes, 
Greek Socieýv, Oxford 1967, pp. I 62ff.: Kromayer-Veith pp. 28ff ; 50ff.; 
H. L. Lorimer, "The Hoplite Phalanx", BSA, 1947,42, p. 76ff: L. H. 
Jeffery, Arch,?. ic Greece, Cambridge, 1976, p. 41; 67ff; Snodgrass, 
AAG, pp48ff.; J. Salmon, . 111S, 77,1977, pp. 85-92; for the origins of 
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this type of armour cf. A. NI. Snodgrass, "Carian Armourers - The 
Growth of a Tradition", J11S, 84,1964, pp. 107-118; especially p. 117; 
A. M. Snodgrass, "The Hoplite Refonn and History", JHS, 85,1965, 
p. 110-122, for general tactics cf. Anderson, JfFF, 4X, pp. 13ff; J. 
Holladay "Hoplites and Heresies", JHS, 102,1982, pp. 94-103. 
7. Anderson, AfTFAX pp. 14-20 (p. 17 for size); Liddell and Scott p. 1451, - 
0' sv. =Qzccý'and a'vTt, %apq Connolly, GRA IV, pp. 51-54 (p. 53 for 
weight of 7kg); the Spartan anecdote Archilochus fr. 6; AlCaeus in Hrd. 
5.95.1-2; cf. Snodgrass, AAG, pp. 53-54; Anacreaon fr. 51 (Diehl); cf. 
Horace Cdes2.7.10; how the . 7spiswas carried cf. Lorimer BSA, 1947, 
42, p. 76; Xen. . 4n. 7b6.5.16 for shield slung on back in retreat; taking 
up of shields, Xen. Ife. 114.4.10; Dercylidas was forced to stand guard 
carrying his shýield as a punishment, normally it would have been rested 
against his legs, cf. Xen. ffe/13.7.9. 
8. Thuc. 5.7l. ff. (of Mantinea); used to gain tactical advantage at the 
Nemea, cf. Anderson, AfTFAX, p. 141 ff.; contra M. Cary, CAH. V, 
p. 47, "... a typical encounter of the pre-scientific age of Greek 
warfare. "; cf. Xen. Hel/4.2.9-23 for account: reconstructed by W. 
Kaupert in Kromayer, ASIV, text to Blatt V, col. 29; cf. Kromayer 
Schlachilelde, r Bd I V. 207f f.; Schlaclemllas Gr A bI Blatt 3 Katen 8. 
9. Thuc. 5.69. 
10. K. M. T. Chrimes, Ancient Samla, Leicester, 1948, pp. 359 ff. Miss 
Chrimes quotes Arr. rF 3.5, cf. Anderson, AfFFAX, p. 29; 41 (origin 
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in Peloponnesian Var), cLl, Dr? Ysen, ý, -, )Heer,, -p. 28.,;. *.,, 
ý, C6ntiý, 'ý',, 'ý-. Lazenýý"ýýI 
k, p. 1521 (the yo, uin'g "e"r', ' men,, had', S, w. r1m A. rmy, p. 32n. 5 3,5 4; D 
ýl bru. C 
eo '- "bsed heavy armour, quotes Xen. Hel/4. -5; 1-, 4.837); typ arm 
,o, uf, cf. 
Anderson, UFFAX pp. 20-28; muscle cuirass, p. -20-21 cf. n. 36; 
, 67tothorzrp. 
22. n. 37, Persian War origin, cf. Liddell and Scott, p. 1051 
s. v. XLvo06)Qaý. Pausanias 1.21.7 describes linen armour. Alexander 
--worý-finen-annour--at-Gaugamela-Plut. -Aler32-. 8: ---Anderson. -MFFA; ýY; -- 
p. 23 small plates could be added to the Awthorax, cf. Snodgrass, E67A, 
pp. 84-86. Arm-guards Anderson, MFFAX p. 24, cf. Lorimer, BSA, 42, 
1947, p. 132. For the spotlascf. Xen. Aijab. 3.3.20, a leather item Pollux 
0,7cmaslicon 7.70, Liddel & Scott 1629 sx. 0-roVa;, in Arist. Biq* 
933ff. It is a waterproof leather jerkin. Archaic Greek armour covered 
much more of the body, cf. Hagemann, Fxmervng, I pp. 127-132; H. L. 
Lorimer, BSA 42 1941. pp. 88- . 
89; 132-133; Homer ? nd the 
Monameats, London, 1950, p. 247,252. For leg defenders cf. 
. Y, M'Vi-4 
IV, p. 160 pl. LX no. 990. Furtwaengler 0/ 
11. Heavy Archaic hoplite cf. Connolly, GR, 4W, p-59. For equipment 
weight cf. Droysen, ffeen, p. 24; Chrimes, qptcil, p. 359ff; of Prussian 
infantry in the Seven Years War, C. Duffy, The Armty ol*Frederick the 
Gre.? 4 London, 1974, p. 82. Lightening of armour, cf. Anderson, 
MFF. 4X. p. 28 n. 81; p. 29; Droysen, Heen p. 28; K. M. T. Chrimes 
optcil, p. 359ff, esp. p. 366-8 - dated post-Peloponnesian War. There is 
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taciical"', employment, see. Polyb. 2.29ff. '., For.. _Spartan, 
equipment, -., 
Kromayer-Veith p. 38; Athenian equipment, pp-50-51; Si'cilian-,, e'q4jp-,, 
ment, p. 67ff. Lack of Pursuit cf. Plut. Aýo'r228F; Polyaenus, 
Anderson, AfTPAX, p-149. For helmets- cf. Anderson, N. TPAr, 
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to be made of felt. Anderson, however, discusses the pilbg making the 
point that several bronze examples exist, AfFFAX, pp. 29ff. 
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pp. 492ff and Harnniond in Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos (Eds. ), Ailip 
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-6qýkpe4` arkýý', ýhaý ýhe` ," halanx was occa I sionally-r6 ofAfkýohvp. ý9 pP 
4e 'spears. Polyb. 18'. 29 2 30.1"', with ohe+an6d h6pil 
A rrET12.10; *ýAel. 14; Ascl. S;, ý, Bosworth, HSCFr8j, `p. 240; -Walbaiik, 
AN '. -289; - -T,, irn, IlAfND, -p'. 27-8. General unwieldiness, cfi Livy 97, pp 
38.42A, Arr. 1.4.1 where it was'used in a sweeping motion from side to 
side, a feat difficult to conceive accomplished with one handl Five 
ýU, FAV point§-pfWcle-d rom eac 
Hammond, "Training in the use of the sarisa and its effect in battle". 
Anbichlhon 14,1990, p. 53; see the diagram in Hammond, AG. -KCS, 
p. 55,164ff; d Markle, AIA, 8 1, pp-329ff. 
35. Ascl. 5.1; cf.; Ael. 12 Arr.. T. T12,19.1; Plut. Aem. P=119.1; Cleom. 11.2; 
Diod. 20.100.6; eight palms equalled twenty-four inches, cf. Becher, 
RE, s. v. "Palaiste", XVIII, 2.2471. Droysen, Heer,, p. 13,. 60cm -in 
diameter;, cL Launey, 1. p. 340ff; Coussin. hudis, p. 76, pl. XL. 2; 
Kromayer, Heer, pp. 108,133, -50cm diameter; Anderson, AfFFAX, 
p. 131, cf. n. 63; Head, BMCCAkee., pp. 7ff for shields on coins; 
Walbank, FhjF)3 p. 289,18" dia.; Reinach, BCH, 1910, pp. 444ff; 0. 
Lippold, Zv den SWdlovmew der Allen, Jena, 1910, pp. 501 f f. cf. notes 
13-15; D. Burr, Fevwco&" from Mviim, Vienna, 1934, p. 16, n. 112, 
pl. 41; Menas stele, cf. Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, p. 128. 
36. Polyaen. 4.9.3; Plut. Dem. 49 are two examples of the confusion the 
sources can cause. For pelle, cf. Liddell and Scott, p. 358, a small, 
rin-dcss leather shield; cf. Hrd. 7.75. 
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37. Bowl sl-ýields, H. Droysen in A VF, 11, pl. 2 (perhaps), pl. 46, no. 2; pl. 48, 
no. 1; A. J. Reinach, BCH, 34,1910, p. 437, fig. 2; p. 439, fig 3, A; p-444, 
fig. 7; P. Callaghan, AAA, 11,1979, pp. 53-60; BICS, 28,1981, 
pp. 115-21; A VP, - 1, p. 251, no number, for belt buckle. Lyson and 
Callicrates, Callaghan, AAA, 11,1978, p. 56. Boscoreale: A Robertson, 
JRS, 45,1955, p. 64, pl. 12 (may be an ? Wraspid shield); Heuzey, . 
2707, M834, -iý. a49, -R. --L-aM, --Makedotu-s'cher-ýthild. -Ntdked6iiisclier 
becher schuchthand", Studien Zarrov-and Fmch geschichle Balae, 
1940, pp. 48-72. The relief work on the faces of these shields is often 
seen as typically Macedonian, cf. G. Waurick in A VF, 11, Taf. 45, pl. 5 
and 6. 
38. Plut. Aem. Fjv119, note Plutarch refers to apelle. 
39. Reinarch, op. cit, p. 437, fig 2, again the shield is depicted frontally, 
note it may be a bowl shield. For the shield-cover cf. A VF, X, Taf. 27, 
f, g; cf. p. 33 for text. 
40. Connolly, GRA W, p. 79; the shield is very sinfflar to the Persiangerrha, 
cf. Snodgrass, AAG, p-78- 
41. Livy 32.17.13; cf. Caes. B. G. 1.25 forpdapinning shields together. 
42. For: Fuller, Oeneralship, p. 51; Tam, HMND, p. 11. Walbank, Fhilip, 
p. 289; Kromayer-Veith p. 134, nb. contradicts at p. 108. Against: 
Hammond, AG. XSG, p. 32, only officers wore the demi-cuirass; 
Griffith, FCFS, 4,1956, p. 8 due to socio- economic factors, p. 9 larger 
spears compensated; Droysen, Neer, p. 110; Delbruck, p. 182 using the 
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Paeonian coin; Rustow-Kochley p. 240 in effed in. '. hh' p icratean pe tast. 'ý'. 
Undecided: Dro, en, ffeei, pp. 40-1 cf. n. 27"tefeýýng", 'i6,,, 'Diý"ý'ý,,:, ý,. 77.7", YS 
(contradicts p. I 10); Harnmond in Hatzopoulos and Lo'bko"; '-"l s (FAID- poy 9 
Ailip ofMjcei1bj7, p. 59 simply notes how heavy the armour depicted 
in the Lyson and Callicrates tomb appears to be. 
43. M. Andronicus, Vegaivw the Royal FomA Athens, 1984, p. 37, fig. 16; - 
M. V. Charbonneux, Hellenistic AA, London, 1973, p. 56,285, pl. 53; 
Hammond in Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos (Eds. ), Philip ofAfacedow, 
p. 63, notes the spear could be a md&7, A VF, 11, p. 285; Reinach, RA, 1, 
1889, p. 319; A. Davesne, Frise da. Temple dAFfenzis, Paris, 1982. 
44. A VF, 11, pl. 1,2; Coussin, p. 76, pl. 1.23.2; G. Waurick, A VF, Taf. 61, 
p. 3; Andronicus, opcit; Hammond, opcit 
45. A. H. Smith, "Some recently acquired reliefs in the British Museum", 
MS, 36,1916, pp. 81-2, figs. 12-13; P. Connolly, CAH, vol. VII, plates, 
part 1, Cambridge, 1984, p. 84, fig. 103; A VF, 11, pp. 141ff, pl. 1,2 (also 
shows mail cuirass), 9,26: A. Davesne, L? Bise da temple dArlemis.? 
Af.? Snewie dit Afeandre, eatalo , gue 
des fmgments dv mume da Lou me, 
Paris, 1982, fig. 6, nos. 2,4; fig. 18, no. 1; fig. 62, no. 2; fig. 79, no. 1; 
fig. 80, nos. 2.4; fig. 85, no. 2; fig. 94, no. 3; fig. 101, no. 2; fig. 103, no. 
1; fig. 108, no. 6; fig 115, no. 3; fig. 119, no. 2; Coussin, Ansd&, p. 76, 
pl. 23, no. 2 for an 'iron bound' cuirass. 
46. Hatzoupoulos and Loukopoulos (eds. ), Philip of Macedow, Athens, 
1980, p. 225, pl. 127. For a discussion of the Evolha-ar cf. A VP, 11, 
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p. 279., 
47. Polyaen. 4.2.10. 
4,83. Polyaen. 4.3.12'; cf. Feyel, ow. cit p. 38 for a similar piece of'equipment 
from the later Antigonid period. 
49. Curt. 9.3.21-3; cf. 8.5.4; 9.3.21 for re-equipping as Silver Shields. 
, 50, -ArrA. 27. Sý-2A-3; -3,23.3; -4.6.3, -28.8. - 
51. Plut. FW9; Paus. 8.50.1; cf. Polyb. 11.9.5.10.11. Note the A chaean 
league had a force of hoplites in the time of Aratus, cf. Polyb. 4.14. 
52. Polyb. 2.68. .I 
53. Livy 32.10.11. 
54. Feyel, op. cil, col. 1,11.2 for kolhabas (two obols), 11.6 tharal-es, (6 
oboM and hemilhomy (I dr. ). Cf. Liddell and Scott, Suppl, p. 87 for a 
definition of lothabus Feyel, p. 31 argues they rnight be a perizorm 
which was a girdle or loincloth, cf. Liddell and Scott, p. 1314. 
55. Connolly, GRA W, pp. 79-80; Delbruck p. 179; Walbank, PhiFa p. 290; 
for he,: gemon cf., Feyel, qW. cil, p. 31, a front ranker; contra Lesquier, 
pp. 83ff; RevFHI, 1908, p. 222 argued a hegemon was a commander of 
a sy, 747gmv. For Macedonian officers in general cf. N. G. L. Hammond, 
"Some Macedonian offices c. 336-309 B. C. ", JHS, 105,1985, pp. 156- 
160. 
56. App. Syr35. 
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57. , Ascl. 1.2; Ael. 2-7-9; Aff. F. 7.2, note Arrian refers to 
hoplites with coats 
of mail, a reference to Roman legionaries of the second century A. D.? 
58. Thuc. 2.100; cf. Geyer, Ahikedb. zPhil p. 88: R. Lock, Almy p. 8', Best 
pp. 142ff. That Macedon was weak in'infantry before the reign of Philip 
11 cf. Thuc. 4.124; Polyaen. 2.1.17; 4.1.1; Xen. HellS. 2.37. 
59. Lock, ow-cil, pp-9ff, 21,22,24, n. 57; cf., Theopompus, Fr. 348 
(Fi-Grff. p. 115); Anaximenes, FrGrMl, A, no. 72, K pp. 116-7; 
Harpocreon, Dernothenes O1y, 71hi, -cs2. l7, Jacoby, FrGrH., 11, A. no. 72, 
K pp. 116-7; R. D. Milns, "The Army of Alexander the Great", 
Fouadvfiov Hardt Four L ýýde De L : 4,76qýuile Ckss., ique, 22,1967, 
pp-87f f; Alexwder the Ore. 7t, London, 1968, pp. 46f f; Hisi, 16,1967, 
pp-509; Berve 1, p. 113; Kromayer-Veith p. 99; Tam, Alex., 2, p. 144. 
For later references 'to fiv&be4vývv, cf. Phot. Lexs. v. age'ratQ0L) 
Aff. 4.23.1: Plut. Flam. 17.8; cf. Bosworth, CQ, 23,1973, pp. 245ff; 
Hammond &'Griffith, M? ce., 11, pp. 405ff; N. G. L. Hammond, CQ, 28, 
1978,128ff; AGWOS, p. 27. 
60. The debate is based on the evidence of Diodorus, 16.3.1; cf. Wilcken, 
Alex., pp. 31-2; 'CAhr VX p. 205; Parke, Mems, p. 155; Hogarth, FHhp' 
mdAlex. 7nde, r oJ*Mjcedba, pp. 60ff; Hanunond in 'Hartzopoulos, & 
Loukopoulos, Philip ofAf,? ceYbg p-59; Andronicus, BCH, 94,1970, 
pp. 96-1 10; Lammert, 'RE, 2513f f; J. - R. Eflis, Philip 11. wdMacedbjwýw 
lm, oeyi? hým, 1976. p. 53. i 
61. Markle, AJ, 4.82. - 1978, pp. 484-9; nb. Hammond, 4G. *KSG, p. 26, 
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appears'to'supip'ort'the introduction of hoPlite's. ' The area' Pr'obabljý did 
not have thepolis base to suPPOrt hoplites in any number, cf. Arr. 7.9; 
Lucan 10.47-8. 
62. Diod. 16.3.1 -, cf. Front. Am12.3.2; Hammond, History of Oreece, p. 538; 
Kromayer, AS, II, p. 165. 
63. Diod. 16.3.1., Loeb translation. 
64. Diod. 13.44.3; cf. Parke, Aferng pp. 155-6; Anderson, AfFFAX, 
pp. 129ff; Best pp. 3-11,102ff; Lock, op. cit, pp. 23,24, n. 57; Coussin, 
h7sb7ts, pp. 65,68; Best pp. 3-1 1; cf. Lucan Dia. IMM439. 
65. Lock, opcit, p. 23 on Euripedes Rhesus305; cf. Karstedt, Ifermag 81, 
1957, p. 104. 
66. Missile armed with addition of long spear cf. Delbruck p. 182; 
Rustow-Kochly p. 240. Converted to hoplites cf. Anderson, MFFAX, 
pp. 129ff. Nothing revolutionary' in lphicratean reform, cf. Parke, 
Afei=, pp. 155-6; Best pp. 102ff. 
67. Livy 31.38.10; cL Delbruck p. 179; Hammond in Hartzopoulos & 
Loukopoulos (Eds. ) Philip ofAfacedon, p. 59. 
68. A. Aymard, REA 56,1954, pp. 15-36; Anderson, MFFAX, p. 131; 
Parke, Afeim, pp. 155-6; Coussin, Inslits, pp. 66. n. 5,68: Comie, 
op-cil, pp. 5,25,27ff, 31-8,65ff; Kromayer-Veith pp. 97,116; Wilcken, 
Alex., p. 30; Bum, G*R, 12,1965, pp. 140ff. 
69. Aff. 7.23.3; cf. Demostenes on Anaximenes in Jacoby, Fr. Grff., 11., A. 
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No, 72, FA pp. 1 16-7; cf. N. G. L Hanunond, Slvdiesia, ý, 'GArj 
oxford, 1973, p. 548; Domaszewski p. 26; Polyb. 12.19.6-, 'cf. 'Cuit. 3.9.12. " 
70. Aff . 7.9; cf. Coussin, Insk? s, p. 83; C. Edson, CP, 
53,1938, ' `0ý156fft 
Lucan 10.48; Lock, opteik, p. 30. 
71. Achaea, Plut. Amlas 9.4.3; Beloch, Bevolkemn, ý, p. 157; Griffith, 
Jhe. res., pp. 80ff; the reform, cf. Plut. FW9, Paus. 8.50.1; nos at Sellasia, 
cf. Polyb. 2.65.3; three tier system cf. Polyb. 38.15.. 6; Griffith, Afercs, 
pp. 99-107; Mantinea, Polyb. 11.15.6ff: cf. Plut. FhillO. 
72. Sparta, reform, Plut. Cleom. 11.2-, Griffith, Afercs. pp. 80ff. Rostovtzeff, 
SEHHIV, p. 195; Shimron, Late Swrl.?, p. 50; Chrimes, op. cit, pp. 348f f; 
Cavignac, Klio, 12. p. 271; Garfouldas, Fyrrhux p. 448; Arist. Fol2.9.16. 
Numbers at Sellasia, cf. Polyb. 2.65.7; Plut. Cleom. 27,20,000 men. P. 
Cartledge and A. Spawforth, Hellenistic and Roman Sparta, London, 
1989, p. 40ff; 52; 56 (for arming helots in the Macedonian style), 
discuss the reasons for the reform. 
73. Diod. 19.85. 
74. Polyb. 5.65,79-82,103; previously a native Egyptian caste, Hrd. 2.164- 
66; cf. Jos. AnM. 9.4; Livy 33.40; AppMith. 87; Just. 38.1; Coussin, 
, 6wlils, p. 7; Lesquier pp. 2-4, pp. 11- 29,40; Rostovtzeff, SMW 11, 
p. 709; Launey 1, p. 315; Walbank, Folybios, 1, pp. 589ff; Griffith, 
Merns., pp. 108,118; Mahaffy, Bermslh., 1899, pp. 140ff; Tam, 
CAM Eff, p. 730; Cary, History of the Greek World, p. 405; A. 
Bouche-Leclerq, Histoine des Seleucidn% p. 480. The clerach system is 
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described in Crawford, Kerleoshis, p. 85; Lesquier pip-19,2-, 201. 
75. Seleucid military strength and sources of manpower, are reviewed at, A. 
Bouche-Leclerq, Histoire des Seleacideg. Paris, 1013,1, pp. 476ff; 
Bar-Kochva, SA, pp. -20ff; Griffith, Mems., pp. 147-70; CAH. VII, p. 169; 
A. Kressig, MirIschäft und 6esellshaft im Se7eaeidenreich, ' Berlin, 
1978, pp. 32ff, 46; Launey, 1, p. 331ff; Tam, AUND, p. 70; Jones, Greek. 
-. - .--.. - P-, - -605fF'11, ' jiý-'422v Ciýv, p. 23; Rostovtzeff, 
&AWO, 1 pp-- 0 --44OfF, '-472;, -- 
Bickerman, lasfi? s., pp. 55ff, 74-8; Schalit, JQW, 49,1960, pp. 289-318; 
V. Tschirikover, Die Helle, &sch 
- 
SWIbegim7der vota Alermder der 
Grossei7 bis Buf der Romerzeit, Leipzig, 1927, pp. 334-5; Edson, CP, 53, 
1958, pp. 153-168; cf. Athen. 5.210, e-f, 12.527; Fr. Grff. 87, fr. 10; 
Polyb. 4.48.2-12; 5.40-7.53.5; Strabo 11.13.6; Jos. Antl. 138; 
Tac. Am7.5.8.4-5. Forkmoikov, * cf. Bickerman, InsYls. p. 102; Launey, 1, 
pp. 669-75; Bouche-Leclerq, op. cit, 1, p. 476; Bar-Kochva, SA, pp. 2231; 
App. Sty. -32.1; 37.1. For use of European mercenaries cf. Griffith, 
Mercs., pp. 151-3,164: Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 21; Bickerman, kslils, p. 77; 
I Macc. 11.8; Jos. AnZ13.129; Just. 35.2. Methods of land allotment, cf. 
OGIS, 229; SEGIV, 13; cf. Griffith, Afemg, pp. 154-5. For references 
to the Seleucid phalanx cf. Polyb. 5.53.3,79.45; 10.29.5; 16.18.4; 
30.25.3; Ap. Syrl8,32; Livy 36.18.2; 37.40.1,7; it always numbers in 
the tens of thousands. 
76. Daphnae, Polyb. 30.25.4; cf. Walbank, Folvbios, III, p. 450; Magnesia, 
-" Livy 37.40.2; App. SVr. 32. -, CAH. VII, pp. 169ff. gives a general military 
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capacity of 70,000 men, cf. Bar -Kochýa, SA,, pp. 41-ý., Parke, %'Oiýcs., ý-.,:, ý 
pp. 209; 214 recognised native Orientals may have fougfit as phalg, (n'g'ite's-, ' 
in the, Seleucid army; cf. Launey, 1, p. 319 who arped these were',, of 
little military value and' simply impressed to -pack out numbers at 
Daphnae, contra Tam, Bacbij., p. 180; cf. Griffith, Afe=, pp. 152-3. 
77. Troops return home to harvest, Polyb. 2.54; 4.87; Livy 32.4. Manpower 
problems, settlement and population transfer, Livy 33.3.1,9.1 ff; 
39.24.3-4; 40.3.3-4; 42.51.6. Cf. Walbank, Fhilio., p. 289; Tam in 
CAH-VII, p. 201. Scholars argue the economic position of the 
Macedonian peasantry did not change between the time of Philip 11 and 
the wars with Rome, cf. Griffith, G&R, 12,1965, pp. 125ff; FCFS, 4, 
1956, p-8ff. Macedonian strength in the Third Macedonian waý is 
recounted by Livy 42.11.6ff, 5I. Iff. and Plut. Aem. F.?, vI8.5 
78. Diod. 19.27; 29. 
79. Arr. 7.22.3; cf. Ascl. 6; Tarn, HMND, p. 13.: Ilogarth, op. cit p. 271 
argued it was designed to combat cavalry in a planned central Asian 
campaign that neyer took place because of Alexander's death. 
80. Paus. 9.15-16; Plut. Smll. 4-18.4; cf. Griffith, Mems, p. 191; Droysen, 
Heer, p. 154. 
81. Note, however, that Aff. FT. I. l quotes his sources, one of which is a 
technical manual by Pyrrhus. 
82. Ascl. 1.2; Ael. 2.7-9; Arr. TF3.1-2. 
360 
81 -Ascl. 2; Ael. 4-8; "Arr'TT6ff; -''Miisd'en', Cahjýiign of 
Liverpool, 1964, pp. 65-8; Chfimes, o 'd, ,, 
b cit, pp. ' 359,371 ar guý e 
Hellenistic armies' derived their 'organisation' from Spartan models. ", 
Note the Spartan army did not call its files lochov, a Aochos was half or 
quarter of a mom. 
84. Connolly, GRA IV, p. 77 based on Polyb-2.65.7; cf. Plut. Cleom. 27.1 1. 
85. Ascl. 2.8; Ael. 9.1-4a; Aff. FFIO. 1-3. Rustow-Kochly pp. 236-7; Les- 
quier pp. 92ff; Connolly, GRAIV, p. 76; for alternate speiriz, cf. L. 
Keppie, Miking of the Romiw Army, London, 1984, pp. 11-56; 
especially 19-23,33-5; Kromayer-Veith p. 136 it made the phalanx 
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Kromayer, BCH, 1910, pp. 521-2; Walbank, FoZ (ybios, I, pp. 286,541; 
Fh&, g p. 293. In Roman service it was a cohort, Plut. Am. 4. 
86. Ascl. 2.1; MAIM Aff. F7.7-8. 
87. Ascl. 4.1-4; Ael. 11.1-5; Arr. F. T. H. Iff. Note Front. S&, M. 1.3.1, where he 
implies Alexander's phalanx attacked in open order. Cf. Kromayer, 
"Vergleichende studiern zur Geschichte des Griechischens und 
Romischen Heerwesens", ffeimes Zei&rhdf4 35, pp. 216ff. 
88. Polyb. 12.18.2,19.7,21.1; 18.30.3-4; other references to sunis . p. 
ide. % 
Ascl. 4.3; Arr. TT11.4; -Ael. 11.4; Aff. 1.4.3.6.2: 4.17.7; 5.17.7. Tam, 
HMND, p-28 argued this formation made the later phalanx more 
cumbersome. Walbank, PhAp, p. 289 argued that the formation formed 
at one man per one and half feet.; Kromayer-Veith pp. 135-6 0.44m; 
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Pydna, refuted by Kromayet-Veith p'. 358; cf. BoSWorth, -ýWSCF,,, 81, 
1977, pp. 248-9; Griffith, FCFS, 4,1956, pp. 7-10. Th6'*6rjrnafi6ris,: 'w'e`r'e 
changed by inserting other Aochoiinto the front ranks, side by side their 
comrades, cf. Steinwender, Hermes, 1909, pp. 179-97; Kromayer-Veith 
pp-135-6; Polyaen. 4.2.2. infers that the countermarch drill could be 
'-E-0iriipfEted ifi'the"fa-ce-of 'iffie-e'ne-my. "The-debite-6-vei . legio-n-'a-ryfrib"fiti-ge, 
in this period is outlined at Kromayer-Veith pp. 364-5. Proctor, 
ff,? mih, z1s AfarchiR ffistorv, Oxford, 1971, p. 10 argued that Polybios' 
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conclusion, see Walbank, Fhf, ý(vbiog 1.34ff. 
89. Aff. 2.10.2. 
90. Polyb. 12.21.2; Walbank, Folvbios., 11, p-35. 
91. Like a wall, Livy 31.38.10; 36.18.5; a lestudo, 32.17.13. Delbruck 
p. 178 believed that to advance in sunaspideswas to court disaster. 
92. Ascl. 10.18; Ael. 29.7,9; 38.1-2; Arr. T. 7.20ff. 
93. Arr. 7.23.3 adds that these men recieved higher pay, reminiscent of 
'double pay men' in sixteenth century Landsknechte pike units, cf. C. 
Oman, A History ol* the Art of W.?, r iw the Sirteenth Cevtuly, Reprint, 
London, 1987, p. 78. 
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94. Polyb. 11-12. 
95. Aff . 2.10.2; see above note 23; Tam, HA"D,, p. 8; may also 
have been 
used by Seleucid- troops at I Macc. 6.34-8,40; Jos. A,? 112.371; cf. 
Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 180; for similar drifl cf. Xen. EqM.? S. 4.1-3; 
Aff. 1.13.1-2. 
96. Arr. 3.13.5. 
97. Ascl. 11; Ael. 36; Arr. T. 7.28; modern commentators see the echeloned 
line as the most probable formation that was used in action, based on 
Epan-ýinondas' classic oblique attack, cf. Coussin pp. 78ff; E. Kahnes 
and J. Kromayer, DreiDiydochev SchlachleA Leipzig, 1921, pp-391ff; 
Kromayer. AS, IV, pp343ff, 165; Rustow-Kochly p. 266. 
98. For the problems reconstructing ancient battles see N. Whatley, "On 
the possibility of reconstructing Marathon and other ancient battles", 
JHS, 84,1964, pp. 119-139. 
99. Coussin p. 83; Delbruck p. 82; Droysen, Ublem, p. 64; Tam, HMND, pp. 
13,28; Galfifi, SCI, 3,1976, p. 52; Hanunond, KFo, 31,1938, p. 215. 
Contra is Appian's assertion that the Seleucid phalanx was on a par 
with that of Philip and Alexander, Syz. 19. 
100. Battle vs. Bardylus, Diod. 16.4.2-7; cf. Front. S&jZ2.3.2; Hammond, 
Hist of Greece, p. 538; Kromayer, AS, 2, pp. 165ff. For the early period 
in general cf. Hanunond, "Diodorus' narrative of the Sacred War", 
AlS. 57,1957, pp. 44-77; T. R. Martin, "Diodorus on Philip If and 
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Thracian campaign of 352-351 ", CF, - 
72,1977, pp. 32739. 
101. Plut. Fe118; Alex. 9; Polyaen. 4.2.2; Diod. 16.85.5ff; cf. ' Plut. DýM- 
19. lff; Paus. 9.40.10; Strabo 9.2.37, ' Just. 9.4.6. Numbers, Kromayer- 
Veith p. 75. The Macedonian breakthrough, G. Soteriades, "Das 
schlachtfeld von Cliaronea und ý der grabhugel der Makedonen", 
Ath. Ah? t, 28,1903, p. 319 argued it was made by infantry, contra 
Markle, AIA, 1978, pp. 490-1. by cavalry. Thq feint retreat is based on 
Polyaenus, cf. Hammond in Hartzopoulos & Loukopoulos (Eds. ), 
Philip ofAfacedow, p. 59. Kromayer, AS, 11, p. 165 argued Philip refused 
his right and wheeled his cavalry into the advancing Greek line, 
disrupted, one presumes, by the oblique Macedonian formation, cf. 
Rustow-Kochley p. 266. Cf. Hammond, "The two battles of Chaeronea 
(338 and 86 B. C. )" KFo, 31,1938, pp. 186-218; Braun, "Zur schlacht 
bei Chaironea", Oiff, 37,1948, pp. 88ff: Pritchett, "Some observations 
on Chaironeia", AIA, 62,1968, pp. 307-11; Tam, HAfND, p. 13. 
102. Curt. 6.1. lff. 
103. Arr. 1.13-16; Plut. Alex. 16; Diod. 17.19.21; Polyaen. 4.3.16. 
104. Arr. 2.9-13; Curt. 3.8-12;. Diod. 17.33; cf. Polyb. 12.13-22. 
105. Aff. 3.11-16; Diod. 17.53-60; Curt. 4.12. lff. 
106. Aff. 5.18-19; Diod. 17.87-8; Curt. 8.13-14; Plut. Alex. 60; Polyaen. 4.3.22; 
Front. S&jA. 4.9. 
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107. Arr. 1.1.9; drill and diýcip4he"'is"c6m'm'erite, d-oii'by, ýBick'e'rma'n',, ", *, ý-, ki&&, ý. 
I: & ko P. 74; Tam, HMND, P. 74; Han"rirnond'ih,, HaftzopouI6s ,U oulos'ý ''P 
(Eds. ), ALý, ýp of Afwedow, p. 59. Note the'feigned withdr'awL'co'uIq, be 
added, cL note 100 above. 
108. For how the Diadochi phalanx was raised cf. Briant, REA, 75, * 1973, 
pp. 43ff; Launey, 1. pp. 96,295-6; Griffith, Afemg pp. 39-41; Brunt, JHS, 
83,1963, pp. 39ff. 
109. Diod. 18.9.1-3,15,16.4,17.3ff; Just. 13.5.8; cf. Tam, JHS, 49,1939, 
pp. 124-135; C. A. Robinson, AJF, 61,1940, pp. 402- 412. 
110. Diod. 18.20; Plut. Eum. 4.1. 
111. Diod. 18.44. 
112. Diod. 19.29, see note 77 above. 
113. Diod. 19.27-8; for the battle 19.39ff; Plut. Eum. 15. 
114 Cf. Tam, HAfND, P-16; W. Heckel, "The Career of Antigenes", 
SDpmbol,? e Osloenses, 42,1982, pp. 57-67. 
115. Diod. 19.27.4ff; Plut. Evm. 16.9; Polyaen. 4.6.10,6.13; Nepos Bvm. 15; 
just. 14.3-4. 
116. Diod. 19.82-3; cf. Just. 15.1. 
117. Plut., Vem. 29.3-4; Diod. 20.113; cf. Plut. Fj7r. 4. 
11 PIut. Dem. 4 4; Pyrr. 7. 
119. Plut. Fyfr. 27.3; Paus. 7.8.5; Glover, G&R, 17,1948, p. 7 argued the 
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wagon and ditch were designed as an elephant, obstacle; .. this mayAbe so, 
but they also proved a fornýiidible defence against infantry attack. 'ý. 
ý' 
120. Polyb. 2.69.3-9; Plut. Cleom. 28-, Philop. 6; CAH, VII, pp. 761ff; _ - 
G. 
Soteriades, BM, 34,1910, pp. 5ff; J. Kromayer, "Sellasia", BM, 34, 
1910, pp. 508ff: AS, 1, pp. 199ff., where Kromayer argues Cleomenes 
designed his battle plan along similar lines to those used by 
Epaminondas, this writer simply cannot see how he came to such a 
conclusion, Sellasia being so dissimilar to any of the battles of the 
great Theban -leader; R. Urban, "Das heer des Kleomenes bei 
Sellasia", CHron Band 3,1973, pp. 95fff; A. Ferrabino, "La battaglia 
di Sellasia", AAF, 54,1918119. pp. 754ff; W. W. K. Pritchett, StuSesid 
A, 7cievt GreeIr Topogmphy, 11, Berkely, 1965, pp. 68f f; W. Loring, JHS, 
15,1895, pp. 25,60ff; Leake, Afore.?, 11, p. 530. Plut. Cleoxll; cf. '7.3 
where 4,000 pedo, &oi and 2,000 helots are armed with the &vim, cf. 
M. Daubies, "Cleomenes III, les hilotes et Sellasie", HU 20,1971, 
pp-665-93; Urban, op. cit, notes that it is difficult to determine which 
contingents of phalanx were &visa armed; Launey, I, p. 12, n. 7. 
121. Kromayer, AS, L, p. 228; they lower mdmiat Polyb. 2.69; cf. Walbank, 
Folybios, 1, p. 272; A. Fuks, "The Spartan citizeu. body in the mid third 
century and its enlargement proposed by Agis III", Athea, 40,1902, 
pp-246,262ff. for the size of the Savfi. '? 1e body in the mid-third 
century B. C. 
122. Polyb. 2.65-66. 
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23 'ý. 2-66.5; cf. Walbank, Alo ii . ý80. I' .. P61Y os, ýl p 
124. Polyb. 2.66.10-11,67.1; the pvXoiEeserýelsupports, 66.6-7; thd Acha&ah v 
hoplites, 66.7; cf. 4.14 Caphyae for'e'vidence of th . eir equipment, 
SeHasia pre-dates PHopoemen's reform. 
125. Polyb. 2.65.9 
126. -Polyb. 2.68--5ff-. - 
127. Polyb. 2.68.9. 
128. Polyb. 2.68.8; note he also refers to smh-ji here, perhaps indicating a 
more flexible battleline than the serried ranks of mdmphorouZ Note 
Soteriades, op. cil, believed the slope was smooth and gradual, inferring 
it would not have disordered the phalanx. The mjim phalanx, however, 
could suffer greatly from any unevenness of ground and certainly 
Polybios believed Eucleidas' men were fighting at a disadvantage 
because of being stationed on Euhs. 
129. Polyb. 2.69.6; Plut. Cleom. 28; cf. Walbank, Fol(yhiag, 1, pp. 285-6.130. 
Polyb. 2.69.9; cf. Walbank, Folybiag 1, pp. 286-7 and his references; this 
may be a reference to either the use of the suimspides or a deep 
phalanx, or bothl 
131. Polyb. 5.64,84.2ff; cf. CAII VIV, pp. 1 17ff; Bar-Kochva, SA, pp. 128- 
141; Walbank, Polybiag I. pp. 613ff: Galfili discussed the deployment 
of the two armies, SCX 3,1976, pp. 52ff. For topography cf. Pedech, La 
Methodffistojique de FW ( vbe, Paris, 1964, pp. 538ff. 
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132. Polyb. 5.85.6. 
133. Ptolemaic phalanx numbers, cL Bouche-Leclerq p. 480 (20,000); 
Griffith, Mems, pp. 108ff. - quoting Polyb. 5.65.9 - (20,000); Lesquier. 
Lw, fffs., pp. 4ff, noting vast nulitary capacity quoted by App. Proem. 10 
(25,000); Tam, CAH. VII, p. 730; M. Cary, History of the Oreelr Morld, 
p. 403; Mahaffy, Hemalh., 10,1899, pp. 140ff; Meyer pp. 64, n. 217,87. 
The equipment of the argymspides, cf. Bouche-Leclerq p. 480; 
Lesquier, lasfi'fs., p. 15 (heavy inf. ); Droysen, pp. 128, n. 2,107, n. 1 
(heavy inf. ), nb. this conclusion appears contrary to their tactical use at 
P. 22; Bar-Kochva, SA, pp. 64-4 firmly concludes they were &2dm- 
phorol 
134. Polyb. 5.85.10. 
135. Polyb. 5.64.4ff, 79.4ff. 
136. Polyb. 5.85.2ff. 
137. Polyb. 11.11ff, 15.6-16; Plut. AMO; W. E. Pritchett, Studies ia Greek 
Topogmphy, - F-vt A- BuMerields, Berkeley, 1969, pp. 37,66ff; J. 
Kromayer, AS, I, pp-297ff. 
138. Polyb. 1 1.15.6,16.2; cL, 2.69; 5.85.9; App. Sff. 19; Plut. Aem. Pav119. 
139. Plut. PhillO. 5; cf. Kromayer, opcit; Walbank, Po&biag 11, pp. 282-3. 
140. Polyb. 11.11.6, cf. 16.7. 
141. Polyb. 11.11.1,12.4; cf. Kromayer, opcil pp. 292,301; Walbank, 
Fblybios, pp. 283,288. These weapons were probably the light bolt 
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shooter illustrated in E. W. Marsden's, OFeek ? nd, Rgm.? a'AibZAqiy, -'ý4, 
vol. 1, pp. 43,167. 
142. The cheirokffisla, cf. Marsden, opcit, pp. 4,26,189, *-, i64' wh6re' 
Marsden confirms that artillery pieces were normally transported in a 
dismantled state, p. 169; vol 11, pp. 206ff; for the Oxus crossing, cf. 
Arr. 4.4.4; Curt. 7.9.3ff; Marsden, opcit, pp. 165-6. 
143. Polyb. 11.11.6; cf. Coussin, h2slits., p. 83; Walbank, Fol ybios.. 11, p. 286 
who argued the formation was supposed to make the phalanx more 
flexible. 
144. Plut. FW9.8; cf. Polyb. 11.10.11; for Nemean games cf. Plut. Ad 11. 
145. Polyb. 4.14; cf. note 71 for other references pertaining to the Achaean 
army. 
146. Polyb. 11.15.2-3. 
147. Plut. PhillO. 4. 
148. Polyb. 11.15.4-7. 
149. Connolly, GRA W. pp. 140-2, especially the diagram on p. 141; Delbruck 
pp. 272ff. 
150. Dion. Hal. 19.12; Plut. Fj7T16-17; cL Garfouldas, Fj7Thus, pp-69-76; 
Delbruck pp. 298-9. 
151. Dion. Hal. 20.1-3; Plut. Fj7r2lff; cf. Garfouldas, Py, 7hvs, pp. 88-93; 
-e Delbruck pp. 299-300. 
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152. Plut. Fyrr2l. 6. 
153. Dion. Hal. 20.3.6; Plut. Pyrr. 21.6-7. 
154. Dion. lial. 20.1.2ff; , pe. 
irvi Polyb. 18.28 for 'alternate s cf. Coussin, 
Instils, pp. 82-3; Tam, AWND, p. 14. For the order of battle cf. 
Dion. Hal. 20.1.2-5. 
. .--- 
155- Connolly, _ ORA IVpp. 
105-112, - the Sanuutes may 
have . 
fought- as - __ 
peltasts. 
156. Plut. Pyrr8. 
157. Dion. Hat. 20.10-12; Plut. Fyir25: cf. Garfouldas, Fyjrhas, pp. 118-121; 
Scuflard, The Elephant in the Oreek m7dRomw lVorld, London, 1974, 
pp. 111-115; Delbruck p. 300. 
158. Livy 31.38.10ff; 32.5.9.10.11; cf. Plut. Flam. lf. 
159. Polyb. 18.18ff; Livy 33.3-10; Plut. Fl,? m. 8ff; Pritchett, Studies A7 Greek 
TOPOSMPAýv, vol. 4, pp. 133-144; cf. p. 136, fig. 14 for map; Walbank, 
, Pol, . ybios, 
11, pp. 572ff. 
160. Polyb. 18-24.3; Livy 33.8.12; Plut. Flim-8. 
161. Polyb. 18.24.3. 
162. Xen. LmFoll 1.4,8; Aff. 2.8.3; cf. Polyb. 12.19.5; cf. Connofly, GRA If, 
pp. 44,46 for reconstruction. 
163. Polyb. 18.24.9. 
164. Polyb. 18.24.8 (Loeb translation); Walbank, Fblybios, 11, p. 582. For 
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forming'on the crest'of the'hill, Polyb. -24.9. "' It' m6it, be fioi6d here. that 
the Macedonian affny ý had been training before the outbreak of 
hostilities, this may have facilitated the complex manoeuvres at 
Cynoscephalae, see page 94 of the main text. 
165. Ascl. 10.18. 
166. Livy 33.8.14 who rode roughshod over the technicalities of phalanx 
drill, to make his account worthless; Plut. R=8; Polyb. 18.24.8; cf. 
Walbank, Folybiag 11, p. 292. 
167. Polyb. 18.24.9; Livy 33.8.13; Plut. F/, =8; once more Livy's account 
contains grave effors, cf. Walsh. G&R, 5,1958, pp. 84-5. 
168. Polyb. 18.26. Sff; Livy 33.9.5ff; Plut. Flxn. 8; for numbers on this wing 
cf. Walbank, Fol, (vbiag 11, p. 583; Kromayer, AS, 11, p. 84. 
169. Polyb. 18.26. lff; Livy 33.9.8ff: Plut. Amn. 8; cf. Walbank, Folvbios, 11, 
pp. 583-4: Kromayer. AS, II. p. 316, n. 3; Connolly, in Hackett (ed. ). 
Warfare h7 the Amiewt World, London, 1989, pp. 150-1, for a 
reconstruction of an aerial view of this moment in the battle. 
170. Livy 32-17.4,11,13. 
171. Livy 32.17.13. 
172. Polyb. 18.30. 
173. Livy 35.43.6; App. Sjr. 18; Kromayer. AS, II, pp. 220-7; Bar Kochva, 
SA, p. 15, n. 24 for numbers. Topography, cf. Pritchett, qpxit pp. 71ff; 
P. A. MacKay, "Procopius' De AedXxiis and the topography of 
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Thermopylae. ", AM, 67,1963, po. 241ff, pls. 49-50 and map. 
174. Livy 36.16.1: App. Syrl8; Pritchett, op. cit pp. 79-80. 
175. Livy 36.18.5. 
176. Livy 36.18.2; App. Sjr. 18: at 19 the Seleucid juiloifall back through 
the phalanx: cf. Ascl. 6.1; Aff. TT13.1.2ff; Ael. 5.1; 7.4-5; 31. 
177. -A pp. Sff. 19; note Livy implies this at . 36.18.5. 
178. Livy on the deployment of the phalanx around the rampart, 36.18.2; the 
retreat and suggestion that the phalanx's formation was like a wall, 
18.5. 
179. Livy 37.37-44; App. Sý-v, -30-6; cf. Bar-Kochva, SA, pp. 163ff; SCX 1, 
1974, p. 8; Kromayer, AS, II, pp. 154-63. 
180. App. Syr32: cf. Livy 38.46.2. 
181. App. Syr34-5. 
182. Livy 38.42.4: App. Sjr3S; cf. Bar-Kochva, SA, pp. 167ff. 
183. Livy 37.40.5-8. 
184. App. Sjr32; 35; cf. Livy 38.42.2; Kromayer, AS, 11, p. 215 argucs this 
formation was assumed to give the phalanx flexibility, the argument 
.I follows the line used for the 'alternate sfiemi; contra Delbruck p. 368. 
185. Livy. 44.37ff; Plut. Aem. Riull8ff; N. G. L. Hammond, "The battle of 
Pydna. ", JHS, 104,1984, pp. 31-47; Pritchett, op. ciZ pp. 145ff; E. 
Meyer, "Der schlacht von Pydna. ", Sitz. Ber de. - Be. -lia A cad, 1909, 
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0ý380-808, Kromayer, AS, 11, - . 340ff for numbers. pp , 
186. Cf. Pritchett, optaý 
187. Livy 44.41- compared to Plut. Aem. P=10.1-2; 20. 
188. Livy 44.41.6. 
189. Front. Strat. 2.3.20. 
00. Front. S&aZ3.20; Plut. Aem. F, 7a, 120.4; 19.1. 
191. Livy 41.42.2; Plut. Aem. Pa&. 21.1. 
192. Polyb. 18.31. 
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Notes to ChaplffJl 
Ascl. 1.2; Arr. FTI. 3; 3.1-4; Ael. 2.7; 9; cL Tarn, IIA'fND, Ip 
A. Dain, 'Hisloh-e da Texle d: Flien le Lacdcian, Paris', -1946, p. 32-3; 
Best'p. 4; Lammert, R4 19.405; 58-68 sv. Fellaslov, - Bicken-nan, Inshis., 
p. 55 who comments on Polyb. 5-53: 16-18; 5.61.8; 68.11; App. Styrl7; 
Livy 36.18: Zonaras 9.20.5. "Some confusion over the role of the peltast . 
appears in some modem works, eg. Couss n, hsii&, p. 67. 
2. For example Thuc. 2.29.5; 4.129.2; 5.6.4; 7.27.1; Xen. ffel/4.3.15 for 
mass use of peltasts by Agesilaus; cf. Best pp. 17ff for "professional" 
peltasts . Anderson, AfTFAX, pp. 111-2 for "natural" peltasts. 
H. W. Parke, Fhe O. YfordClamicalDictio,?,?, ry, p. 707, sv. Fellasts 
4. Peltasts were used on both sides in the Peloponnesian War, Parke, 
Afe. rcs., pp. 17-18; they could be hired or laid-off at short notice, 
Thuc. 7.27ff; cf. Tam, HMND. p. 9; for pre- Peloponnesian War 
examples cf. Hrd. 5.64, Cleomenes I's march on Athens as example of 
large area operations. The problems posed by a Peloponnesian War 
scenario were forseen by Perikles Thuc. 1.90ff. Rough terrain combat, 
compare Delium. (Thuc. 5.63ff) to Aetolia and Amphipolis 
(Thuc. 3.105ff; 4.102ff). Cf. H. F. Millar "The Practicle and Economic 
Background of the Greek Mercenary Explosion. " G&R, 31, no. 2,1984, 
pp. 153-160. 
Peltasts as a "natural" troop type - Best pp. 3-16; Coussin, Ansdis., 
p. 65. The Thracian origin of peltasts - Anderson, MFFAX, p. 113-4; 
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I- Launey 1.397; cf. Xen. Anjb7A4; Ilrd. 7.75. The chaia6t6*ris'fic; I 
patterned cloak fastened around the neck, high boot and f6x'sýin ciý, ý in 
art - ABVp297, no. 15; CVA Danemurk, VIII, pls. 324,325, i, e', f. 
CVA USA, VI, P1.257.1b. Peisistratus introduced Thracians to Athens, 
cf. Snodgrass, AAG, p. 79. Note that Thracian peltasts have javelins in 
all art representations. The Greeks took up this new style of Thracian 
peltast, cf. Parke, 'Afems., 'p. 48 n. 2; Best p. 12; 6f. Xin. -ffe/1.3.2.2; 4. For 
a reconstruction of a Thracian peltast see Connolly, GRA IVp. 49. 
6. Use of rowers as peltasts cf. Thuc. 4.9.1; Xen. He. 111.2. lff; 2.4.2ff; 
2.4.10-12; Parke, Meru., p-48 n-2 who has these soldiers Properly 
organised; others see them as a rabble, cf. Hatzfeld Alcibiade, Etude 
sur Ihisfoire dAlhenes a Aa Aý7 de Ve Siecle, Paris,. 1951, p. 278.; 
Lippolt, LeAchl, p. 44 n. 1; Best pp. 36-7, Anderson, AfFFAX, p., 114. 
Note the peltasts are formed from sailors in the fleet, the p&oiare an 
entirely different force. Parke, Mercs, p. 48 n. 2, the motive was to 
provide an alternative to mercenaries; p. 18 n. 3 to equip the lower 
classes. Xenophon has cavalry, epileftiand peltasts at Hell. 1.2.7; L. 
Casson, The Anciej7t Afajiwers, London, 1960, p. 100 identifies peltasts 
here as marines off of the fleet's ships. See Xen. HeII2.4.24; 
-0 ý 
Thuc. 4.9.1 for use of hastily equipped 1helesin the fighting against The 
Thirty. The theory that the peltast is simply a jLvilbs with a shield can 
be found at Best pp. 4,43; Anderson, MFP, 4X. p. 112. Forthepe. /lesee 
Arist:. RaW-498., a rimless shield covered in goatskin; Parke, Afercý, 
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pp. 17-18, a round target, cf. also KromayFr, -, 'Hee. -,., '- 
AfFPAX, p. 112 n. 18. XenAa.? b5.2.29 has a*, t6r-onzefc'ov'ered", '. v'ersion. 
Xen. A, a. 7b. 7.4.17 records the incident'of theý'Thracian. 'capjhi", on. a 
fence by a s1field slung on his back. In art the pelte is often depicted as 
made of wicker, cf. Xen. Hel/2.4.45; Ael. 29.11-12 - provide literary 
support. Snodgrass reconstructs the peltast at, AAO, pp. 93ff. Griffith, 
--253; -Launey 1.336ff; 402-give -full -definitions of - Metes. - - g. 239F 
possible equipment used. 
7. Xen. He112.4.15; Parke, Mercs., p. 80; Best p. 7,35,38,44,103. Parke. 
Me=, p. 54 has peltasts as "closely defined" fight infantry, cf. 
Lippolt, Leicht, p. 33. For peltasts with slings cf. XerLHeh'4.6.7. 
8. Cf. Parke, Mere&, pp. 23-43 for his comments on Xenophon's 
An,? Azvsý, eg. Pygela 409 B. C. Xen. He, #1.2.1-2; cf. Best 36ff; p. 44 for 
comments on Isocr. Pm. 7W,. 4.144. His conclusion is that peltasts were 
professional soldiers. 
9. Diod. 15.44.2-4; Loeb translation. 
10. Nepos Aphicr 1.3-4; Loeb translation. 
11. Briscoe, Commentiry on Livy Books 31-LU Oxford, 1973, p. 142. 
cornment: ý on Livy 31.36.1 - lphicrates gave impetus to peltast 
development and use. Kromayer-Vieth, p8l; Cary, CAH. W, p. 48 for 
comment on this new type of soldier. Kromayer-Veith pp. 89-90 
identifies a unit of these troops at Xen. Hel/4.5.11-17. Best pp. 85ff saw 
these troops as an intermediate type, as does Snodgrass, AAO, 
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pp. 109-110. Other scholars see them as a: forerunner of, the'M'. acedonjaný-ý- 
phalanx, cf. Anderson, AfFPAX, p. l32ff; 'Griffith, 'Ahciint:., 
S&Ses in Hovoar of 0 F. Eb6ýih, 1981, ppl6lff. Rustow; -',,.. -*ocht-` ý 
p. 240, in effect the later phalanx was formed of peltasis""' Fuller 
Oenervlship, p. 42 illustrates fully the possible innovations'this, new 
type gave to warfare. Parke, . 4fej-cs., p. 80 points out that Diodorus; (and 
-indeed--Nepos) -works from the-standpoint of the-hoplite, thereform- 
lightens hoplite, equipment. 
12. For reconstructions of the lphicratean peltasts see J. Warry, lVarl2me -in 
the Classic. 71 World, London, 1980, p. 67. Parke, -Afercs., p. 80; Lippolt, 
Leichl, P. 62 argue the lphicratean' peltasts were armed with both 
javelins and a long thrusting spear. 
13. See in conjunction with note 12. Griffith, AMSin Hon CH. Edsm. 
p-166 sees this troop type as a precurser to later pikemen. Anderson, 
MTFAX, pp. 129ff a conversio*n to hoplites. Grifrith opcil. p. 167 
suggests this new force fought at Cunaxa. Cf. Parke, Meirs., p. 156 
14. See above p. 6ff. for the debate surrounding the lightening of hoplite 
equipment. In tlýs case refer especially to Best p. 102; Parke, Afeirs., 
p. 80. 
15. Parke, Afercs., p. 80. 
16. Parke, Mercs., p. 80; Lippolt. Leicht, p. 66. Agesilaus may have 
introduced peltasts into Europe in an attempt to retrain part of his army 
in the new tactics, cf. Xen. ffelll. 23; 38; cf. Best p. 81. 
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17. Best pp. 103ff. A- modification . to; the theory ý that barbarians were. - 
integrated into the Greek military system has already been "postulated at 
note 16. The normal equipment of Thracian peltasts Was, according' to 
Best, two javelins, or a long thrusting spear, cf. Lucian DijlMor1273. 
Thracian styles of fighting were exported to Greece, cf. Parke, Aferas, 
p. 42 n. 2; Best p. 12; Xen. Heff 3.2.2; 4. For Thracian use of the 
--hom , pha, 
i.? cf. Lesquier p. 13; Droysen, -Heer, p. 25; 26 n. 3; N. Sekunda 
"The Rhompaij, A Thracian Weapon of the Hellenistic Period. ". 
Aj7cie, 7tBVIWj,? i72?,. Nottingham, 1983, pp. 275-288; A. J. Reinach, BCH, 
1910, pp-444ff; cf. Plut. Aem. 18.3; Livy 31.36.1; 31.39.11; 33.4.4. For 
the mvehaim, a traditional Thracian weapon, cf. Best p. 104; cf. 
Xen. Amb 7.4.16. For swords in general cf. Best p. 104. For mdm use 
by Thracians cf. Parke, Afems., p. 156 based on Lucian Di,? IMM 439. 
Bikerman, Inslitv, p. 55 notes how confused the Lucian evidence is, 
especially as to who actually wields the mjim. Thracians were 
traditionally akmbsýljior peltasts, cf. Launey 1, p. 397; Berve 1, p. 136. 
Best p. 105 argues that peltasts were created by giving jwi7oishields, 
note, however, that he makes it clear he does not believe equipment 
was standardised, pp. 103,107. For the pelle, cf. Best p. 7; spears, cf. 
Best p. 7; boots, cf. Lippolt, Leich4 p. 65 n. S. For a reconstruction of the 
Thracian peltast cf. Connol-ly, GRA IV, p. 49; Warry optcil p. 49. 
18. Anderson, MFFAX, p. 130-1, cf. notes 59,60 and 61; p. 129ff; 130 n. 59 
for use of excep(ionally long spears by foreign troops. Anderson uses 
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the following supporting evidence, , Xen. Aj7.? b 1.8.9; Cyr 6.2.10; 
7.1.33; cf. Hrd. 7.8.1. 
19. Parke, Afercs, p. 80; Kromayer, Neel, p. 86; Lip'polt, Lciclil, p. 62,66; 
Kromayer-Veith p. 89 date the reform to 39312 BC. Anderson, AJA, 
1963, p. 411-3; cf. his AMPAX, p. 130; Best p. 108 accepts Diodorus' 
date of 37413 BC (as paradoxically does Parke, Aferm, p. 81, part of a- 
discussion over pp. 79-81 where he accepts the description of the 
reform as recorded by Diodorus). 
20. All possible instances of actual use of the new peltast are quoted at 
Parke, Afe=, p. 77. For the encounter between Chabrias and Agesilaus, 
cf. Diod. 15.22.23; Xen. Anab 6.2.39; cf. Best p. 108; Anderson, 
AfFFAX, p. 129 n. 55; "The Statue of Chabrias", A. M. 67,1963, pp 
411-13; cf. Nepos C15,. 7bias I ff; Lippolt Leicht, p. 66; Kromayer-Veith 
p. 89. Lippolt, Lekht, p. 67 quotes a further incident at Diod. 16.24.2. 
Best p. 106 adds Leuctra to the list, Xen.. /fel/ 6.4.9. Contrary arguments 
II 
can be found at Parke, Afe=, p. 80. Lippolt, Leicht. p. 67 adds the 
possible use of these troops in the Phocian establishment, cf. Diod. 
16.29.2. 
21. Parke, Afercs, p. 77, notes Xenophon did not mention the reform. This 
was because of his experience outside the mainstream of Greek 
I 
warfare. cf. Anderson, MFFAX p. 132: Parke, Afeim, p. 77; his Spartan 
bias, Best p. 107,108 n. 1; cf. R4 V1, sv. "Timotheus", 2.1324.32-35. 
Best p. 36ff; p. 38 (especially); p. 44. Generally Best is astonished at 
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Xenophon's weakness regarding peltasts and his bad 'of:,, tecluucal' 
temis. Thucydides is quite exclusive in his use of the 
4.32.3.4.93.2. Note that Best reaches no conclusion -why -Xinophon 
acts as lie does. 
22. Cf. Xen. Hell 6.2.39; 6.5.51-2. 
23. Lippolt, Leichl, p. 62: Anderson, AfTFAX, p. 130; Kromayer- Veith 
p. 89. Demosthenes episode, cf. Thuc. 3.105ff; Anderson, AfTFAX. 
p. 117 argues that most hoplites would have been too heavily equipped 
to do this, despite the light hoplite theory, supported by Anderson and 
discussed above. 
24. Thuc. 4.24ff; cf. Brasidas' tactics in 423 at Thuc. 4.125. 
25. Xen-He/13.4.23ff; Penguin translation; see also the fight between the 
Spartan mr.? and lphicrates' peltasts near Corinth in 390 B. C., 
Xen. HeII4.5.1 I ff. 
26. Cf. Best p. 72ff;, Xen. Agesl. 31; Plut. AgeslO. 3; cf. Xen. AnaA 7.3.44- 
46. Lazenby, Sý)-wr&n. 41mýv, p. 12 explains age group organisation, cf. 
also Anderson, MFFAX, p. 119. Sometimes this tactic did not work, 
Xen. Hell 4.3.22-3; 5.4.42-45; Thuc. 4.127; 4.34.1. Cf. G. B. Grundy, 
Th, vq: rdides ýwdi? Hj. ýIoly of His Age, p. 272-3. Lacedaemonian troops 
dispised peltasts, Xen. Hell 4.15-17. The Spartans may have copied this 
tactic from the Thracians, Thuc. 7.30.2. For its use at Lechaion cf. 
Xen. Hell 4.5. llff; Plut. Peloo. 2.1; cf. Kromayer, Hem, P. 89. 
Anderson, AfFPAX, p. 125 compares Sphacteria to Lechaion. Iloplites 
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are - always distin uished from pelta'sts. in ancient'.,,.,. g. 9 
Dem. 9.48ff. This ancient attitude is somewhat' c' on 16 a: 
modification, of, the light hoplite -theory, Chrimes, b ait;. ý367,, i4ses OP. 
Arr. F.. T 3.5 to argue that peltasts were light-. hoplites. Best p . 
105 
supports the theory that Spartan tactics prompted the reform. of 
Iphicrates. 
27. The tacticians cite the three types of infantry at Aff .F F3: Ascl. 1.2. 
28. Note that in Classical times these troops were 'shield- bearers', often 
slaves, with no real combat role, eg. Xen. He-//4.5.15. 
29. Polyaen. 4.9.3 
30. Spendel, Ubter, p. 35 - peltasts a hinge between cavalry and infantry; 
p-41 between jwtzheljtývi and avAo.,, - cf. Rustow- Kochly p. 240. 
ýor 
links with lphicratean peltast cf. Spendel Unfer., p. 41; Rustow-Kochly 
p. 147. Equipment cf. Droysen, Heer, p. 25,26 n3; Delbruck p. 147ff; 
Spendel op. cil p. 41. The ancients are not precise in their use of the 
term jwlle, cf. Tarn, HMND, p. 16 on Livy 43.41 For the Patros coin cf. 
Droysen p. 41-2; Spendel opcit p. 41. Gabiene cf. Diod. 19.40.3; 
Spendel, Mler, p. 43; Rustow-Kochly p. 342 - the hyp"pisismay be 
line or heavy infantry by the time of this battle. Spendel UJ71e. -., p. 44, 
this change also effected the ar&raspides. Light hyp", 50isig cf. 
Kromayer-Veith p. 109; Spendel Unle. -, p. 41; Berve 1.125; Parke, 
Afercs, p. 136; J. R. Hamilton, CO, NS 5,1955 , pp. 218-19. Heavy 
hypaspists Tam NAfNDpp. 16-l7; Griffith, FCFS, NS 4.1955-6, p. 3. 
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-7 h Coussin, pp. 66 yp"p isis are peltaýts*, "Beyan, _,,., 
6tes Polybios 7.162; 16.10; alsb 'Ad; B Selevczig p. 2ý4'quO 
"egm. ller, p. 446, ''the hý i: ofvth-"` la nx , 
ýAts were', part Pý 
Lesquier p. 15 is less , categorical, they'- are - probably p link ýAftr'oops. ' 
General arguments as to the role of the hpýws, ýists can be found at 
NValbank Philip p. 291-3; Pol) (, vbio. g 11.274; 486; Tarn, HAIND, p. 6; 
Addock, -GMA W, p. 26 emphasises the role-as-a link -between infanfty 
centre and cavalry wing. H, 9paspAlson. special missions Aff. 1.6: 1.8.4; 
1.20.9; 1.22.4; 2.4.75; 2.23.2; 3.17.2; 3.22ff; 3.23.3; 3.24.1; 3.25.6; 
3.30; 4.3.1; 4.6.3; 4.24.1; 4.27.1: 4.29; 5.12.2; 5.22.5; 6.2.2; 6.6.1; 
6.22.1. Taxeisof phalanx on special missions Aff. 1.20.9; 2.4.3; 2.23.2: 
3.23.3; 3.24.1; 4.6.3; 4.24.1; 4.29; S. 12.2: 6.6.1; 6.29.1. 
31. 
. 
Coussin fadts. p. 68; Tam, ZZILVD, p. 1 I- largely peltasts; Parke, 
Afe, rcs, p. 189 has peltasts forming the rear ranks of the phalanx to add 
extra weight and to cover any gaps caused by the fighting. 
32. Arr. 2.8.3. 
33. Cf. Strabo 14.3.18; Polyb. 12.17.7; cf. Walbank, Polý( . ybiavll, pp. 
368-9, - 
cf. Parke, Afeim, p. 189. 
34. Diod. 19.9ff; Nepos Eum. 8.5. 
35. Diod. 19.28; for the attack cf. 19.30. There is considerable debate as to 
the lineage of the various zvgymspidunits of the Hellenistic period and 
their relationship to Alexander's hypvpis& For information, cf. 
Bikerman, lasdls, pp. 52-3; 64-5; for references to later argympi&and 
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hypaspistscf. Polyb. 7.16.2; 16.18.7. ', -30.25.7; ýPoly'ae'nus": 4.9. -3,,, Liýý., ý'- 
37.40.7. Diodorus mentions at: the. ', Bat'ti'e". 'ofý(. aifiel"ý,, F6ii-" 
the Nile 19.30. Tam, H-4fjyD,, 1'0", ', -s'P` ec b late's"', . as ý'to,. 'th6"-', 'ý"p'o's-s'ibl'e' P. 
incorporation of Orientals in these Successor hjMgpisb: ýrgrmspid 
units. 
36. Lucian Zeztds 8- 11; cf. Bar-Kochva, SA. p. 63; FCFS, NS 19,1973, 
pp. 3-5. 
37. Polyb. 2.65.2, cf. Walbank, Fv1yjbixg 1.274. where he compares these 
troops to Alexander's hyjwspi5&, - cf Walbank Milip. pp. 291-3. Cf. in 
addition Launey 1.12 n7. 
38. Polyb. 2.66.5; Plut. Philop 6ff; Cleom. 28ff. Plutarch makes no 
reference to the special combination. Walbank, Fo. Ivbiog 1, p. 280 - 
peltasts are used with Illyrians at Thermum, cf. Polyb. 5.13.5-6, 
Walbank sees these troops as, however, phalanx. So too Kromayer- 
Veith pp. 124 n-3; 133. These infantry are effected by the controversy 
over Alexander's hvpaspiso cL note 37 above. M. Daubies, RU, 20, 
1971, p. 683ff for role of the Megalopolitans and Achaeans. 
39. Polyb. 2.66.5; cf. Walbank, PoZ, (vbia5; 1. p. 280; PhtYip., p. 293; 
Kromayer. BCH, 1910, p. 251-2. See Polyb. 2.66.6 for the deployment 
of the support troops. Pritchett, SAtSesz; 7 Ancieat Greek FqpqSr,? phy, 
Vol. 1,1965, p. 69 discusses the deployment of this flank in detai. l. 
I Kromayer, AS, 1. p. 230ff has a reconstruction. 
40. Polyb. 2.68.4-5. 
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41. Polyb. 4.64. 
42. Walbank, FhiF)7, p. 290ff; cf. Livy 44.41.1-2. Tam, 11UND, p. 7 opposes 
E. Mcyer, Berhi? SB, 1909, pp. 794-8 = XlSchrilleat Halle, 1924,11, 
p. 483ff, who identifies these troops as the leucaspidphalanx. Feyel, RA, 
2,1935, pp. 63ff notes that Philip had more 4ýýwspislsthan Alexander. 
For a land grant to a hypuspist cf. Polyb. 18.33.1-7; Diod. 30.11; 
Wells, AJA, 42,1938, p. 252. Griffith 1981, p. 319 sees these 1tva7spAts 
as peltasts. They are part of the phalanx at Pydna, cf. Meyer qptcil; 
Kromayer, AS, 11, p. 310ff; De Sanctis, "Sellasia", RePAII? sInda dell' 
A, abichita, 1927, pp. 489-91. Walbank, Fhilia, p. 293 on Polyb. 5.23.4 
says they are not much lighter than the phalanx. Demetrius used such 
troops against Pyrrhus, cf. Plut. Fyir24- 
43. Polyb. 4.67. 
44. Polyb. 4.67. 
45. Polyb. 4.75ff; 5.8fff. 
46. Polyb. 5.13. 
47. Polyb. 4.80. 
48. Livy 31.36.1. 
49. Polyb. 10.42. 
50. Polyb. 8.13-14. 
51. Polyb. 5.23; note in the Jewish Rule of War Book VI "peltasts had only 
seven javelins". cf. G. Vermes, The DIwd Se,? Scrolls 67 Bqglish, 
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'. 131 " Loiidg'n',, 1962, 'p 
't I 
52. We have discussed the role of the phalanx in - this' battle', see 'above 
pp. 95ff. For numbers cf. Livy 33.4.4-5; 37.3.3-4; Launey 1.13 n. 3; at 
1. pp. 100-102 Launey notes that peltast numbers may be concealed in 
other contingents; Walbank, Philip, p-292. 
53. Indeed some authors see them as part of the phalanx, cf. Kromaycr, 
AS, 11, p. 310; Walbank, Philip, p. 292 n. 2. Walbank, Folybiag 2, p. 583 
on Polyb. 18.25.3 all of the heavy infantry who had not been 
incorporated into the phalanx charged. This is an extension of the 
h, v, wsp, &Idebate, however even in Alexander's time the mze4vý-oiwere 
distinct from the hv)usvistg cf. Aff. 4.23.1. 
N, 
54. CL Polyb.. 18.24.8; Walbank, Folvbiag 2. p. 582 discusses this 
manoeuvre with reference to the phalanx only. 
55. Livy 42.51AS; cf. 31.36.1; 38.5.11. Note that 2,000 were picked troops, 
cf. 42.51.4, the agema Cf. Polyb. 5.65.2; 84- 7; Aff. 2.8.3; 3.11.9. Livy 
42-51.5 has them in two chikrchie. % Cf. Briscoe, Commw4wy ow Livy, 
p. 142; Launey, 1, pp. 100-2. 
56. Hammond, JIN, 104,1984, map 3, p. 40. 
57. Livy 44.41.2. 
58. Plut. Aem. PauII8.3-4. 
59. Hammond, opcil, p. 45; cf. Plut. Aem. Rayl 19.1. distinguishes them 
from the leucaspidesand ch,? Ajspideg Hammond, qacit. p. 46 includes 
385 
the'aiemajn the,, pike fo6nati6njor the, positiow. ofl, the. pe'ltasts If 
Pritchdt, opcit, Vol. 4, "p. 162;.. Kromaym,, SMLýkcý7k-i 
Abteilung 10, -. Leipzig. 1923, p. 335-6; P.. Melo'ni, "Peirseo", Aiýwjli&ll' 
Universila & Caglimi 20,195ý,. p. 394. NValbank, Polybiag 3, p. 388 
, gema as picked 
troops; cf. Plut. Aem. Fav, 118.3.4; Livy 44.41.1 has the ? 
these men were separate from the phalanx, see also Kromayer. AS, 2, 
pp. 335-- 6. E. Meyer, KISchr-2, p. 486 n. 3; Tam, HMjVD, p. 17: the 
leuc,? spides are the &e= and, futhermore, they are peltasts; contra 
Kromayer, AS, 4, pp. 606-8. Polybios consistently calls Antigonid guard 
infantry hvpupistsor peltasts, some scholars use this evidence to argue 
that the Ptolemaic guard infantry. the &em,?, were also peltasts, cf. 
Griffith, Aferm. pp. 1 19,319; Walbank, FhiF, 4 pp. 292-3. For Antigonid 
h., Vpup. isfscf. Feyel, RA, 2,1935, p. 63-4: W. Heckel, Symb Oslo., '57, 
1982, pp. 55-7. 
60. Livy 44.41.2. 
61. Plut. Aem. Pau118.4 
62. Livy 42.51.4. 
63. Plut. Aem. PjLdl8.3. 
64. Plut. Aem. Fiv, 121.3. 
65. For peltasts cf. Polyb. 5.65.2: 5.82; 5.84.9. For ?, Werna cf. Polyb. 5.65.2; 
5.82: 5.84.7. Cf. Griffith, Aferm, p. 118: Walbank, Pblvbios, 2. 
pp. 590-1 who has the peltasts become the Macedonian peltasts, cf. 
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POlyb. 15.25.3. Scholars are confused as to the' tactical'role, of the- 
, gema 
Lesquier p. 14; Droysen pp. 110; 116 they were regulpr,, lijýhi 
I 
infantry, ie. pvl'oi, and that they carried the equipment of Alexander's 
h, vjvspist% Laun6y, 1, pp. 100-2; 314 saw them as, peltasts, but 
recognised the problems surrounding the reequipment and training of 
the Ptolemaic army before the campaign. Picked troops cf. Meyer, Dvr 
ffeerwesen de. - Roleimmr undRomer, P. 64 'n. 214; contra W. Schubart, 
Qv=sdowes de rubas mililmibas, qa, 71es faej7; 7t regwo Largidmis, Di ss. 
Breslau, 1900, pp. 51ff; 59; Bouche-Leclerq p. 9 n. 2. Droysen pp. 16-17. 
Meyer, op. cit pp. 7; 64; 86-7. they are the link between the cavalry 
and the phalanx. For the destruction of the .7 . ge=at 
Raphia cf. Polyb. 
584.9; Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 136. For numbers of &em.? at Raphia cf. 
Launey, 1, pp. 100-2; 197,314. Bickerman, Ins, 62s, p. 68 gives the total 
peltast forces as 11,000 for the Ptolemies, 27,000 for the Seleucids. 
66. Polyb. 5.82. lff. 
67. Polyb. 84.9. 
68. It is clear that Alexander's hywspisfs changed their title to ? Wr&vpidk, 
cf. Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 58; Spendel, Unter, pp. 35-47; BerVe p. 128; 
Tam, Alex., 11 pp. 116-118; 151-2; 153 n. 3; JHS, 31,1941, p. 173; 
Walbank, Fhih, ýp., p292: Griffith, Mercs., p. 319; Mihis, Hist, 20,1971, 
pp-186-96; cf. Diod. 17.57.2. Seleucid aW1zLvpidsare affected by both 
the hywsaistargurnent and the parallels drawn between Antigonid and 
other guard units, cf. Walbank, FoZyMos, 2. p. 608 on Polyb. 5.79.4; cf. 
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also Livy 37.40.7; also Polyb. 30.25.5 for the, - Daphnai pande. 
v Bar-Kochva, SA, pp. 139ff; 58ff, the Selcu'cid a Ri"hia, 71 rffm, . 
iTI ids p 
were phalangites. 
69. Polybios' account is not very useful on this point. At 5.84.9 he tells us 
how the Greek mercenaries fell on the .7 , gema and peltasts. 
The 
mercenaries numbered some 5,000 men. Cf. Polyb. 5.79.9; 82.10; 
Walbank, Pol, Mios, 2, p. 614. 
70. Polyb. 10.29. lff. 
71. Thora&v, cf. Polyb. 11.11.4ff; 11.16.1; 4.12.3ff; Plut. F/m7qa9. lff; 
Polyacn. 6.4.3; Paus. 8.50.1. Cf. Griffith, FCFS, 4,1956, who sees these 
troops as part of the phalanx, obviously note the case of the Elburz 
crossing. For the thimeog an oval shield used by Thracians, see 
Plut. Aem. F=115-18; cf. P. F. Stary, "Ursprung aus Ansbreitung der 
einsenzeithichen ovalshielde mit spindel fosmigen Schildbuchel. ", 
Cerma&. 7,59,1981, pp. 287-306 for the use of this shield in northern 
EuroPe. This type of shield can be found on the Aernifius PauHus 
monument, probably in the hands of a Roman. For the Sidon example 
cf. G. Mendel, ataloWme des sculplzwesdesmusees O&ommjs volmme 
1,1912, pp-258; 264ff no. 105; P. Perdrizet, R, 4,4th ser., 3,1903, 
p-234; L. Robert, BCH, 1935, p. 418; Bickerman, Ansdls, pp. 89-93; 
McDowell, Ob,, ýcIsIromSeIevci,?, 1935, p. 110; M. Andronicus, "Deux 
steles funeraines grecques de Vergina. ", BCH, 79,1955, p. 87-101. esp. 
fig-2. Bickerman, qptcit, calls the shield a pelle. Perdrizet, op. cit, a 
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scalum. The '&ýviare 162, 
n. 2; Bar-Kochya, ýA 'nIf ", "u, ., arg es, a ic . Pý 
No th' ,,,, ', 4, `p-,, l4,4, *I' te' at 
this troop-type was common in., i Sý16ucidie, rvice the were' used: býjhe, 
rebel Molon, Polyb. 5.53. For a reconstruction of the fhoiahýles cf. D. 
Head, Ann ies of the Afacedoi z 47n and Fan ic I Vars, 19 8 2, p p. 114 - 5, 
fig. 42. For a thureophoros cf. Ilead, op. cit, p. 1 14 fig. 41; I Warry, . 
Mar&re z'a -the Clamical Morld, Lbridon, - 1980, p. 67. 
72. Polyb. 10.49ff. Cf. Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 10 on Just. 41.5.7 who has 
100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry present. Cf. N. C. Debevoise, 
Hislary of ParlHj, p. 17 n. 69; P. Pedech, REA, 60.1958,17 n. 1. 
73. Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 62-3; cf. p. 63 for the equipment arguments that 
suffound the Seleucid ar&r,? spids, - see also note 68. 
74. Cf. Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 63; 161-2; Kromayer, AS, 11.51-3. Livy 36.18.5; 
App. Sjr. 18. For numbers cf. Livy 35.43.6-, App. S . 12,10,000 infantry 
and 500 cavalry. Note that Roman veliles would have opposed the 
Seleucid screen, L. Keppie, The Afab; 7g ollhe Romua Armtr, London, 
1984, pp. 33; 39; cf. Livy 24.4. 
75. App. SXrl8. 
76. LivY 36.17.2. 
77. Livy 37.40.14. 
78. App. Syr35. 
79. For problems surrounding the numbers of peltasts at Magnesia cf. 
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'ýYýo "h p . 8-9., Ki6ip eF 
9 ii' 1bý. 2;, Ba c va, SA, 
,y.! 
"AS, 11 `0ý. p 
80. Cf.. Griffit4,4feim, p. 80ff; Launey, 1,0.20P n. 2; `. 1G. Ix2 LIALP? -'40'. p 
The'n"tar'y'Camp'"aigns, of thiý state'were little iiiore' thaý "raidý',, Cf. 
Walbahk, ' Folybios, 1. p. 460; Lucian Dialfffort 13.2; 15.1; Livy 
33.3.13. Note Ptolemaic Egypt supplied the Aetolian League with 
6,000 pelle, Polyb. 22.9. 
81. Plut. Philop% Paus. 8.50. lff. 
82. Cf. Launey, 1, p. 397; Fieberger, R4 2.1.1072-3; G. Kazarau in CAH 
VIII, p. 545. 
83. PolybAllff; cf. Walbank, Folvbim, 2. p. 461. Pritchett, Creel 
TopoSr, aphy, vol. 4, p. 120ff, discusses this battle in detail. See also 
Geisau, R4 sy. Kaphy(i)a(i) col. 1896-9; Leake, Aforea, 3.125; Launey, 
1, p. 415; Griffith, Afe=, pp. 104; 252 n. 12. - 
84. Note 71 above discusses this troop type. See in addition Launey, 1, 
pp. 103 n. 2; 187; 240; 415; Polyb. 4.12.3; 11.11.4; cf. 10.29. For troops 
in the Achaean army equipped with the henzithomkes cf. 10 ix. 2; cf. 
Launey. 1. p. 200; Snodgrass, AAG, p. 72.11. Russell Robinson, The 
Almouroffmfiviial Rome, London, 1975, p. 16, cites the Sidon frieze, 
he identifies this soldier as a Galatian mercenary or perhapi a Roman 
legionary. 
85. Polyb. 11.11.4; cf. Walbank, Folybiotg 2, p. 285 who sees them as 
neither phalanx nor fight troops. Cf. Launey, 1, p. 415. II Note these 
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Ir6o 'were" deý! oj4'aiid ." uiid: PluC., PWOO. 
general studies on" the' battle see WM býnk. `, F 
Pritchett, Fqpqpý `. 66ff., "1Kro-imyir., * AS, ' It 'pp. 29' 7ff 'vbl. 4,, po 
supplies a map in 'addition, it is'useful to note from this that the 
thomEW were not necessarily'on, the same level as the phalanx. The 
thomli&imay have been behind other troops, including the phalanx 
given --; an - extreme-argument, cf. -Walb. ank-op. ciL; Kromayer, "AS, 1'. 
pp. 295-6. 
86. Livy 37.39.9; Appian Syr3l. Launey, 1. pp. 140-1; note that Livy 
commonly calls these troops c,? e1m&, * whereas Appian uses peltast. Did 
Achaean peltasts carry the lhvreos? Cf. Plut. Philop. 9; Paus. 8.50; cf. 
Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 166-9. Livy has these troops deal with the Seleucid 
chariots, Appian places them behind the Italians. 
87. Beloch, Klio, 6,1906, pp. 34-51; Feyel, Pol . ybe et 
lhistoire de-ja 
Beo, ffe, Paris, 1942, pp. 213ff; SM 9.46 11.14: 49 IM: Launey, 1, 
pp. 151; 157; 159; 160; 240; 262; 499 (n. 20; 508; 534 (n. 3); 888; cf. 
SEG. 354; 355; AG7.3087,11.16- 130,2716 Cf. Launey, 1, p. 262 for 
widespread adoption of this troop type. 
88. Cf. Coussin, Insh2s, p. 76; Launey, 1. p. 219 n. 2; Bicken-nan, Zwlils, 
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391 
the Sidon friezes cf. L. Robert, BC11, lix, 1935, pp. 428ff;. BCII'-,., ix.., 
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pp. 435-93, cf. - especially p. 490 and fig.. -here the soldier-is identified as-- 
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93. Cf. Head, opcit pp. 120-1; figs 52 and 53. 
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15. Greek, a'yxvo'xq, Latin, amewlam-cf. Gardinier, qpcit, pp. 249ff; Harris, 
: op. cit, p. 28. pl. 11; Nis Johanson, Ada Archgeologiv, 1960, p. 130, 
fig. 3.7 
16. Gardiner, o pcit, pl. XX. 
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in Ancient Gr'eece". Greelr HeiiZ. &g. 1, part 3,1964, pp. 102ff; "The 
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22. P. E. Klopsteg, "Physics of bows and affows", Amejimv loum, 71 ol* 
395 
Phymks 2, no. 4,, 1943, pp. 178ff. 
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London, 1980, p. 84; D. Head, Annýesiwd Emmies of the Akeedonim 
andFmaýc Wars, Sussex, 1982, p. 137, figs. 87,90. 
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51. Polyb. 18.19ff; Livy 33.7ff; cf. Plut. Flam. 4., 
52. Polyb. 2.69. 
397 
53. App. Syrl9. 
54. Cynoscephalae, Polyb. 18.24.8; Livy 33.8-, cf. Kromayer, AS, 2, p. 82; 
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Meurig-Davis, "Elephant tactics", CQ, n. s. 1, pp. 15.1-5. 
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Afadm, 1905, pl. vi; Rostovtzeff, SEHIIIV. p. 373, pl. xliv. 
28. Bickerman, las&s, p. 93; 1. Vendikov and T. Gerrasimov, Thr.? cii, 7 Art 
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45. Cf. note 39 above, especially Launey. 
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53. Xen. AnaltI. 8.7; Cjr. 6.1.50-51; 7.81.2; also cf. Julius Valerius 1.53; 
Propertius 3.12.11-12; Vergil Ae, 7.11.76ff. Tam. . 1IMND, p. 
7 3; 
Bar-Kochva, SA, p-74, it was this Oriental influence that led to the 
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70. 
59. Tam, HMND, pp. 77-8; Strabo 11.525; Hrd. 3.106; Bickerman, lizals. 
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bury, op-cit p. 114; Plut. Luc. 28. 
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1956, pp. 75ff; P. Medinger, T'Are Turquois et Les Arches Parthes a la 
- 
bataille 
-de Carrhe. 
', - RerArch., Vol. 11,6th Ser., 1933, pp. 227-234; 
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, 4.1,4,1943,47,2ndSer., pp. 174-182; Hrd. 4.46,70,127; Tam, HMM, 
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A, gure Ware, pp. 96-7. 
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16.18.7; Livy 35.20; I. L. Merker, 'The Ancient Kindon of Paionia. ', 
"Im Soudies, 6,1965, p. 45. 
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p. 167; Tam. Alex., 1, pp. 155-8,160,162, quoting Aff. 6.14.4; Lock, 
Aimy., pp. 36-47; Momigliano, Athem 13, p. 11; Bosworth, HSCF, 81, 
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Arr. 3.11.8: 3.27.4; 4.22.7.23.1,24.1: Lock, AiNly., pp. 68ff: Tam, 
Alex, II, p. 161: Droysen, Uale. -, p. 23. Kromayer-Veith p. 130 note 
hi, qwrch is a common Greek cavalry officer, cf. Polyb. 10.23.4: 20.5.8: 
22.15; Livy 37.11; Thuc. 4.72.4 Arist.. 41h. Pol6l. 4; Fo18.94; 
Xen. Hipp. 3.6.11. For Ptolemiac numbered Hppwchiescf. Kromayer- 
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Veith p. 127. Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 106 on Polyb. 10.21.3; '' 18.. 19.9 a 
chilarchy is two hipwrcHesof 512 men. 
85. Aff. 3.27A, 29; 4.24; Diod. 17.65.1; Lock, Armtr., pp. 62,68ff; Beloch 1, 
p. 106 n. l. For political motive cf. Brunt, MS, 83, pp. 29,31; Tam, 
Alex., 11,161. Note the ile is stiH used, Lock, Arm *pp. 69,82 based ýV' 
ptcil; Griffith, JHS, 83, p. 73 n. 16 believed on Aff. 6.21.3. Tam, q 
division into hecatowy-m cf. Lock, AMýY, p. 83. Two lochoiper ile in 
the reform, cf. Kromayer-Veith p. 100; Droysen, Valers, p. 23. 
86. For tactical/strategic motive cf. Lock, AiMtr., pp. 70-2. 
87. Arr. 4.16.2ff. 
88. Polyb. 10.22. 
89. Lesquier, lastits, pp. 12ff. 
90. Ascl. 7.10; Ael-20.1; Arr. T. T18. 
.. 
91. Droysen, Unlers, p. 23 a cavalry command; Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 106; cf. 
Polyb. 10.21.3; 18.19.9; Tam, Alex., II, p. 161; Kromayer-Veith 
pp. 127ff; Walbank, Folybim; II, p. 227; Lort- Serignan p. 27. Lesquier 
p. 88 on Polyb. 5.63.5 a 700 strong Ptolemic hippamhv. CAH, VII, 
p. 170. Feyel, Folvb, pp. 213ff quoting AG. VII. 3087, argues for third 
century Boeotian hoparchywith AWas lower organisational level; cf. 
Kromayer-Veith p. 66- The 1.000 strong hippawAy is common in 
modem works, cf. Bar-Kochva, SA p. 73 on Polyb. 30.25.8; Tam, 
Alex., 11, pp. 161ff; Rustow-Kochly p. 255; cf. Aff. 4.24.1; 5.13.4; 6.21.3. 
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Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 68 based on Livy 37.40.6,10; App. Sýrr32; 
Polyb. 30.25.8 believes Seleucid units fought in many of their greatest 
battles organised in 1,000s; cf. E. Gatilli, 'Raphia, 217BCE. Revisited. % 
SCI, 3,1976, p. 52. Bikerman, Ins, 66-, p. 52 for 2,000 strong Seleucid 
guard cavalry, pp. 64,94 that Seleucid used hipparcSescf. Rostovtzeff, 
REA, 1931, p. 12; Phelgon 257 fr. 36C3; cf Minns, AIS, 25,1915, p. 31 
for'thd-Avroman parchrrfent. Griffith, Afeim, chap. VII for Pergamene 
use of hipparchies. 
92. Lochoi, Ascl. 2; Arr. FT10.1; Ael. 4.1-3; 5.1-2; dilochol. Ascl. 2.8; 9.1-4; 
Arr-FT10.1; Tam, Alex., 11, p. 100; Lock, Anny, pp. 57ff, 62; Beloch 1, 
p. 100, n. 1; Griffith, JHS, 1963, pp. 68ff. Tam, Aler., 11, p. 161; 
Bar-Kochva, SA pp. 166ff an helalomsý of 100 men based on 
Arr. 6.27.6. Rustow-Kochly pp. 252,255,250 men. Spendel, Ulilers, 
p. 8; Kromayer-Veith p. 103 half an ile, cf. Arr. 3.16.11. A unit of 
manoeuvre Polyb. 10.23.4. On Arr. 6.27.6 cf. Bosworth, Comm. on Arr, 
p. 320; Curt. 5.2.9. Motive for introduction cf. Tam, Alex., p. 160. Lock, 
Army., pp. 62ff for relationship to Ae. Lesquier p. 91 in the Ptolemaic 
army a lochosis a sub-division of an Ae; cf Wilken, Alex., p. 144 on 
Arr. T.. T12.3. Droysen pp. 60,67,81,110, in the Antigonid army the 
lochos only appears as an infantry unit. The Ie&jwhjy cf. Bosworth, 
Comm. ow Am, p. 376 on Arr. 3.18.15; Lock, Aimýv, pp. 64ff; Plaumann 
p. 66 equals two Aviand links its introduction to the Aochý. i refornis; 
Berve 1, pp. 106 n. 4; 107 n. 2 quotes the Sudia believing there to be four 
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units in this formation, 'cf. Aff. F. TIO. l where a letrarýlý, e qtýalifoui- 
an in antry fonnation. 
93. Poly b. 10.23.4-7. 
94. Polyb. 10.9.21,21.3,23.4.: 18.19.9; Plut. Phil7.3: Livy 35.7; Walbank, 
Fblybio. g 11, pp. 227,573,580,10 Iww.? e equal 300 men; cf. Kromayer, 
AS, 11,1 p. 79, n. 2. Kromayer- Veith p. 138, smallest tactical unit; 
Lesqieur p. 90 equal to a turmwe or 80 men; Brunt, JHS, 1963, 
pp. 27-44. 
95. Polyb. 10.29. 
96. Polyb. 2.32.6; 18.25,28.10 refers to a small formation like a Roman 
maniple. 
97. Arr. 7.23.3; cf. Droysen, VvIers, p. 14; Lesquier p. 91 on FNiAl. 30, 
11.13e and P. Febt, 107, col. 11,1.1; Xen. Cjr. 2.1 a cavalry unit; 
Polyb. 6.25.2 for a Roman dewjion. 
98. Lock, Armýv, p. 62. 
99. Polyb. 5.65ff; Diod. 19.83. 
100. Kromayer-Veith p. 104, n. 3; Rustow-Kochly p. 255; Droysen, Unlem, 
P-23: Aff. 7.6.3. 
101. Seleucid, Bar-Kochva, SA, p. 75 n. 73-5: Edson, CF, 53,1958, p. 153-, 
Bevan, House of Seleucus, 1, p. 325; Minns, JHS. 25,1915, pp. 22ff. 
Ptolemaic, E. Van't Dack, JJF, 29,1983, p. 89; Meyer p. 36ff; Griffith, 
Afercs., pp. 110ff; Lesquier pp. 12ff, Appendix I pp. 291ff. 
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102. Markle, AJ, 4,1977, p. 338beneved. cavatry couId: b ie'ýýi p ha Ia nx,, h, 6 t e, _-, 
"ter. ' A'ýýf. ' ý'-A`T. T. -46.6, rec M"' he contradicts himself a paje': Ia 0 
p. cavalry could not break -infantr ýNote Le y uier, * F Droysen 
pp. 153-4 who believed cavalry dirqini'shed in importance at the end of 
the second century. 
103. Kromayer-Veith p. 138. The question as to whether the Roman army 
inherited its organisation from the Hellenistic armies is addressed by 
A. K. Lawson, 'Zu Den Rornischen Reiterspielen. '. Archvolosisches 
KojTaW, 7de, 7zbl-? IZ, 10,1980, pp. 173-184. 
104. Kromayer-Veith p. 138 n. 3. 
105. Ascl. 7.2; . 4; Ael. 18.1-3; 18.5-9; Aff. T. T. 16.6-8,9-14 it allows a 
formation to hit the enemy in an ordered mass; cf. Xen. ffipp. 3.9. Cf. 
Lort-Serignan p. 25. 
106. Xen. HeM. 4.13; Hipa2.2-4; cf. Cjr. 2.2.30; 8.1.14; Polyb. 12.18.3; cf. 
Kromayer-Veith p. 138 accept eight deep as the standard. Note these 
fonnations are deep by the standards of later periods, cf. C. Duffy, The 
jWh%zr, YAwjiej7ce hzthe Ase ofReason London, 1987, p. 222. 
107. Aff. 1.15. lff. 
108. Polyb. 12.18.8; cf. Walbank, PolyHa%II. p. 370; Kromayer Veith p. 138. 
109. Ascl. 7.2; cf. 7.5ff for how the formation was assembled; Ael. 19.1.3; 
18.1-3 for assembly; Arr. F. F16. lff; 17.1 for assembly; cf. Marsden, 
ampaisw of Gamwmefj, Liverpool. 1964, pp. 69-70; Lort-Scrignan 
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P. 25. 
110. Aff. Anabl. 15.7; Ascl. 7.2-3. -6-7; Arr. TT. 16.1.6-8-,, 17.3; Ael. 18.1,4; 
ptcif, pp. 69,72-3; A. M. Devine,. 19.5: 40.2-4,6. Cf' Marsden, o 
EMBOAON -a Study in Tactical Terminology. ' Fhoenir, 27, no. 3, 
1983, pp. 201-217; Lort- Serignan p. 25; p. 85 where he argues the 
formation pierces the enemy line. Note most modem authorities accept 
this formation was standard in the Hellenistic period. 
111. Arr. 3.14.2; cf. Devine, qpxiý for a comprehensive discussion of this 
problem. 
112. Xen. Hipja3.4.13-14 for hand-to-hand: 3.13-14 for feigned flight. this 
interpretation is not confined to the Classical period, cf. Duffy, opcil, 
p. 224-5. Xen. HeII3.4.13-14. 
113. Xen. Hipplll. 
114. Kromayer-Veith p. 96, Maceddnian. horse had, always been a potent 
force, cf. Markle, AM, 1977, p-339 for ability to break infantry. That 
the tactic originated from war with the Tribaflians cf. Markle, AJA. 
1978, p. 49 1. Hammond and Griffith qptcil pp. 413ff discuss the 
motives for the introduction of the wedge. 
115. Markle, 41A. 1977, p. 339 (note his contradiction p. 340); Lort-Serignan 
pp. 85,110; contra Anderson, A GH, p. 151 n. 64. 
116. Arr. 1.14. lff. 
117. cf. note 112 above. 
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118. Aff. ET16.6-8,9-14. 
119. See above at note 109 for how the rhomboid was formed, a wedge was 
simply half a rhomboid. 
120. Ascl. 3.1; cf. Ael. 10; Arr. Anab7.23.3. 
121. Once more refer to note 109 above for an indication of the depth of the 
wedge, cf. also Marsden, optcit, pp. ý4ff. 
122. Kromayer-Veith p. 116; Tam, HUAD, p. 64; Marsden, op. cit, 68ff. 
Based on Arr. 3.8ff; cf. 3.13-14 for detail; cf. Bosworth, optcl? 
pp. 288ff; cf. Diod. 17.57. lff; Curt. 4.15.12ff. 
123. Polyb. 12.18.1; cf. Walbank, FhlvbicL% II, p. 369 who assumes a 
fonnation of wedges, refers to Ascl. 7.. 3; Arr. FF16.6. Kromayer-Veith 
p. 359 for comparison to manipular formation. 
124. Polyb. 10.23; cf. also Xen. Hipa3.4.13-14 on how this formation might 
have manoeuvred. The writer ýelieves Polybios used oulmous here 
simply because of the small number of horse in Greek poleidleague 
armies, for eastern armies one could substitute Am. ' 
125. Kromayer-Veith p. 119 for deployment in general, p. 92 for deployment 
on flanks. For Mantinea cf. Thuc. 5.67; Delion, 4.94. 
126. Sellasia, cf. Polyb. 2.65-66,67,69; Plut. Phil6; Kromayer, AS, 1. pp. 22, 
237; Pritchett, Topofflvphy, vol. 4, p. 68. Magnesia, cf. Livy 37.40.5-6: 
Just. 36.8.6; Bar-Kochva, SA. p. 170. Tam, HMND, p. 33 for cavalry 
dominance in tlýs period. 
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127. 'Gaiý, -Diod. 19.83; cf. Diod. 18.30; Plut. Eum. 4.6-7 for'sirifflar tictics in 
the battle against Craterus. 
128. Diod. 19.83. 
129. Diod. 19.82. Note it was intended that the weaker wing wait until the 
stronger was victorious before it fought. 
130. Arr. 3.11.8ff; 12.2; Curt. 4. 
-13ff. 
131. Diod. 19.27ff, 29. 
132. Tam, HMND, pp. 67-8. 
133. lpsus, Plut. Dem. 29; Diod. 21.1.1; Raphia, Polyb. 5.84-5; cf. Tam, 
HA fND, p. 6 8. 
134. Granicus, Arr. 1.14.7; Polyaen. 4.3.16; cf. Judeich, Kho, 8, pp. 394-5; 
Raphia, Polyb. 5.82; cf. Walbank, Folý (ybicw, 1, p. 611; Griffith, JHS, 77, 
1947, p. 77 n. 3; cf. Ael. 4; Gabiene, Diod. 18.28; Gaza, Diod. 18.82. 
135. Polyb. 5.82.8-9; cf. Walbank, Fol, (jvbiog 1. p. 611; Griffith, op-cit, p. 77 
n. 3; on Ael. 31.4; nb. could have been the Ae bzililre, cf. Polyb. 5.84.1. 
136. Arr. 1.14.7; Polyaen. 4.3-16; may also have been used in conjunction 
with infantry, cf. Aff. 3.11.8; Diod. 17.57.1; Curt. 4.13.26, cf. note 116 
above for modem opinions that Hellenistic cavalry could break an 
infantry line. 
137. Raphia, Polyb. 5.84; Galilli, o ptc4 pp-95ff; Gaza, Diod. 19.83. 
138. Cf. above note 135. 
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139. Gabiene. - Diod. 19.28; Theiinopylae, App. Sjr20: Livy, 3§AýAl, ""' aza, y ., -., v 'd- 
Diod. 19.92. 
140. Bar-Kochya, SA, p. 69; Polyb. 5.85.12.; 10.49.7-13; 16.18.7; Livy 
37.40.6; App. Syr33; Diop. Hal. 20.1.4. 
g of Ep. iros, 141. Ascalon, Dion. Hal. 20.1: P. Garfouldas, Pj2Thus, jVn 
London, 1979, p. 389 n. 184; Panion, Polyb. 16.18.8; ' Bar-Kochva, SA, 
pp. 146ff, esp. p. 151: Axius river, Polyb. 10.49. 
142. Diod. 19.20. 
143. Polyb. 10-23.1-3; Kromayer-Veith p. 132 believed Hellenistic cavalry 
used standard organisation. 
144. Poly, 10.23.4ff; cf. Xen. ffipp3.9; Plut. Phi/7.3; Xen. Ilipp. 7.23-5; 
Hell. 7.1.21; Kromayer-Veitli p. 91, 
145. Polyb. 12.18.3. 
146. See above note 92. 
147. Polyb. 10.24.7; Loeb translation. 
148. Dion. Hal. 20.2.1-3., 
149. Curt. 3.11.13-15. 
150. Livy 31.35. 
151. Polyb. 10.49. 
152. Polyb. 10.23.8 
153. Ascl. 1.3. 
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154. Ael., 2.11-13. 
155. Aff. TF4.1-6. 
156. Hrd. 4.119-120; Xen. AnA3.3.10; E. Darko, "Influeneces , týýra-ru'einnes 
sur l'evolution de l'art nüEtaire des Grer-s, Romains et des 
Byzantins. By=býojz 1935, vol. 10, pp. 443- 469; for the Hellenistic 
period cf. pp. 443; 452-4; Darko discusses Arrian's references 
pertaining to Alexander employing Oriental horse archers; T. 
SuUmirski, "Les Archers a Cheval cavaleries legere des anciens. " 
Re we Intemaffonal D Aisloh-e AVffairrs, 195112,3, pp. 447-46 1; S. V. 
Kisseley, "Histoire Ancienne de la Siberies du Sud. Materiaux et 
Recherches. ", AibhasAmýje, 1951, pp. 169-189. 
157. Aff. 5.13.4. 
158. Diod. 19.30; cf. 19.27; the Paropanisadae and/or the Arachosians, note 
the reference to bow-armed elephant escorts. 
159. Raphia cf. Polyb. 5.79,82; Magnesia cf. Livy 36.40.80; cL 35.40.3 for 
tactics; 36.38.3; for their role cf. Bar-Kochva, SA. pp. 169ff; Kromayer, 
AS, p. 44. Dahae in general cf, Pliny M6.50. For the "Parthian shot" 
cf. P. Medinger, Varc turquois et les archers parthes a la bataille de 
Caffhes. ', Revae Archeolqgique, 1933,2. pp. 227-34; MI Rostovtzeff, 
'The Parthian Shot'. AJA, 1943, XLVII, pp. 174-87. 
160. Polyb. 4.8.10; cf. 4.14; cf. Walbank, Pol( . ybiag 
1, p. 457; Kromayer-Veith 
p. 138. 
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161. Livy 33.7.13. 
162. Polyb. 4.1 I ff. 
163. Polyb. 4.64. 
164. Livy 33.7.13; Polyb. 18.19ff. 
165. Livy 31.35. 
166. Aff. 1.12.7; 1.14.6; 3.7.7; 3.8.1; 3.20.1; cf. Diod. 17.17.4 for Thracian 
prodromol., 
167. Livy 31.35. 
168. Arr. T7.9.2; 35.6; 36.5; 40.1; 42; cf. R. W. Davies, "Cohortes 
Equitatae. ", HU, 1971,20, p752; A. K. Lawson, 'Zu Den Romischen 
Reiterspielen. '. Arrhvolqgisches Komspo, 7denzblW4 10.1980, pp. 173- 
184. 
169. Ael. 2.13; Aff. T. 72; 4.5ff. 
170. Livy 35.28.8-, Grifrith, Afercs, pp. 248-9; Kromayer-Veith p. 139; 
Martin, nvAlh, pp. 422-3; Larnmert, R4 2,1.519; P. WuHleumer, 
Farwle, Paris, 1939, pp. 187-8; Griffith, o pcit, p. 248 quotes the 
Skddmg cf. Aff. F. 72; Thuc. 5.57.2; Xen. He. 11 7.5.23; Diod. 19.29.2 for 
hampHppoi 
171. P. Gardner, The Tyfiff ofGreek Co, 6w, Cabridge, 1883, p. 421, pl. V, 
nos. 8 and 9. 
172. Launey 1, pp. 603-4; Kromayer-Veith p. 139. 
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-ý. ýp. 183ff; 'Gfiffttý, '--, 71. 173' 2 W6jjjjýrjjjjj,!, auney po. 60 ff 
0.247; 'd, -Polyaen. 4.2.1. KiomiýeF-, Y66ý'p. 139; Gýrf6uldas,, *irha% 
p. 303; cf,. 'Plut -. Fjýi 13;, Stiibbý'6.280; Di6d.:, 20-104 
174. Diod. 19.39.2; 42.2; cf. 19.29. 
175. Polyb. 16-18-2. 
-- 176.. Livy 
37.40.13. - .. 
177. Diod. 19.82.2. 
178. Plut. Cleom. 6.4; Fhilop. 16.4; Polyb. 4.73.7; 11.12.6-7; Livy 35.28.8,29; 
IG. 2. ii. 958 11.56 sqq.; 930.33; 961.34; IG. ii. 3.1218; /O. vii. 1.2466; 
IC. ix. 2.509; cf. Martin, CavAth pp. 422,418-23. 
179. Ascl. 7.11; Ael. 20.2; Aff. TT18.3. 
180. Launey 1, pp. 603ff and references. 
181. Polyaen. 3.7.1. 
182. Livy 35.29. L. 
183. Polyb. 11.12.6. 
184. Plut. Fht7lO; cf. Polyb. 11.13. 
185. B. Rubin, 'Kataphraktenreiterei im Lichte der Ausgrabangen. ', Hist, 
1955,4, pp. 264-283, see p. 265 for Hellenistic period. 0. Gamber, 
4 Kataphrakten, Clibanarier, Normannenreiter. ' larbud- der Kuns&&- 
tojischev smmnlang ii Wien, 1968,64, pp. 7-44; P. Jaeckel, 
'Pergamische Waffenreleifs. ', Waffen md Kastamekuride, 1965, 
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pp. 87ff: H., H. Russell Robinson, OjieaZ? l Afmour, pp. 12,17-18, rigs. 
9-11; A 1. Rostovtzeff, The Excavadons at Dura Europus, 6th Season, 
Yale, 1936, pp. 439ff; A-D. V. Bivar, 'Cavalry Equipment and Tactics 
on the Euphrates., Dumh-zdon Oaks Fafiers, no. 26,1972, pp. 273-291, 
figs 1-30; RE, 2479; Polyb. 30.25; 31.39; Walbank, Pol, ývbiag 111, 
pp. 142-3: Livy 37.40,48; 37.40; Amm. Marc. 24.6.8; 25.1.12. For the 
plewida, cf. P. 'Bernard, 'Une peice d'armure Perse sur un par.? 
monument Lycien. ' Sj7iz, 1964,41, pp. 195-212; Xen. ffel/6.4.1; 7.1.2; 
A, a,? bl. 8.6; Bq. 12.8. 
186. Ascl. 1.3; Arr. TF4.1; Ael. 2.11; cf. K. Keichle, Die lildik dvsRavias 
Animus - Bejid de Rom. -Germ. KOMM., 1964, pp. 24-5,87f f. 
187. Curt. 3.11.13ff; cf. Arr. 2.9. 
188. Aff. 3.13.4: cf. Diod. 17.53; 59.1ff; Bosworth, Comm. on Arr., p. 306; 
Marsden, 07mpaign ol*Gjupmela, pp. 43; 53f f. 
189. Polyb. 16.18ff; cf. Bar-Kochya, SA pp. 146,148,156. 
190. Livy 37.40.5-6,11; 42.2; App. Spr32-4; Justin 36.8.6; Bar- Kochva, 
SA pp. 74-5; 163ff; Kromayer, AS, p. 44. 
191. L. Keppie, TheAfj"7 of the Rom-an AFmy, London, 1984, pp. 38-9; 
Polyb. 18.30. 
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Not6 to'Chaptff 
-5 
V. D Hanson, The lVestem? Wqýv of Mar - AYjv&y B,? &Iei, 7 Clmicul 
pliles Oreem London, 1989, pp. 96ff; 135ff; J. F. Lazenby in Ho, - 7he 
Cl-? s5ic-? IB,? &IeExpejieRce, Ed. V. D. Hanson, London, 1991, pp. 87ff. 
2. Eparninondas et 71 cf Lazenby, Swr&aArmX, pp. 125ff; 151ff.; for the 
Nemea, opcit pp. 135ff 
3. Xen. Anab. 8. 
4. An 'inner flank' is essentially a flank created by the creation of a large 
gap in the line of battle. In effect a properly deployed anny has only 
two flanks. Once battle conunences, however, and bodies of troops 
manouevre then holes appear in the army formation. If the hole is large 
enough an enemy troops can pass through without fear of hinderance 
then two inner flanks are created. In the case of cavalry this is less 
important because they are usually moving at speed and usually 
attempting to break through the enemy line, hence they have the 
initiative and the enemy finds it difficult to complete any substantial 
envelopment of their formation. With infantry - such as a mji-w 
phalanx - however, the creation of an 'inner flank' is potentially fatal. 
This is not to say that armies of the Hellenistic, or indeed any, period 
should form up shoulder-to-shoulder, in many ways there need to be 
gaps between units and sub-units to allow for formation changes and 
movement without disorder - hence Polybios' recommendations for the 
formation of bodies of horse. It is the case, however, that any gaps be 
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smaU enough to be within - supporting range of either the troops in the 
main battleline or a reserve placed to the rear of the army. A general of 
the statue of Frederick the Great of Prussia wamed of the inadvertent 
creation of 'inner flanks', cf. quoted in Maude, F. L., Ca v, 71ry, - Its Fast 
London, 1903, p. 98, and Nosworthy, B., The A, 7.? Iomty of 
Victory, New York, 1992, p. 178. 
The ability of Republican Rome to raise vast numbers of legionaries is 
amply demonstrated by the Second Punic War, where at the height of 
the conflict she had a quarter of a million men under amis, cf. J. F. 
Lazenby, The Hamibwlic Mm, Warminster, 1978, pp. 233-235 and 
notes.. 
Polyb. 30.25.3. 
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S-urces. Bibli graphy ýnd Abbreviations 
Abbreviations, for periodical references follow the standard- set, ' by`tfiý. ` 
Cambjidge AmimtHislory, -those used for oft quoted books are noted inAhe 
appropriate place below. 
1. Abbreviations of Ancient Authors and Their-%rks-Used in 1hi Ihes 
Ael. Aelian, Fac6ca. 
Ael. VH. = Aelian, Vad.? Hisloiij. 
Anun-Mar. = Anunianus Marcellinus. 
Anacreon. 
Anaximenes. 
App. AFth = Appian, Mthidates. 
App. j%ozim. = Appian, Awica. 
App. Sjr. = Appian, Sj77iw. 
Arist. Birds= Aristophanes, Bir& 
Arist. A th. Pol = Aristotle, Consdfiidon of the A then&ns. 
Arist. Frag. = Aristotle, Fm,! gme'71j. 
Arist. Ecaa. = Aristotle, Oecommica. 
Arist. Pol = Aristotle, Poffbi7s 
Arr. = Arrian, Anw&vsý 
AmEct = Arrian, Order ofBa&le Against the Alaw. 
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A ff .TT=A rri an, Fechae Fochh?. 
Ascl. = Asclepiodotus. 
Athen. = Athenaeus. 
Caes. B. G. = Caesar, The OaMc Mir 
Curt. = Quintus Curtius Rufus. 
beim-ost. -= Dem*o-s'theiiis, Oly, 71hi.? cs. -- 
Diod. = Diodorus of Sicily. 
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